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


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ALAN CAIRNS and CYNTHIA WILLIAMS
Research Coordinators

The Politics of Gender, Ethnicity and Language in Canada

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*The Politics of Gender, Ethnicity and
Language in Canada*

This is Volume 34 in the series of studies commissioned as part of the research program of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada.

The studies contained in this volume reflect the views of their authors and do not imply endorsement by the Chairman or Commissioners.



The Politics of Gender, Ethnicity and Language in Canada

ALAN CAIRNS

AND

CYNTHIA WILLIAMS

Research Coordinators

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When the members of the Rowell-Sirois Commission began their collective task in 1937, very little was known about the evolution of the Canadian economy. What was known, moreover, had not been extensively analyzed by the slender cadre of social scientists of the day.

When we set out upon our task nearly 50 years later, we enjoyed a substantial advantage over our predecessors; we had a wealth of information. We inherited the work of scholars at universities across Canada and we had the benefit of the work of experts from private research institutes and publicly sponsored organizations such as the Ontario Economic Council and the Economic Council of Canada. Although there were still important gaps, our problem was not a shortage of information; it was to interrelate and integrate — to synthesize — the results of much of the information we already had.

The mandate of this Commission is unusually broad. It encompasses many of the fundamental policy issues expected to confront the people of Canada and their governments for the next several decades. The nature of the mandate also identified, in advance, the subject matter for much of the research and suggested the scope of enquiry and the need for vigorous efforts to interrelate and integrate the research disciplines. The resulting research program, therefore, is particularly noteworthy in three respects: along with original research studies, it includes survey papers which synthesize work already done in specialized fields; it avoids duplication of work which, in the judgment of the Canadian research community, has already been well done; and, considered as a whole, it is the most thorough examination of the Canadian economic, political and legal systems ever undertaken by an independent agency.

The Commission's research program was carried out under the joint

direction of three prominent and highly respected Canadian scholars: Dr. Ivan Bernier (*Law and Constitutional Issues*), Dr. Alan Cairns (*Politics and Institutions of Government*) and Dr. David C. Smith (*Economics*).

Dr. Ivan Bernier is Dean of the Faculty of Law at Laval University. Dr. Alan Cairns is former Head of the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia and, prior to joining the Commission, was William Lyon Mackenzie King Visiting Professor of Canadian Studies at Harvard University. Dr. David C. Smith, former Head of the Department of Economics at Queen's University in Kingston, is now Principal of that University. When Dr. Smith assumed his new responsibilities at Queen's in September 1984, he was succeeded by Dr. Kenneth Norrie of the University of Alberta and John Sargent of the federal Department of Finance, who together acted as Co-directors of Research for the concluding phase of the Economics research program.

I am confident that the efforts of the Research Directors, research coordinators and authors whose work appears in this and other volumes, have provided the community of Canadian scholars and policy makers with a series of publications that will continue to be of value for many years to come. And I hope that the value of the research program to Canadian scholarship will be enhanced by the fact that Commission research is being made available to interested readers in both English and French.

I extend my personal thanks, and that of my fellow Commissioners, to the Research Directors and those immediately associated with them in the Commission's research program. I also want to thank the members of the many research advisory groups whose counsel contributed so substantially to this undertaking.

DONALD S. MACDONALD



At its most general level, the Royal Commission's research program has examined how the Canadian political economy can better adapt to change. As a basis of enquiry, this question reflects our belief that the future will always take us partly by surprise. Our political, legal and economic institutions should therefore be flexible enough to accommodate surprises and yet solid enough to ensure that they help us meet our future goals. This theme of an adaptive political economy led us to explore the interdependencies between political, legal and economic systems and drew our research efforts in an interdisciplinary direction.

The sheer magnitude of the research output (more than 280 separate studies in 70+ volumes) as well as its disciplinary and ideological diversity have, however, made complete integration impossible and, we have concluded, undesirable. The research output as a whole brings varying perspectives and methodologies to the study of common problems and we therefore urge readers to look beyond their particular field of interest and to explore topics across disciplines.

The three research areas, — *Law and Constitutional Issues*, under Ivan Bernier; *Politics and Institutions of Government*, under Alan Cairns; and *Economics*, under David C. Smith (co-directed with Kenneth Norrie and John Sargent for the concluding phase of the research program) — were further divided into 19 sections headed by research coordinators.

The area *Law and Constitutional Issues* has been organized into five major sections headed by the research coordinators identified below.

- Law, Society and the Economy — *Ivan Bernier and Andrée Lajoie*
- The International Legal Environment — *John J. Quinn*
- The Canadian Economic Union — *Mark Krasnick*

- Harmonization of Laws in Canada — *Ronald C.C. Cuming*
- Institutional and Constitutional Arrangements — *Clare F. Beckton and A. Wayne MacKay*

Since law in its numerous manifestations is the most fundamental means of implementing state policy, it was necessary to investigate how and when law could be mobilized most effectively to address the problems raised by the Commission's mandate. Adopting a broad perspective, researchers examined Canada's legal system from the standpoint of how law evolves as a result of social, economic and political changes and how, in turn, law brings about changes in our social, economic and political conduct.

Within *Politics and Institutions of Government*, research has been organized into seven major sections.

- Canada and the International Political Economy — *Denis Stairs and Gilbert Winham*
- State and Society in the Modern Era — *Keith Banting*
- Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society — *Alan Cairns and Cynthia Williams*
- The Politics of Canadian Federalism — *Richard Simeon*
- Representative Institutions — *Peter Aucoin*
- The Politics of Economic Policy — *G. Bruce Doern*
- Industrial Policy — *André Blais*

This area examines a number of developments which have led Canadians to question their ability to govern themselves wisely and effectively. Many of these developments are not unique to Canada and a number of comparative studies canvass and assess how others have coped with similar problems. Within the context of the Canadian heritage of parliamentary government, federalism, a mixed economy, and a bilingual and multicultural society, the research also explores ways of rearranging the relationships of power and influence among institutions to restore and enhance the fundamental democratic principles of representativeness, responsiveness and accountability.

Economics research was organized into seven major sections.

- Macroeconomics — *John Sargent*
- Federalism and the Economic Union — *Kenneth Norrie*
- Industrial Structure — *Donald G. McFetridge*
- International Trade — *John Whalley*
- Income Distribution and Economic Security — *François Vaillancourt*
- Labour Markets and Labour Relations — *Craig Riddell*
- Economic Ideas and Social Issues — *David Laidler*

Economics research examines the allocation of Canada's human and other resources, the ways in which institutions and policies affect this

allocation, and the distribution of the gains from their use. It also considers the nature of economic development, the forces that shape our regional and industrial structure, and our economic interdependence with other countries. The thrust of the research in economics is to increase our comprehension of what determines our economic potential and how instruments of economic policy may move us closer to our future goals.

One section from each of the three research areas — The Canadian Economic Union, The Politics of Canadian Federalism, and Federalism and the Economic Union — have been blended into one unified research effort. Consequently, the volumes on Federalism and the Economic Union as well as the volume on The North are the results of an interdisciplinary research effort.

We owe a special debt to the research coordinators. Not only did they organize, assemble and analyze the many research studies and combine their major findings in overviews, but they also made substantial contributions to the Final Report. We wish to thank them for their performance, often under heavy pressure.

Unfortunately, space does not permit us to thank all members of the Commission staff individually. However, we are particularly grateful to the Chairman, The Hon. Donald S. Macdonald; the Commission's Executive Director, J. Gerald Godsoe; and the Director of Policy, Alan Nymark, all of whom were closely involved with the Research Program and played key roles in the contribution of Research to the Final Report. We wish to express our appreciation to the Commission's Administrative Advisor, Harry Stewart, for his guidance and advice, and to the Director of Publishing, Ed Matheson, who managed the research publication process. A special thanks to Jamie Benidickson, Policy Coordinator and Special Assistant to the Chairman, who played a valuable liaison role between Research and the Chairman and Commissioners. We are also grateful to our office administrator, Donna Stebbing, and to our secretarial staff, Monique Carpentier, Barbara Cowtan, Tina DeLuca, Françoise Guilbault and Marilyn Sheldon.

Finally, a well deserved thank you to our closest assistants: Jacques J.M. Shore, *Law and Constitutional Issues*; Cynthia Williams and her successor Karen Jackson, *Politics and Institutions of Government*; and I. Lilla Connidis, *Economics*. We appreciate not only their individual contribution to each research area, but also their cooperative contribution to the research program and the Commission.

IVAN BERNIER
ALAN CAIRNS
DAVID C. SMITH



This Royal Commission was asked to inquire into the future of Canada. The mandate addressed itself to the interaction of the political, constitutional, and economic systems. It directed us to analyze and report on the “appropriate institutional and constitutional arrangements to promote the liberty and well-being of individual Canadians” . . . as well as to focus on the conditions for promoting the economic union and the economic development of Canada.

The desirable future toward which the Commission worked presupposes acceptance by Canadians and their governments of the procedures, rules, and political institutions appropriate to that task. That acceptance is embedded in an evolving system of constitutional government which contains the terms on which Canadians have agreed to live with one another as members of a common community.

Conceptions of community, of what it means to be a Canadian, of how we define ourselves as a people, have undergone remarkable changes in the last half-century. The companion volume to this collection (*Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in Canada*) traced the recent and rapid emergence of rights-based conceptions of citizenship. The changes in conceptions of community described in this volume are logically and directly related to the evolution of rights. Every recognition of rights is accompanied by an altered conception of community. The reverse is also true — new conceptions of community and identity precipitate new notions of the rights of citizens.

Government programs, laws and activities are not only concerned with managing the economic well-being of citizens. By their actions governments also distribute and redistribute status and recognition to groups in society. Every enhancement of state activity increases the cost

to groups of exclusion from the symbolic order of the state. Ever conscious of this, citizen groups are becoming more insistent and more skillful in placing demands on the political agenda. New identities based on language, ethnicity, and gender, evoking powerful and emotional bonds of community among their members, develop a new significance for politicians. They cannot be ignored.

The essays in this collection, written from various disciplinary perspectives, focus on the efforts by both groups and governments to shape the distribution of status and power in Canada and the country's symbolic order. Sociologist Bernard Blishen reviews patterns of value change in Canada since Confederation and discusses the emergence of a "New Communalism" based largely on interests and issues of the postwar period. The other four essays focus on policy areas where efforts for inclusion in the symbolic order and a redefinition of the bonds and structure of community in Canada have been intense in recent years. Several of these essays also describe major efforts by particular groups to challenge the existing distribution of income, status and power in society. Sociologist Raymond Breton analyzes the federal policy of multiculturalism and the postwar transformation of the ethnosymbolic order in Canada. Cultural geographer Eric Waddell examines the divisive issue of language policy in Quebec and Canada. Political scientist Sandra Burt reviews the development of the women's movement in Canada since 1970 and recent issues that revitalized the movement. Political scientist Roger Gibbins and sociologist J. Rick Ponting assess the impact of proposals for aboriginal self-government on conceptions of citizenship and community in Canada.

Through their focus on the interrelationship of changing social values, citizen demands, and government actions, these essays enrich our understanding of the complex dialectic of state and society in Canada.

ALAN CAIRNS
CYNTHIA WILLIAMS



The issues in the volumes on Constitutionalism, Citizenship, and Society in Canada by their very nature demanded interdisciplinary research and reflection. The intellectual stimulation and reward for the editors of this interdisciplinary collaboration were immense. We gratefully acknowledge the patience and enthusiasm of the authors who contributed to this project. Regrettably, illness prevented Allan Moscovitch of the Carleton University School of Social Work from completing a paper on the welfare state in Canada for inclusion in these volumes.

In addition to the authors, the Research Advisory Group for this area of research included Dr. John Chenier, Policy Analyst, Secretary of State; Dr. Michael Ray, Professor, Department of Geography, Carleton University; and Dr. Frank Vallee, Professor Emeritus, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Carleton University. The comments and suggestions of members of this group on early drafts of these papers and on the formulation of issues in our overview paper helped improve these volumes. The papers have also benefited from comments and assessments of referees who must remain anonymous.

Special thanks are due to several members of the Royal Commission staff — in particular, Karen Jackson, Executive Assistant to the Director of Research (Institutions) for her contribution to the content of our arguments and her assistance in administrative matters. Special thanks are also due to Kent Roach for valuable research assistance in the summer of 1984, Françoise Guilbeault and Donna Stebbing for secretarial support, and Ruth Crow, who coordinated the editing of these papers for publication.

Our deepest thanks are extended to Pat, Lynn, Wendy, and Elaine in

Vancouver, and to Doug in Kingston who tolerated our long absences from home during the mandate of the Royal Commission. The intellectual pleasure and reward we enjoyed through our association with the Royal Commission was made possible only by the encouragement and understanding of our families.

A.C. AND C.W.



Continuity and Change in Canadian Values

BERNARD BLISHEN

Canada, like other industrial nations, is undergoing widespread social change at a faster pace than ever before. Many features of our basic institutions are being transformed and some of the values on which they were based are being weakened or swept away to be replaced by others. As this Royal Commission indicated in its first report, *Challenges and Choices*, the scope and implications of these changes call "into question basic assumptions, values, and institutions at every level of society, from the shop floor to the cabinet room, to the international economic system," but while many values change, others endure.

Changes in values have serious implications for society. They create a demand for new government policies and priorities; change the status order; alter people's views of their society, community and nation; and generate new modes of self-expression, self-identification, and social participation. The speed at which these changes take place creates a disjunction between a society and its past. Old meanings seems irrelevant, new values appear transient, and the stability of the social order is at risk. New principles appear but existing social institutions seem unable to incorporate them, calling their legitimacy into question.

In order to meet the challenge of these value changes, we need to understand how they are related to other social changes and how they influence public policies. This is a demanding analytical task, particularly if the relevant data are not available. It becomes manageable, however, if a speculative mode of analysis is used. This paper provides such an analysis of the social changes that have occurred since Canada emerged as a nation and the ways that some values have changed over time while others have remained relatively constant. In particular, the

paper examines the extent to which certain public policy priorities reflect changing and stable values since World War II.

The Nature of Social Values

Social values can be defined as conceptions of desirable behaviour which people use to determine their goals, guide their conduct and evaluate the actions of others. These guiding principles are learned in a variety of institutional and social settings throughout one's lifetime, particularly in the early years, with family, friends, teachers and school-mates, priests and fellow worshippers, and co-workers all playing a part in the learning process.

Values are both an element in an individual's self-identity and the foundation of social institutions. People therefore see themselves reflected in the institutions of their society. A change in the institutional order can weaken this self-identification, so that people feel that existing institutions are no longer their own (Breton, 1984).

Although values define the generally accepted ends of human action, when they conflict the choice among them is not always self-evident. In this regard, Bell (1976) suggests that our economic, political, and cultural institutions were built on opposing values: "For the economy, efficiency; for the polity, equality; and for the culture, self-realization (self-gratification). The resulting disjunctions have framed the tensions and social conflicts of Western society for the past 150 years" (pp. xi-xii).

The values of a society should not be confused with its beliefs. Beliefs are based on people's perception of reality and of the manner in which their society operates, while values specify how the reality ought to be interpreted and how people ought to behave. The beliefs and values of a society may change at different rates, or beliefs may change while values remain constant. The reality on which beliefs are based may change more rapidly than the beliefs themselves.

Values can be the basis of social consensus. Shared values help to legitimize the institutional order and prevent disagreement from becoming too disruptive. This is an important feature of Canadian society, in which there is a high potential for dissension because of the political dynamics of the federal state and the numerous social and cultural cleavages within this state — regional, ethnic, linguistic, status, religious, and others. Fortunately, these divisions overlap, preventing the isolation of particular groups, since each shares some part of the value system with others. Furthermore, where values conflict and cleavages appear, they rarely generate the emotional intensity that would threaten social stability. However, there have been exceptions, the most recent being the FLQ crisis of 1970 and the Quebec referendum of 1980, both of which occurred in a province which had undergone a period of rapid social change during the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s.

In the following analysis, values are classified in terms of the following dichotomies: equality-elitism, achievement-ascription, 'change-stability, individualism-collectivism, and uniformity-diversity. These are ideal types and serve as useful analytical tools, but no society really emphasizes one of the values in a dichotomy to the total exclusion of the other. The analytical task is to determine in what historical period and under what conditions a particular value emphasis is apparent. In his comparative analysis of the value systems of a number of countries, including Canada, Lipset (1963a; 1963b; 1964; 1965; 1970) uses a similar set of dichotomies, based on Parsons' (1951) concept of pattern variables, which has created a critical debate (see Hagerdorn, 1980, pp. 110–18).

Canadian Values before World War II

In order to discuss the value changes in Canada since World War II, it is useful to have some idea of the values that existed before that time. While no systematic empirical studies of values were undertaken during those early years, the imaginative and speculative analysis of later scholars provides some indication of those that have emerged out of the Canadian historical experience.

One of the most significant features of the developing Canadian consensus was the rejection by the northern colonies of the American Revolution as a means of national development. By 1774, the Northern colonies had seemed certain to be embroiled in the coming revolution. They had many of the same grievances as did the thirteen colonies to the south. In the northern colonies however, the elites turned their backs on revolutionary change. In Quebec, the Catholic hierarchy had already rejected the new ideas and values that were soon to lead to revolution in France. Now, "the clergy and seigneurs of Quebec, grateful for the lavish concessions of the Quebec Act, set their faces sternly against the revolutionary contagion," and the merchants, who were profiting from the changes in the imperial order, saw no gain in severing this connection (Creighton, 1957, p. 159). The lack of consensus and communal feeling in the rest of the population, which was scattered by geography, separated by privilege, and segregated by race, resulted in a level of indifference and apathy which the revolutionary spirit could not overcome.

This rejection of revolutionary values was later strengthened by their suppression in the north itself — for example, in the crushing of rebellions in both Upper and Lower Canada in 1837. In both colonies, there was growing discontent with the obvious social inequalities perpetuated by elite groups who remained loyal to the Crown. The failure of these populist rebellions meant the continued ascendancy of existing political and economic elites, the strengthening of Tory values, and the continuation of belief in the evolutionary development of "responsible

government" under colonial rule. Elitism, based upon acceptance of limitation and hierarchy, was embodied in a status system patterned after that of Britain. For the elite, change was an inevitable outcome of national development, but not at the expense of social stability. National development was to be based on a strong belief in convention and tradition, on the value of individual effort, but also on the value of collectivism evident in a willingness "to use the power of the state for the purpose of developing and controlling the economy" (Horowitz, 1979). Belief in the monarchical tradition would serve to develop a consensus on the need for order and restraint, at least among the ruling elites, in an increasingly pluralist society depending for its continuing development on an external metropolitan power. Allegiance to the Crown was presumed to be a guarantee of peace, order and good government. This conservative thrust was strengthened by an influx of United Empire Loyalists who refused to accept the egalitarian values of the American Revolution.

Colonial rule in Canada officially ended with the joining of the colonies of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and the United Province of Canada in a Canadian federal state. However, the constitution of this state, embodied in the British North America Act of 1867, still retained significant remnants of colonial rule which were evident in its retention of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as Canada's supreme court of appeal and in the extent to which Britain retained control over certain aspects of foreign affairs. This latter remnant of colonial status was evident in the subordinate position of Canadian representatives on British delegations negotiating on issues directly affecting Canadian interests. The essential purpose of the new constitution was to unify the provinces and create a national society, while respecting the cultural diversity of its two founding cultures, French and English, as well as religious and language differences. If the constitutional manifesto was to serve its unifying purpose, a national policy was needed which would focus the energies of the new nation.

Canada's economic, political and social development after 1867 was largely the outcome of the National Policy of John A. Macdonald and Wilfrid Laurier. It has been described as "a national programme expressed in terms of staples and transportation, tariffs and railways, land and immigration policies, and the buttressing of enterprise by government ownership and support" (Easterbrook and Aitkin, 1958, p. 406). The implementation of this policy indicates the acceptance of state intervention in Canada's economic development. The construction of the railways was a condition of confederation and required substantial government grants and subsidies to railway entrepreneurs. Tariff protection was aimed at developing a domestic manufacturing industry. Government land grants to immigrants helped to develop the agricultural resources of the West. Railway freight rates were laid down by the

central government to assist in the movement of grain from the Prairies. The implementation of the collectivist-oriented National Policy helped to create a tentative Canadian nationalism which bound together diverse and sometimes conflicting economic, political and social interests. Out of this context of competing interests emerged a recognizable national consciousness. Clark (1968) claims that, "the Canadian political community was not the creation of a people seeking a national identity. It was the creation rather of certain business, political, religious, and cultural interests seeking the establishment of a monopolistic system of control. [This was necessary because the geography of the emerging nation] favoured large scale bureaucratic forms of organization and widespread intervention by the State" (p. 233).

Up to the beginning of World War I, Canada continued to be divided by conflicting interests. These were particularly evident in the anglophone and francophone communities of central Canada, both of them proud of their historic roots — anglophone traditions stemming from the Loyalist settlement, the imperial connection, and life in the back concessions of Ontario, and francophone traditions from the distinctive culture, language and legal system of a mainly rural Quebec. But the divisions in Canadian society were by no means confined to these communities. In the Atlantic provinces, the feelings of community, based on historical traditions developed during the eras of fishing and forestry and on a general dissatisfaction with the economic aftermath of Confederation, seemed to separate this region from the rest of the country. The Prairie provinces had their distinctive patterns of ethnic settlement, with communities separated by great distances. Struggling to survive on a vast plain subject to climatic extremes, the inhabitants of the Prairies could find little relevance in the values of central Canada and consequently began to develop a regional self-consciousness. Similarly, British Columbia, with its distinctive history of colonial survival under the threat of American expansion, its rich resources, salubrious climate, and mountains isolating it from other parts of the country, also began to develop an inward-looking regional self-awareness.

The Canadian state sought to lessen these cleavages by continuing its collectivist policies aimed at developing a national economy "based on wheat, railways, tariffs, on iron and coal, and the continuation of close relations with Europe" (Easterbrook and Aitkin, 1958, p. 407). At the same time, the state attempted to protect the traditional religious, language, and legal rights specified in the British North America Act. A major concern underlying these policies was the development of a national community.

World War I was an important step in the development of the Canadian value system out of which a national consensus and community were to emerge. The beginning of the war witnessed an upsurge in national feeling and an increase in the power of the federal government. The

government organized a war effort which included building a national military force, with which Canadians could identify, and increased production of strategic resources such as wheat, copper, lead, nickel, and munitions. But while the war increased the pace of Canada's economic development, it deepened the cleavage between the French and British cultures. French Canadians were deeply opposed to conscription. Their opposition was based on a number of factors. As Smiley (1963) notes:

[Because] they were the oldest Canadians of European stock they were much more firmly rooted in North America than their English-speaking fellow citizens. . . . Their undoubted loyalty to Great Britain . . . lacked the emotional pull which was essential to command deep sacrifices in a remote European war. While the rest of Canada was deeply affected by living or remembered links with the British Isles and by United Empire Loyalist and Imperial tradition, their experiences and memories were essentially North American. It was not unlikely, therefore, that the attitude of the French-speaking Canadians towards a long war in Europe would differ from that which prevailed in the rest of Canada. (pp. 114-15)

Furthermore, Ontario's action in limiting the use of French as a language of instruction increased the opposition of French Canadians to conscription. The conscription crisis was one of a number of causes of the continuing cultural cleavage. Others included: the conquest of Quebec; suppression of the 1837 rebellion in Lower Canada; divisive debates between French and English representatives prior to Confederation in 1867; the execution of Louis Riel — a symbol of French Canadian nationalism — in 1885; and the controversy over the Manitoba separate schools question, which culminated in establishment of a non-sectarian provincial school system as a result of the general election of 1896.

The end of World War I was followed by a short period of prosperity and the emergence of a strengthened collective approach to economic problems. Economic development now included the exploitation of new staples — oil and minerals, pulp and paper, and hydroelectric power. The organization of cooperative wheat pools in the West and the formation of farmers' governments in Alberta and Manitoba signalled the beginning of the cooperative efforts and populist parties in this region that would attempt to develop policies to lessen the economic disparities between regions and particularly the effects of economic depression.

During this period, the political power of the provinces increased at the expense of the federal government. This was due in part to the development of postwar social security programs that came under provincial rather than federal legislative jurisdiction. With the onset of the Depression, the need for social security became increasingly urgent. The situation was particularly severe in the west and westerners therefore felt betrayed by the federal government — a response which ultimately set the stage for the region's economic and political demands

and its strengthened regional consciousness. The provinces were faced with the increasing costs of discharging their constitutional responsibilities in the field of social security, at a time when their declining revenues made this impossible or extremely difficult. The federal government was obliged to come to their aid. Despite these depressed economic conditions, the federal government initiated a number of public enterprises, including the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Corporation in 1936 and Trans-Canada Airlines in 1937. These were state-owned national enterprises responsible to Parliament and they were and remain symbols of Canadian nationhood.

By the late 1930s, certain value themes were evident in Canadian society. The early colonial connection had cast Canada into an elitist mould. The pressures for a wider acceptance of egalitarianism, originally created by the successful revolution to the south, had been weakened by strong elitist counterpressures. There were many opportunities for individual achievement, but the ascriptive barriers of language, religion, and culture continued to be serious obstacles. Canadian society had been altered by a series of economic changes related to the development of new staple products, as well as a number of social changes related to immigration, industrialization, and the growth of cities. Despite these changes, there was a continuing desire for stability on the part of elite groups. The elite saw the Crown as an important symbol of stability in changing times. Although the individualism of the entrepreneur was seen as a bulwark of economic development during this period, the elite were aware of the need for collective support for a number of economic endeavours. During the debates preceding Confederation, some members of the political elite had shown a desire for uniformity of culture based on the British connection. Nevertheless, the Confederation agreement included a general acceptance of the dual nature of Canadian society, and as the waves of immigrant settlers from many ethnic streams grew and spread across the land, there was a gradual acceptance of cultural diversity as a basic theme in Canadian society.

The Canadian Value Dilemma

World War II provided a sharp impetus to Canadian economic development. The production of munitions increased Canadian manufacturing capacity. In order to sustain this increased capacity, the production of traditional staples also increased substantially.

The crisis of World War II focussed the feelings of Canadians as never before. Horowitz (1973, pp. 321 – 59), an American political sociologist commenting on the development of Canadian society, claims that:

The two World Wars . . . served as a surrogate revolutionary war effort. . . . these two experiences permitted Canada to emerge in a condi-

tion of political parity with both England and the United States. . . . Canadians mustered the political wherewithal to withstand political coercion from the south, and . . . to declare a high degree of independence and total political autonomy from England at the same time. And so it came about that the political liberation of Canada took place without a revolutionary war. . . .

But as in World War I, this second world conflict generated a conscription crisis which threw Canada into political turmoil at a time when national survival was threatened. The potential for conflict between the two founding cultures again became apparent. Yet from these upheavals emerged some of the distinctive features of our present industrial society.

Following World War II, the Canadian elite, especially its bureaucratic and intellectual segments, strove to develop policies and programs which they felt were in line with emerging Canadian values. These they believed would develop a distinctiveness out of which could emerge a stronger sense of identity, unmarked by the dangerous leanings of prewar European nationalism. This national feeling was evident in the debate on the Citizenship Act in 1946 and also in the confirmation in 1947 by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the Canadian Parliament's power to pass legislation making the Supreme Court of Canada its final court of appeal. The legislation was enacted in 1949. Perhaps the most obvious example of the effort to stimulate national interests was the appointment of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences in 1949. Following the Canadian collectivist tradition, the report of this commission recommended increased financial assistance to a number of institutions that symbolized Canadian nationhood: the National Film Board, the National Gallery, the Public Archives of Canada, and the National Museums. The report also contained "some of the headiest Canadian nationalism that has ever been written" (Smiley, 1967, p. 44). This strengthened nationalism was also manifest in the admission of Newfoundland to the Canadian Confederation.

Developments such as these helped to generate a sense of belonging to a national entity and of identification with and commitment to our national symbols. There were obvious economic, political and cultural obstacles to the emergence in Canada of a feeling of nationhood and its attendant values, but what is perhaps most striking is that this national feeling and its attendant values emerged in spite of the economic, political and cultural hegemony of the United States.

In the immediate postwar period, the values of Canadian society appeared to be a somewhat clearer version of those existing before the war. They showed the continuing compromise between the influence of Britain and the increasing influence of the United States. The values of both of these countries served as models in the selection of the goals of not only English-speaking Canadians but also, to a lesser extent, of

French-speaking Canadians. This use of two national models created ambivalence — the Canadian self-image was fashioned out of a curious mixture of respect for and resistance to American and British traditions.

As far as particular values were concerned, Canada generally favoured the American model of an egalitarian and open society, but with modifications reflecting the continued leanings of some Canadians toward the British model of a hierarchical society based on elitism and the restrictions it imposed on social interaction. The ambivalence arising from attempting to follow two different and sometimes contradictory models meant that the expression of egalitarianism and other values was generally more subdued in Canada than in the United States itself. Similarly, the American emphasis on achievement and material success was constrained in Canada by reluctance to discard the ascriptive features of the British model. In the United States, there was a commitment to change, to the future, and to accepting the risks involved in the drive for greater competence, wealth, freedom and power. In Britain, there was greater emphasis on stability, constraint, order and public dignity. Again, Canadians seemed to be caught between these two models. In the United States, individualism, especially in the economic order, was seen as the driving force in entrepreneurial activity, but in Canada this was tempered by a strong collectivist thrust, reflecting the need since colonial times to build a national community in the face of threats of military and economic domination from the south. As Canada entered the post-war era, one of its main distinguishing characteristics was cultural diversity. The acceptance of the idea of two cultures had been evident since Confederation and the recognition of multiculturalism had emerged in the early twentieth century. Unlike the United States, with its belief in a “melting pot” of immigrant cultures out of which was to emerge a more or less uniform product, Canadians opted for diversity, for the retention of the cultural attributes of its different immigrant streams.

These examples of Canadian values in the early postwar period provide some indication of the nature of the prevailing value dilemma from which there gradually emerged a set of values that, though indistinct, could nevertheless be recognized as typically Canadian. This may be summarized as egalitarianism weakened by continuing elitism, achievement muted by a leaning toward ascription, change but not at the expense of stability, individualism but a continuing dependence on collectivism, and diversity balanced by a substantial degree of uniformity. The economic, social and cultural changes that occurred in the following decades, combined with the development and implementation of government policies to meet the problems generated by these changes, helped to clarify existing Canadian values and to develop others. This is particularly evident in the emergence of Canada’s social security system, which embodied the collectivist impulse and attacked the obstacles to redistributive justice.

Social Values and Social Security

In the Canadian federal system, social security programs develop out of a bargaining process between provincial and federal governments which is influenced by the values embedded in the political ideologies of the parties in power. Before World War II, the prevailing view was that assistance should be provided to the "worthy poor." The values of achievement, individualism and self-reliance were paramount; the state should only intervene to protect those unable to protect themselves against the economic vicissitudes of the capitalist system. These values were integral elements of the market ethos, which Bryden, in his analysis of Canada's old age pension policy (1974), calls "the cultural expression of the market economy which has moulded Canadian social, economic, and political development." This market ethos led to the perception that for the individual, "poverty resulted from lack of diligence and foresight . . . most men would waste away in idleness if they could live without working. This would destroy their moral fibre and impose an unjust burden on the industrious and thrifty members of society" (p. 19). Acceptance of the values embedded in the market ethos meant that the capitalist economic system was to be left basically intact.

Both the Liberal and Conservative parties at the federal and provincial level subscribed to this view, while recognizing the needs of the "worthy poor." There was little difference between the two parties in values related to economic dependency. Both recognized, however, that the individual citizen had civil rights which guaranteed equality before the law and that there were political rights which provided for participation in government. Moreover, they were beginning to recognize the demand for a limited range of social rights for the individual — a development which would eventually lead to the protection of a wide range of social rights in the form of social security benefits. This development was stimulated by the obvious deprivations and hardships suffered by Canadians in all regions during the Depression.

After World War II, the Canadian government, faced with the need to develop economic, social, and cultural policies to meet the problems of postwar reconstruction, turned to parliamentary committees, royal commissions, and government departments and agencies for analysis and advice in charting Canada's path to postwar reconstruction. The findings and recommendations of these bodies were greatly influenced by the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. This manifesto provided a basic standard against which to measure Canada's redistributive efforts to create a more egalitarian society, and linked Canada with the international community in its pursuit of fundamental individual rights and freedoms. It specified a wide range of individual rights, including freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; freedom of opinion and expression; peaceful assembly, liberty,

security of person; and recognition before the law. Policies to meet the problems of postwar reconstruction were influenced strongly by articles 22 to 26, which specified rights to social security, work, free choice of employment, protection against unemployment, equal pay for equal work, just remuneration, trade union membership, rest and leisure, an adequate standard of living, and education (Rubin, 1983). The egalitarian thrust that was to characterize much of the ensuing social security debate was closely linked to this statement of rights.

In 1945, the Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction was convened to discuss the federal government's proposals for high employment and income security, and for social security programs aimed at alleviating the hazards of unemployment, sickness and old age. These proposals, more comprehensive than any others previously discussed at this level, proved unacceptable to the provinces, and the priorities they included were shelved. It may be that the egalitarian thrust of these proposals, limited as it was, could not be reconciled with the prevailing values of the market ethos — achievement, individualism and self-reliance. Henceforth, social security measures were to be decided upon in discussions between federal and provincial governments, and were introduced to meet residual needs on a more or less ad hoc basis.

The Old Age Security Act, introduced in 1951, provided a small pension to all persons aged 70 years and over. The accompanying Old Age Assistance Act provided a pension for those between 65 and 69 years who met the requirements of a means test. The Blind Persons Act and the Disabled Persons Act were introduced in the early 1950s. The Unemployment Assistance Act was passed in 1956; provision of benefits under this act was based on a needs test. The Youth Allowance Act, passed in 1964, was an extension of the Family Allowance program which provided assistance to families with children up to 18 years of age who were attending school full-time. The Canada Pension Plan and the Guaranteed Income Supplement, introduced in 1966, provided a level of retirement income without a means test. The Canada Assistance Plan, also introduced in 1966, consolidated into one program all the existing financial assistance programs that were based on a test of means or needs.

The gradual development of these government programs aimed at providing greater equality of condition and redistributive justice was accompanied by a growing demand that these benefits become a matter of individual right. This was evident not only in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights — the manifesto that had sparked so much of the debate about social security — but also in pressure for the abolition of means and needs testing. Another significant feature of this development was the growth of citizen participation in program planning and implementation. The National Council on Welfare, for example, established in 1970, included representatives from various disadvan-

tagged groups in need of social security. Thus, after World War II the Canadian idea of social rights gradually took on a more universal character. The trend was toward general acceptance of the individual's right to a more comprehensive range of social security benefits and of the state's responsibility to provide them. Later this trend was weakened by growing concern about the costs of providing a comprehensive, universal social security system during a time of slowing economic expansion. But during the first two decades after World War II, the impact of rapid social and technical change created a demand for the maintenance of these social rights.

This period also saw a growing demand for state recognition of group rights. In spite of the advances made in redistributive justice, inequities and deprivation were still experienced by women, native Canadians and some ethnic minorities, and these groups sought redress. In his sociological analysis of ethnic pluralism, Porter (1979) points out that because of the failure of instruments of redistribution to correct these inequities, "fashioned as they were for the individual, minorities have had to organize to obtain some measure of distributive justice when deprivation remained concentrated within particular groups" (p. 126).

Social Change and Social Values since World War II

A number of social changes occurring since World War II have been associated with the strengthening of some values and the weakening of others. In terms of the value dichotomies, which are an analytical thread of this discussion, these social changes have tended to strengthen diversity and weaken uniformity, to increase egalitarianism while lessening the impact of elitism, to increase acceptance of change at the expense of stability, to continue the collectivist thrust while maintaining an attachment to individualism, and to emphasize achievement at the expense of the power of ascription.

A key variable in the development of Canadian society has been demographic change. In 1981, the Canadian population was nearly 25 million. The population increased by more than 42 percent between 1930 and 1980, growing by nearly 22 percent between 1941 and 1951, due to the sharp increase in the fertility rate and in immigration. The growth rate has shown a continuing decline since 1951, reaching a low of just below 6 percent between 1971 and 1981.

The successive waves of immigration that Canada has experienced throughout its history have been of particular significance for the development of Canadian values. The National Policy of Macdonald and Laurier encouraged immigration, drawing people from many ethnic streams in the late nineteenth and especially the early twentieth century. Immigrants played an essential part in the development of western Canada and in population growth generally. They also created the

cultural diversity which is a basic characteristic of Canadian life, and has been further enriched by postwar immigration. Up to the end of the nineteenth century, the majority of immigrants were British. Between 1900 and 1914, immigrants from eastern and southern Europe joined the stream, although many later migrated to the United States. Over the two world wars and during the Depression, immigration virtually ceased. From 1945 to 1970, about 3 million immigrants came to Canada, about 2 million of whom remained here (Overbeek, 1980). They included many ethnic streams, some of which had been excluded in previous waves. Today, ethnic diversity is viewed as a vital element in Canada's value consensus. The acceptance of these diverse ethnic strains has strengthened the value of ethnic diversity.

A demographic trend with significant implications for the future of Canadian society is the rising proportion of aged people in the population. The proportion of the population aged 65 and over rose from nearly 11 percent in 1961 to just below 14 percent in 1981. This increase is due to falling fertility rates and greater longevity. Canadian fertility rates have been lower than the replacement rate for the past decade. If this trend continues, the Canadian population will begin declining shortly after the turn of the century (Canada, Department of Employment and Immigration, 1983). An appropriate immigration policy could reverse this trend, but there is little evidence that such a policy is being considered.

A decreasing rate of population growth, with an attendant increase in the ratio of aged and retired persons to earners, has serious economic and social effects. The productivity of the working population must be high enough to provide an acceptable standard of living for the elderly. A continuing low birthrate may mean a smaller labour force in later decades, which will have to provide for the needs of a growing population of old people.

As the aged segment of the population grows, its values, attitudes and traditions are likely to become more important influences on the rate of social change. Because the social orientations of older people are less adaptable to change and may differ widely from those of younger people, there is likely to be greater inter-generational conflict. But there is some question about the extent to which values have changed. Some studies suggest that the experience of the older generations in the Depression and World War II has caused them to place higher value on economic security and collectivism. For example Inglehart's 1977 study, based on European data, claims that there has been a shift from materialist to post-materialist values between generations — from concern with issues of economic security to concern with self-expression and self-realization. However, two studies using Canadian data taken from the Quality of Life Survey undertaken in 1977 (Stevenson and Ornstein, 1981; Bakvis and Nevitte, 1984), find little support in Canada for Inglehart's thesis.

Another social change that reflects a change in values is the increase in the divorce rate. The number of divorces per 100,000 married women rose from 621.0 in 1970 to 1050.4 in 1979 (Statistics Canada, 1983, p. 62). Whether the increased rate of marriage dissolution could conceivably result in a permanent change in family structure cannot be foretold with any certainty, but the same Statistics Canada study observes that "because three of every four divorced people remarry, we would speculate that the majority of people who divorce consider the act to be the cancellation of their particular marriage, rather than the denial of the institution of marriage in general" (p. 233). Nevertheless, this trend does suggest an increased emphasis on self-expression and independence.

A further social change is the increased educational level of the population. The postwar baby boom, which lasted until about 1960, was followed by an unprecedented demand for postwar education services and facilities. From 1961 to 1981, the participation rate in post-secondary institutions of the population aged 18 to 24 years rose from 11.9 percent to 21.2 percent for males and from 9.7 percent to 21.8 percent for females.²

Among the factors contributing to the increased demand for education was the belief that all young people, regardless of their socioeconomic background, should be able to compete for a place in the post-secondary educational system on the basis of their ability to meet the standards set by post-secondary institutions. Policy makers expanded access to post-secondary education in the belief that this would lead to greater equality of educational opportunity and a more egalitarian society.

Access to higher education is still an issue in Canada but the rhetoric accompanying it has become more restrained. A policy of universal access to higher education is, in effect, a commitment to mass higher education. Universal access is still seen as a step toward the goal of equality of educational opportunity, but with the worsening economic conditions in the 1980s, the cost of this policy puts severe restraints on its full implementation, particularly with respect to cost-sharing between the student and the state. Recent government policies have increased the student's share of the cost. Although students can get loans or bursaries, those from less affluent families are at a financial disadvantage because loans must be repaid soon after the student enters the labour force. These restrictions limit accessibility to higher education as a means of achieving equality of educational opportunity. In spite of these restrictions, however, 13 percent of the Canadian adult population in 1981 were graduates of post-secondary institutions. Since education enhances a person's analytical ability and self-direction, it is likely that this trend toward higher education level has raised the standards of critical judgment of the population. According to Inglehart (1977), this also means "that increasing numbers of people are available with political skills that enable them to play roles previously limited to a small political elite" (p. 15).

The increased proportion of post-secondary graduates is one of sev-

eral significant changes in the labour market. Others include a rising rate of labour force participation by women, a substantial increase in employment in the service sector, and higher levels of unemployment.

Female participation in the labour force has increased steadily in the postwar years and has accelerated in the past two decades. Between 1970 and 1983, the participation of women in the labour force rose from just over 38 percent to nearly 53 percent. The participation rate of married women increased from nearly 42 percent in 1975 to just over 52 percent in 1983.³ This may be partly a result of changing attitudes about the employment of married women, particularly women with children. These data indicate the extent to which gender has been an ascriptive barrier to the occupational achievement of women.

Most of the increase in the employment of women has been in the service sector, where female employment rose from 45 percent to nearly 50 percent from 1975 to 1983. The goods-producing sector has traditionally employed fewer women. Female employment in that sector rose from less than 20 percent to nearly 24 percent between 1975 and 1983.

The services sector grew by 52 percent between 1970 and 1983, while the goods producing sector declined by almost 11 percent. An important feature of many service sector occupations is that they tend to place greater emphasis on cooperation and reciprocity and less on coordination and hierarchical structure than goods-producing jobs, especially at the assembly-line level. High-level service jobs include such functions as policy analysis, trend analysis, strategic planning, evaluation and feasibility analysis, which are sources of innovation, policy and decision making in the developing post-industrial society. These jobs require high levels of education and provide more opportunity for personal flexibility, self-direction and self-expression than lower-level jobs in the service sector.⁴

Much of the growth in the service sector is due to the microelectronic revolution. Instruments of technical change in the past, such as the development of assembly-line production, have affected only a minority of the labour force. The microchip is more formidable than all previous instruments of technical change because it affects almost all kinds of work. Existing skills in the service sector, including clerical work, information collecting and distribution, record keeping, typesetting, draughting, and many other skills in the goods-producing sector, particularly on the assembly line, have all been seriously affected. Some new skills have been developed as a result of this new technology, the most noticeable being those associated with its application, such as computer hardware design and programming. Nevertheless, as Keyfitz (1984) observes, "the very efficiency of the computer guarantees that it cannot be a major source of employment. Automation is conspicuous in the manufacture of computers themselves; the microchip is self-reproducing" (p. 4).

The computer revolution demands not only new skills, but new types of organization, new attitudes and new values. The rapid rate of technical change will render many skills obsolete and require workers to learn new skills, possibly several times during their working life. The traditional stages in the development of an occupational career may no longer be possible. Values will change and stability and conformity will give way to acceptance of change and flexibility.

Accompanying these labour force changes and changes in value orientations will be a continuing pattern of relatively high unemployment, particularly for workers with no post-secondary education. Canada's unemployment rate has been edging upward for nearly two decades. This gradual upward shift in unemployment falls most heavily on the young.⁵ The unemployment rate for Canadians under 25 years of age increased from 5.6 percent in 1966 to 19.9 percent in 1983. In contrast, the unemployment rate for the labour force as a whole in 1983 was 11.9 percent. It should be noted, however, that young workers experience shorter spells of unemployment than older workers — on average 18.4 weeks in 1983, compared with 21.8 weeks for those 25 years and over. In addition, the proportion of "discouraged workers" — those not included in official unemployment figures because they had decided that no work was available and had stopped looking for employment — may be lower for young people.⁶

Continuing high unemployment rates and substantial erosion in the value of money (as evident in an inflation rate that rose over 110 percent between 1971 and 1980) have created a high level of uncertainty in the population. Uncertainty leads to a questioning of traditional values, institutions and political procedures. At such times, instead of depending upon elected representatives to create a more egalitarian society, people tend to participate in the democratic process in a more direct fashion by forming organizations aimed at bringing about a greater degree of distributive justice to alleviate existing problems through direct action, and sometimes through confrontation. Recent confrontations between the federal and provincial governments and unions, students, the unemployed, women's groups, and others suggest that this form of direct action is an acceptable, if not always successful, technique. These pressures can become driving forces for change in the socioeconomic order. It seems surprising that these confrontational pressures have not increased during the current economic recession in Canada. Whether the various social security measures now in existence serve to alleviate these pressures is open to question.

The state's response to unemployment has been a series of make-work and retraining programs, industrial development incentives and other measures designed to stimulate the economy. Since there is a tradition of state intervention in the economy, Canadian society has generally accepted these measures. In fact, there is clear evidence that this collec-

tivist impulse is being strengthened as the state is forced to concede to group pressures to become involved not only in the economy but in social and cultural life as well. These pressures groups often consist of individuals who feel deprived of their legitimate individual and social rights because of some ascriptive characteristic such as gender, ethnic background, religion and language.

This feeling of deprivation is also apparent in those whose expectations for a higher standard of living have been thwarted. Economic expansion since World War II has raised living standards substantially but some Canadians have experienced little change. Average real income in Canada rose 38 percent between 1967 and 1977. This made possible a rising standard of living reflected in personal expenditures on goods and services per capita, which increased from \$1,851 in 1961 to \$3,400 in 1978, in constant 1971 dollars (Statistics Canada, 1980, p. 111). Income distribution, however, has changed very little. Over the postwar period, 4 percent of total income has gone to the lowest quintile of the population, and 40 percent to the highest quintile (Statistics Canada, 1980, p. 100).

The rise in national income and living standards has been accompanied by a rise in consumer wants, stimulated by the creation of a larger assortment of goods and services and by advertising which turns the satisfaction of wants into issues of self-expression and self-worth. Moreover, as these consumer wants are satisfied, people come to feel entitled to them and are no longer prepared to accept a lower or even a fixed standard of living. When their wants are not met, people feel deprived and may band together to demand what they consider their legitimate entitlements to a particular standard of living. The state becomes the focus of these demands.

Since World War II, these social changes have been accompanied by a burgeoning of regional consciousness — a phenomenon which is related to the traditional value of diversity in Canadian society. Regional consciousness is based on a feeling of belonging to a geographic region — often identified with a province — with a distinctive economic, political and social milieu. Stevenson (1980) bases the concept of a region on the economic and political power that confers what he calls “boundary maintaining abilities” so that: “Over time, the natural regions that may have existed before the boundaries were established will be obliterated while the area within each set of boundaries will take on the appearance of a region, even if it was not one before. . . . Canadian provinces have done this so successfully that for all practical purposes “province” and “region” are now synonymous” (p. 18).

The residents of a poorer region may consider their economic conditions unjust when compared with those of other regions, and this feeling of injustice may be stimulated by the regional political elite who use their power to protect regional interests against what they see as exploitation

by the federal government or other regions. The continual assertion of this power has been much in evidence in Canada during the past few decades, and has been an important stimulus to regional consciousness, despite federal equalization and regional development programs.

These social changes, some of them postwar developments and others longer-term trends, have been linked with changes in emphasis on Canadian values. The acceptance of diversity has been strengthened and continues to be an essential feature of the legitimate social order, despite the fact that it sometimes conflicts with the trend toward greater uniformity evident in existing economic, political and social institutions. The drive for a more egalitarian society — although weakened by elitist values, particularly in central Canada, and by economic recession in recent years — has been maintained, and forms the cornerstone of the growing social security system. While there is increased awareness and acceptance of change, the traditional Canadian emphasis on stability and social order continues. The collectivist impulse, which supports government intervention in the economy and provision of a wide range of social security benefits, has been strengthened, even though individualism continues to permeate many activities. Achievement is still considered important, particularly in one's occupation, and ascriptive characteristics such as ethnic and language background and sex, are increasingly recognized as obstacles to be overcome by collective action.

The Emerging Communalism

These trends in value orientations are of particular significance for the future development of Canadian society. The continued predominance of the values of diversity, equality, change, collectivism and achievement, when associated with a heightened group identity and an emphasis on self-expression, create the conditions for the development of a form of communalism. This is evident in the increased prominence of minority groups in the drive to achieve individual and social rights through state action. The liberal democracy which has developed in Canada focuses on attainment of individual and social rights of citizenship. But because ours is a stratified multicultural society, with manifest material and status inequalities between groups, those groups who felt deprived or unjustly treated have assumed the instrumental function of asserting the rights of their members and demanding state action to attain them. This is evident in the case of the francophone community in Quebec.

Francophones have historically had a lower socioeconomic standing than anglophones. During the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, the francophone community in Quebec strengthened its demands for a rise in its socioeconomic standing and its position in the status order. Their lan-

guage, education and legal rights were already established but were no guarantee of distributive justice in the economic order. The simmering feelings of material and status deprivation and injustice which emerged when Quebec francophones compared their economic and social status opportunities with those of the anglophone community, particularly the one in Quebec, developed into a demand for change which was to be directed and organized by the new Quebec francophone elite. Henceforth, the rights of francophones were to include rights to distributive justice which had previously been a matter of individual rights. Demands for equal economic opportunity for the Quebec francophone community became more powerful than similar demands based on traditional individual rights. In Quebec, adherence to equality and achievement as universal values had failed to overcome the advantages of power and privilege of the anglophone elite. Consequently, the legitimacy of Canadian social, economic and political institutions was called into question by Quebec francophones who no longer accepted the values upon which these institutions were based. As Breton (1984) notes, "their intense feeling was that Canadian society was not their society, its institutions not their institutions, its meaning and symbols not their meanings and symbols" (p. 129). Francophone Quebec began to take command of its own destiny.

Its stand was strengthened by the reports of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism which appeared between 1965 and 1968. The Commission recognized that Quebec francophone rejection of the Confederation agreement of 1867 was based on dissatisfaction with their inferior socioeconomic position and with the country's failure to recognize francophone claims for equal status with the anglophone community, its refusal to extend French language education outside Quebec, and its unwillingness to open the civil service completely to francophones. The Commission's recommendations were aimed at rectifying these injustices through measures aimed at promoting bilingualism and biculturalism which would create greater status equality between French and the English Canadians.

Another important feature of the Commission's reports was the place they gave to other ethnic groups in Canada. The Commission's recognition of the claims of groups that were neither French nor English gave them the incentive to fight for their ethnic identity and press for equal recognition with the two founding cultures. Consequently, when the Official Languages legislation was implemented in 1969, it was opposed primarily by these ethnic groups, particularly in the West, because they felt that their status would be threatened by the new legislation (Breton, 1984). In response to this opposition, the government introduced an official policy of multiculturalism in 1971 which gave recognition and support to all ethnic communities, to enable their members to express their ethnic identity and participate on equal terms in Canadian society.

Under the influence of this policy, individuals have become more aware of their ethnic identity and more interested in participating in the demand for minority group rights, particularly in the case of the visible minorities. Competition has emerged between these groups as they seek recognition of their rights. In this competitive struggle, there is always the threat of change in the status order and the attendant anxiety of some groups that they may lose status.

In Canada, state intervention in the socioeconomic order, aimed at achieving redistributive justice through a range of social security measures, emerged during the Depression and the period following World War II. State intervention in recent decades has expanded beyond the material order to include a concern with the redistribution of social status among Canada's ethnic communities. Minority group membership, which has always been a distinct disadvantage in the struggle for occupational success and social status, has now been recognized by the state as an obstacle to status equality requiring some form of policy intervention.

The reports of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and the ensuing policies concerning official languages and multiculturalism have served as a signal to all minority groups that the demand for group rights associated with the ascriptive features of group membership would now be recognized by the state. Recognition has depended on group organization and leadership, on the extent of participation by those with the ascriptive characteristics, on clarity in defining group concerns, and on their relationship to the general consensus.

The women's movement is another significant development in the state's recognition of group rights. The recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women, established in 1967, have had a significant impact on the women's movement in Canada. The recommendations were based on the rights and freedoms specified in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and on the principle that there should be equality of opportunity between the sexes. The recommendations resulted in the assignment of a cabinet minister to coordinate government action directed at improving the status of women, and the establishment of an office within the federal Public Service Commission to ensure equal treatment for women within the civil service. These federal government initiatives were followed by the appointment of an Advisory Council on the Status of Women in 1973, to serve as the mechanism through which the concerns expressed by women's groups could be brought to the attention of the federal government. This arrangement has not been entirely satisfactory, however, and another organization has been set up which bypasses the minister responsible for women's issues. The growing demand for the recognition of women's rights has also resulted in the involvement of a number of standing committees of the House of Commons and the Senate. Published reports

of these committees, dealing with such issues as wife battering, children at risk, employment opportunities, and the rights of Indian women under the Indian Act, have generated further interest and participation in women's groups across the country. Provincial advisory councils have been set up to advise governments on women's issues.

In seeking to bring women's issues to the attention of the government and public, these various bodies serve a consciousness-raising function, motivating increased numbers of women to become involved in attempts to break male hegemony. Such participation not only promotes women's self-awareness and group identity, but also the desire for independence, self-development, achievement and equality.

The growing recognition of group rights by the state is also evident in the federal government's recognition of the legitimacy of some Indian land claims. Indian feelings about the many economic and social injustices they had experienced, particularly the loss of their lands, led to the government study which resulted in the 1969 white paper on Indian policy. This paper proposed to abolish the legal distinction between Indians and other Canadians. Indians were to be included in the "mainstream" of Canadian society and their special status was to be terminated. The government recognized some Indian land claims but did not accept many other aboriginal rights claims. Despite the negative response of Indians, the government set up an Indian Claims Commission to listen to native proposals. Subsequent submissions by the Commission to the government resulted in a change in the government's position. In 1975 it agreed to resolve Indian claims through negotiation and by 1982 it had agreed to pay Indians for their land claims.

To date, the government has not accepted the principle of native sovereignty over disputed land. Nevertheless, the government's recognition of the legitimacy of many Indian land claims has provided a further stimulus for Canada's native people to assert their group rights, by building and strengthening native organizations, thereby strengthening their group identity and raising their self-awareness.

Since the Constitution Act of 1982, and particularly after the Penner Report of 1983 (Canada, House of Commons, 1983), the issue of native self-government has become a central focus of constitutional discussion between the federal government and native organizations. The fact that the federal government, in the Penner Report, gave serious consideration to the idea of forming a third tier of government made up of Canada's native peoples is indicative of the extent to which the Canadian state has accepted the concept of group rights. This development also sharpened the group identity of native peoples and strengthened their belief in political action.

Another indication of the growing state recognition of group rights in Canadian society is the report of the Special Committee of the House of Commons on Visible Minorities (1984). The report points out that "the

basic intent of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was to find ways and means of increasing the participation of the francophone community, largely represented in Quebec, in every aspect of Canadian society. . . . A similar thrust of energy is required to move visible minorities to full participation in Canadian society" (p. 5).

The recommendations of the committee seek to provide conditions for the integration of these minorities in the labour force, including the public service, and in Canadian society generally. Since members of visible minorities are particularly vulnerable to discrimination, the committee recommended a series of legal measures aimed at penalizing discriminatory behaviour. It also made a number of recommendations based on its view that the media has a particular responsibility for reducing racial prejudice associated with visible characteristics. The organizations making submissions to the committee included native Canadians, Arabs, Japanese, Chinese, Sikhs, Hutterites, Métis, blacks, Filipino, West Indians, and Pakistanis. This list indicates the number and type of minority groups which may be affected by the committee's recommendations. As with the state's recognition of the group rights of francophones, women and natives, recognition of the rights of visible minorities has served to strengthen their claims, stimulate membership and participation in organization representing the groups, sharpen group identity, and promote self-awareness. Breton (1984) sees in the report of the committee "a search for institutional recognition" and an instrument that will facilitate group "competition for status," both of which will strengthen group identity (p. 136).

The most important development in state recognition of group claims for the rights of its members is the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Although the Charter emphasizes individual rights, group rights were also an obvious concern for those who created it. The growing demand for recognition of these rights, particularly since the debate following the reports of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, helped to create pressure on the state which culminated in the recognition of equality rights of minorities and women in Section 15 of the Charter. One of the future roles of organizations representing minority groups will be to ensure that the provisions of the Charter concerning these rights are applied and protected. In this regard, Section 15 (2) is particularly important in that it authorizes the use of affirmative action programs to ameliorate the conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups, including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

Conclusion

As Canada developed from colony to nation, a set of values emerged, developed and changed over time. There was a recognition of the desire

for a greater degree of equality, but not at the expense of elitism. There was also a recognition of the need for achievement in the developing nation, but the influence of ascription remained. In this growing society, change became more acceptable, but not at the expense of stability and order. Collectivism, in the form of government intervention, was a governing consideration in economic development despite the claims for the importance of individualism. The recognition of the bicultural nature of Canadian society and the influx of diverse immigrant streams increased the emphasis on diversity and weakened the acceptance of uniformity.

Following World War II there was a shift in the emphasis of these value orientations. This is evident in government policies and priorities, particularly those concerning the development of social security programs. During this postwar period, Canada underwent a number of social changes that had implications for the emerging value system. These included greater diversity of immigrant streams; a decreasing rate of population growth; an increasing proportion of aged people in the population; a rising divorce rate; a rise in post-secondary education participation rates; substantial growth in employment in the service sector; emergence of the microelectronic revolution; a rising level of affluence threatened by an economic downturn; and the development of strong regional consciousness. These social changes were associated with the strengthening of some values and the weakening of others. The emphasis on equality was strengthened as ascriptive obstacles to status and material equality were gradually overcome through continued collectivist efforts. Although these obstacles stemmed from the diversity of Canadian society, it was paradoxically the growing acceptance of diversity that led to collective efforts to remove them.

The increasing importance of organizations representing minorities and women is an indication of the inability of Canada's democratic institutions to create the conditions that would allow individuals to voice their needs and demands more effectively in the democratic process. Limited participation by citizens is a fact in western democracies. This point is made by McDonald (1977), who argues against the assertion that "such limited participation . . . helps to maintain stability and persistence of institutions and social systems. Mass participation is considered of secondary importance and unhealthy for the persistence of the body politic. Active participation by elites in the political process, and deference to these elites by the masses, is accepted" (p. 457).

The participation of individuals in a range of collectivities, demanding state recognition of the right to status as well as material equality, is a form of communal politicization that continues to grow. Its growth is a reaction against the failure of these traditional limited forms of participatory democracy to provide the conditions which would allow individuals to be more self-expressive and to feel that their concerns are

the concerns of the governing elite. People recognize that while communal politics involves them much more directly in decisions and policies affecting their well-being than the traditional political process, it must be carried on within the framework of the federal and provincial political communities. As this type of communalism succeeds in attaining its goals, its visibility increases. This stimulates people's awareness of the extent to which their group identities, their ethnic background, religious persuasion, gender, and other characteristics may be ascriptive obstacles to status and material equality.

Because of these developments in recent decades, the state faces a challenging dilemma. On the one hand, it is under increasing pressure to recognize the rights of groups to special consideration to counter barriers based on the ascriptive characteristics of their members. On the other hand, it must continue to protect the rights of individuals regardless of their differences. There is probably no permanent solution to this dilemma. Balancing the demands of the new communalism with the traditional individual and social rights of citizenship will require a continuing effort on the part of the state. Policies directed to this end should take into account the values that have had a lasting influence on the development of Canadian society. But policy makers should recognize that while values remain relatively constant, social change may create a change in emphasis. For concerned with the planning of a new national policy, there is a need to recognize that the Macdonald-Laurier National Policy had lasting political and social as well as economic effects. A new national policy should take into account the development of Canadian values, particularly the way in which the collectivist emphasis in Canadian society has developed into a communal emphasis on the protection of individual and group rights. In this way, a significant element in the development of the self-identity of Canadians would be protected. The recognition of this value emphasis would also strengthen the diversity of Canadian society so that its bilingual and multicultural elements would be maintained and developed.

Notes

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1. Achievement values evaluate the individual in terms of characteristics which have been attained through individual effort, such as occupation, income and social standing. Ascriptive values evaluate the individual in terms of characteristics over which the individual has no control, such as ethnic group, sex and age.
2. Data supplied by the Education Division, Statistics Canada.
3. Data supplied by the Research and Analysis Division, Statistics Canada.
4. Data supplied by the Research and Analysis Division, Statistics Canada.
5. Data supplied by the Labour Force Division, Statistics Canada.
6. Data supplied by the Labour Force Division, Statistics Canada.

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Multiculturalism and Canadian Nation-Building

RAYMOND BRETON

Introduction

The place of ethnic groups in society cannot be approached exclusively from a socioeconomic point of view. The integration into society of people of different ethnocultural origins or speaking different languages implies more than their incorporation into the economy and its organizational system. The relationships of groups and individuals with societal institutions in general and with the state in particular are not entirely material and instrumental. Integration also entails participation in the symbolic order. Those who are part of the society share its cultural assumptions and meanings, partake in the collective identity, and respond to common symbols. Relationships with institutions involve a symbolic/cultural exchange as well as an instrumental/material one. In other words, people have symbolic as well as material interests. The two categories of interests are not unrelated; on the contrary, their pursuit is frequently intertwined. They are nevertheless different.

It is in part through or in relation to societal institutions that individuals and groups pursue their material interests. Institutions constitute systems of opportunities and constraints that vary for different segments of society. Within these systems, individuals and groups pursue their interests through instrumentalities such as information, rules, procedures, technology, budgets, and networks of contacts.

It is through and in relation to institutions that individuals and groups pursue their symbolic/cultural interests. Institutions are also systems of symbolic opportunities and constraints which, as for material benefits, vary for different social groups. They provide a more or less munificent or limiting context for the shaping of social identities, the search for

meaning to one's existence, and for the definition of one's role in the community and society. They are also environments within which individuals and groups seek recognition of their identity and their historical and contemporary contribution to society. Institutions and their authorities control symbolic resources and some of the means to attain them — that is, resources and means pertaining to the identity, meaning, and recognition sought by individuals and groups.¹

The achievement of a satisfactory material condition requires not only appropriate action on the part of individuals and groups and the absence of barriers to their full participation, but also a favourable system of opportunities. Similarly, the enjoyment of a satisfactory symbolic/cultural condition requires not only appropriate actions and the absence of barriers, but also an institutional system that offers possibilities for the discovery of identity, for meaningful participation, and for the attainment of social recognition.

These possibilities consist of the system of values, beliefs, and items of cultural identity embedded in public institutions. The underlying conception of the society, sociopolitical philosophy, and cultural assumptions are conveyed through a multiplicity of media. They are expressed, for instance, in the Constitution and the Charter of Rights and in statements (e.g., white papers, speeches, task force reports) presenting, justifying, or explaining policy options. And of course the various policies are themselves a reflection of a system of values and a cultural identity. As far as ethnocultural groups are concerned, the Charter of Rights and the government's policy on multiculturalism constitute symbolic statements of considerable importance.

They are also expressed by symbols and rituals — institutional positions symbolic of authority such as the monarchy and the Governor General; the flag; historical figures and emblems appearing on stamps, money and public documents; dedication ceremonies; national holidays and their public celebration; monuments; and films and publications extolling the country, its people, history, natural environment, and achievements.

Values, beliefs and cultural identity are also reflected in organizational forms, mechanisms, and traditions. These include parliamentary government; the administration of justice; the electoral system; the decision-making process, including provisions (or lack thereof) for citizen consultation or participation; and the openness or secrecy of communication with the public. Of special relevance to linguistic and ethnocultural groups are the languages officially adopted for the conduct of public affairs and the presence (or absence) of mechanisms for taking into account their particular aspirations and concerns. The size and place of such mechanisms in the governmental structure reveal the importance that authorities attach to that field of activity and its constituent groups.

The composition of the staff of public institutions, especially those in positions of authority, is also a statement about the character or identity of the institutions and, by implication, of the society. Both employment policy and actual composition have a symbolic value. This is another area of considerable importance to linguistic and ethnocultural groups. It is not only a matter of jobs but also an indication of the extent to which society recognizes their identity and place in Canadian society.

Values and beliefs are also manifest in the multiplicity of practices, regulations, and other instrumental activities involved in the conduct of public affairs. These are primarily means toward certain practical results, but they also contain beliefs about human nature and the kind of society we want to be. They reveal certain principles and send messages to members of the society. The system of taxation is not only an instrument to collect revenues and orient economic activity. It also contains principles about what is a proper and fair distribution of the cost of public affairs. The budget is not only a management device. Its allocations also reveal a set of values and principles, indicate the problems considered worth addressing, the objectives to be sought, and the relative importance of various sectors of social, economic or cultural activity.

The symbolic/cultural component of public institutions is a complex reality. Only two of its aspects will be considered here. The first pertains to the creation of symbolic/cultural resources and to the degree of development of the symbolic/cultural component of public institutions. The second has to do with the distribution of those resources among the various segments of the society. Societies can be symbolically as well as economically developed or underdeveloped. They can be rich or poor in cultural meanings and identity. The repertoire of symbols and rituals may be elaborate or rudimentary. Klapp, among others, argues that contemporary Western societies show a certain degree of symbolic poverty or underdevelopment in the midst of material affluence. Symbolic poverty in his view is not a lack of factual information but a lack of the "kinds of symbols which make a person's life meaningful" (Klapp, 1969, p. 317). This poverty is the basis of the "identity-seeking movements of modern society"; they are "symptomatic of the fact that some modern social systems deprive people of psychological 'payoffs,' the lack of which [are] expressed by terms such as alienation, meaninglessness, identity problems. . . . The sense of being cheated is not explainable in economic terms because it is a *shortcoming in meaning*" (ibid., p. vii). The source of identity problems is not the individual but the symbolic/cultural system which, because of its inadequacies, "makes it harder for individuals to define themselves satisfactorily . . ." (ibid., p. 14).²

Because public institutions provide a context within which individuals pursue their symbolic interests — the definition and expression of iden-

tity, the search for meaning, and the pursuit of recognition — they constitute a system of opportunities for these purposes. If the symbolic/cultural component is developed and rich in values, symbols, meanings, and historical references, it provides an abundance of possibilities for the pursuit of symbolic interests. If it is poor or underdeveloped, people will feel “symbolically cheated” (Klapp, 1969, p. vii) and will turn elsewhere for the desired sources of identity and meaningfulness and for channels of cultural expression and recognition.

On the other hand, it may be that there is not a lack of meanings, but rather that meanings are not extensively communicated. Symbols and rituals may exist but be infrequently utilized. In other words, public authorities may give little attention to the underlying values of what they administer. Rather, they may emphasize their economic and practical aspects. In modern industrial societies, there is perhaps a tendency to consider the symbolic/cultural dimension of institutions as secondary, as something to consider when the “real” problems and issues have been dealt with. The debate over public policies tends to concentrate on their economic and material aspects; the concern is with a “rational” analysis of economic costs and benefits. This is reflection of the “*economisme*” that pervades our culture (Bourdieu, 1975) and its materialistic orientation. Shils and Young (1953) attribute this relative neglect to the “intellectualist bias” of elites. Klapp (1969) sees its source in the technological culture that leads to the mistrust of any method “whose processes and results are intangible, cannot be physically measured, and are not repeatable in a way achieved by precise instruments and mechanics.” He also (p. 125) relates it to the bureaucratic culture “which organizes people according to rational rules” and to scientific culture that considers rituals to be “in the domain of illogical and unscientific thought.”

The second aspect concerns the differential distribution of the symbolic resources or the opportunities of access to them. Generally, all segments of society are not equally advantaged by institutions. Some experience primarily the constraints, some opportunities they offer, while for others the package is fairly well balanced. This is the case for their material/instrumental features — tax regulations, tariffs, rules for subsidies, and safety regulations are only a few examples. It is also the case with the symbolic aspects of institutions. For instance, the constitutional and legal definitions of the collective identity may not reflect to the same degree the various cultural identities present in the society. Public organizations may embody the values and cultural traits of some groups but not others. Symbols, rituals, ceremonies and official pronouncements may recognize and give status to some groups but ignore others. They may be meaningful for some, antagonize others, and leave still others indifferent.

In other words, public institutions and their authorities are involved in the distribution of symbolic as well as material resources. They dispense

recognition and honour. They allocate possibilities for identification with purposes that have significance beyond an individual's limited experience. They distribute opportunities for meaningful social roles. These symbolic opportunities or resources can be unequally available to different categories of people, whether they are defined in terms of language, ethnoculture, region, gender, religion, age, or some other socially significant attribute. Accordingly, a well developed symbolic/cultural system can be perceived as inadequate by particular linguistic or ethnocultural groups, in the sense that they feel disadvantaged relative to other groups as far as possibilities of identification, meaningfulness and recognition are concerned.

Individuals expect to recognize themselves in public institutions. They expect a certain degree of consistency between their private identities and the symbolic contents upheld by public authorities, which are embedded in the societal institutions and celebrated in public events. Otherwise, individuals feel that they are strangers in society, that the society is not *their* society.

This expectation goes beyond the symbols of identity. Individuals also expect to recognize themselves in the values and meanings incorporated in the culture of public institutions. They expect a concordance between their own and the public way of life or cultural style. In this connection, Gusfield (1981, p. 182) notes that law

provides a reassurance to some that the society is indeed *their* society, its meanings their meanings, and its morality their morality. . . . The public order is capable of assuring those whose values it reflects that it is a society of consistent values in a culture of logical and morally satisfying meanings.

Concordance is also important in the case of language. Members of the society tend to expect a certain degree of congruence between the public language and their own linguistic competence and style. Indeed, in a powerful way, the language used in public affairs and institutions signifies to individuals and groups "that the society is indeed *their* society"; the institutions, their institutions. Language is perhaps the most effective symbolic medium for assuring a mutual reflection of the public world of institutions and the private world of individuals (Jackson, 1977).

To the extent that the symbolic/cultural system is inadequate for certain groups in the society, it will be a source of alienation for them. They will come to feel "estranged from, made unfriendly toward the society and the culture it carries" (Nettler, 1957, p. 672). They will become resentful toward the institutions that fail to recognize adequately their identity, societal role, and aspirations. Distributive inadequacies also frequently lead to social tensions as symbolically disadvantaged groups pressure for a redefinition of the character of public institutions, and as those who anticipate symbolic losses attempt to resist possible changes.

Inadequacies in the distribution of symbolic resources, and the alienation, resentment and social tensions they bring about, undermine the legitimacy of public institutions in general and of state institutions in particular. The values, cultural premises, and philosophies that underlie public institutions justify them in the eyes of members of the society. By validating the institutions and their character, they become the basis of the loyalty of individual members. Loyalty implies a commitment to an institution largely because of the values it embodies and the identity it represents, and not only because of expected material benefits or fear of punishment.³ If such loyalty is low in a significant segment of the population, society's capacity to act effectively in relation to problems and opportunities is reduced. Also, the degree to which the institutions are accepted as legitimate for the management of public affairs is diminished. A serious lack of loyalty means a rejection of the institution, independence movements being an extreme form that this rejection can take.

Collective expression of symbolic frustration by significant social groups and perceived problems of institutional legitimacy may lead authorities to intervene.⁴ Their interventions can work to improve the symbolic/cultural system — e.g., the exploration of history for new symbols, the introduction of new ceremonies, the enrichment of existing rituals, the encouragement of cultural creation, and so on. On the other hand, the interventions can aim primarily at redefining the symbolic/cultural component so as to establish a more satisfactory correspondence between public institutions and the identity, cultural characteristics, or lifestyle of particular segments of the population. This symbolic transformation can entail additions, the removal of items that irritate certain groups, or selective emphasis depending on particular circumstances.

In this essay, it will be argued that multiculturalism policy is best understood in this light. Before considering the policy itself, however, it is useful to describe briefly the sociopolitical context in which the condition of ethnocultural groups became a public issue. This context involves various events and circumstances, as well as government activities and sociopolitical processes triggered or accentuated by government actions or by the changing sociopolitical environment.

The Sociopolitical Context of Multiculturalism

In recent decades, Canada has experienced a number of symbolic challenges. Among the main ones were those occasioned by the expressed dissatisfaction and claims of linguistic and ethnocultural group. Several members of these collectivities increasingly perceived and experienced the symbolic (as well as other) dimension of public institutions as inadequate. What some groups questioned was the historically estab-

lished character of state institutions. Others questioned the interventions to transform that character. The challenge experienced, especially that posed by the Quebec independence movement, had to do with the legitimacy of state institutions. More fundamentally, it pertained to the very conception of Canadian society and the positions that various collectivities were to occupy in the society and in relation to state institutions.

A society is continuously in the process of being constructed and transformed under the impact of a multiplicity of internal and external forces and actions related to social and institutional interests. There are times, however, when the process is accelerated, when change is precipitated, when a variety of circumstances and interventions converge to generate a significant reorientation or reconstruction of the collective identity and the character of public institutions. It is the contention here that the decades following World War II constituted such a period in Canada, at least as far as the ethnocultural component of the symbolic order is concerned.

In this section, some of the main circumstances, events, and state interventions that characterize that period are briefly reviewed. This overview of the context is essential to understand the underlying dynamics and meaning of multiculturalism as an institutional policy. The relevant context involves a complex interaction of various circumstances and state activity that impinged directly or indirectly on the symbolic/cultural order. A number of the events and circumstances that took place drew the authorities of public institutions into the process of symbolic change, but some of these circumstances were themselves the result of state activity. Sociopolitical processes were triggered that led in turn to further pressures on the state, in the form of either opposition to proposed symbolic changes or claims for different kinds of changes.

The section begins with a presentation of a few relevant phenomena, including state activities. This is followed by an examination of the sociopolitical processes involved in redefining the symbolic order and the position of various segments of the society within it.

Immigration was considerable between World War II and 1980. In the 15-year period ending in 1945, immigrants to Canada totalled 219,494. In each of the two subsequent 15-year periods (1946–60 and 1961–75), Canada received over two million immigrants (2,005,240 and 2,244,081 respectively). In the following 8-year period (1976–83) an estimated 945,668 arrived. During this period, immigration policy and regulations were an object of public debate and change (Hawkins, 1972). Among the most significant events were the creation of a Department of Citizenship and Immigration in 1950; the Immigration Act of 1952; the 1962 regulations that removed racial discrimination in the selection of immigrants; the controversial deportation cases of 1964 that led to the commissioning of an independent inquiry whose recommendations led to the Immigra-

tion Appeal Board Act; the white paper submitted in 1966 and the appointment of a special joint committee of the Senate and House of Commons to examine it; the creation of a new Department of Manpower and Immigration in 1965; the 1967 regulations that introduced the "point system" for the selection of immigrants; the controversial green paper of 1975 and the Senate-Parliamentary committee set up to examine it; and the new Immigration Act of 1977.

One consequence of the immigration flow during that period was to further increase the ethnic diversity of the population. Table 2-1 shows the distribution of the population within three broad categories. The size of the non-British, non-French category as a percentage of the total Canadian population increased from 20 percent in 1941 to 26 percent in 1981.

Changes have also occurred within the "other" ethnic category. First, it has become more diverse over the years, as is indicated by the distributions presented in Table 2-2. Second, members of "other" ethnic groups are somewhat more likely to live in urban centres than they were some decades ago. One implication of this is that with urbanization, the traditional supports of ethnic boundaries — territorial segregation, institutional completeness, cultural identity, and social distance — became insufficient. If it is to maintain itself, urban ethnic pluralism also seems to require a more dynamic regenerational orientation, which includes "dimensions of ideological mythology, historical symbols, charismatic leadership, and social status" (Driedger, 1977, p. 77). The symbolic dimensions of ethnicity become predominant (Burnet, 1975).

This predominance is further accentuated by the fact that the white ethnic population is in large proportion a middle-class population (Darroch, 1979; Blishen, 1970; Reitz, Calzavara, and Dasko, 1981). Associated with this change is a greater concern with status and social honour relative to material well-being (Collins, 1975, chap. 4). It would perhaps be more accurate to say that members of the middle class are pre-occupied with the status-enhancing aspects of material objects and pursuits, and take their instrumental features for granted.

The size of the ethnocultural groups and their increasingly urban, middle-class composition have augmented their sociopolitical significance. This was revealed in a special way during Diefenbaker's years in power. Newman (1963), p. 187) notes that a

praiseworthy and realistic historical concern of John Diefenbaker was his view of Canada not as a bi-racial, but as a multi-racial nation. As the first Canadian prime minister who was not of purely British or French stock, Diefenbaker was genuinely sympathetic to the welfare of the two million immigrants who had crossed the Atlantic in the postwar years.

The following is a significant statement by Diefenbaker (quoted by Newman, 1963, p. 187):

TABLE 2-1 Population of British Isles, French, and other Origins
Canada, 1901-1981

Ethnic Origin	1901	1911	1921	1931	1941	1951	1961	1971	1981 ^a
					(thousands)				
British Isles	3,063	3,999	4,869	5,831	5,716	6,710	7,997	9,624	9,674
French	1,649	2,062	2,453	2,928	3,483	4,319	5,540	6,180	6,439
Other	659	1,146	1,466	2,068	2,308	2,981	4,792	5,764	6,370
Multiple Origins	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1,600
Total	5,371	7,207	8,788	10,377	11,507	14,009	18,238	21,568	24,084
					(percent)				
British Isles	57.0	55.5	55.4	51.9	49.7	47.9	43.8	44.6	40.2
French	30.7	28.6	27.9	28.2	30.3	30.8	30.4	28.6	26.7
Other	12.2	15.9	16.7	19.9	20.0	21.2	25.8	26.7	26.4
Multiple Origins	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Statistics Canada, *Census of Canada*, various years.

a. In the 1981 census, respondents could report more than one ethnic origin:

"In earlier censuses, only the respondent's paternal ancestry was to be reported, theoretically resulting in one ethnic origin per respondent. For 1981, this restriction has been removed and a person may now report more than one ethnic origin" (Statistics Canada, 1984, p. V).

Those whose multiple origins consisted only of "other" origins were added to the "other" category. It should also be noted that the 6.7 percent of multiple origins can be broken down as follows: 1.8 percent involve British and French origins and 4.9 percent other combinations.

TABLE 2-2 Population by Ethnic Group, 1871-1971

	1871	1911	1921	1931	1951	1961	1971
				(percent)			
Austrian	—	3.8	7.3	2.4	1.1	2.3	0.7
Belgian	—	0.8	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.3	0.9
Czech and Slovak	—	—	0.6	1.5	2.1	1.6	1.4
Dutch	10.1	4.9	8.0	7.2	8.9	9.1	7.4
Finnish	—	1.4	1.5	2.1	1.5	1.3	1.0
German	69.4	35.2	20.1	22.9	20.8	22.3	22.9
Greek	—	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	1.2	2.2
Hungarian	—	1.0	0.9	2.0	2.0	2.7	2.3
Italian	0.4	4.0	4.6	4.7	5.1	9.6	12.7
Jewish	—	6.7	8.6	7.6	6.1	3.7	5.2
Lithuanian	—	—	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.4
Polish	—	2.9	3.6	7.0	7.4	6.9	5.5
Roumanian	—	0.5	0.9	1.4	0.8	0.9	0.5
Russian	0.2	3.9	6.8	4.3	3.1	2.5	1.1
Scandinavian ^a	0.6	9.8	11.4	11.0	9.5	8.2	6.7
Portuguese ^b	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.7
Ukrainian	—	6.6	7.3	10.9	13.2	10.1	10.1
Yugoslav	—	—	0.3	0.8	0.7	1.4	1.8
Other European	1.3	0.6	1.2	0.4	1.2	1.9	1.7
Chinese	—	2.4	2.7	2.3	1.1	1.2	2.1
Japanese	—	0.8	1.1	1.1	0.7	0.6	0.6
Other Asiatic	—	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.7	2.2
Native Indian and Inuit	7.9	9.2	7.8	6.2	5.6	4.7	5.4
Other and not stated	10.1	4.6	2.7	1.4	6.3	5.2	3.5
Totals (other than French and British)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number in thousands	293	1,147	1,465	2,068	2,980	4,699	5,764

Source: Statistics Canada, *Perspective Canada* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974), p. 262.

a. Includes Danish, Icelandic, Norwegian and Swedish.

b. Included with "Other European" prior to 1971.

Being of mixed origin myself, I knew something, in my boyhood days in Saskatchewan, of the feeling that was all too apparent in many parts of Canada, that citizenship depended upon surnames, or even upon blood counts. It was then, as a boy on the empty Prairies, that I made the initial determination to eliminate this feeling that being a Canadian was a matter of name and blood.

Through Diefenbaker, the political presence of ethnocultural groups was increasingly felt — through his very person as prime minister, his appointments to the Cabinet, and the presence of elected members of his party who belonged to “other” ethnic groups (18 different ethnic origins were represented) (Newman, 1963, p. 188).

The establishment of the Canadian Folk Arts Council in 1964 was another indication of the growing presence of cultural diversity in Canada. The Council, with member organizations in all ten provinces, sponsored a large number of activities and contributed to an increased level of awareness of ethnocultures in Canada.

The American cultural and economic presence in Canada also increased during that period. At the cultural level, this prominence was apparent not only in popular culture, but also in news coverage and educational materials and personnel. Thus, the growing American presence, which for a long time had been experienced as a threat by Canadians, now presented a new kind of challenge for our collective identity. Its impact was compounded by a shift in identity away from England. It was not the case of a small, young and independent country submitting to influences from a powerful neighbour. Rather, the growing American influences were experienced by a country that had been economically, culturally and politically tied to another country, which it considered its mother country. This was primarily the experience of Canadians of British origin. For them, the growing American presence represented a break, as they felt they ceased to be part of something important and meaningful. They felt that their collective and individual identities were at stake.

This sense of loss was accentuated by the decline of the British Empire, a phenomenon that began in the last part of the nineteenth century but became evident with World War II (Burnet, 1975, p. 207; Bell-Deutschmann, 1978). That important entity, of which many Canadians felt their country to be an integral part, was itself on the decline and could therefore contribute less to Canadians' sense of collective identity and their own historical significance. The empire was losing its status-giving properties. For some, the decline of the British Empire and its implication for the British cultural presence in Canada was experienced as a loss or a sort of symbolic vacuum. For many, however, it was defined as the normal evolution of the country. It was a new symbolic cultural opportunity. They felt they were a part of, indeed the makers of, a distinct nation.

One manifestation of this was the symbolic distancing from Britain represented by a number of federal government initiatives. One of the most significant was the Canadian Citizenship Bill of 1946.

Up until then, British nationality, or British "subjecthood," had been the basic identity of all peoples under the British Crown; and Canadian citizenship, in so far as it could be said to have existed at all, was simply a minor local variation. The Canadian act completely reversed this order. (Creighton, 1976, p. 129)

There were other manifestations. For instance, in 1949 the Supreme Court of Canada replaced the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London as Canada's final court of appeal. The practice of appointing Canadians as Governor General began in 1952 with Vincent Massey. More significant, however, was the federal government's proposal for a distinctive Canadian flag and its expressed wish to adopt "O Canada" rather than "God Save the Queen" as the official national anthem. A flag was adopted in 1965 after a long and intense debate throughout the country (Albinski, 1967). The adoption of "O Canada" as the national anthem was to come later, in 1975.

During this period, a new sociopolitical awakening was also taking place among native peoples. Ponting and Gibbins (1980, p. 25) write that "during the 1960s Indian Affairs in Canada came to be so buffeted by the winds of social change that a climate of confusion and near turmoil prevailed." Changes took place within the native community as well as in its relationship with government. The late 1960s saw the formation of the National Indian Brotherhood and the emergence of a new class of Indian political leaders. These leaders and their organizations have been an important source of pressure for change. Also in the late 1960s, the federal government proposed drastic changes in its relationship with Indians.⁵ The 1969 white paper considered that the best way to deal with the unacceptable conditions in which many Indians found themselves was through "full and equal participation in the cultural, social, economic and political life of Canada" (Canada, 1969, p. 6). Its approach was integrationist, if not assimilationist. Needless to say, the government statement proved to be highly controversial. Opposition to it from a number of sources, especially from Indians, was so strong that the government was forced to retract and the proposed policy was withdrawn in 1971. It should be noted that this was also the year of the promulgation by the federal government of its multiculturalism policy.

Perhaps the most important phenomenon of the period was the independence movement in Quebec. This was the most serious challenge for public institutions in general and state institutions in particular, and was perceived as such by a significant proportion of Canadians. Its importance derived not only from its particular objectives but also from its rapid growth and sense of urgency. The movement voiced grievances

and frustrations on one hand and aspirations and demands on the other. These brought about a number of government interventions, most of which became controversial, if they were not so when initially proposed.

One of the first and most significant interventions was the creation of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.⁶ The commission itself constituted an important element in the sociopolitical dynamics of the period. Its mandate was

to inquire into and report upon the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada and to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races, taking into account the contribution made by the other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution; and in particular

1. to report upon the situation and practice of bilingualism within all branches and agencies of the federal administration — including Crown corporations — and in their communications with the public and to make recommendations designed to ensure the bilingual and basically bicultural character of the federal administration;

2. to report on the role of the public and private organizations, including the mass communications media, in promoting bilingualism, better cultural relations and a more widespread appreciation of the basically bicultural character of our country and of the subsequent contribution made by the other cultures; and to recommend what should be done to improve that role; and

3. having regard to the fact that constitutional jurisdiction over education is vested in the provinces, to discuss with the provincial governments the opportunities available to Canadians to learn the English and French languages and to recommend what could be done to enable Canadians to become bilingual. (Canada, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1967, pp. 173–74)

The objective was quite clear. It was to explore how the public institutions of Canada should be modified, instrumentally and symbolically, to better reflect the bilingual and bicultural character of the country, while recognizing the contributions of other groups. The objective was that both English- and French-speaking Canadians be able to consider the national institutions as their own.⁷

The commission made several recommendations, many of which were subsequently adopted and implemented by the government. It is not necessary to review all of these here. The promulgation of the Official Languages Act in 1969 should be mentioned because of its distinctive importance. The main objective of the Act was institutional, not individual, bilingualism. It was to transform national institutions in their functioning and in their symbolic dimension.

These were among the main events and state activities taking place in the ethnocultural field in Canada. Similar movements and events were taking place in the United States (the civil rights movement, for example) and in European countries, in an overall climate of social change. Four phenomena should be mentioned because of their impact on Canadian society at that time.

First, there was considerable economic expansion. The evidence summarized by Bothwell, Drummond, and English (1981, p. 10) reveals

a steady upward progress in output, employment, and prosperity. . . . Since 1944 most Canadian families have been improving their situations most of the time, and the economy has grown almost fast enough to absorb the rapidly expanding labour force, which rose from 5.2 million in 1945 to nearly 11 million in 1979. Population rose from 11.9 million to 23.6 million, while output rose from \$29.7 billion to \$126.1 billion in 1978 (in both years outputs are valued at 1971 prices). It is not surprising, then, to find that the average income was much higher by the mid- to late-seventies than in the mid-forties. In 1944 it was \$2,486 per head; in 1978, \$5,388. In thirty-four years, hardly more than a generation, the average Canadian's living standard doubled.

Second, there was a noticeable increase in state intervention in social, economic, and cultural affairs. This expansion was to some degree associated with the population growth and economic prosperity noted earlier, and to some degree also to changes in political philosophy. Government activity is partly reflected in the size of its expenditures. In Canada, real government spending at all levels as a percent of GNP rose from 28.6 percent in 1947 to 40.0 percent in 1977. The increase was modest at the federal level (from 14.2 to 16.1 percent). It was most significant at the provincial level (from 5.2 to 12.4 percent), a reflection of the substantial expansion in various provincial services such as education and health care. At the local level, the increase was 4.4 to 8.9 percent (Butler and MacNaughton, 1981, pp. 89–92). Employment growth in the public service relative to total employment took place mainly in the 1950s. From 1961 to 1975, it grew by only 1.5 percentage points (from 22.2 to 23.7 percent of total employment). The growth of public service employment in absolute terms over the postwar years reflects the increase in population during that period (Foot, 1978).

Thirdly, the baby boom generation⁸ started to come of age around the mid-1960s, and to enter post-secondary education or the labour force. These cohorts had already challenged other institutions — those involved with childbirth, daycare, and primary and secondary education — largely due to their sheer numbers in comparison with the preceding generation. As they reached adolescence and young adulthood, their impact was also due to the cultural values and lifestyles they championed.⁹

The relevance of the baby boom generation should be underscored. Its challenge to societal institutions concerned symbolic dimension to a considerable extent. Once the instrumental problems of accommodating the upsurge in numbers had been more or less taken care of, the central issues had to do with recognition, identity, individual and collective expression, and the relative merit of alternative lifestyles. Although they were partly different in specific contents, these were very much the kind of issues on which the ethnic-based movements were focussing. It should be noted in this connection that the baby boom phenomenon took place among Canadians of "other" origins as well as among those of British and French origins.

Finally, toward the end of the late 1960s, the feminist movement began to gain momentum. A number of organizational activities led to the formation of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women. Its report was tabled in 1967 and published in 1970. In 1972, a conference on the theme "Strategy for Change" was organized which "gave birth to the National Action Committee, an umbrella organization that continues to provide a formal network for Canadian women. Because the NAC speaks for 170 women's organizations across the country, it forms the basis of an important pressure group" (Wilson, 1982, p. 127).

The sociopolitical context of the period can be described as a configuration of changing circumstances, events and state activities, as well as a set of unfolding processes. These processes were an integral part of the evolving situation. They were, so to speak, its underlying dynamics — a dynamics, as noted above, consisting of the interaction between various circumstances, groups pursuing their symbolic interests, and the state pursuing its institutional interests. The following appear to be among the most important of these processes.

Rise in the Salience of Ethnicity

Among the underlying processes were those that raised the salience of ethnicity in public affairs. Ethnicity, like other attributes of social differentiation such as age, gender, religion or social class, does not always have the same importance in determining what becomes a public issue. Different social, economic or political conditions can increase or decrease its prominence. The conditions of the 1950s and 1960s heightened its salience.

The rise in immigration affected the prominence of ethnicity because newcomers understandably attach great importance to their culture of origin. A large inflow of new immigrants tends to revitalize the ethnic community; it provides a new clientele for ethnic organizations and is a source of cultural renewal.

The proposed and actual changes in immigration policy and the public debate surrounding such changes also increased awareness of various

ethnic groups and their growing significance in Canadian society. Aside from their economic, social and demographic consequences, these changes were symbolic events that brought to public consciousness questions concerning the kind of society we are and want to be.

The expression of grievances and aspirations by linguistic and cultural groups brought these social cleavages closer to the centre of public affairs. Moreover, political authorities could not ignore voices from the French-speaking community and from native peoples. Their responses and the public debate they generated further increased the salience of these lines of social affiliation. Public controversies frequently make people more aware of "the side of the ethnocultural fence on which they stand" or lead them to choose sides. The result is frequently an increased consciousness of who one is or is not from an ethnocultural point of view.

Indirectly, economic prosperity also contributed to an increase in the prominence of the symbolic dimension of ethnicity. In periods of prosperity, economic issues tend to be less at the centre of public preoccupations. Other issues can then gain some importance. In contrast, periods of economic decline tend to give relative prominence to the material/instrumental aspects of ethnicity and ethnic relations.

Erosion of the Symbolic Component of Public Institutions

Several of the events mentioned above contributed to the erosion of the symbolic system in its collective identity, cultural traditions, and linguistic dimensions. In this period a convergence of circumstances seemed to bring the process to a head — increased immigration, the American presence, the decline of the British Empire, government initiatives to reduce Canada's symbolic ties with England, and the Quebec independence movement. It became increasingly clear that the character of public institutions was inadequate in the sense that it corresponded less and less with the character of several segments of the population. The vision of a British type of society was increasingly unrealistic for Canada. A somewhat different view of the Canadian entity and a different collective identity had to be reflected in the cultural character of political, educational and other public institutions; in the language of use in these institutions; in their practices, traditions and way of life; and in the symbols used to represent the society and its people. During the 1960s, it became increasingly evident that the symbolic/cultural character of public institutions needed redefinition and renewal to more adequately correspond to the new realities.

Displacement of the Traditionally Dominant Status Group

Corresponding to the erosion of the symbolic/cultural character of public institutions was the lessening of the cultural dominance of the group

that had been fairly successful in the past in defining and controlling the character of those institutions.¹⁰ The decline of the British Empire, particularly after World War II, no doubt contributed to the partial loss of cultural status experienced by Canadians of British origin. However, events within Canada contributed more directly to this status displacement — the independence movement and other expressions of Quebec nationalism, federal initiatives with regard to the French language, the increasingly multicultural character of Canada and the political articulation of the idea of cultural pluralism, and the American economic and cultural presence in Canada.¹¹

Ethnic studies and the inclusion in history textbooks of material on the contribution of other ethnic groups were also perceived as a threat by a number of Canadians of British origin. These signs of new awareness of other ethnic groups reflected the loss of cultural dominance by British-origin Canadians, and the fact that they were less in possession of society's symbolic system. Also, ethnic studies inevitably uncover more or less unpleasant events that may tarnish the image that cultural groups construct for themselves and for outsiders. Ethnic studies may build the image of the cultural minorities; what they do for the dominant cultural group is less certain. The political awakening of native peoples is also relevant here, especially their attempts to alert international opinion to their condition of subordination and poverty.

Although the experience of status displacement is almost inevitably accompanied by status anxieties and resistance, it must be noted that the reaction of the British-origin community was positive to a significant degree.¹² This is reflected in the changing attitudes and behaviour of individuals, as well as in institutional accommodations vis-à-vis francophones, native peoples, and other ethnic groups. There is still, however, a significant resistance in certain segments of that community.

Intergroup Comparisons and Competition

The events and circumstances also triggered or accentuated intergroup comparison. The expression of aspirations and claims by one group almost inevitably leads other groups to compare them with their own situation. Intergroup comparisons are further accentuated when institutional authorities begin to respond to expressed claims and aspirations. What particular groups seek and obtain from public institutions is closely monitored by the leaders of other groups.

The Quebec nationalist movement in general and the independence movement in particular raised numerous questions about the place of the other ethnic groups in the sociopolitical system. What kind of collectivity did the French represent — a founding people and charter group, a nation, or a group like other ethnic groups? If the French collectivity was to be defined as different, what would that imply in terms of political

status and prerogatives for itself and other groups? What would be the relative gains and losses of the different groups?

It was inevitable that the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism would become part of the dynamics of intergroup comparisons. Although established by federal authorities to deal with the independence threat, it could not avoid the controversy over the relative position of different groups in society, nor could the government in its subsequent policy proposals. In the controversy, the vision of Canada that was implied by the name and mandate of the commission was questioned. The commission increased the level of ethnic consciousness among the non-British, non-French ethnic groups and led them to compare their situation with that of the French collectivity. Groups looked at each other in terms of their contribution to Canadian society and questioned each other's claims concerning the significance of their contribution. Groups that could not plausibly claim that they had played a special role simply rejected the historical contribution to the founding and constitution of the society as a legitimate basis for public recognition.

In short, the Quebec independence movement and the royal commission heightened the status anxieties of many members of other ethnic groups. It increased their fear of being defined as second-class citizens, of having their culture and contributions to Canadian society devalued, and of being symbolically cheated or degraded while the status of another group was raised and glorified.

These pressures and counterpressures led to a shift from biculturalism to multiculturalism — a shift in the allocation of sociopolitical recognition and status among ethnocultural groups. Although the special status of the French collectivity was still acknowledged in the bilingualism policy, the multiculturalism movement and subsequent government policy represented a possible loss of status. In fact, multiculturalism could mean that the French collectivity would eventually be perceived as merely another ethnic group. The independence movement and efforts to assume a more significant place in national institutions can be seen as attempts by the French to raise their status. Their resistance to multiculturalism was an attempt to prevent a loss of whatever sociopolitical status they had succeeded in gaining over the years.

Generally, what has happened in the last few decades is that the sociopolitical context in which groups strive to achieve social recognition and compete with other groups has been modified. Several new social, demographic, political and economic conditions affecting the means and conditions of status attainment or maintenance have emerged. Foremost among these are the new parameters resulting from changes in the degree and type of government interventions. This is true in several spheres of activity, but is especially the case in the linguistic and ethnocultural fields. Governments in Canada have frequently intervened in the past in regard to languages and ethnocultures. What charac-

terizes the recent period is the extent and especially the content of their interventions.

The growth of state intervention means that groups are not only competing with each other in the marketplace, but increasingly in the political arena as well. This is the case with symbolic as well as material interests. Access to the resources of the state have become more important for the improvement of one's symbolic and material condition.

State interventions provide opportunities and set constraints for the pursuit of symbolic goals. They offer means for groups to compete for status with other groups, but they also define the basic parameters within which the competition is to take place. As mentioned earlier, new policies were introduced, together with associated regulations and programs. These changed the system of status-enhancing opportunities and constraints for linguistic and ethnocultural groups. With a different legislative and organizational apparatus, the cultural status game has to be played quite differently.

Sociopolitical Mobilization

Accompanying the above processes were those of sociopolitical mobilization on an ethnic basis. "While some of the beliefs and propositions underlying the 'ideology' of multiculturalism (if not the term itself) have long been current among Ukrainian Canadians and some other ethnic groups, it was only during the 1960s that this 'ideology' crystallized. . . ." (Bociurkiw, 1978, p. 101). Representatives of some groups articulated certain demands or opposed the claims of others. As already indicated, this mobilization took place in the context of a widespread mobilization of groups in the society at large. Moreover, ethnic mobilization in Canada occurred in the context of ethnic mobilization in several other countries.

How widespread and intensive ethnic mobilization for multiculturalism was is difficult to ascertain. Limited research results are available on two aspects of mobilization — popular support and organizational activity. Surveys that could document the existence of grassroots support for multiculturalism do not appear to have been carried out before the early 1970s, when two major studies were undertaken (O'Bryan, Reitz and Kuplowska, 1976; Berry, Kalin and Taylor, 1976). Both found fairly wide support for a multiculturalism policy. This support must be interpreted with caution, however, as both studies found little awareness of the policy. In their 1973 study, O'Bryan and his colleagues asked a sample from ten minority ethnic groups in five cities if they were aware of the policy. "Only 22.3 percent of the respondents said 'yes.' About the same number had some vague knowledge, but more than 50 percent had not heard of the policy" (O'Bryan, Reitz, and Kuplowska, 1976, p. 154). The 1974 study by Berry et al., based on a

national sample, found that less than one out of five Canadians had any knowledge of the multiculturalism policy that had been in existence for three years.

Berry et al. also found that although support for the idea of multiculturalism was high, it was viewed as something that should take place within ethnic communities and not in the public sphere. The view of majority and minority persons tended to be negative with regard to the use of non-official languages in broadcasting and regular school programs; they also tended to reject the use of public funds to support multiculturalism. The study also found that the idea of multiculturalism received the greatest support among Anglo-Saxon respondents, followed by those of "other" ethnic origins, and then by French Canadians. After reviewing the results of the two surveys, Palmer (1976, p. 60) concludes:

Given the general lack of awareness of the federal multicultural policy, the luke-warm support for multiculturalism as an idea, and the unwillingness to take any positive action in support of multiculturalism, one must conclude that the prevailing Anglo-Canadian attitude toward it is one of indifference.

The results show that his conclusion can be applied to the non-British, non-French groups as well.

Awareness of the government policy may not have been widespread and support for the idea may not have been strong, but it was nevertheless sufficient to spawn a certain amount of organizational activity. It is this activity that "crystallized the ideology," making it a public issue by attracting the attention of politicians, civil servants, and the media.¹³

A significant portion of this activity took the form of a protest against some of the positions of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. A number of groups rejected the definition of the situation that was incorporated in the terms of reference of the commission. Statements to that effect were made to the media and briefs were submitted to the commission (Burnet, 1984). In his review of this protest, Jaworsky (1979, p. 50) notes that

as the B&B Commission began to hold formal meetings in the prairie provinces, reaction from the non-Anglo-Saxon and non-French ethnic groups became more vocal. The vehement statements made by some members of the "other" ethnic groups were unexpected, and as a result the Commission's co-chairman had to postpone some of their formal meetings, and had to slow down the work of the Commission.

The protest, however, was not unanimous. Some groups supported the commission's perspective on the question of language and culture. In addition, the number of ethnic organizations that submitted briefs was relatively limited. The commission's report lists 55 briefs from 14 different ethnic groups, but of those, 32 (about 60 percent) were submitted

by Ukrainian organizations.¹⁴ This does not suggest a widespread mobilization across groups. Finally, there was little or no coordination among the various groups in the preparation and presentation of their briefs (Jaworsky, 1979, p. 50).

Conferences were also organized to activate public opinion or influence governmental authorities. An important one was the "Thinkers' Conference on Cultural Rights" held in Toronto in 1968. It was organized by Senator Yuzyk and was attended by representatives of about 20 different ethnic groups. In 1970, a campaign consisting primarily of conferences was launched by the Ukrainian Canadian University Students' Union "to mobilize grass-roots support . . . for the policy . . . and to stimulate other ethnic groups to articulate their demands" (Bociurkiw, 1978, p. 108). This campaign, it should be noted, was financially supported by the federal government.

This financial assistance indicates that governmental agents and organizations were also actively involved in promoting a shift toward multiculturalism. In addition to giving assistance to ethnic organizations, the Citizenship Branch also

helped to arrange public meetings across the country to discuss the work of the B&B Commission, and individual Branch officers encouraged these [ethnocultural] organizations and interested individuals to prepare and present briefs to the Commission. (Jaworsky, 1979, p. 52)

The government also provided mechanisms through which the views of ethnocultural spokesmen could be expressed and monitored. The ethnic press was reviewed. The minister and his staff held public and private meetings with ethnic group representatives (Jaworsky, 1979, p. 63). The 1970–71 hearings of the Parliament's special joint committee on the Constitution was also a channel of communication with governmental authorities on this matter. The committee recommended in favour of multiculturalism (Bociurkiw, 1978, p. 104).

Provincial governments were also part of this movement. The Alberta government announced its multiculturalism policy in July 1971 and Ontario announced in September that it would hold an Ontario Heritage Conference the following year. Such provincial initiatives probably spurred the federal government to move in the direction of multiculturalism.

Another incentive was that multiculturalism turned out to be instrumental to the Trudeau government's political agenda. Indeed, the terms of the royal commission could be interpreted as lending support to the "two nations" view of Canada. A policy of cultural pluralism would help to undermine a notion that was seen as dangerously consistent with the Quebec independence movement (Jaworsky, 1979, p. 59).

In short, the research results on popular attitudes do not indicate a strong and widespread demand for state intervention in the ethnocultural field, except for the symbolic affirmation of Canada as a multi-

cultural rather than bicultural society. The demand for a federal policy of multiculturalism seems to have come primarily from ethnic organizational elites and their supporters, from government agencies and their officers, and from political authorities.

The Federal Multiculturalism Policy

Significance of the Policy

It was in a context replete with ethnically related events that the notion of a multicultural ideal for Canadian society entered the public debate. The events of the late 1950s and 1960s had set in motion processes that either led directly to the promulgation of an ethnic policy or at least provided a climate favourable to a move in that direction. In fact, such a policy was an integral part of the reconstruction of the symbolic system. Public institutions needed to be modified in such a way as to reflect the linguistic and multicultural character of society. As discussed earlier, such reconstruction entails two related tasks. First, new values, meanings and identity must be adopted; organizational forms must be transformed or created to embody the new values, cultural traits, and collective identity; and symbols must be invented for their public expression. Such a transformation involves introducing new symbolic forms and eliminating those felt to be offensive or obsolete.

The second task is usually necessitated by the first. Changes in the symbolic/cultural system generally require a reallocation of status among some of the groups. Symbolic changes that give more recognition to some segments of the population are likely to be perceived as a relative devaluation by others. In their attempts to manage this reallocation, authorities had to intervene on several fronts at the same time — language, ethnocultures, aboriginal rights — and in a variety of ways on each of them.

The contextual changes noted earlier suggest that the climate was propitious for changes in the symbolic order. The immediate motive, however, was the rise of the independence movement and the government's initial response. The transformation of institutional identity, language, and symbols to help members of the French segment of the society recognize themselves generated identification and status concerns not only among persons of British origin, but among those of non-British, non-French origin as well.

The first manifestations of these concerns by non-British, non-French groups was the reaction of some representatives to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. They reacted against the assimilationist orientation of the commission toward "other" ethnic groups and the clearly secondary place they occupied in its preoccupations (Burnet, 1984). As the mandate quoted earlier indicates, it was acknowl-

edged that their role was to be taken into account, but it was not seen as a central one.

These reactions led the commission and its staff to attempt "to formulate a scheme in which their members were in no way second-class citizens, a phrase of which the Commissioners had become very weary, but yet the French and English linguistic communities were upheld" (Burnet, 1984, p. 11). The reorientation of the commission was reflected in Book IV of its Report, *The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups*, published in 1970. The federal government's response was the policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework.

It seems quite clear that when the policy was introduced, the concerns of the non-British, non-French segment of the society were not primarily with cultural maintenance. Instead, their concerns reflected status anxiety — fear of being defined as second-class citizens, marginal to the identity system being redefined. The policy was thus in part a response to the status anxieties voiced in relation to the themes of biculturalism, a two-nation society, charter groups, and founding peoples. One of its objectives was to affirm symbolically that Canadian society is open to all cultural identities, to indicate that it recognizes them all and that it recognizes them all as equal.¹⁵

This underlying concern with the public recognition that various components of the society should receive is clearly expressed in the Prime Minister's statement to the House of Commons in 1971 in which he announced the policy:

In the past, substantial public support has been given largely to the arts and cultural institutions of English-speaking Canada. More recently and largely with the help of the royal commission's earlier recommendations in Volumes I to III, there has been a conscious effort on the government's part to correct any bias against the French language and culture. In the last few months the government has taken steps to provide funds to support cultural-educational centres for native people. The policy I am announcing today accepts the contention of the other cultural communities that they, too, are essential elements in Canada and deserve government assistance in order to contribute to regional and national life in ways that derive from their heritage yet are distinctively Canadian. (Canada, House of Commons, 1971, pp. 8545–46)

The policy was intended as another element in the shaping of our society. This is reflected, for example, in this excerpt from the same statement to the House:

A policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework commends itself to the government as the most suitable means of assuring the cultural freedom of Canadians. Such a policy should help to break down discriminatory attitudes and cultural jealousies. National unity, if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense, must be founded on confidence in one's own individual identity; out of this can grow respect for that of others and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes and assumptions. A vigorous

policy of multiculturalism will help create this initial confidence. It can form the base of a society which is based on fair play for all. The government will support and encourage the various cultures and ethnic groups that give structure and vitality to our society. They will be encouraged to share their cultural expression and values with other Canadians and so contribute to a richer life for us all. (Canada, House of Commons, 1971, p. 8545)

The policy's objective is the incorporation of the "other" ethnic groups in the cultural/symbolic fabric of Canadian society. For instance, the promulgation itself was an important symbolic gesture affirming a particular value — the full acceptance of all members of the society, whatever their cultural background. "A policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework" also represents an attempt to accommodate the competing status claims of the various linguistic and ethnocultural groups. In addition, the mechanisms established for consultation, the organizations set up to respond to expressed needs, and the presence of special items in the national budget are themselves symbolic of the greater importance of the "other" ethnic groups in the public affairs of the nation. The apparatus constitutes a symbol, over and above the specific activities carried out and the cultural contents expressed through it.

The policy is also part of the reconstruction of the symbolic system, in that it was perceived as one of the elements that would counterbalance the Americanization of Canada. It was noted earlier that the American presence accentuates the Canadian collective identity problem. Weinfeld (1981, p. 94), for instance, writes of the frustration of English-Canadian nationalism

in identifying a uniquely Canadian culture or set of national characteristics. In the absence of any consensus on the substance of Canadian identity or culture, multiculturalism fills a void, defining Canadian culture in terms of the legitimate ancestral cultures which are the legacy of every Canadian: defining the whole through the sum of its parts.

The frequently heard statement to the effect that Canada does not seek to be a melting pot like the United States, but rather to be a multicultural society, provides informal evidence for that interpretation.¹⁶ Multiculturalism helps to define a distinctive collective identity and thus to differentiate Canadians from Americans. Viewed from that perspective, it could be said that the growing American presence, together with the decline of the British presence, constituted an opportunity for symbolic innovation.

In short, the multiculturalism policy is a symbolic act that is part of a long and continuing sequence of symbolic transformations in Canadian public life and institutions. In the previous section, several of the symbolic changes in earlier periods were mentioned (e.g., Canadian citizenship, the adoption of a flag and national anthem, the Official Lan-

guages Act). The multiculturalism policy represents an additional change to the symbolic/cultural system. This change is in harmony with the previous adaptations to the changing sociopolitical environment.

Moreover, it has already been followed by other significant symbolic events. Among those is the Charter of Rights, part of the new Constitution. In relation to ethnocultures, it states: "This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians" (Article 27). The Special Committee of Parliament on Visible Minorities in Canadian Society constitutes in itself another important symbolic phenomenon. Several of its recommendations (Canada, House of Commons, 1984) deal explicitly with the symbolic dimension of society and public institutions, and with the recognition and status given (or not given) to visible minorities.

Implementation of the Policy

When the multiculturalism policy was announced, four policy directions were indicated:

First, resources permitting, the government will seek to assist all Canadian cultural groups that have demonstrated a desire and effort to continue to develop a capacity to grow and contribute to Canada, and a clear need for assistance, the small and weak groups no less than the strong and highly organized.

Second, the government will assist members of all cultural groups to overcome cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society.

Third, the government will promote creative encounters and interchange among all Canadian cultural groups in the interest of national unity.

Fourth, the government will continue to assist immigrants to acquire at least one of Canada's official languages in order to become full participants in Canadian society. (Canada, House of Commons, 1971, p. 8546)

It should be noted that before the 1971 announcement, the federal government was already pursuing activities in those four areas. Subsequent programs were, to a certain degree, in continuity with previous ones. The new policy nevertheless represented a turning point. With it came a significant shift in the magnitude of programs, the range of pursuits, and the emphasis given to the four areas of implementation.¹⁷

In the 1950s and early 1960s, the responsible unit was the Canadian Citizenship Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.¹⁸ Its concerns were the integration of immigrants, citizenship, and intergroup relations. The activities reflecting these concerns included support for language classes set up and operated by provincial departments of education, conferences on citizenship with special reference to the integration of immigrants, and the establishment of a research unit to investigate problems concerning intergroup relations (a recommenda-

tion made at a conference). Several publications¹⁹ and films²⁰ prepared during that period reveal the same preoccupations.

Shortly after announcement of the multiculturalism policy in 1971, organizational innovations were made. The Prime Minister appointed a minister responsible for the implementation of the policy (1972), the Multiculturalism Directorate was established (1972), and the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism was set up as an advisory body to the minister (1973).

The programs which were added to the existing policy instruments emphasized cultural expression, support to the corresponding community organizations, and the national celebration of ethnocultures. These new emphases were reflected in the array of programs put into operation in the early 1970s.

- Multicultural Grants Program. Through this program, funds are provided to groups and organizations for cultural activities such as festivals, television programs, Saturday schools, literary clubs, and art exhibits.
- Multiculturalism Centres. Grants are provided to ethnic groups for setting up and administering a central facility.
- Ethnic Press Program. This program provides funds for the placement of advertisements in the ethnic press. A monthly digest of reports in the ethnic press is also provided in order to improve government understanding of ethnic communities.
- Third Language Teaching Aids.
- Multicultural Studies Program. Research in the ethnocultural field is supported through this program. The program includes the Ethnic Histories Series.

To administer these programs, it was frequently necessary to establish linkages with ethnocultural organizations. In some instances, the creation of organizations or federations of organizations was encouraged by government officials in order to facilitate communication with the ethnic communities. More often, however, the initiative came from the communities themselves.

Activities were also carried out in other government agencies, as, for example:

- Canadian Centre for Folk Culture Studies — a section in the National Museum of Man that documents the traditional cultures of ethnic groups;
- Ethnic Canadiana Program — the National Library's collection of ethnic newspapers and other publications; and
- National Ethnic Archives — a unit of the National Archives.

Other agencies involved in activities related to multiculturalism are the National Film Board, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the Canadian Radio and Television Commission, and the Canada Council.

In short, the programs in existence in the decades before the multiculturalism policy tended to focus on the integration of immigrants, although the other policy directions listed above were not entirely neglected. Following the policy announcement, the emphasis shifted to the first of the four areas, namely cultural expression, but attention was also given to the others.

Recent Evolution in Policy Implementation

Assistance to ethnic groups for the expression and development of their cultures was the main orientation for about a decade, together with assistance to new immigrants.²¹ Recently, however, some changes in the implementation of the policy have been introduced under the impact of a variety of circumstances. Some have to do with the policy instruments adopted, some stem from the limits to governmental intervention in that field, and others pertain to the changing social context.

Although no systematic evidence exists on this question, over the years a gap began to appear and progressively widen between the multiculturalism ideal and its concrete manifestations. The assistance to cultural groups “to continue to develop a capacity to grow and contribute to Canada” was increasingly perceived as assistance to ethnic folklore. Some began, less flatteringly, to refer to multiculturalism as a “song and dance” affair. The concrete expression of multiculturalism was to a degree trivializing the value it was meant to convey. Instead of enhancing the value of cultural diversity and its contribution to Canadian society, multiculturalism ran the risk of producing the opposite effect. To the extent that it was fostering the attitude that ethnocultures were not to be taken seriously, multiculturalism in its concrete form faced the danger of degrading ethnocultures rather than celebrating them. The need for reorientation was beginning to be felt.

The critics of the policy became more numerous.²² Some saw the policy as a device used by politicians to lure voters and by bureaucrats to maintain or increase their agencies' clientele. Others charged that the underlying intention of those in power with regard to multiculturalism was simply to keep “ethnics” within the confines of their communities so they would not challenge the existing distribution of power. Finally, those who saw the policy as an attempt to maintain ethnic cultures argued that this was a futile exercise, since the structural conditions for the preservation of ethnocultures — such as parallel institutional systems — did not exist in Canada. They could perhaps exist in relatively isolated rural settings, but it was unrealistic to expect to establish them in cities. Multiculturalism was therefore a waste of money. Being ignored, however, is a worse fate than being criticized. Many Canadians

of British and French origin (as well as others who had been "assimilated") felt displaced by the symbolic transformation and either resented multiculturalism or considered it a passing fad. Some opposed it openly; others ignored it.

This situation led many to wonder if the prevailing orientation of the policy implementation was having the desired effect. Even those highly favourable to the policy began to ask if the programs were not producing results opposite to those desired. The situation seemed to call for a rethinking of the objectives of the policy and/or of the ways in which it had been implemented.

In addition, there are limitations to be considered. First, as noted earlier, public sentiments are not favourable to the use of public funds for the promotion of ethnocultures. Second, members of ethnic groups do not want to be "locked in" by ethnic boundaries. On this question, what Greeley (1974, p. 302) says about American ethnic differentiation also seems to apply to Canada — namely, that its most striking aspect

is that by definition ethnic boundaries are *supposed* to be permeable. . . . Among white ethnic groups in the United States ethnicity has never been primarily a means of separation, much less isolation. . . . The hyphen denotes equality; it is not a way of withdrawing from the rest of society so much as an institution for dealing oneself into the society.

This is an important constraint to activity in the ethnocultural field. In fact, in Canada this constraint was an integral part of the objective of the policy of "multiculturalism within a bilingual framework."

The individual's freedom would be hampered if he were locked for life within a particular cultural compartment by the accident of birth or language. It is vital, therefore, that every Canadian, whatever his ethnic origin, be given a chance to learn at least one of the two languages in which his country conducts its official business and its politics. (Canada, House of Commons, 1971, p. 8545)

Third, in the implementation of a policy, there is always the risk of favouring or appearing to favour some ethnic groups over others and thus triggering processes of intergroup comparison and rivalry. Finally, through the allocation of subsidies, the government agency and its officials are drawn into the internal politics of the ethnic community. This may entail favouring or appearing to favour some organizations over others (unless grants are given to all organizations). Perhaps more difficult for the managers of programs are the problems that can arise with the use of the subsidies — specifically, how to devise and administer an adequate system of controls. When receiving grants, ethnic organizations become instruments for the implementation of government policy. Therefore, what they do with the funds at their disposal is of concern to those who administer the policy. The process of verifying and accounting can be a

source of tensions, not to mention the fact that the government agency may lose control over the way some of the funds are used.

These problems were exacerbated by the use of grants as the favoured policy instrument during that period. That is, rather than setting up its own structures and organizing its own activities, the government tended to rely heavily on programs mounted by a network of voluntary associations to which it handed out grants. Of course, this was a matter of relative importance, not of all versus none. Other policy instruments were also developed and used in the subsequent period.

The creation of a unit to administer a program provides a number of possibilities of action (in addition to its symbolic role of recognizing the importance of certain groups or activities for the society). However, it also imposes certain limitations. The very fact of being established with a certain mandate within a department or ministry restricts the range of actions that can be initiated without involving other departments. Convincing officials of other departments to initiate certain programs, to include multicultural concerns in their own programs, or to participate in joint programs is certainly an important problem of implementation. This difficulty stems partly from the fact that the Multiculturalism Directorate's field is largely defined in terms of a particular population (i.e., the "other" ethnic groups) rather than in functional terms (as are the fields of most other government departments). Thus, matters of relevance for its clientele often fall under the jurisdiction of other departments.

Finally, the social context has been changing. The context of the late 1970s and early 1980s is different in some significant ways from the one that saw the introduction of the concept and policy of multiculturalism.

Immigration has been somewhat lower in recent years. As immigration from Europe has declined, the proportion of Canadian-born members of ethnic groups of European origin has increased. With the passage of time, the proportion of second-generation members has been increasing in all ethnic groups. Second-generation individuals generally seek to distance themselves from the culture of origin, if not to reject it outright. This is part of their search for full integration in *their* society — that is, the one in which they were born. This demographic trend is likely to reduce the salience of ethnicity in social life.

In addition, the difficulties of the Canadian and international economies seem to have brought economic and class issues to the foreground and pushed those related to ethnocultures and national identity to the rear. In this connection, the American presence is perceived not so much as a threat but as an essential element to economic recovery.

Finally, and perhaps most important for the matter under consideration, the independence movement in Quebec is beginning to lose momentum. Things are beginning to quiet down on that front, and some have gone as far as to suggest that nationalism is dying or dead in Quebec. This seems doubtful. What is more likely is that it is in transi-

tion, partly disorganized because its future orientation is somewhat uncertain. Be that as it may, it is now subdued compared to its earlier strength. Other groups are therefore less likely to perceive it as a threat to their own public status.

The effect of these contextual changes has been to progressively temper the processes that had operated in an earlier decade. The situation has reduced the salience of "white ethnicity" in public affairs, moderated the competition among cultural groups for public recognition, lowered the concern for national identity, and slowed down sociopolitical mobilization on an ethnic basis. Not that these processes have ceased to operate — rather, they have been moderated by the changing circumstances, just as they were accentuated earlier by other conditions. Moreover, the moderation is progressive — politicians and pressure groups may not be willing or able to abandon some of the items that had been on the public agenda for some time (e.g., the referendum in Quebec; the patriation of the constitution).

On the other hand, the social context has been characterized by an increase in the size of "visible minority" groups. As Table 2-3 shows, a significant proportion of the Canadian population is of non-European origin. This is the result of the modification of immigration regulations during the 1960s. In the 1960s and 1970s, the main sources of immigration began to change significantly from European to non-European countries, as shown in Table 2-4. In the 1962–67 period, the United Kingdom, United States, and European countries provided 80 percent of immigrants; over 1968–76, the percentage dropped to 56 (Canada, Manpower and Immigration, *Annual Reports*). A further drop to 42 percent took place in the 1980–82 period (Employment and Immigration, 1983, p. 19). Of course, not all immigrants from third world countries are non-whites. But a significant proportion are and this is reflected in the changing composition of the non-British, non-French origin population, as shown in Table 2-3.

This change increased the salience of ethnic differentiation on the basis of colour rather than culture and/or language. The shift was accentuated by an increase in incidents of interracial violence, which were highly publicized. Official reports on these incidents were prepared and published (Pitman, 1977; Ontario Human Rights Commission, 1977; Ubale, 1978).²³ The main public issues pertaining to multiculturalism became those related to racism. The full acceptance of visible minorities by society and their participation of these groups in its institutions became one of the major concerns in the ethnocultural field.

New programs, increased awareness of the constraints and limitations of government interventions, and the changing sociopolitical content all have contributed to changes in the emphasis and approach of multiculturalism policy. One such change is a greater emphasis on programs aimed at overcoming of barriers to full participation in Canadian society.

TABLE 2-3 Population by Ethnic Group, 1981^a

European Origins		Asian and African origins	
Austrian	0.7	Armenian	0.4
Balkans	2.3	African	0.8
Baltic	0.9	Asian Arab	1.1
Belgian	0.7	Chinese	5.1
Czeck and Slovak	1.2	Indo-Chinese	0.8
Dutch	7.2	Indo-Pakistani	3.5
Finnish	0.9	Japanese	0.7
Greek	2.7	Korean	0.4
German	20.2	Lebanese	0.5
Hungarian	2.1	Philippine	1.3
Italian	13.2	Other	0.2
Jewish	4.5		
Polish	4.5	Latin American origins	
Portuguese	3.3	Caribbean	1.5
Romanian	0.4	Haitian	0.3
Russian	0.9	Other	0.4
Scandinavian	5.0		
Spanish	0.9	Other origins	0.8
Ukrainian	9.4		
Other	0.4		
Total		5,642,380	

Source: Statistics Canada, *Census of Canada*, 1981.

- a. Because ethnic origin was ascertained differently in the 1981 than in earlier censuses (see note below Table 2-1) and because of the increase in non-European origins, the distribution for 1981 is presented separately. Those declaring multiple origins are not included in this table. This accounts for the different number of "other" ethnic origins in Tables 2-1 and 2-2.

This shift was prompted by the increase in the visible minorities population and in incidents of racial discrimination. The new emphasis has meant a greater preoccupation with race relations as opposed to cultural expression and development. In 1982, a Race Relations Unit was created within the Multiculturalism Directorate and symposia were held on "Race Relations and the Law" and on "Race Relations in the Media." A Special Parliamentary Committee on Visible Minorities in Canadian Society was established in 1983 and submitted its report in 1984 (Canada, House of Commons, 1984).

The shift toward race relations as a significant policy direction of government multicultural activity made those charged with administering multiculturalism more aware of the instrumental dimension of the ethnocultural field — i.e., the removal of discrimination in employment, in relations with the police, and with regard to educational opportunities. The instrumental concern was also reflected in programs to provide immigrant women with language training and other assistance to help them participate in their new environment. For example, a conference on immigrant women was held in 1981.²⁴

This does not mean that symbolic problems have disappeared. On the

TABLE 2-4 Ten Leading Source Countries of Immigrants to Canada, Selected Years, 1951-1981

1951	1960	1968	1973	1978	1982
Britain	Italy	Britain	Britain	Britain	Britain
Germany	Britain	United States	United States	United States	United States
Italy	United States	Italy	Hong Kong	India	Poland
Netherlands	Germany	Germany	Portugal	Hong Kong	India
Poland	Netherlands	Hong Kong	Jamaica	Philippines	Hong Kong
France	Portugal	France	India	Jamaica	Vietnam
United States	Greece	Austria	Philippines	Portugal	Philippines
Belgium	France	Greece	Greece	Italy	Germany
Yugoslavia	Poland	Portugal	Italy	Guyana	China
Denmark	Austria	Yugoslavia	Trinidad	France	Guyana

Sources: Canada, Department of Manpower and Immigration, *The Immigration Program* (Ottawa, Information Canada, 1974), p. 84; Department of Employment and Immigration, 1978 *Immigration Statistics* (Ottawa; Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1980); Department of Employment and Immigration *Background Paper on Future Immigration Levels* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1983).

contrary, new ones have emerged and indeed a further redefinition of the symbolic character of public institutions has been required. Their character could no longer be primarily British or exclusively bicultural, and being multicultural was not sufficient either. It had to become multiracial. Being a white society is profoundly embedded in the Canadian collective identity, but the changing demographic composition of society and the political articulation of claims by visible minorities challenges the traditional collective self-image and the corresponding character of public institutions. This preoccupation underlies, for example, programs in the field of education in relation to the media. There was yet an additional set of intergroup relations to be managed. Changes to accommodate visible minorities are sometimes interpreted by other groups as decreasing their importance in the eyes of public authorities, and some feel resentment about being considered "invisible." The possibility that visible minorities and race relations may occupy a predominant place in the ethnocultural field is beginning to generate some degree of status anxiety. It is the source of possible tensions. In short, the integration of visible minorities requires accommodations at the symbolic and the instrumental level.

In the field of culture, the late 1970s and the 1980s saw increased attention given to multiculturalism in education at the federal, provincial, and local levels. The teaching of heritage languages became a more important objective. This is perhaps related to the larger size of the second generation within ethnic groups and the need felt by parents to transmit their cultural heritage. Since education is a provincial responsibility, the possibilities of action of federal agencies in this domain are limited. Their action has to be indirect, in the form of conferences (as was organized on heritage languages in 1981) or through funding of community groups and associations, such as the Canadian Council for Multicultural and Intercultural Education. The policy directions here are both cultural transmission and intergroup harmony.

Changes can be noted not only in policy orientation but also in the approaches adopted. For example, the target of governmental activity is changing. Instead of focusing almost exclusively on the ethnocultural communities, programs are increasingly oriented toward societal institutions. This move to institutional action was partly due to an increased awareness of its critical importance in relation to policy goals. For example, there is the realization that it is not sufficient to assist groups in fighting discrimination; action must also be aimed at the organizations in which discrimination occurs. The move also appears to be the result of a greater awareness of the pitfalls encountered when several different ethnocultural groups deal with organizations on an individual basis.

The institutional orientation involves both instrumental and symbolic aspects. One of the objectives is to deal with discriminatory or unfair treatment and its consequences. Another is to modify institutions in

such a way that they better reflect the changing character of society and its population. In addition to this institutional action, assistance is also given to ethnic organizations to fight discrimination and support cultural/symbolic activities.

Action directed at societal institutions has implications for the role of ethnic organizations as instruments of policy implementation. Such action appears to be encouraging interorganizational collaboration across ethnocultural groups. The reason is that joint action is perceived as more effective in bringing about institutional change, and may also serve to reduce intergroup competition and channel efforts toward the attainment of common goals. It is, however, a fairly recent initiative that may or may not be successful.

Finally, in order to overcome the restrictive effects of compartmentalization within a particular ministry, increased attempts are being made to involve other government departments whenever their domain of activity is relevant for ethnocultural groups.

Conclusion

A few points should be underscored. First, the symbolic order is an essential dimension of social and political reality, especially as a component of public institutions. It is important to individuals and groups who aspire to recognize themselves in and be recognized by public institutions. It is also important for society, since it affects the legitimacy of public institutions and their capacity to act effectively.

Second, the relative importance of the symbolic/cultural and the instrumental/material components of reality can shift with changing circumstances over time. This means that sometimes public attention is focussed more on symbolic issues and sometimes more on material issues.

Third, like the economic or instrumental component of reality, the symbolic system can be the object of action by institutions, including the state.

Fourth, the condition of the symbolic system itself can also vary under the impact of changing circumstances. The meaningfulness of its content may differ for different segments of the population. What it signifies for members of society may be rich and satisfying or poor and underdeveloped. Some of its features may be perceived by particular groups or by the entire society as deficient or inadequate, therefore requiring remedial action. Thus, aspects of the symbolic system become defined as problems requiring intervention. As a result, public authorities may have no choice but to act to modify the symbolic/cultural component of public institutions.

Fifth, interventions to modify the symbolic system, like interventions in economic or other areas, may alienate or antagonize certain segments

of the population, generating or accentuating conflicts among different groups. Symbolic innovations entail incorporating new values, lifestyles, traditions or symbols in the structure and functioning of public institutions. This process almost inevitably requires a reallocation of recognition among social groups. It involves a certain redefinition of the status that groups are to occupy in relation to public institutions. This reallocation is itself a source of tension and conflict which needs to be managed if the eventual result is not to be the opposite of what is desired.

Finally, once government or other public institutions have intervened, a new dynamics begins to operate. A policy field is created or redefined. The way it is structured and the content of the activities that characterize it are partly determined by the parameters of the policy. But to a significant degree, the structure and activities are also determined by the network of government agencies, community groups, and ethnic organizations that come to occupy the field. The evolution of the field in its symbolic as well as its instrumental component is dependent on the social and political forces operating in that interorganizational system. From the point of view of institutional authorities, the management of the symbolic order must now largely be carried out through that inter-organizational system.

Notes

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1. The framework presented here draws from the writings of several authors: Bourdieu (1975; 1979); Berger (1966); Durkheim (1912); Cohen (1977); Edelman (1964; 1971); Gusfield (1981); Shils and Young (1953); and Smith (1969). Other aspects of the phenomenon under consideration have been presented elsewhere (Breton, 1984).
2. See also Tremblay (1984).
3. For a discussion of the importance of loyalty for organizations and states, see Hirschman (1970, chap. 7).
4. Public authorities may fail to intervene. This may be because they do not perceive the situation as a problem requiring action. On the other hand, they may define it as a problem but not know what to do about it, or they may know but may not be willing or able to implement whatever measures they think are required.
5. These changes are outlined in Canada, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1969).
6. Book IV of the commission's report dealing with the contribution of the other ethnic groups, was published in 1970. See Canada, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1970).

7. The implications of the commission's mandate for the non-British, non-French groups are discussed later.
8. Jones defines the baby boom generation in the following way: "For two centuries, the birthrate in the United States and the world has steadily declined. It is still declining. There is only one exception: the single, unprecedented aberration we call the postwar baby boom. It was not, as is often thought, a short rise in the birthrate caused by returning GIs making up for lost time. It began that way in 1946, but instead of stopping in the 1950s (as in Europe), the tidal wave of births continued, affecting all races and classes with astonishing uniformity" (Jones, 1980, p. 2). By and large, this definition is applicable to Canada.
9. On the baby boom phenomena, see Jones (1980) and Kettle (1980).
10. See, for example, Palmer (1976), Harney (1982), and Bell-Deutschmann (1978; 1979).
11. The anti-American element that underlies English-Canadian nationalism is probably a reaction to the threat of status displacement occasioned by the American presence.
12. The fact that English is the main language of science, industry and commerce in the world no doubt provides a linguistic security that makes it easier to accept accommodations.
13. Analysis of aspects of ethnic mobilization in Canada during the years preceding the announcement of the policy in 1971 appear in Bociurkiw (1978), Burnet (1984), Jaworsky (1979), and Palmer (1976).
14. The numbers are inexact, as it is not always possible to identify the ethnic affiliation of an organization by its name. For example, I counted 32 Ukrainian organizations that have submitted briefs, while Bociurkiw mentions 37 (1978, p. 124).
15. For a further discussion of this point, see Breton (1984).
16. Multiculturalism as a value defining the collective identity is underscored by the fact that the actual degree of acculturation of other ethnic groups is not significantly different in the two societies. It is also underscored by occasional statements to the effect that Canada has always opted for multiculturalism, in contrast with the United States. In the light of existing evidence, such statements clearly constitute a rewriting of Canadian history. (See, for example, Palmer (1976; 1982a; 1982b), Abella and Troper (1982), Sunahara (1981); and Bausenhardt (1972).
17. The information on programs and activities presented in the following was obtained from interviews with Messrs. Johnston, Patel, and Lugtigheid of the Multiculturalism Directorate in Ottawa. In addition, the following sources were consulted: Canada, Secretary of State (1973); Canada, Minister of State for Multiculturalism (1978; 1980; 1983; 1984a; 1984b); Canada, Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism (1982; 1983; undated). The reader should also consult the interesting description and analysis made by Bociurkiw (1978) and by Jaworsky (1979).
18. The branch was transferred back to the Secretary of State in 1966.
19. The following are among the branch's publications during that period: *How to Become a Canadian Citizen*; *Our Land, Our History, Our Government*; *Citizen and Citoyen* (provided information and ideas for developing citizenship and related projects); *The Canadian Family Tree*; *What It Means to Become a Canadian Citizen*; *Celebrating Dominion Day*; and *Let Us Look at Prejudice and Discrimination*.
20. The films are: "Let's Discuss It" (dealt with techniques for organizing discussion groups); "Threshold" (for organizations involved with the social integration of immigrants); and "A Vote for Michalski" (on the experience of a newcomer to Canada).
21. These programs have not been abandoned. A recent publication of the Multiculturalism Directorate (Canada, Minister of State for Multiculturalism, 1984a, p. 9) lists the following:
 - Writing and Publications Program — provides grants for research, writing, translation and publication of works reflecting the diversity of cultures in Canada.
 - Performing and Visual Arts Program — provides funds for production and promotion of performing and visual arts depicting our cultural diversity.
 - Canadian Ethnic Studies Program — encourages the study and research of important aspects of cultural pluralism.

- Group Development Program — provides funds for developmental purposes to voluntary organizations representing interests and concerns of ethnocultural communities.
 - Intercultural Communications Program — provides funding for those organizations acting collectively on behalf of member groups or organizations and promoting cross-cultural activities.
 - Cultural Integration Program — gives assistance primarily for the integration of immigrants into society, and their full participation in the community.
 - Cultural Enrichment Program — encourages the learning and retention of heritage languages.
22. See, for example, Porter (1972; 1975), Brotz (1980), Peter (1981), Roberts and Clifton (1982), Smiley (1980), Vano (1981), Harney (1982), and Zolf (1980).
 23. For a summary of the studies of this question, see Patel (1980, pp. 7–15).
 24. The instrumental preoccupation is also reflected in the brief submitted by the Minister of State for Multiculturalism to the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Canada, Minister of State for Multiculturalism, 1984b).

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State, Language and Society

The Vicissitudes of French in Quebec and Canada

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The language question in Quebec and Canada has been the focus of considerable attention over the past two decades. Commissions of enquiry, reports, evaluations and projections, inspired by governments, interest groups, academics and, not infrequently, informed citizens, have been the order of the day. Since the 1960s, language has emerged as a constant preoccupation in the media and for a large part of the Canadian intelligentsia. Given the legislative attention accorded it by the Quebec and federal parliaments, it has contributed directly to the reformulation of national and regional identities. The distinctiveness of the issue can be attributed not only to its content but to its inherently conflictual nature and the many questions it leaves unresolved. Is Canada a bilingual country? Are *Québécois* by definition francophones?

To attempt to review the literature on this issue within the scope of a single essay would be a daunting task, unlikely to leave much place for reflection and criticism. Similarly, to travel the wasteland of census data and government legislation, picking over issues of interpretation of statistics and legal texts, would likewise exhaust the author, frustrate the reader, and, more importantly, risk obscuring the larger context in which they are set. In any case, this path has been well trodden by a multitude of scholars from demography, sociology, political science and other social science disciplines.

Given the constraints of time and resources, a potentially more rewarding exercise is to identify the larger context of language policies, choices and patterns, and to establish the transformations in this context through time. All too often the legislation, statistics and analyses act as a screen that conceals a certain perception of language, individual and collective rights, and power relations that exist between language groups and governments in

this country, and of the very idea of Quebec and Canada. Until this context is clearly delineated and understood, there is little chance that the language question can be resolved to the satisfaction of the population as a whole and of the different levels of government.

Hence, what follows is in a sense a personal¹ reflection on the language issue which seeks to identify and account for attitudes toward French and English in this country that are at the root of both individual choices and legislation in Quebec and in Canada. Such a reflection necessarily touches upon values (*ideas* of Quebec and Canada), geography, institutional arrangements, and power relations, and demands a historical depth that goes back to the very origins of the country. Its focus is Quebec and the relations between state, language, and society in that province. However, it is assumed from the outset that this issue cannot be dealt with properly without reference to Ottawa and, to a lesser extent, the other provinces, hence to the constant interplay between two levels of government. In other words, what follows is a wide-ranging reflection with a single preoccupation — Quebec. In the circumstances, the status of French in other provinces, notably New Brunswick, is largely overlooked, as is the whole domain of non-official languages, be they native or European. Although the reflection is personal and perhaps subjective, it is based on 12 years of research on official language minorities, as well as considerable experience in collaborating with various government bodies directly concerned with the question.

Finally, this Royal Commission offers an excellent opportunity to reflect on the linguistic make-up of Canada. As Alan Cairns and Cynthia Williams remark in their overview paper in volume 33 of this series, a political contract presupposes a social contract — the terms on which Canadians have agreed to live with one another. Elsewhere, the Fédération des francophones hors Québec has pointed out in its numerous public statements on the Commission that it is necessary first to establish the type of society within which one wants economic development to occur.

Perspectives on the Present

Francophones, anglophones, founding peoples, charter groups, *la nation québécoise*, official languages, official language minority groups, French immersion, bilingualism, *la Loi 101*, the Official Languages Act, Article 17, Section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867 . . . What is more intimately and profoundly Canadian than this persistent reference to legislation, identities and loyalties based on language? Rare are the “bibles” of the Canadian and Quebec cultural elites that ignore the issue. Insofar as our literature is concerned, it is explicit in Gabrielle Roy’s *Bonheur d’occasion* and Hugh McLennan’s *Two Solitudes*, but also

implicit in Louis Hémon's *Maria Chapdelaine* and Margaret Atwood's *Surfacing*. As for the academic world, what self-respecting nationalist scholar has not been nourished by Richard Joy's *Languages in Conflict*, George Grant's *Lament for a Nation*, or, in the case of French Canadians, the writings of Michel Brunet, Jean-Paul Desbiens, Lionel Groulx, Guy Rocher and Marcel Rioux, to name only a few? Little wonder that support for state intervention within the domain of language and culture has been so strong in recent decades, concerned as the two intelligentsias have been, on one hand, to defend a singular French experience in America and, on the other, to promote a separate Canadian identity on the northern half of the continent.

It is all too easy to be blinded by the present and assume that the state has always been active in the domain of language, and that such actions have played a critical role in determining language patterns among the population at large. In the following pages, it will rapidly become apparent that both the Quebec and Canadian governments displayed a remarkable laxity toward language prior to the 1960s, in the sense that the primacy of English went largely unquestioned. As well, a close reading of the events of recent years will reveal that it is extremely difficult to establish a direct association between the state, language and society — that is, to measure the impact of legislation on the population at large. The history of Quebec and Canada until recently is essentially one of governmental indifference in the face of the tenacity of the French-speaking population. Events of the past two decades highlight the convergence of two very different spheres of influence — one, the state, which proposes (and imposes) linguistic models from above, and the other, the population at large, which manifests preferences from below. Even now, after almost two decades of state intervention, it remains unclear which is the dominant axis. No accurate reading of the present, or speculation regarding the future, is possible without reference to the past.

A Historical Perspective: Quebec

If, as a result of the Conquest, the “empire of the Saint Lawrence” was transferred from France to England, the language shift toward the primacy of English in Canada occurred much more slowly, indeed imperceptibly. The antecedents of Montreal's English daily newspaper, *The Gazette*, is illustrative of this process. Founded as a French-language weekly in 1778, it became a bilingual publication in 1785, to be finally transformed into an English-language daily in 1822. And who would venture a guess as to its future in 1985 when over half of its readership, if not francophone, is certainly bilingual?

Returning to the Conquest, the British appear to have adopted a remarkably complacent attitude toward French in Lower Canada until

well into the nineteenth century. The first generations of British army officers and governors general in Quebec City almost certainly all spoke French, while some — notably Haldimand — were of Swiss Protestant origin and had only a faltering command of English. The fur trade, although managed by a Scottish entrepreneurial class established in Montreal from the late eighteenth century, used French as the language of work because the vast majority of employees of the North West Company were French Canadians. As for the smaller enterprises that dominated the American midwest, they were largely owned and operated by French Canadians.

Even though the shift from the fur to the timber trade in the early nineteenth century enlarged the field of anglophone entrepreneurship, French persisted as the dominant language in the forest and in the social universe of the logging camps (or “shanties” — *chantiers* as Anglo-Gaspesians persist in calling them).

This policy of conciliation on the part of the Imperial authorities was only formulated after a decade or more of hesitation, however, during which massive English immigration, assimilation of the French Canadians, and major economic transformations were also envisaged. Confronted by the evident impossibility of effecting such changes in a short period, and threatened by the American Revolution and hence an invasion of Lower Canada, the British opted in favour of according a series of rights and liberties to the French Canadians in return for their submission and loyalty to the Crown. The Quebec Act (1774) addressed itself essentially to legal and religious matters, guaranteeing religious liberty and the maintenance of French civil law. In so doing, guarantees were implicitly accorded to the French language, and the access of French Canadians to the public service was assured.

Such early recognition of French rights, however, was not reinforced by subsequent legislation until Confederation, almost a century later. It was rather the contrary that occurred. For example, English was declared the only official language on the occasion of the Act of Union of the two Canadas in 1840, a decision that was only revoked eight years later.

Parliament in Quebec City and the provincial civil service, minuscule though it was, proved to be remarkably complacent on language matters. The public service functioned in English throughout the nineteenth century and issued official cheques in that language until 1925, while certain ministries — notably those with a financial and economic vocation — remained essentially anglophone until well after the Second World War. As regards legislation, with the single exception of the Lavergne Act of 1910, there was nothing prior to the 1960s.

It would nevertheless be totally absurd to suggest that for 200 years following the Conquest, Quebec was silent on language or related issues. The *Patriotes* vigorously opposed British cultural colonialism and

“Lafontaine, toute comme la totalité du Canada français, s’opposait à l’Acte d’Union” (Monière, 1977, p. 165). Fifty thousand people gathered on the Champ-de-Mars in Montreal in November 1885 to protest the hanging of Louis Riel, while a succession of Quebec premiers beginning with Honoré Mercier demanded that Ottawa respect the autonomy of the provinces.

Such a discrepancy between the manifestations of linguistic — and hence of collective — aspirations in Quebec and the paucity of language legislation has its origins, according to Monière (1977) and a number of other historians, in events which immediately followed the Conquest and which found expression in the Quebec Act. The spirit of conciliation invoked by this act was ultimately tied to one of collaboration by the French Canadian seigneurial and clerical elites whose interests were gravely threatened by the Conquest:

Le clergé et la noblesse élaboreront donc une stratégie commune pour défendre les intérêts de classe visant à obtenir la reconnaissance de la langue, de la religion, des lois et coutumes françaises qui assurent le maintien du régime seigneurial et l’obtention de places dans l’administration civile et militaire. En échange, ils offrent la loyauté et la fidélité du peuple envers la nouvelle domination coloniale. Leur idéologie en sera une de collaboration fondée sur l’affirmation de la bonté, de la générosité de l’occupant et de la nécessité divine de la soumission. (Monière, 1977, p. 85)

The interests of both parties prevailed, Lower Canada remaining British and sheltered from the influences of the American and French revolutions, and the traditional bourgeoisie confirmed in its pre-Conquest rights and privileges. Of this strategic alliance was born a long tradition of collaboration inspired on the part of important segment of the French Canadian elite, by a respect for British institutions, the monarchy and, subsequently, the predominantly English character of Canada. This coalition of *clergé-seigneurs* gave its support to the British colonial government in 1775, 1812 and 1837, and generally adopted a position favourable to the maintenance of acquired French and Catholic rights within Quebec but rarely to their extension, at least until the second part of the nineteenth century.

A more aggressive French Canadian nationalism that directly challenged the colonial structures and British institutions in Lower Canada emerged in the early decades of the nineteenth century and assumed crisis dimensions with the Rebellion of 1837.² Articulated by members of a new social class, composed of members of the liberal professions and demoralized by a lack of employment opportunities in the context of a deteriorating economic climate, its leaders aspired to the control of the political and administrative structures of the colony. By the 1830s, this meant the creation of a French Canadian republic modelled on the United States.

Opposed not only by the colonial authorities but equally by the Church and the seignorial class, their project was doomed to failure. The degree of discontent did, however, result in considerable hesitation by the British as to whether to pursue the tactical alliance with the French Canadian elite or to work toward the systematic assimilation of the population as a whole. If loyalty of the masses appeared uncertain, then the latter strategy would prevail. Such preoccupations were at the source of a policy of encouraging immigration from the British Isles during the first half of the nineteenth century, directed toward the strategic encirclement of the French through the exclusive occupation of the Eastern Townships and establishment of a band of settlement along the foot of the Laurentian Shield between Quebec City and the Ottawa Valley. In a spirit of "greater justice" and inspired by the American experience in Louisiana, Lord Durham, in his report on the 1837 Rebellion, recommended assimilation of the regional linguistic identity within a larger national identity. Not surprisingly, the Act of Union of the two Canadas in 1840 declared English the only official language.

After a decade or more of hesitation during the 1830s and 1840s, a policy of collaboration came to prevail over one of assimilation, for a diversity of reasons:

Nous assistons, après 1837, à un renforcement des cadres cléricaux et des tendances agraires. La bourgeoisie canadienne s'en accomodera d'autant mieux que l'introduction du gouvernement responsable lui promettait d'accéder aux postes administratifs et qu'après 1850, la conjoncture économique était plus favorable aux professions libérales. (Ouellet, 1969b, pp. 93-94)

The political aspirations of the petty bourgeoisie were thwarted in 1837 and the spirit that prevailed until the end of the century was mostly one of collaboration, first with the imperial authorities and then with the English majority in Canada, creating a dialectic in Quebec that has nourished political debate ever since and has continued to divide its elite. One segment has persistently argued in favour of collaboration and the legitimacy of existing political structures — hence rights for French Canadians within the framework of a bilingual country. A second segment has gravitated toward the creation of a French state and a separate political destiny for Quebec — hence toward unilingualism and the transformation of existing political arrangements.

But to return to the aftermath of the Rebellion:

À compter des années 1840 . . . l'Église obtient la pleine reconnaissance juridique et l'anticléricalisme d'une partie des dirigeants canadiens-français ne survit pas à l'échec de 1837-1838. Commence alors ce qu'on a appelé la réaction catholique. Cette réaction est caractérisée par la reprise en main et l'encadrement des fidèles par un clergé désormais plus nombreux. Elle s'appuie sur la fondation de nombreuses organisations, la venue de commu-

nautés [de la France], l'amélioration de la pratique religieuse et le progrès des dévotions populaires. À partir de cette époque, le clergé bénéficie d'un renouveau de prestige et de pouvoir au sein de la société. (Linteau et al., 1979, p. 232–33)

The pattern was set for the next hundred years:

L'idéologie dominante allait désormais refléter la vision du monde du clergé, ses intérêts et les sources de son pouvoir. (Monière, 1977, p. 158)

The state was relatively weak and largely silent on issues of language, while the Church respected its legitimacy and authority but assumed an ever-increasing role in the management of French Canadian society, a trend which the Constitution Act of 1867 only served to reinforce:

La Confédération met . . . en place une structure étatique qui favorise l'influence de l'Église. Les domaines relevant de la compétence provinciale sont en grande partie ceux qui intéressent l'Église: l'éducation, la santé publique, la propriété, le droit civil, bref, ce qui touche de plus près à la vie quotidienne des gens. (Linteau et al., 1979, p. 233)

It was thus the Church — frequently in alliance with patriotic organizations such as the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste, founded in Montreal in 1834 — that assumed the role of defenders of the French language. For both, the goal was to defend the interests of a people wherever they might be found across the North American continent. Hence, their preoccupations were ethnic; language being just one consideration, along with religion, the family and a whole array of educational, social and economic needs. These needs assumed critical dimensions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, following the massive migrations of French Canadians southward to the milltowns of New England and westward to the mining, lumbering and agricultural centres scattered across the continent.³

The ideology of the group, as expressed by its intellectuals and clerical leadership, gravitated between a concern for cultural survival and a messianic sense of *mission providentielle*. Concern for cultural survival was manifested in the enormous *rassemblements de famille* that were periodically organized in Quebec City or Montreal — gatherings of the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste; the three great Congrès de la Langue française of 1912, 1937 and 1952; and the États généraux du Canada français, the most crucial one of which was held in 1967.⁴ The messianic role was expressed in the establishment of hundreds of *paroisses nationales* scattered across the continent and situated on both sides of the U.S.–Canada border. It was an ideology founded sometimes on the notion of conquest, sometimes on retreat into an ethnic fortress, but always (if one excepts Louis Riel's dream of a New Nation) an ideology of separate development — expressed most succinctly by the Curé Labelle's dream of a "promised land" to be carved out of the *pays d'en haut*.

This intermingling of language, faith and race, articulated around a need to carve out a separate destiny, flourished in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, finally to succumb in the early 1950s following a long series of tragic confrontations with the secular world beyond the confines of the Saint Lawrence Valley.

Two important points must be retained from this episode of the promotion of French Canadian identity. First, Quebec was perceived for the most part as being no different from any other francophone area in North America. Francophones living in Sherbrooke, Montreal, Woonsocket, Lowell, Lafayette, St. Boniface, Detroit, Gravelbourg, Kankakee or Maillardville all shared the same minority experience and preoccupations. If reunions were organized periodically in Quebec City, it was because the city was perceived as the source of a civilization with continental ramifications. The periodic gatherings simply provided an opportunity to assess individual experiences and offer mutual support and encouragement. Secondly, and logically, the institutional and territorial bases of identity, and hence the defence and promotion of language, were very different from those one might associate with the government of Quebec. They were essentially founded on a relatively fluid basis of national parishes scattered across the continent, yet clearly articulated around a Quebec hearth in terms of the origins of the population and the headquarters of the institutions that served the diaspora.

So, for Quebec and for French Canadians in general, the promotion of language was intimately associated with the idea of a *French America* that found coherent expression in the latter part of the nineteenth century with the massive migrations out of the Saint Lawrence Valley and with the dynamism of the Métis nation in the West — at the same time that moves were being made to strengthen the unity of the British colonies in North America, so creating the Dominion of Canada.

A Historical Perspective: Canada

For the French Canadian elite, concerned with promoting the interests of a *peuple*, the birth of Canada in 1867 was viewed with measured optimism (see Linteau et al., 1979, p. 257). Perceived as a pact between provinces and between the French- and English-speaking races or nations, Confederation appeared to accord for the first time unequivocal legitimacy to French-speaking Canadians. Quebec and Ontario, as provinces, were equal and dominant partners in a collaborative enterprise where, according to Section 133 of the British North America Act, the goal of bilingualism appeared to have been achieved:

Either the English or the French Language may be used by any Person in the Debates of the Houses of the Parliament of Canada and of the Houses of the Legislature of Quebec; and both those Languages shall be used in the

respective Records and Journals of those Houses; and either of the Languages may be used by any Person or in any Pleading or Process in or issuing from any Court of Canada established under this Act, and in or from all or any of the Courts of Quebec. The Acts of the Parliament of Canada and of the Legislature of Quebec shall be printed and published in both those Languages.

The belief that this model would be progressively extended to the rest of Canada was strengthened by the creation of Manitoba in 1870, with linguistic and religious duality guaranteed by the laws of the province. In the eyes of French Canadians, the nascent Canadian state legitimized their presence and was ready to accord them an important role in the construction of a new and powerful nation.

The bases for such optimism were extremely fragile. All the new Constitution did was to legitimize the *use* of French and this within certain restricted contexts. Educational rights were strictly of a confessional nature, according protection notably to the Protestant minority in Quebec rather than the Catholic minorities of the other provinces. Indeed, the educational sphere was placed under provincial jurisdiction, and if Section 133 of the Act did give the federal government the power to intervene in order to protect minority educational rights:

Cet article s'avérera tout à fait inefficace comme mesure de protection pour plusieurs raisons. D'abord parce que le problème des minorités est posé uniquement en termes religieux, ensuite parce qu'il ne protège que des droits inscrits dans des lois au moment de l'Union. Enfin, l'intervention fédérale n'étant pas obligatoire, le gouvernement — pour des raisons juridiques ou politiques — sera incapable ou ne voudra pas imposer des mesures coercitives aux provinces qui brimeront leurs minorités. (Linteau et al., 1979. p. 256)

With all the advantages of hindsight, Sheppard, not surprisingly, concludes that “if we examine objectively the words of S.133 of the BNA Act standing alone, we must conclude that they give very little support to the theory that Canada is a bilingual country” (Sheppard, 1966, p. 349), while Gendron remarks that, from the outset “... hors des exigences de l'article 133, le gouvernement d'Ottawa ne cédait pas aux exigences du bilinguisme” (Commission Gendron, 1974, p. 3).

If the early years of Confederation offered some support to French Canadian aspirations, from 1877 until the First World War the federal government's position on language — and by extension that of English Canada — became clear. The abolition of education rights for the francophone minorities in New Brunswick (1871), the Northwest Territories (1892) and Ontario (1912), the hanging of Riel in 1885, the elimination of French from the Manitoba Legislature in 1890 all confirmed the systematic opposition in English Canada to the extension of French language rights and of an articulate French presence beyond the boundaries

of the province of Quebec and the Parliament in Ottawa. It was all too easy to conclude that French Canadian society was likewise being condemned to the limited territorial base of the Saint Lawrence Valley. Without exception, the federal government furnished tacit or active support to the provinces in this legislative retreat from bilingualism.

Ethnic chauvinism apart, the reasons for federal indifference are to be found in the very different vision of Confederation that was formulated by Sir John A. Macdonald and pursued by Wilfred Laurier. As the title of the Act suggests, Macdonald's goal was to create a *British North America*; that is " . . . s'appuyer sur l'empire [britannique] pour maintenir et affirmer l'identité canadienne en Amérique du Nord" (Hamelin et al., 1971, p. 444). His National Policy went far beyond matters of loyalties and cultural ties in its concern to exploit the economic strength of the empire in the building of Canada. The new country was to be British in terms not only of language but also of capital and markets. As such, the limited place accorded to French by the BNA Act was quite simply viewed as a compromise, a concession necessary to the construction of such a nation. Not surprisingly, he applied a policy of strict observance of the Act in matters of language and provincial jurisdiction, as was clearly evident in the debate over the Manitoba school question:

Le gouvernement fédéral ne peut désavouer une loi que si elle est inconstitutionnelle ou si elle va à l'encontre du bien commun.

Macdonald refusa de la faire par crainte d'encourir le reproche de violer l'autonomie des provinces. [Mais] . . . en niant toute relation entre le droit minoritaire et le bien commun, Macdonald fermait la porte à une conception d'un Canada biculturel et assurait le triomphe du principe unitaire, c'est-à-dire d'un Canada unilingue et uniculturel, sauf le Québec. (Hamelin et al., 1971, pp. 426, 434)

While in opposition, Laurier periodically exploited nationalist sentiments, French language rights, and a greater degree of autonomy for the Dominion, but once in power he came down firmly in favour of the idea of a Canada aligned with England, while assuring certain residual rights for French Canadians, at least within Quebec:

Laissez les deux races vivre à côté l'une de l'autre, chacune avec ses traits caractéristiques; elles n'en seront que plus rapidement unies dans une communauté d'aspirations vers un but commun — celui de rester anglaises d'allégeance et canadiennes de sentiment.

On me demandera peut-être quel sera l'avenir du Canada. L'avenir du Canada est d'être anglais. Je ne partage pas les rêves ou les illusions du petit nombre de mes concitoyens d'origine française sur les bords du Saint-Laurent . . . (Laurier, 1890, pp. 751, 757).

This stance upheld, on one hand, a dominant language and institution modelled on England; on the other, the privilege of continued recourse to French within Quebec in a context of respect of provincial rights.

Quebec was quick to react to the progressive limitation of French-language rights outside the province within the context of a restrictive interpretation of the BNA Act. Riots followed the announcement of the hanging of Riel, and fund raising — the “sou scolaire” — in churches throughout the province assured the continuation of French schooling in Ontario. More important, developing French Canadian nationalism focussed increasingly on the promotion of French within Quebec, the maintenance of French educational rights outside the province, and the necessity of creating a bilingual Canada, notably by promoting French in Ottawa. In other words, it was the French Canadian nationalists who, at the turn of the century, sought to promote an indigenous Canadian identity, both for reasons of simple justice and to counter accelerating Americanization of the country, disillusioned as they were by developments since Confederation:

Si cette langue [l'anglais] devait devenir un jour la seule langue parlée dans le pays, ce jour-là, le Canada serait perdu pour l'Angleterre et il aurait cessé d'exister comme entité nationale; ce ne serait plus qu'une toute petite partie du grand tout américain . . .

Il est évident que tant que le Canada gardera son caractère de nation bilingue, il restera par le fait même, une nation tout à fait distincte de la nation américaine qui est unilingue et anglo-saxonisante . . . le parler français . . . est le plus puissant constituant de la nationalité canadienne . . . le bilinguisme est absolument nécessaire à l'indépendance du Canada. (Jean-Marie Pénard, 1916, cited in Bouthillier and Meynaud, 1972, pp. 381, 384)

More preoccupied by the French Canadian than the American threat to national identity, the appeals of Henri Bourassa and other Quebec nationalists, went unheard in English Canada. Confirmation of the Imperial connection and hence of a dependent rather than independent identity, was expressed for these nationalists in Canadian engagement in the Boer War and First World War.

The kind of dynamic that prevailed at the beginning of the twentieth century is clearly illustrated by the experience of Armand Lavergne. As a member of Parliament in Ottawa, he presented a bill in 1906 “afin de faire reconnaître dans les services de l'Etat ou d'utilité publique des droits de la langue française pratiquement ignorés dans tous ces domaines” (Lavergne, 1934, p. 122). Without support from fellow MPs, he was unable to call the vote and the bill was withdrawn:

Rappellerai-je aussi la campagne de ridicule dont on tenta de couvrir le malheureux député de Montmagny, coupable de vouloir appliquer l'esprit et la lettre du pacte fédéral dans les ressorts de l'administration de notre vie nationale? (ibid.)

Later, as a member of the Quebec legislature Lavergne presented the same bill there, and it was adopted following a close vote in a parliamen-

tary commission in 1910. Entitled “Loi amendant le Code civil concernant les contrats avec les compagnies de services d’utilité publique,” it required that:

Doivent être imprimés en français et en anglais les billets des voyageurs, les bulletins d’enregistrement des bagages, les imprimés pour lettres de voiture, connaissements, dépêches télégraphiques, feuilles et formules de contrats, faits, fournis ou délivrés par une compagnie de chemin de fer, de navigation, de télégraphe, de téléphone, de transport et de messageries ou d’énergie électrique ainsi que les avis ou règlements affichés dans ses gares, voitures, bateaux, bureaux, usines ou ateliers. (cited in Bouthillier and Meynaud, 1972, p. 328)

This bill was the sole item of language legislation passed in Quebec prior to the 1960s, if one excludes the decision of a number of municipalities to amend their charter with a view to publishing their minutes in French only.⁵ It evokes the fact that the French Canadian elite in the early part of the twentieth century was mainly concerned with the promotion of bilingualism and sought to debate the issue in the federal arena. It was failure there that ultimately led them to turn their attention to Quebec.

Resolutely British in the early decades in terms of symbols, loyalties and language, the federal government began to institute certain cautious changes over the period of 1921–48: the first bilingual postage stamp in 1923; all stamps and money orders bilingual as of 1926 (to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of Confederation); bilingual paper money in 1936 (following a tumultuous debate in the House of Commons), etc. In the mid-1930s, Ernest Lapointe, minister of justice in the King government and King’s principal lieutenant in Quebec, set out to create a federal public service that would be more representative of the francophone community with respect to language use and proportion of francophone employees. As a result of his efforts the Lacroix Bill was adopted in 1938, stipulating that:

Except where otherwise expressly provided, all appointments to the Civil Service shall be upon competitive examination under and pursuant to the provision of this Act, and shall be during pleasure: provided that no appointment, whether permanent or temporary shall be made within a province, and no employee shall be transferred from a position in a province to a local position in the same or another province, whether permanent or temporary, until or unless the candidate or employee was qualified, by examination on the knowledge and use of the language of the majority of the persons with whom he is required to do business: provided that such language shall be French or the English language. (Heward, 1966, Appendix A, p. 97)

In its application, this law at least provided the assurance that federal civil servants in Quebec would henceforth speak French, a second significant step in the bilingualization of the Quebec public domain after the Lavergne Bill.

These progressive modifications in the Canadian symbolic order can be related, in part at least, to a series of events affecting the whole of the country: the First World War, the economic crisis of 1921, the Depression of 1929, and the Statute of Westminster in 1931. The Depression resulted in the federal government assuming a rapidly expanding role in the internal affairs of the country. Certain provinces were on the verge of bankruptcy; at the same time new spheres of state endeavour were being created. In the interests of collective survival, individual provinces permitted the federal government to intervene in domains that were hitherto under their competence. The federal government began to loom large in the lives of all Canadians in all parts of the country. At the same time, the Statute of Westminster was passed in England, according effective political autonomy to Canada. The umbilical cord was finally cut and henceforth Ottawa was responsible not only for the development of foreign policy but equally for establishing the very identity of the nation:

Bien que le statut de Westminster n'affecte en rien le partage du pouvoir établi par l'Acte de 1867 entre l'état central et les états provinciaux canadiens, il est devenue la source d'une révolution dans l'ordre politico-culturel établi en 1867, en devenant la source d'une modification importante dans le sentiment nationaliste de la majorité anglo-canadienne incarnée par l'état central . . . (il) acquiert un prestige particulier aux yeux de la majorité anglophone du pays. (Lévesque, 1959, p. 173-74)

Although some French Canadian nationalists reacted enthusiastically to this new conjuncture, any serious reflection on national identity, with a view to accommodating both English and French realities, was delayed first by the Depression and then the Second World War. Federal government preoccupations were above all economic and political. The Rowell-Sirois Commission was created to investigate relations between the Dominion and the provinces, particularly fiscal arrangements, and after three years of enquiry (1937-40) recommended increasing centralization of powers in Ottawa. So began the endless rounds of negotiations between the federal and provincial governments over the division of powers, with Quebec figuring largely in the confrontations.

An increasingly omnipresent federal government was only one of several factors that provoked a new phase of French Canadian nationalism beginning in the 1920s and 1930s. Accelerating industrialization and urbanization, together with the massive penetration of American capital, sport and culture (cinema, popular music, magazines), created a climate of insecurity and stimulated the search for a solution that would reinforce provincial autonomy, both economically and politically. Such was the climate that inspired the cooperative movement and also brought Duplessis to power.

The growing preoccupation with provincial autonomy was not seen as

incompatible with federalism but rather as consistent with the original logic surrounding Confederation that had appeared so attractive to the French Canadian political elite of the time. In the words of Groulx, Confederation constituted the "resurrection of French Canada" by virtue of resuscitating Quebec as a political reality and hence legitimizing her aspirations.

The language question served to fuel, if not to spark, the whole debate. The modernization of Quebec had meant its anglicization, not only of the work world, but of the street and the landscape in general:

La prédominance absolue de l'élément anglais dans les hautes sphères de l'activité économique se traduit par la négligence partout voulue, partout affichée de la langue française: dans les services publics, dans les grands magasins qui pourtant recrutent chez nous le gros de leur clientèle — en particulier dans le domaine fédéral. (Edras Minville, 1934, cited in Bouthillier and Meynaud, 1972, p. 470)

It was this general environment of a "pays français, visage anglais: expression d'un état de choses, reflet surtout d'un état d'esprit" (Minville, 1934, cited in Bouthillier and Meynaud, 1979, p. 472) that struck such foreign observers as André Siegfried and Raoul Blanchard. So pervasive was it that even *Vieux Québec* had a predominantly anglophone aspect in the 1930s.

Groulx, speaking of French Canadian interests in 1934, affirmed that "nous avons perdu, depuis vingt-cinq ans, tellement de terrain." Such was the predominance of English in the spheres of industry and commerce that between the two World Wars, Quebec experienced a state of what some of its elite referred to as *anglomanie*:

Du culte aveugle que, de la base au sommet de notre société, on voue à la langue anglaise, à l'esprit anglais, aux méthodes anglaises, à tout ce qui porte le cachet anglo-saxon. (Edras Minville, 1934, cited in Bouthillier and Meynaud, 1972, p. 467)

The response again came essentially from Church and patriotic organizations in the form of *campagnes de refrancisation* that, during the 1920s and 1930s, sought to draw the attention of the population as a whole to the gravity of the linguistic situation. This specific response was in turn transcended by a new phase of French Canadian nationalism:

Le nationalisme canadien-français se précise. Pendant une génération il avait surtout eu comme objectif de résister à l'impérialisme britannique . . . [Les Canadiens français] se préoccupent maintenant davantage de leurs intérêts collectifs comme habitants de la province de Québec et comme citoyens de l'État fédéral. (Brunet, 1969, p. 203)

The Implications for French Canadian Society

From what we have revealed thus far, the general legislative climate was quite clearly unfavourable to the development of French in both Quebec

and Canada. A few, largely symbolic, victories in Ottawa between the two World Wars had served to modify slightly the image of Canada, giving it a vaguely bilingual coloration. However, in Quebec the importance of French was declining in the face of accelerating industrialization and expanding spheres of federal intervention. "Dans les bureaux, les affaires et le commerce, le français est banni systématiquement" (Monière, 1983, p. 16). Given the degree and rapidity of change from the 1930s on, serious re-evaluation of the linguistic portrait of the country was in order. The government of Mackenzie King, in extending its services, was led ineluctably to pose the question of the extension of bilingualism and the employment of bilingual personnel:

L'état fédéral a dû reconnaître qu'il était impossible de limiter l'usage du bilinguisme à l'enceinte du parlement et des tribunaux fédéraux. (Brunet, 1969, p. 201)

In Quebec, in spite of the intransigence of Duplessis toward English Canada, certain politicians began to plead for the modernization of the educational system, which would accord greatly increased importance to English, mathematics and other "practical" subjects.

Adélard Godbout, Quebec premier from 1939 to 1944, was perhaps the most influential campaigner for educational reform:

Nos jeunes gens ne devraient pas jusqu'à l'âge de 20 ans, recevoir une instruction qui ne les prépare à rien, s'ils ne désirent pas devenir prêtres . . . Nous sommes, 3,000,000 de Canadiens français contre 17,400,000 d'Anglais. Je ne peux rien dire de plus à nos jeunes gens que ceci: ils ne peuvent pas réussir s'ils ne connaissent pas la langue anglaise. (*Le Devoir*, October 23, 1940)

His pleas were particularly well received in Montreal, to the extent that for a time consideration was even given to making the Catholic school system integrally bilingual:

Pour toutes ces causes, et sur proposition de M. Tagget Smyth, il est résolu à l'unanimité de prier le Conseil pédagogique d'étudier les deux suggestions suivantes:

1. Que les écoles bilingues soient dorénavant la règle pour les institutions de la Commission ou subventionnées par elle;
2. Que la Commission favorise la création d'écoles que les enfants des deux langues peuvent fréquenter indifféremment. (*L'Action Nationale* 16 (2): pp. 227-28, 1940)

Although Godbout was more concerned with modernization than with simply promoting the English language, it was in the 1930s and 1940s that Quebec was closest to becoming a bilingual province in a unilingual country, with French confined to the home, school, church, and perhaps quite literally the marketplace.

Yet despite the very considerable pressures that the expanding and indifferent state and private sectors imposed on the French language, the

French-speaking population as a whole continued to show a high degree of vitality. The 1941 census was a crucial date in Canada's demographic history. The French had succeeded in maintaining themselves at approximately 30 percent of the country's population and were showing a capacity to expand territorially beyond the boundaries of Quebec, while Canadians of British ethnic origin dropped below 50 percent for the first time since the beginning of the nineteenth century:

We see that the period of roughly 1841 to 1941 saw the gradual expansion of the French group out of their previous domain along the St. Lawrence, first into their own province (Eastern townships, Ottawa Valley, Quebec City and Montreal), then into eastern and northern Ontario, not to mention the United States. This expansion, however, largely did not carry over into the West of Canada. The census of 1921 showed the high-water mark of expansion with 22 percent of persons of French mother tongue being outside of the province of Quebec. Still, in 1941 the picture looked bright for a bilingual Canada, with the French outside of Quebec more than replacing themselves proportionately in the next generation, and ten percent of the population aged 0-9 outside of Quebec being of French mother tongue. Some even thought at this time that the French could attain a majority in the country, a position which they had lost since about 1805. (Beaujot, 1982, p. 382)

This strength is to be explained by a variety of considerations, notably the extremely high fertility of French Canadians, associated with a 15-year period of depression and war during which immigration to Canada had virtually ceased. High fertility was in part an expression of economic conditions — family farming, urban poverty, diversified household economies, etc. — but equally of a strongly developed ethnic identity. Articulated around the Catholic Church and a whole range of ancillary institutions, and subject to discriminatory pressures from outside, this environment, demographically speaking, encouraged a high degree of endogamy as well as the assimilation of individuals marrying into the group (native peoples, Irish, Scottish, Italian, etc.). The Church sought to channel migration across the country through programs of agricultural colonization that were maintained until the early 1950s, while responding rapidly to the needs of urban migrants by establishing French Canadian parishes with schools and other basic institutions in the mining and manufacturing centres that attracted so many *Québécois* in search of work. All this, associated with a still insignificant state and the virtual absence of electronic media, gave a cellular structure to the organization of French Canadian society. Each cell, whether urban or rural, whether called the *quartier* Moulin à Fleur in Sudbury, the *paroisse* Notre-Dame-de-Lourdes in Coquitlam, the village of Saint-Léon in Manitoba or Willowbunch in Saskatchewan, was characterized by a remarkably high degree of internal cohesion, the links being provided by institutional and family ties that could generally be traced back to Quebec. As Gabrielle Roy notes, writing of Ely, Manitoba in 1942:

Le Québec était partout présent, où que vous tourniez l'oeil, chez ces gens qui n'y avaient pourtant jamais remis les pieds depuis leur départ pour ainsi dire au berceau. Mais leur doux parler était celui du Québec. Leur amitié si chaude et bienveillante en était.

Curieuse chose! Longtemps avant la télévision et la radio, le vieux Québec, le Québec seul et pauvre émettait des ondes de vie. Elles se propageaient en tous sens; elles atteignaient des villages lointains, les hameaux perdus, même des maisons seules comme celle où j'étais ce soir, et elles les réchauffaient de l'humble feu partout ressenti. (Roy, 1984, pp. 118–119)

Until the 1950s, distance from Quebec was largely immaterial to the survival of French-language minority communities, seemingly due to their relative geographical isolation and their dependence on religious rather than secular institutional arrangements that were largely managed and staffed directly from Quebec.

Transforming the Canadian Symbolic Order

The postwar years have been profoundly marked by what Raymond Breton terms “the transformation of the Canadian symbolic order” — that is, the symbolic character of federal institutions,

so that the French segment of the population could identify with them. Among the steps taken were the establishment of the Royal Commission [on Bilingualism and Biculturalism] . . . ; the Official Languages Act in 1969, the initiation of several programs designed to increase the francophone presence in various institutional domains, and especially in the federal institutions. Numerous changes in the symbols themselves were also introduced: for instance a Canadian Flag was adopted in 1965; Trans-Canada Airlines became Air Canada; the Dominion Bureau of Statistics became Statistics Canada; “O Canada” was proclaimed as the national anthem; stamps were changed; the money was redesigned with more Canadian symbols; and the Constitution was patriated. . . . (Breton, 1984, p. 129)

Conventional wisdom has it that such changes can be traced back to the government of Lester Pearson (1963–68), but closer examination reveals considerably deeper roots. The recriminations of Ernest Lapointe regarding the paucity of francophone civil servants were taken up in the House of Commons shortly after the war by a particularly vocal and aggressive group of Quebec deputies. “This group of five men was known as the committee of five, or ‘Little Chicago’ five” (Heward, 1966, p. 44). Acquiescing to their pressure, Mackenzie King created a committee in 1947 under the direction of Solicitor General Joseph Jean to investigate the state of bilingualism in the different departments and agencies of the government and to make recommendations for improving the situation. The committee appears to have died a natural death, since no record exists of any report or subsequent actions. However, the

much larger issue of national identity surfaced very quickly afterwards. The war was over, the Depression a thing of the past, and Canada was entering a period of rapid and highly successful economic growth:

Pour couronner l'essor du nationalisme anglo-canadien sur le plan politico-financier, pour justifier en somme cet excellent moyen d'unité nationale, il fallait désormais s'attaquer au coeur même du problème, celui de la dispersion des forces culturelles. . . . (Lévesque, 1959, p. 178)

The Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, created in 1949, was the first to identify unequivocally what was to become the preoccupation of the 1960s and 1970s:

There are in fact two Canadian cultures, almost wholly separate each from the other. . . . Whenever we speak of it as if it were a unit we must be careful to remember that its unity is the unity of a walnut — it has a single shell, but within that shell are two quite distinct formations of meat flimsily joined in the centre. The shell is the political structure of the nation. . . . The meat is the two cultures, as yet very lightly joined together, of French-speaking and English-speaking Canada. (Sandwell, 1951, p. 2)

The absence of a single Canadian culture is noted, as is the limited differentiation between English-speaking Canada and the United States. By implication, the relative strength of French Canadian culture is admitted:

The mental attitude of Canadians is so close to that of the general mass of the people of the United States that they receive American broadcasts and cinema productions with no sense that they are "foreign" products; the culture of English-speaking Canada is so little differentiated from that of the United States that when the Americans are not dealing with their own politics they seem to be speaking from the same body of general assumptions as if they were Canadians. (With the French-speaking Canadians it is much more the difference of mental attitude, of fundamental philosophy, that constitutes the obstacle, than the difference of language. . . . (Sandwell, 1951, p. 6)

The report concluded that Canada was gravely threatened by the process of Americanization, and that the federal government should intervene to promote a distinctive, bicultural Canadian identity. By extension,

Le peuple canadien-français fut cordialement invité à joindre son effort à celui du peuple anglo-canadien, étant donné que la culture française représente en elle-même une barrière contre l'américanisme envahisseur. (Lévesque, 1959, p. 160)

It was in many respects a remarkable document. While emanating from Ottawa and hence with an Anglo-Canadian perspective, it was innovative in proposing a resolutely continental vision of the country, and one in which the French fact was viewed as a positive force necessary to

the survival of Canada. Henri Bourassa's message was finally received — 40 years later — by the English Canadian political and cultural elite.

As fate would have it, this convergence in thinking and aspirations of English and French Canadian nationalists went unnoticed in government circles. Politically speaking, the 1950s were an interregnum during which Diefenbaker's Ottawa lost touch with Quebec and lost interest in the language question, while Quebec remained stifled by the obscurantism of Duplessis. Twelve critical years elapsed between the end of the Royal Commission on National Development and the creation of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1963. During that period Quebec changed so radically that a major segment of its cultural and political elite was eventually to lose interest in bilingualism and pan-Canadian nationalism as ultimate goals. Such is the irony of history — English Canada, as incarnated by Ottawa, began to take an interest in French Canada just as the latter ceased to exist as a single demographic, cultural and ideological reality. More important, a pattern was set whereby Ottawa (and pan-Canadian nationalism), by seeking thereafter to accommodate Quebec, was constantly to frustrate it. Divergence rather than convergence of interests was once again to become the order of the day, with Ottawa trailing Quebec in its appreciation of the latter's aspirations. And once again the federal government was to incarnate the nation — a single nation. Hence it was in Ottawa rather than in the social and cultural fabric of the population at large that the idea of a bilingual country took root in the 1960s.

From French Canada to Quebec

To attempt to summarize within the space of a few paragraphs the changes that occurred in Quebec in the course of the Quiet Revolution would be as absurd as it is impossible. For the sake of the present analysis, however, emphasis should be placed on the collapse of the institutional base of traditional French Canadian society, and hence of certain values and practices associated with it. As I have noted elsewhere:

Because of the virtual collapse of the Catholic Church, the institutional arrangements linking Québec with the diaspora were eroded. . . . Some 2,000 priests were ordained in Québec in 1947, but by the early 1970s the number had fallen to less than 100. Consequently it was no longer possible for the Church to play an active role in the education, health and social welfare of Québec society . . . nor to provide tangible aid to the diaspora. Likewise, the allegiance of the migrants themselves was rapidly changing. The francophones of the Western interior were no longer calling themselves French Canadians, but Franco-Manitobains, Fransaskois, and Franco-Albertains. . . . In Québec, French Canadians were also in the process of

redefining their collective identity — as Québécois [to bear witness to the new secular authority, the one North American state the ethnic group controlled]. It had become urgent to exercise political power in an aggressive manner “at home” because doubts were being raised about the long-term survival of the French fact even in the St. Lawrence Valley itself. The farm, the network of kin, and the parish no longer constituted the “action space” of the majority; now it was the factory, the office and the suburb. English was the common language of work [and economic power, and was readily espoused by most immigrants and even by some francophones]. Demographers warned that the Montréal metropolitan area, containing almost half of Québec’s population would become predominantly English-speaking by the end of the century. (Waddell, 1982, p. 145–46)

In other words, the 1960s and 1970s were characterized by the reformulation of ethnic identity among French Canadians. Henceforth the primordial attachment was to be to language rather than religion and to the province rather than the continent. In Quebec the state was to incarnate the nation, but it was the *État du Québec* rather than Canada. The state was expressed in the government, the public and para-public sectors. It had an unequivocal territorial base, and it was entering a period of exponential growth. Finally, francophones were *majoritaires* within its structures. Hence a new state of mind, new institutions, and the exercise of power in an arena that was aggressively modern. The *anciens clercs* of the Church were abruptly transformed into the *nouveaux clercs* of the State.

The change was not without its difficulties. Immigrants were also involved in the process of reformulating ethnic identity. Increasingly preoccupied by material rather than spiritual considerations, the Italians progressively transferred their primordial allegiance from the Catholic Church to the English language. This often meant a transfer in the language of education of their children and a shift in inter-ethnic ties from the francophone to the anglophone charter group. Other largely Catholic immigrant groups manifested the same tendencies, thereby creating a growing sense of abandonment and isolation among francophones.

The shift in allegiance from an intangible French Canada and the dream of an *Amérique française* to the concrete reality of Quebec confirmed the divorce between the *Québécois* and the francophones of the diaspora. The latter had no secular structures with which they could identify — or, at best only a school or a municipality. They continued to seek refuge in traditional values, entrenched in their minority status and ravaged by assimilation to the point where their only hope was to promote some kind of integrally bilingual and vaguely folkloric identity — or so it seemed to the majority of *Québécois* now that there were no longer migrants or missionaries to maintain the ties.

The final shock followed from the modernization of Quebec's educational system. Trained in French as hard scientists, engineers, architects, administrators and the like, and at the same time possessing an academically grounded *identité nationale*, the new elite came into brutal contact with the anglo world of business in Quebec. Not only was this world hostile to the use of French, but it even had serious misgivings about the employment of French Canadians in positions of authority. The relation between language and ethnicity was clear, as were the barriers to upward mobility for the rapidly expanding francophone middle class in Quebec. The state offered ready access to power, but it was necessary at the same time to enlarge the spheres of utilization of French and to make the language attractive to immigrants.

Emerging from a context in which francophones had been called upon to learn English — if not, indeed, to become English — in order to succeed, it was now too late to promote bilingualism in Quebec. During the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s a whole series of confrontations occurred between the two languages, some of a purely symbolic nature, others implying substantial reforms — the naming of the Queen Elizabeth Hotel by the Canadian National Railroad in the late 1950s, the St-Léonard school crisis in 1968, *McGill français* in 1969, the FLQ crisis in 1970. Beginning with the 1962 demonstration in front of Central Station following Donald Gordon's derogatory remarks about the ability of French Canadians to assume administrative positions in business, and ending with the creation of the Gens de l'Air in the late 1970s following opposition to the use of French in air traffic control, public pressure was repeatedly applied in order to increase the use of French and the employment of francophones in critical sectors of the work world. The *État-providence*, having supplanted the *Église-providence*, had no choice but to assume the initiative. The Office de la langue française was established in 1961; Hydro-Québec became a state monopoly in 1963, with French as its working language; the Gendron Commission was appointed in 1968 to investigate the status of French in the province; Bill 22, "promoting the teaching of the French language" was enacted in 1974; and Bill 101, the "Charte de la langue française," was enacted in 1977. Following negotiations with Ottawa, Quebec was allowed once again to intervene in the process of selecting foreign immigrants to the province. Thanks in part at least to a favourable international climate following the decolonization of Africa and Southeast Asia, large numbers of French, Belgians, Vietnamese and other French-speaking people were on the move. For the first time in 200 years, Quebec could ensure that immigrants would be predominantly francophone or francophile rather than anglophone.

These successive state actions were remarkable in terms of both volume and diversity, and they resulted, notably, in enhancing the status of French, by extending its use to domains hitherto dominated by

English. This process was facilitated by efforts, emanating from the Office de la langue française, to improve the quality of the language and hence to "operationalize" it. Lexicons of technical terms were produced for key industries, trades and professions, preparing the ground for the francization of the enterprises themselves.

Underlying these developments was the categorical rejection of bilingualism as a legitimate goal. Both Bills 22 and 101 bore witness to this by declaring Quebec society to be intrinsically francophone. The practice of bilingualism in Quebec had permitted anglophones to remain largely unilingual and required francophones to acquire fluency in English in order to function in the world of industry and commerce. Given such circumstances, francophone Quebecers were perceived in the 1960s as constituting a *majorité minoritaire* in opposition to anglophones who behaved as a *minorité majoritaire*. Transported to a country-wide level, in which francophones were an effective *minorité*, such inequalities could only be reinforced. The basically asymmetrical nature of French-English relations in Canada was now evident. Further, this asymmetry was judged to be unalterable given the number, concentration, and relative political strength of francophones. The political, demographic, and geographical configuration of the country imposed minority status, condemned French to the status of a subordinate language — hence, a language "in translation," and assured that immigrants would continue to be attracted to English.

The bases for contemporary Quebec nationalism were firmly established and the sentiments widely diffused through a rapidly expanding middle class. Restructuring the province meant, inevitably, confrontation with Ottawa over jurisdictions and collective aspirations and, at the same time, the rupturing of ideological, if not fraternal, ties with the francophone diaspora. This latter was effected in 1967, on the occasion of the États généraux du Canada français, with the adoption of a resolution confirming Quebec's right to self-determination. Needless to say, this was a bitter pill for the *francophones hors Québec* to swallow.

Meanwhile, Back in Ottawa . . .

The Diefenbaker government's concessions to French were essentially limited to the introduction of simultaneous translation in Parliament in 1958 and the issuing of bilingual cheques in 1962. Such largely symbolic gestures only served to fuel Quebec nationalism, confirming the French Canadian feeling of being totally absent from the affairs of the federal state. Hence, when the Liberals acquired power in 1963, the issue of reform was paramount. Confronted by the accelerating Americanization of English Canada, associated with the decline of a British definition of the country, and the very real threat of Quebec separatism, Lester Pearson had no choice but to take up the offensive:

Les Canadiens français peuvent-ils participer vraiment à la gestion des affaires de l'État? Les Canadiens anglais sont-ils prêts à accepter les changements nécessaires pour que l'association à part entière devienne réalité? Quelles mesures concrètes y aurait-il lieu de prendre pour fournir à tous les jeunes Canadiens l'occasion de devenir véritablement bilingues?

Le temps est venu pour les Canadiens de faire un sérieux examen collectif de l'aspect biculturel et bilingue de notre pays. . . . (Beal and Poliquin, 1968, p. 17)

In the eyes of the prime minister, the idea of a bilingual and not simply bicultural country was taking form, and it was this bilingual character which would distinguish the country from its southern neighbour, rather than the mere existence of French-speaking Canadians within its boundaries. But it would take six years for the vision to crystallize, and even then the insistence on form would belie a significant diluting of content.

Meanwhile, a somewhat tenuous, and ephemeral, convergence of the interests and aspirations of a selected element of English and French Canadian cultural elites occurred within the framework of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, instituted by Pearson. Operational from 1963 to 1971, it proved to be "the largest, longest and most expensive royal commission in Canadian history" (Harbron, 1977, p. 121). It had as its mandate ". . . to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races" (RCBB, 1967, p. xxi). With the concept of two nations as a premise, the commission was in an excellent position to confront and propose solutions to the crisis of unity and identity that Canada was experiencing. Although it never completed its mandate, particularly with regard to constitutional matters, the commission did indeed identify major problem areas, introduce critical concepts with regard to the configuration of Canadian society, and make numerous recommendations that Parliament subsequently acted upon.

Perhaps the most important notion introduced was that of *inequality* between the two language groups insofar as rights, opportunities and access to services were concerned — French-language schooling, government services in French, French as the language of work, etc. The issue in the case of francophones (and, by extension, of minorities in general) was presented as being one of *collective* as distinct from *individual* rights, a relatively new preoccupation in North America. Among the most critical revelations — in terms of its repercussions — was that of the 14 ethnic groups identified in Quebec in 1961, the French ranked twelfth with respect to the mean income of male wage earners, 8 percent below the average, while the British ranked first with a mean income that exceeded the average by 42 percent (RCBB, 1969).

The commission revealed that there was not only a spatial expression to this Canadian duality, but also interpenetration of the groups. Hence, *official language minorities* were identified and the presence of fran-

cophones in all the provinces noted. However, if the anglophone minority was shown to be relatively privileged, it did not thereby follow that the country had an inherently asymmetrical structure. For the commissioners it was simply a question of striving to eliminate inequalities while maintaining the coast-to-coast expression of the two populations and their liberty of movement from one part of the country to the other. The crucial problem Canadians had to grapple with was that of continuing to promote individual rights, in conformity with a North American value system, while at the same time assuring the maintenance of francophone communities and the French language across the country as "an essential mark of the Canadian identity and the foremost point of distinction between this country and the United States" (RCBB, 1967, p. 16).

If, in its report, the commission insisted on the inseparability of language and culture, it quite evidently hesitated over the procedure to be adopted in their promotion. Confronted by the choice between a *territorial* and a *personality* (or *institutional*) approach to the provision of language services and rights, it finally opted for the latter. Such a vision dictated that institutions be bilingual, with individuals having the right to be served in their language wherever they may be. Hence, the commissioners came down in favour of integral coast-to-coast bilingualism at the very time when Quebec was abandoning such an option. At the same time they admitted to the problems inherent in the application of such a concept and proposed four levels of intervention: that French and English become the official languages of the Parliament and Government of Canada; that New Brunswick and Ontario imitate Quebec in becoming officially bilingual; that bilingual districts be established throughout the country in areas where the minority is sufficiently numerous to be viable as a group; and that the federal capital area should accord equal status to French and English. Again — and it cannot be too strongly stressed — the model referred to throughout is that of Quebec, a model that Quebec itself was no longer satisfied with.

Parliament was quick to act on the general recommendations of the commission and adopted the Official Languages Act in 1969. English and French thereby acquired the status of official languages for all purposes of Parliament and government of Canada — hence, of its Crown corporations as well as its civil service and judicial bodies. Programs were established to help anglophone civil servants acquire a working knowledge of French, to promote the teaching of the second official language in schools across the country, to aid in the revitalization of minority groups, and so forth. French-language working units were created within the civil service, and the position of Commissioner of Official Languages was established, with a view to promoting language reform throughout the country and ensuring that the goal of equal status of French and English in the federal domain was realized. The list of innovations is virtually endless.

If the face of the country was thereby transformed, the capacity of the central government to effect substantive change was severely limited by provincial and municipal jurisdictions. New Brunswick was the only province prepared to follow suit and become integrally bilingual; Ontario adamantly refused to accord any official constitutional status to French. More important perhaps, it proved totally impossible to implement the concept of bilingual districts. On the one hand, Quebec reacted vehemently to the proposition that the entire province become a bilingual district, in contrast to the other provinces (New Brunswick excepted), which were to have bilingual “islands” created within their boundaries. On the other hand, the English-speaking provinces accused the federal government of seeking to create linguistic “ghettos.” The recommendations only served to fuel English-French tensions, and municipal and provincial levels of government expressed little interest in collaborating in the project.

Political considerations also led to the modification, if not the outright rejection, of certain of the key recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. In a spirit of increasing centralization in Ottawa and of concern with building a single Canadian nation forged out of a multitude of origins, the concept of two founding peoples was dismissed. Given the fragility of Canadian identity and the centrifugal forces in operation, it was judged impossible to accept the existence of a *different* people within the territorial confines of the state. By extension, the policy of biculturalism was rejected in favour of one of multiculturalism, insistence being placed on the need for a uniform language policy across the country. Canada was to be bilingual — not only institutionally but also demographically and geographically — or it was not to *be*.

So, in the interests of forging this new national identity, language was separated once and for all from culture. It became an end in itself and the approach to its defence and promotion became essentially a judicial matter — of rights. The federal government thus provided additional confirmation in the 1970s of what Heward had already observed in the 1960s in his report to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism:

Language presents itself with two aspects: as a matter of cultural survival and as an ancillary to the exercise of the power attributed by the B.N.A. Act to parliament or to provincial legislatures. In Canada, it has been dealt with generally from the ancillary point of view and has been regulated only insofar as necessary to permit the full exercise of jurisdiction over another competent subject matter. (Heward, 1966, p. 9)

In other words, the central focus of attention has been that of the right of individuals to use a language in certain legally defined (and hence limited) contexts, as well as the obligation of the state to communicate with its

citizens in one or the other official language. All this has occurred at the expense of a concern to promote language as a privileged instrument of communication within a cultural group, with a view to promoting its collective and distinctive identity. It was hardly surprising that such a conception of language and culture, and indeed of Canada, would fail to receive sympathetic support in Quebec. In this respect the commission failed in its primary goal of accommodating Quebec nationalism. Worse, it nourished regional forces elsewhere in Canada, principally through alienating the West. The Parti québécois, with its goal of sovereignty association, was elected in 1976 and re-elected in 1981.

Not surprisingly, in the wake of the election of a "separatist" government in Quebec and of increasing discontent in the West, Parliament moved to create another commission of enquiry, the Task Force on Canadian Unity, which submitted its report in 1979. Its mandate was to examine the problems of Canada's disunion and to draw appropriate conclusions. Given such scope, the Commission's reflections went beyond a concern with the country's historic duality, to deal with issues of regionalism, multiculturalism, the demands of native peoples, and opposition to the central government in general. In its report it affirmed that:

In our judgement, the first and foremost challenge facing the country is to create an environment in which duality might flourish; the second is to provide a fresher and fuller expression of the forces of regionalism in Canada's constitutional system and power structure.

As for . . . native rights and cultural pluralism, we believe we have a responsibility to suggest how they are affected by the interplay of duality and regionalism and how they might be recognized in a restructured federalism. (p. 21)

In other words, the Pepin-Robarts Commission viewed regionalism as a potentially creative rather than destructive force within the country. Language patterns were viewed as an expression of primarily regional forces, and hence the central problem was identified as one of the more realistic separation of provincial and federal jurisdictions in order to give proper expression to the cultural, economic, political and geographical diversity of Canada:

Since we view the provincial governments as equal in stature and maturity to the central government, we have no difficulty in stating that in a restructured, genuinely federal union the provinces should be recognized as having a constitutional status equal with that of the central government. (Canada, Task Force on Canadian Unity, 1979, p. 86)

Without such essentially political adjustments, all attempts to reinforce Canadian unity were bound to fail:

We believe that any general reform effort, however well intended, which fails to enhance duality or which offends the principle of regionalism is unlikely to increase harmony and unity in Canada. (Canada, Task Force on Canadian Unity, 1979, p. 36)

The Commission's conclusions and recommendations constituted a trenchant criticism of a decade of federal Liberal government policy. Hence, not surprisingly, the report was rejected out of hand by Ottawa — and national unity and harmony have continued to be elusive goals.

Perhaps the federal government had no choice. In its reintegration of language and culture, its concern to legitimize and reinforce regional diversity, and its judgment that the crisis of Canadian unity was in part related to an excessive concentration of power in Ottawa, the Commission's report constituted a grave challenge to ten years of federal cultural and language policy.

The last major intervention by Ottawa occurred in 1982 with the creation of the Constitution Act. Conceived in the tradition of the British North America Act (Constitution Act, 1867) and the Official Languages Act of 1969, it was another stage in the progression toward conferring equal status on the French and English languages across the country. In terms of the hierarchy of jurisdictions, official bilingualism is notably instated in New Brunswick, which is thereby the first province to adopt the federal model.

In addition to confirming the official status of the two languages "in all institutions of the Parliament and government of Canada," the Constitution Act of 1982 was innovative in guaranteeing certain specific linguistic rights to citizens within the framework of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Charter notably guarantees minority language educational rights without distinction to the province, conditional on the fact that minorities reside in situations "where the number of those children so warrants." Although certain aspects of the Charter do not yet apply to Quebec, and although its utility in promoting the interests of the widely scattered francophone minorities remains to be seen, its authority and message are clear. First and foremost, in its own words, "The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect (Section 52(1) Constitution Act, 1982). Second, it goes a step further in reinforcing the model of two official languages arranged symmetrically around a central government located in Ottawa. In other words, the Charter evokes no spirit of compromise or accommodation of a different approach to language that has been developed by Quebec (or indeed by other provinces), and the seeds of conflict, expressed by opposing jurisdictions, remain.

The Effects of Language Policy on Society

Fifteen to twenty years of language legislation in Quebec and in Canada have not been without effect, even if the consequences have not always been those envisaged by the state. Perhaps the most remarkable lesson to be learned is that of the apparent failure of the various federal laws and interventions to alter the language map of the country. Beaujot provides a succinct statement of the situation at the end of the 1970s, following a detailed analysis of time series data on ethnicity, mother tongue, knowledge of official languages, and home language:

For the most part, the data considered here imply that, except in Acadia and Ottawa, the country is moving toward the unilingual areas of a territorial bilingualism model. The part of the Soo-Moncton bilingual belt that is outside of Quebec is degrading into language islands and in English Canada beyond the belt French has a very minimal presence. In Quebec, the various forces at work, including the increasing French control over the economic sector and the changed status of Montreal into a regional service centre, with the aid of Bill 101, and the disproportionate departure of English groups, are also increasingly turning the province into a unilingual area. (Beaujot, 1982, p. 385)

His findings are corroborated by all the major researchers engaged in statistical and spatial analysis of language data, notably Cartwright, Castonguay, De Vries and Vallée. In this they confirm the analysis and prognostications of Joy (1972), whose research was conducted in the 1960s.

The figures speak for themselves. In 1941, 29.2 percent of Canada's population was of French mother tongue; by 1981 the figure had fallen to 25.6 percent. At the same time the proportion residing in Quebec continued to increase, from a low of 78 percent in 1921 to a high of 88.8 percent in 1981. And it is not likely to stop there, since if 10 percent of the 0–9 age group in Canada less Quebec was of French mother-tongue in 1941, by 1976 the proportion had dropped to 4.5 percent (Beaujot, 1982, p. 373). Indicators of linguistic assimilation of francophones abound. Beaujot, for instance, compares the proportion of French mother tongue population in the age group 0–9 with 25–34 for each province over the period 1941–76, and reveals that only in Quebec is the population replacing itself (Beaujot, 1982, pp. 373–75). Insofar as bilingualism is concerned, it is the francophones who assume the burden; 42.6 percent declared themselves bilingual, in 1981, up from 34 percent in 1971, compared with 7.6 percent of anglophones (up from 5.5 percent). At the provincial level, 28.7 percent of Quebec francophones and 60.8 percent of New Brunswick's francophones are bilingual, while in every other province the figure exceeds 80 percent. Fully a quarter of a million Canadians with French mother tongue declare English to be their language spoken at home, this being the case with one out of three francophones outside

Quebec. Beaujot goes so far as to affirm that "the linguistic loyalties of the French outside of Québec have been found to be hardly stronger than that of the Ukrainians and not much different from that of French minorities in the United States" (Beaujot, 1982, p. 376, citing Krotki, 1980, and Veltman, 1977 and 1980, as his sources).

Reasons for this decline are readily identifiable. They centre principally on the breakdown of isolation of francophone minority communities through urbanization and industrialization, and hence the transfer of authority to members of the dominant language group. The Church withdrew from the centre of the institutional scene, new loyalties developed, and English became the language of work. So the communities gradually lost the internal cohesion necessary for survival. It is a vicious circle. The population and density of the communities decline through assimilation and out-migration. There is at the same time a progressive increase in the minimum size required for group survival. It is clear that many francophone communities scattered across the country will not make it into the twenty-first century, or at least will not be considered francophone according to the present definition of the term.

Federal language legislation is largely powerless when confronted by the circumstances of assimilation. It cannot force an integrally bilingual population to request services in French, and it cannot dictate the language of work. To influence migration patterns would be to go against cherished notions of freedom of mobility. Education is essentially a provincial concern, notwithstanding certain provisions of the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the language programs of the Department of Secretary of State. The economy is largely dictated by the private sector, and values are increasingly determined by the media and popular culture, largely Anglo-American in origin. Bilingual signs on federal property — or on cereal boxes — constitute a paltry alternative vision and if bilingual civil servants do not have the occasion to use French, the language is rapidly set aside. At the same time, in promoting a uniformly continental vision of language, links with Quebec are rarely encouraged by the central government. For Ottawa, Quebec is viewed more in terms of a political reality that offers an alternative (and conflicting) vision of language in Canada than as a place where French is a language of work, creativity, identity and power.

Rather than draw conclusions from the demographic trends, the response of the federal state has been to work even more vigorously to promote language on a coast-to-coast basis . . . through plans to resurrect *francophènes* in areas where the language is no longer spoken, and through support of initiatives to render certain provinces officially bilingual.

Very different tendencies are evident among the official language minority population in Quebec. Assimilation is in no sense an issue for anglophones, given their extreme concentration in the Montreal area,

their physical proximity to Anglo-America, their wealth of institutions, and the high status of the English language. Rather, the statistics point to a tendency to accommodate to official French unilingualism, or to out-migrate — in other words, to choose between adopting or rejecting individual bilingualism and collective minority status. The English mother tongue population declined significantly between 1971 and 1981 — from 13.1 to 10.9 percent (a net loss of almost 100,000 people), while that of French mother tongue increased from 80.7 to 82.4 percent. Similar trends are evident in Montreal, with the percentage of anglophones falling from 22 to 18 and that of francophones increasing from 66 to 68. In both cases the percentage of allophones — persons whose mother tongue in neither French nor English — has remained more or less constant. The statistics on language transfer for 1981 suggest that the decline in the Quebec anglophone population can be imputed essentially to out-migration. A comparison of figures on home language with those on mother tongue by five-year age groups reveals retention figures ranging between 82.6 and 90.4 percent. It is the active age groups (35–49 years) who are marginally most vulnerable to assimilation.

The sociologist Caldwell was the first to highlight the gravity of the out-migration phenomenon. Of a group of 862 students who graduated from English high schools in 1971, he established that 313 had left the province by 1976 (Caldwell, 1978). In a follow-up study of 824 respondents, conducted in 1979, the proportion had risen from 36 to 38 percent for the group as a whole, and to 41 percent for those of English mother tongue (Caldwell, 1980). Such departures become critical in a context of declining in-migration and particularly low fertility rates for anglophones, and of the redirection of immigrants to the French-language school system. During the 1970s the Quebec borders ceased to be a “revolving door” for immigrants of other linguistic groups (to borrow Beaujot’s expression, 1982, p. 372). It is nevertheless worth remarking that according to numerous researchers (Maheu, 1978; Duchesne, 1978; Castonguay, 1980), intermarriage still acts in favour of English, while in mother-tongue to home-language transfers for 1981, the Portuguese constitute the only major “other mother tongue” population to favour French.

In other respects, the statistics point to a more reasonable balance of power and privilege between the two major language groups in Quebec. The income gap has been closed to all intents and purposes, and the proportion of students registered in the French-language school system is closer to the proportion of francophones in the population at large, while the anglophone minority is increasingly assuming the responsibility of bilingualism. Caldwell estimates that “at least one-seventh of English-speaking families now send their youngest children to French schools” (Caldwell, 1982, p. 5), which is somewhere in the range of 12,000 to 15,000 children. Insofar as bilingualism is concerned, the same analyst writes that “the best available estimates suggest that, whereas in

1970 only a quarter of Quebec Anglophones could function socially in French, today the proportion has risen to two-thirds" (p. 5).

It would be easy to conclude from all this that Quebec has been more effective in the application of its language policies than Ottawa. Certainly it has acted more dramatically, notably in limiting access to English schools, instituting French as the language of work, and favouring francophone immigrants. The systematic refusal of the Ontario government to make the province officially bilingual (in spite of the fact that half the country's *francophones hors Québec* live there), and the bitterness of the recent debate over language in Manitoba would appear to confirm the continuing opposition of a "French" Quebec to an "English" Canada. The new Federal Constitution guarantees the right to be educated in French "where the number so warrants," but the federal government has never made any moves to consecrate the right to work in that language. Hence, the effective context of linguistic assimilation remains largely unchanged.

It would, in fact, be wrong to attempt a direct comparison, since the context of and motives for language legislation are very different in Ottawa than in Quebec City. The federal government was facing a legitimacy crisis in the 1960s and 1970s and had the immediate task of proposing a Canadian alternative to Quebec nationalism. The Quebec government was seeking to increase the strength, dynamism and power of attraction of the only French state in North America. Judging from events of the 1980s, both seem to have succeeded, the actions of Ottawa having undoubtedly contributed to the "no" vote in the 1980 Referendum, and Quebec itself having acquired substantially more linguistic security.

Ottawa's actions are at the origin of certain important country-wide changes. For example, the bilingualization of federal services and the more equitable recruitment of francophones to the civil service have transformed the national capital. It is worth noting in passing that such recruitment has mainly benefited the *francophones hors Québec*, who constitute an estimated 40 percent of French-language employees of the greatly expanded federal government bureaucracy in Ottawa. *Bilinguisme oblige*. The development of French-language education throughout English Canada, particularly in Ontario, has been considerable, and this development is expected to lead to a transfer of control of French-language schools to francophones in 1985, at least in Ontario. On the other hand, at the university level, proficiency in French has been progressively abandoned as an entrance requirement since the 1960s, and there is no indication that it will be reinstated. Instead, selected English-language universities are making increasing efforts to offer courses in French to students from French immersion programs.

At the provincial level, an effective "bilingual belt" has emerged around unilingual French Quebec. New Brunswick has become

officially bilingual, the associated rights and privileges being entrenched in the 1982 Constitution Act. Ontario, while systematically refusing all pressures to introduce such legislation, has progressively expanded the range of French-language services in those parts of the province where francophones constitute an important minority, notably in the north and east. De facto bilingual districts are emerging in those parts of the province adjacent to Quebec.

At the individual level, bilingualism — in the sense of being able to carry on a conversation in both official languages — is making rapid progress among anglophones. Increases of over 50 percent were registered in all provinces but Quebec for the period 1971–81, although the relative proportion continues to be extremely low, ranging between 1.8 percent in Newfoundland and 9.0 percent in New Brunswick (compared to 53.3 percent in Quebec). In all, 7.6 percent of Canada's English mother tongue population declared itself bilingual in 1981 (5.5 percent in 1971), a figure that scarcely bears comparison with the 42.6 percent of francophones who are bilingual. Notable also is the fact that, at 10.5 percent, the allophone population proves to be more proficient in the two official languages than its anglophone counterparts.

Certainly 15 years is too short a period to measure the impact of federal language legislation, although De Vries (1982) does assert that policy measures cannot alter trends. As far as he is concerned, their utility is limited to the enrichment of the daily lives of minorities, in the sense that language education may enable many groups to function in the majority environment without having to abandon all ties to their own culture. Even in the case of Quebec, it would be foolish to link developments directly to recent language legislation, since the progressive shift in the balance of power between francophones and anglophones only began in the 1960s. At the same time, standing out from this mass of somewhat contradictory information are two developments that appear to be of critical significance to the future of language in Canada and to the interplay of associated geopolitical forces. One is the fascination for French immersion in English Canada; the other is the very real separation between language and culture that is now occurring in Quebec.

French immersion began in Saint-Lambert, Quebec (a Montreal suburb) in 1965 as a parents' response to the trend toward making French the principal language of work and commerce in the province. Country-wide interest followed the introduction of federal language legislation, with the numbers of children registered in immersion programs accelerating rapidly from the mid-1970s on, to a high of 115,000 in 1983–84 (Stern, 1984, p. 5). Over half of these were in Ontario (54,000 in 1982–83), followed by Quebec (17,500) and New Brunswick, British Columbia and Manitoba (all around the 7,500 to 8,500). In other words, the vast majority of immersion students are to be found in those parts of Canada where French is a visible and important language.

Reactions to the diverse programs of short, intermediate and late immersion are, almost without exception, enthusiastic in terms of both their academic merits and strengthening of national unity. According to Krashen, an American authority in language acquisition:

Canadian immersion is not simply another successful language teaching programme — it may be the most successful programme ever recorded in the professional language-teaching literature. No programme has been so thoroughly studied and documented, and no programme, to my knowledge, has done so well. (Krashen, 1984, p. 61)

For Max Yalden, former Commissioner of Official Languages, it “may well be the most important educational development in the linguistic affairs of our country over the last twenty years or more . . . a Canadian success story of the first order” (Yalden, 1984, p. 3). And yet if dozens of linguists, educational psychologists and the like have studied the academic performances of such students and sought to refine the program, virtually nothing is known of the larger context of immersion or of its long-term societal implications. As Bienvenue has recently remarked:

Little information exists regarding parental attitudes and values, and little has been done to introduce the topic into the field of ethnic relations. After nearly three quarters of a century of discouraging, if not prohibiting, the use of French as a language of instruction in the public and separate school systems, the current placement of non-French speaking students in immersion programs warrants some sociological attention. (Bienvenue, 1984, p. 16)

Initial analysis, based on Bienvenue’s exploratory study (1984), the special 1984 issue of *Language and Society* on “The Immersion Phenomenon,” a review of publications of the Canadian Parents for French, and conversations with educational psychologists active in research and with students and teachers in Quebec-based summer programs all suggest that the fascination with immersion raises as many questions as it resolves.

The diversity of immersion programs — early, late, summer — and of the language map of the country — from Joy’s Soo-Moncton bilingual belt where both French and English are day-to-day realities for a large segment of the population, through Manitoba where French and hence national unity are emotionally charged issues dividing the population, to Vancouver where French is more an idea than anything else — renders generalization almost impossible. Certainly the benefits of summer immersion programs in Quebec, attracting university-level students, appear to be mixed. Many students come at the urging of parents who can afford to finance the undertaking, while others have federal government scholarships. These students clearly do not represent a cross-section of Canadian society, but are drawn essentially from upper middle class and professional families. It is estimated that one-third of those

enrolled in Laval University's summer programs manifest a real thirst to learn French. Many see a summer in Quebec as an occasion to live autonomously in a "foreign country" that has all the conveniences of home. They are at once impressed by what they perceive to be the very different nature of Quebec — the warmth of human relations, the greater facility with which alcoholic beverages can be purchased and publicly consumed, the intense night life — and are also overwhelmed by the cultural barriers that separate them from the *Québécois* and that draw them together as English Canadians, whether they be from Newfoundland or British Columbia.

It is not at all evident that, after returning home, summer immersion students seek out French Canadians in their own provinces with a view to developing the cultural contacts and language skills first acquired in Quebec. However, thanks to the assiduous reporting of the English media, they seem much more aware of the destiny of Quebec's English minority than of their own French one. But at the same time, they also show a sympathetic interest in Quebec and in the aspirations of her francophone majority.

Full-time immersion programs lasting five years or more quite clearly involve a commitment of a different order. Bienvenue in her exploratory investigation in four Winnipeg school divisions, concludes:

Positive attitudes toward official bilingualism, toward French Canadians and toward the instrumental and integrative value of French language fluency are related to immersion enrollments. In this limited sample, French immersion parents hold more positive views in all of these issues than do their counterparts in the regular program. (Bienvenue, 1984, p. 25)

Yet it would be dangerous to generalize on the basis of a single experience.

Any attempt to explain or make predictions regarding French immersion must focus on three (or sometimes two) sets of considerations formulated by participants. In descending order of importance, they are: pragmatic (or instrumental), personal, and patriotic (or integrative). Bilingualism is perceived as a skill that is increasingly important for professional advancement in Canada, whether in the federal civil service, in any sector of life in Quebec, or in large-scale enterprise. The best jobs, in the future, will go to bilinguals. The fact that immersion students are concentrated essentially in Quebec and the "bilingual belt" is confirmation of the hard reality underlying such aspirations. Related to such pragmatic considerations is the recognition of the utility of a second major world language for travel purposes. From an educational point of view, public schools offering immersion programs are seen as having many of the advantages of private schools — lower teacher-student ratios, a challenging curriculum — without the disadvantages of cost. It is common knowledge in English Canada that immersion is the best

funded educational program around, and serves to bolster floundering confidence in the public school system.

Personal considerations hinge on the image projected by immersion programs. As an academically challenging alternative, it appeals to the more gifted students ("My child is very bright, she's in immersion"), while for parents of European origin it offers a familiar educational experience. In Western Canada the fact that the language happens to be French seems to be largely immaterial. It is simply a necessary instrument for stimulating an interest in the world beyond the local community, province, country and continent, with a view to promoting "tolerance and understanding of others. If we couldn't afford to travel, then bringing a little of the world to them would have to do" (Gibson, 1984, p. 8).

Patriotic considerations do not figure nearly as highly as one might expect. Canadian Parents for French, the principal nationwide organization concerned with promoting French second-language programs, makes little reference in its publications to the country's linguistic duality, to Quebec or to national unity, since concern with language as a vehicle for *rapprochement* between French and English is largely presented as an afterthought. The organization itself originated in Vancouver, several thousand kilometres away from French Canada. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that in the thinking of many parents associated with this movement, French Canada merges imperceptibly into French-speaking communities in general, and likewise national into international travel.

Immersion programs seem to be here to stay, and they quite clearly reflect a continuing improvement in the status and visibility of French across Canada. Their implications for the language portrait of the country are much more problematic. There is much to suggest that the current fascination for French language education is more an expression of class (and indirectly of ethnic class) interests than of a concern to forge a new national identity. French immersion schools give the impression of constituting an elite system of education functioning within the public system. The state, through federal intervention, is in the process of elaborating a dual system, one for tomorrow's leaders and one for the followers. For this "new" class, the bilingualism that mastery of the French language confers constitutes something profoundly Canadian in the sense of being sophisticated and more "European." Hence it serves increasingly to demarcate this class from other social classes and, strikingly, from our southern neighbours. As such it is in some respects a continuation of a British North America in terms that are more acceptable to what is now an ethnically diverse population. Support for this interpretation is provided by the fact that there is no transfer of control of the immersion institutions from the anglophone to the francophone community, that immersion ceases at the end of the secondary school

programme, and that graduates of immersion typically remain "reactive" (or "receptive") bilinguals — that is, they do not initiate conversations in French and knowledge of the language does not lead them to exploit the French-language mass media. In other words, French does not appear to have developed significantly as a language of communication as a result of this experience. Rather it waits in the wings to be exploited as some kind of code language to reinforce class and/or national identities.

The anglophone middle class may well end up by feeling duped, having invested a great deal of time and energy in acquiring skill in a second language only to discover that day-to-day use of French is limited to Quebec and to a federal civil service that for the present at least offers few employment opportunities. As for the francophone minorities, who initially see the products of immersion as their natural allies, it remains unclear how they will benefit from a context in which enrolments in the immersion programs already outnumber enrolments of French mother tongue students in the French-language system and in which the former are beginning to tax the limited cultural and institutional resources of the minority communities. If French is strictly an elitist preoccupation, it is scarcely going to stem the assimilation process. Indeed, it is not entirely absurd to envisage the day when francophones living in English Canada will not speak French anymore, but when the portrait of a bilingual Canada from coast-to-coast will be assured thanks to their replacement by a generation of francophiles. The fact that the finalists in the Western version of Radio-Canada's *Génies en herbe* in 1983–84 came exclusively from French immersion programs is perhaps a sign of the times.

In the first analysis, whether the prognostication is bleak or enthusiastic (and there are remarkably few measured assessments), there are many imponderables surrounding the eventual impact of immersion. All depends on the use that will be put to a language that more and more English Canadians are acquiring, the spheres of activity to which it will be applied, the lines of communication that will be established between language groups, and the transfers of power that such developments may facilitate.

If French immersion in English Canada is a complex problem, the developing relationship between language and culture in Quebec is even more difficult to unravel. The past five years or so have been marked, on the one hand, by a progressive disassociation of French language and culture and, on the other, by the changing vocation of that language. Both developments are likely to have significant implications in terms of the reformulation of *Québécois* identity and future relations between French- and English-speaking Canadians.

The evaporation over the space of a few short years of a passionate commitment to the Parti québécois and to debate over the political future of the province has been paralleled, among the younger generations, by

an almost total loss of interest in the Quebec popular culture born of the Quiet Revolution, which glorifies past and ethnic solidarity. Vigneault, Leclerc, Deschamps, Julien, Charlebois and Sol are no longer household words and there are now few privileged lines of communication between the province's cultural elite and the population at large. Far from being a simple question of a *relève* that is slow to materialize, Quebec's cultural industries are in crisis as young people turn to mainstream Anglo-American and, by extension, global culture, be it television, cinema, music or interminable novels. And the transition seems to have occurred quite naturally, while continuing to defend the primacy of the French language:

Nous avons constaté un écart important [chez les jeunes Québécois francophones] entre les comportements culturels et les attitudes linguistiques. Les comportements indiqueraient une valorisation de la culture anglo-américaine alors que les attitudes reflèteraient une valorisation de l'identité franco-québécoise. (Bédard and Monnier, 1981, p. 108)

Explanations for the phenomenon range from sombre assessments about the ravages of deculturation — that language is no longer a sufficient barrier to prevent the merging of Quebec and Anglo-American cultures — to the conviction that it constitutes an expression of a new-found cultural confidence where there is no place for the traditional “siege mentality”:

Leur [les jeunes Québécois francophones] pratique accentuée de l'anglais et, partant de la culture anglo-américaine pourra-t-elle à la longue les amener à remettre en question les idéaux linguistiques que leur propose la société québécoise? Ou, au contraire, ne seront-ils pas portés à s'identifier davantage aux valeurs propres à leur culture en se servant de leur accès aux cultures étrangères comme d'un schème de référence qui leur permet d'affirmer ce qui les différencie? (Bédard and Monnier, 1981, p. 108)

In all probability this fascination with the more universal themes of popular culture, and the concern to have direct access to the multiple sources of creation — in the United States, Great Britain or West Germany — reflect a new-found maturity. If, in a narrow historical sense, the 1980 referendum was “lost” for Quebec, it may well mark a critical watershed whereby the models of the past have been unequivocally set aside. In the 1980s, Quebec's history has become less painful and life on the North American continent less equivocal. Differences have finally been recognized and largely accepted by others; hence the view across *outré-frontières* becomes all the more important and easier to assume. Consequently, young people's preoccupations are now much more universal than those of the preceding generation — ecology, global peace, or down-to-earth concerns about jobs — and are scarcely constrained by ethnic considerations or language loyalties. The predominance of the

French language in Quebec is taken for granted, permitting youth to turn to other issues.

Viewed from another perspective, such a development points to the progressive disengagement of language from ethnicity in Quebec. The French language, hitherto promoted and used almost exclusively as the language of an ethnic group, has now, through legislation, become the language of a province, and is quite evidently in the process of becoming the principal language of communication between diverse cultural communities, in much the same way as English has evolved elsewhere in Canada. The French language school system, at least in Montreal, is being transformed by the *classes d'accueil* (classes for immigrants) much in the same way as the schools of other provinces have been transformed by the immersion programs. An important ethnic literature is now being produced in French through writers like Marcone, Robin and Jonassaint, and reviews like *Jonathan* and *Vice Versa*, while the government proclaims the multifaceted nature of collective identity through publications like *Autant de façons d'être Québécois*.

Such a radical development must inevitably lead to a new reading of Quebec. The classical view of French Canadians as an ethnically homogeneous group (*la race canadienne-française*) and of Montreal as "the second largest French-speaking city in the world" are destined to be abandoned once and for all in favour of a vision of Quebec society as a *culture de convergence* and of Montreal as a multi-ethnic city — "la seule des grandes métropoles sur le continent qui n'a appartienne pas aux Anglais" (Robert Guy Scully, cited in Marsan, 1983, p. 33). Such a vision in no way contests the predominance of the French language or the articulation of a *Québécois* identity; rather, it sees them as privileged vehicles for promoting a modern, complex, rapidly changing North American identity that is proper to the Saint Lawrence Valley.

Pierre Anctil (1984) suggests that it is the existence of a "double majority" in Montreal which accounts for the persistence of much stronger ethnic affiliations among immigrant groups than is the case for other cities of comparable size in North America. For example, Jews, Greeks and Italians recruit the vast majority of their friends within the confines of their own ethnic groups, and even economic activity tends to be organized in the same manner. In the case of the Italians, generational shifts in the choice of official language from French to English in the postwar years have resulted in the maintenance of Italian as the home language, since it is the sole means of communication between parents and children. At the same time, with an immigration policy that favours francophones and francophiles — hence Vietnamese, Haitians, Lebanese and Latin Americans — the visible heterogeneity of Quebec is clearly shifting from the English to the French language. This process is also facilitated by the economic decline of Montreal:

De toute évidence, ce déplacement d'influences en direction de Toronto a eu des répercussions profondes sur la composition ethnique de Montréal et sur la perception que les communautés ethniques ont de leur futur au Québec. Le dernier recensement canadien de 1981 a révélé, par exemple qu'en l'espace de cinq ans, la population anglophone du Québec a glissé de près de 90,000 personnes ou 11% de l'effectif total. . . . Pour sa plus grande part, ce solde négatif au chapitre des déplacements inter-provinciaux s'est effectué à même les populations montréalaises, et a constitué une ponction d'importance pour la communauté anglophone de la ville. (Ancil, 1984, p. 443)

In all probability this shift will result in the emergence of a new national identity, with Quebec culture recognized as profoundly American in its heterogeneity rather than as some kind of ethnic survivor from another continent. The investigation of new immigrant groups is likely to stimulate a rereading of the past by French Canadians themselves, where due recognition will be accorded to the influence of native, Irish, Scottish and other cultures on group identity.

What Does All This Mean?

To draw any firm conclusions from this historical overview of language in Quebec and Canada is no easy task. Linguistic priorities and pre-occupations have varied through time at both levels of government, while language patterns as such have only been partially affected by policy decisions. If francophones throughout much of English Canada resolutely opposed assimilation during the decades of hostile language legislation, they now increasingly opt for such a strategy at a time when the state increasingly legislates in their favour. As for Quebec, during the decades of legislative inactivity the anglophone minority remained largely unilingual, but when confronted by an aggressive promotion of French, large numbers have chosen to leave the province while others militate in favour of return to official bilingualism inspired by the federal model.

Had federal legislation been introduced 30 years earlier, the chances of building a bilingual country would certainly have been considerably greater. The legislation applied in the 1970s has been effective in bilingualizing institutional arrangements, while similar legislation in Quebec has succeeded in imposing French as a working and common language. As such, the status and role of French has been transformed. Philippe Garigue, principal of Glendon College (York University), states:

Le français comme langue a cessé d'être la caractéristique distinctive d'un groupe 'national' canadien, et en devenant l'une des langues officielles du Canada, est également maintenant un instrument de communication dans le pluralisme socio-culturel du Canada. (Garigue, 1984, p. 7)

Such a sweeping affirmation remains to be proved. Although the 1982 Constitution confirms the rights of French speakers before the law and in the educational system, the utility of French as a language of day-to-day communication across the country is still far from evident. There is little doubt, however, that Garigue's comments constitute an accurate evaluation of the situation in Quebec. Quebec nationalism is in the process of being transformed such that its foundations will become unequivocally political and territorial. French unilingualism necessarily destroys the historic association between language and ethnicity, and sets aside regional preoccupations with the survival and supremacy of particular groups. With French as a given in Quebec, attention necessarily shifts elsewhere, to a concern, expressed in that language, with issues shared by the various ethnic groups residing in the province. This process, along with sociolinguistic trends elsewhere in Canada, confirms the continuing shift towards territorially based bilingualism in the country. And yet, if the emergence of "two Canadas" seems inevitable, the processes of assimilation still quite clearly act in favour of English Canada, as Castonguay has so frequently remarked:

En vertu de quelle justice le gouvernement fédéral s'acharne-t-il ainsi contre les aspirations démolinguistiques du groupe français au Québec, alors que pour l'ensemble du Canada, le groupe anglais recrutait en 1981 plus de un million et demi de nouveaux anglophones par voie d'assimilation linguistique, dont 115 000 recrutés au Québec même, et le groupe français en Canada subissait par la même voie la perte nette de plus d'un quart de million d'anglicisés? (Castonguay, 1984, p. 32)

Consciously or unconsciously, Castonguay alludes in his observations to a fundamental structural problem in this country which keeps the linguistic wounds forever open.⁷ Federal legislation takes precedence over provincial legislation. At any given point in time the linguistic model proposed by Ottawa for the country as a whole conflicts with that proposed for Quebec by its own government. Hence, the national government policies constantly threatens the provincial in its actions and the provincial government provokes the national, generating misunderstanding, frustration and confrontation. Recent developments only confirm this historic pattern, as yet another legal judgment disqualifies yet another section of Quebec's *Charte de la langue française*, the whole occurring in the context of processes initiated by Quebec's anglophone minority and financed by federal funds.

The components of this current structural problem, such as they are in 1985, have been succinctly described by Proulx in a recent article in *Le Devoir* (Proulx, 1985). First, the federal government, in proposing a symmetrical bilingual model for Canada and taking up the defence of official-language minorities, has chosen to defend the interests of the English minority in Quebec (against the francophone majority) and the

French minorities outside Quebec, rather than of the francophone community of Quebec — “ partout minoritaire dans l'ensemble canadien.” As such, “tant que la société canadienne n'aura pas accepté le caractère distinct de la société québécoise, il est . . . vain d'attendre du gouvernement fédéral quelque appui politique à la cause du français au Québec à moins que celui-ci épouse la cause du bilinguisme. C'est structurellement impossible.”

Secondly, both provincial and federal charters of rights and freedoms seek to protect individuals and minorities from potential abuses by the majority. However, Quebec society constitutes a Canadian and continental minority, and if the *Charte de la langue française* sought to give it the necessary protection as a simple law it is inefficient, because subordinate to both federal and provincial charters.

Thirdly, if both of Quebec's principal political parties accept the premise of the “primauté du français comme expression fondamentale de l'identité du peuple québécois” and, within such a constraint, of recognizing the rights of the anglophone minority, their language programs differ by virtue of the Liberals being electorally committed to the anglophone minority. Hence, “on ne peut compter pour la défense des intérêts de la majorité francophone du Québec sur la solidarité des deux grands partis politiques.”

Finally, because the Quebec government has taken the leadership in the promotion of French, francophone militancy has ceased. “Du coup, le militantisme s'organisait au sein de la communauté anglophone contre le gouvernement du Québec avec l'appui politique du gouvernement fédéral et son appui administratif. . . .”

So in the eyes of Proulx, the future appears to be as blocked as it always has been, Quebec having lost its most recent language battle. If his judgment is severe, the dynamic that transcends these structural arrangements is clear.

The response of English Canada to the linguistic affirmation of Quebec and to the bilingual model proposed by Ottawa has generally been one of belated accommodation and, by extension, of reinforcing one's own collective identity by the appropriation of certain elements of the identity of the other. French immersion programs constitute an excellent illustration of this phenomenon. Yet such a strategy bears the seeds of its ultimate downfall. The model proposed by the federal state over the past 25 years or so has been one of seeking to extend an archaic Quebec model to the entire country. This model has effectively masked the evolving linguistic picture in Quebec and frustrated those parts of the country that perceive their identity to be based on elements other than the continuing French-English dialectic that pervades central Canada. Language choices seem to have been made in Canada — sometimes in spite of, sometimes because of, state legislation. They involve French in most of Quebec and English in most of English Canada as languages of

day-to-day communication, with a bilingual buffer zone between the two. Within English Canada, French appears to be essentially a symbolic language that mingles class and national sentiments, or a souvenir of distant Quebec or Acadian origins. The failure to introduce institutional bilingualism on the banks of the Red River in 1984 indicates that there are critical divides in this country between areas where identity is based on language and others whose preoccupations are perhaps more related to notions of social justice inspired by successive waves of immigration from a divided Europe. If the bilingual character of federal institutions is here to stay and to truly reflect the country, it must accommodate the considerable regional diversity that characterizes Canada. In terms of language, this means reconsidering the choice between territorial and personality principles posited over 20 years ago by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. If, in the light of subsequent developments and a rereading of the past, the federal government were to revise its judgment and opt for a territorial model, we would finally be able to accept the symmetrical nature of language patterns in this country and facilitate the promotion of other regional identities.

Notes

This paper was completed in February 1985. It is largely the fruit of a long and rewarding collaboration with a graduate student, Louis Dupont, and a colleague, Dean Louder, of the Département de géographie, Université Laval. Their remarkable intellectual curiosity has served as a constant inspiration to me. Louis Dupont conducted the research and wrote the first draft of the material on the history of language policy in Quebec and in the federal government, and Dean Louder did likewise for the demographic material and the discussion of French immersion. Louis Dupont also shared substantively in the overall reflection.

1. It is "personal" in that it constitutes the fruit of some 20 years' residence in Quebec, during which the author has gravitated between the English and French communities — the "métropole" and the "vieille capitale" — experiencing in a very real sense the linguistic tensions and transformations that have, perhaps more than anything else, marked the last two decades of the history of a province and a country.
2. See Ouellet (1969a) for a discussion of French Canadian nationalism.
3. For a general reflection on the French Canadian experience in North America, see Brunet and Savard (1982) and Louder and Waddell (1983).
4. The 1967 gathering confirmed the separate destinies of *Québécois* and *francophones hors Québec*, and hence the dissolution of "la grande famille canadienne-française."
5. A law was passed in the Quebec Legislative Assembly in 1937 giving priority to the French text in interpreting the laws and statutes of the province. However, 11 months later it was withdrawn as a result of pressures emanating from the anglophone minority and members of the legal profession.

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Women's Issues and the Women's Movement in Canada Since 1970

SANDRA BURT

Introduction: Private and Public Worlds

Women have emerged as a political force during several periods in Canadian history. The earliest period was during the struggle for women's suffrage. At that time, women demanded a political voice in order to bring what they regarded as superior values to bear on political life. Today, the activity generated within the contemporary women's movement has revived the earlier notion that women should have a significant impact on public policy. As was the case during the suffrage struggle, the current programs of the groups which are part of the movement extend beyond concerns directly related to the status of women. The Canadian women's movement has generated a set of political demands which, if implemented, could lead to a restructuring of the lives of both men and women.

There is a tendency to classify the demands of the groups active within the movement as women's issues alone. However, it would be a mistake to assume that these issues refer only to the status of women. It is true that the women's movement in Canada is characterized by a general collective sense that women's status should be improved, that the de facto equality of men and women should be an integral part of the Canadian structural and symbolic order. This emphasis on the collective needs of women has been institutionalized by government with the creation of special agencies responsible for investigating and/or improving the status of Canadian women. However, equating women's issues exclusively with status-of-women concerns belies the breadth of the reforms requested by groups within the movement. The meaning of women's issues has changed substantially over time, and today the term

embraces social and moral questions, definitions of rights and obligations, as well as the nature and distribution of power in society. These themes reflect the fundamental changes that have occurred over time in perceptions of what are appropriate concerns for both men and women. They also reflect a transition from general approval of segregated roles for men and women in the early 1900s, to general approval of integrated roles in the late 1900s.

Life in Canada during the early part of the twentieth century was dominated by the belief that men and women lived in separate worlds. While a substantial number of women, particularly from the working class, were employed in the paid labour force, work was regarded as necessary for survival rather than a manifestation of women's rights. The male world was that of politics and paid labour. The female world was limited to the household. The male clearly dominated the female world, and women's lives revolved around the activities of the men in their family.¹ In this context, women's issues were restricted to what was considered relevant to family life, such as the education of children and the care of the home. There was a clear distinction between women's and men's issues.

These separate worlds have been described as public and private. In its earliest use, public referred to the life of the *polis*, to that "collective space which private individuals enter either to make their mutually beneficial bargains or else to arrive at their mutually agreed upon moral and political contracts."² The boundaries of this public world have shifted over time. In the earliest Aristotelian sense, the public world was restricted to political life, to the coming together of men to make rules for the general good. Over time, this world was expanded to include the paid labour force. At the same time, the private world remained strictly limited to life within the home. Private was equated with the family or, by extension, the household. The rules of conduct that governed family life were considered inappropriate for political or labour force activity, and the difficulty of shifting orientations in passing from public to private (or vice versa) was recognized. Men were assumed to be best suited for public life, and women for private life. Men in their public roles made the rules which they expected women in their private roles to follow.

The boundaries separating the two worlds never were impregnable. On the one hand, the church and later the state have played important roles in regulating family size and family life. For example, the state, by controlling women's property rights, had an impact on women's ability to perform their private roles. The church, by presiding over the marriage ritual, dictated the rules of conduct within the family. On the other hand, women, particularly in the suffrage era, sought to enter the public realm to impose on political life the values of their private world. All the same, the public world has intruded into the private world of the family more frequently than the other way around.

The labels of public and private as they have been used in the past corresponded with generally accepted gender roles. Aristotle provided the philosophical justification for the division of roles by proposing that men alone, by their nature, are capable of administering justice and holding office. Women, he felt, were incapable of assuming such public roles. They could instead “*share* in goodness and rationality in the limited sense appropriate to their confinement in a lesser association, the household.”³ Much later, the emergence of the competitive market economy in Western society provided the structural basis for a public/private division of labour. Increasingly, as the work world developed beyond the physical space of the household, the public/private split was cemented, and the notion of public life came to include the competitive market economy. The separation of activities into public and private spheres reflected the attitudes of the men and women dominant in each one. This separation became self-perpetuating as children were socialized into adopting these roles.

Virginia Sapiro has summarized the values dominant in each sphere. The public world, she proposes, is an instrumental world, “marked by the values of rationalism, competition, judgement of value by merit, objectivity, formal social bonds, uniforms and rituals that mask the person, universalism, and a secular morality,” while the private world is an expressive world, “marked by the values of sentiment, irrationalism, nurturance, loyalty, intimacy, love, subjectivity, sacrifice, particularism, harmony, and moralism.”⁴

The idea of separate spheres for men and women has had implications for a broad range of social values. In the past, women have been described as moral, sacrificing, more conservative in their values, spiritual, peace-loving, and interested in social welfare policies. As wives and mothers, it was argued, women learned to be expressive in their general approach to life. This had implications for both their willingness to get involved in politics and the nature of their orientations and activities if they did make the leap into the alien political world.⁵ The conflict between the instrumental public world of politics and the expressive private world of the family was clear. Attempts by women to bridge the gap would either reduce the force of government or destroy the harmony of the family.

The early notion of separate public and private worlds was based on the extrapolation of psychological from biological differences, and was inherent in the dominant classical liberal ideology of the early part of the twentieth century. Liberalism focused on the rational individual, on the human capacity to reason, and the ability of the individual to be self-directing. Many liberal thinkers questioned women’s capacity for reason, arguing that there are inherent, not acquired, fundamental differences in the natures of men and women. The one complemented the other, but in the public world the rational male mind must prevail.⁶

This notion of separate worlds affected women's orientations to politics and policy making. For example, most of the women active within the suffrage movement agreed that the spheres of women and men were separate, but held that they were also equal, and that it was time to "throw the mantle of private morality *over* the public sphere by drawing women *into* it."⁷ This represented an early statement of a theme that reappears, in somewhat different form, many years later. The suffragists also argued that women's involvement in politics would provide greater scope for the public regulation of morality. In this context, women's issues continued to be defined as family-related or private issues.

However, the concept of separate worlds was rejected in the 1960s by the women's liberation groups which emerged in the context of increased female labour force participation. This rejection was facilitated by the discovery that some of the differences between men and women were acquired rather than inherent. Increasingly, these differences were explained in terms of socialization rather than biology, and it became common for researchers to measure how well women had caught up to men in public activities. In this initial period of the contemporary women's movement, frequently the definitions of public and private worlds remained the same. However, it was allowed that women might seek access to competition for public roles. By extension, it was agreed that equality of opportunity could be contained within the boundaries of a public world still dominated by instrumental, rational, self-interested motives. This implied that there was no a priori reason why women could not act instrumentally, rationally and with self-interest.

While the definitions of the public and private worlds remained essentially the same, women demanded partial access to the former on the assumption that they would either reject or make alternative provisions for their responsibilities in the latter. This became the liberal version of equality of opportunity. It created the image of the divided woman, governed by private values at home and public values at work or in politics. This view has had a significant impact on the contemporary treatment of women's issues. As Carole Patemen points out, "Belief in separate spheres is still central to the way in which most inhabitants of liberal democracy think about, and actually structure, their social lives."⁸ Within this liberal framework, women's issues were defined as those of the status of women in the public domain, and centred on the promotion of equal opportunities for women to compete in politics and the labour force.

Inevitably, this set of demands, often equated with consciousness-raising and women's liberation, led to questions about life within the household and the so-called natural abilities of women. Consequently, new feminist claims which rejected the liberal framework were advanced in which the private sphere once again played a significant role. For example, radical feminists confirmed the importance of biological differ-

ences between men and women and saw them as a cause for celebration. In their view, female biology was a creative rather than a limiting force. In a political sense, "the human ideal is that of a woman who has been able to develop her full human powers, the powers that have been suppressed, though not eliminated, by the patriarchy."⁹ They proposed that women take over the public sphere and impose their private values on it. Another group of socialist feminists rejected the idea of an unchanging female nature and pointed to existing differences in the life experiences of men and women as plausible reasons for sometimes differing world views.¹⁰ Their vision was of a future in which men and women would share roles.

In each of these alternative proposals, proposals for change included the modification of both public and private spheres. The emphasis was on redesigning society to incorporate women's positive achievements. Women's lives would change in the process, but in harmony with congruent changes in men's lives. While the private roles of women would be expanded to include redefined public roles, men's public roles would be altered by assuming some private functions. Carol Gilligan has explored the possible impact of this synthesis on women's lives. She proposes that "changes in women's rights change women's moral judgements, seasoning mercy with justice by enabling women to consider it moral to care not only for others but for themselves."¹¹

This gradual transition in the 1970s from demands for greater participation by women in the public world to demands for redefined public and private roles gave the women's movement a new vitality. The transition has been described as a passage from role equality to role change. Role equality has as its goal to equalize the opportunities for men and women to compete for public roles. Role change has as its goal "change in the dependent female roles of wife, mother, and homemaker, holding out the potential of greater sexual freedom and independence in a variety of contexts."¹² Role equality affects the distribution of men and women in public roles. Role change affects the definitions of roles in both public and private spheres. In reality, the distinction between role equality and role change is blurred, because changes in the proportion of women in public life must inevitably affect relations between men and women in the private world of the family.

The eventual inclusion of role change issues within the women's movement is important for understanding both the movement itself and reaction to it. Women's private world values and their proposals to alter public values have received growing attention in the past few years. This has led to concern about the impact of private values on public life. For example, in the late 1970s, American pollsters found that differences between men and women were emerging on questions of war and peace, human rights, and social security. Traditional differences on issues like prohibition were disappearing, with new differences on the compassion,

risk, and force dimensions taking their place.¹³ This gender gap made the news because it was hoped (or feared) that these differences would be translated into votes for a political party. In 1980, the attitudinal gender gap did have an impact on partisan preferences, with 8 percent fewer women than men voting for Ronald Reagan.

In the context of this Commission's work, the transition from role equality to role change issues deserves serious attention. The Canadian women's movement is significant because of its claims that both private and public role definitions should be changed. This paper is an investigation of these claims and the federal government's response to them. The starting point of the analysis is 1970, the year of publication of the report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women. The report was important both symbolically and instrumentally. It contained a comprehensive survey of women's status in Canada prior to 1970, and adopted an economic definition of women's issues for future action. In addition, the report generated a climate of reform in which it became increasingly possible for women to obtain government funding to establish groups. Ultimately, women's groups in Canada combined the economic demands for equal opportunity contained within the report with demands for public regulation of issues historically considered to be within the private world — wife-battering, child abuse, rape and pornography. The gradual expansion of the meaning of women's issues is explored in this paper. The expansion occurred in a climate of real change in the economic, social and political status of Canadian women. Changes in status created the background for reform and underlined the growing gap between traditional role expectations and the new roles.

This analysis has three sections. The first section is an overview of some significant changes which have occurred in the social, economic and political status of women. The second section is a description of the groups which make up the women's movement. The third section is an analysis of the federal government's response to the women's movement generally and to the demands of women's groups specifically.

Most of this analysis is carried out on the national level, which means that some significant parts of the Canadian women's movement have been omitted here. For example, in Ontario alone there are over 1,000 women's groups, many of which concentrate their energies at the local or provincial level.¹⁴ The provincial organizations in Quebec are examined in a separate section of the paper. While it is the case that most of the groups in English Canada with national concerns are allied with a national group, the same is not true in Quebec. Language is the most visible barrier separating the Quebec groups from the women's movement nationally. In addition, the historical differences between Quebec women and women in the rest of Canada make this special consideration both necessary and useful.

The Changing Public and Private Worlds of Canadian Men and Women

Changes in Labour Force Participation and the Nature of the Family

The demands of the women's movement have been advanced in a climate of significant change in the lives of both men and women. The 1970 Report of the Royal Commission of the Status of Women documented the changes in women's roles in Canada. The commissioners estimated that the participation rate of women in the paid labour force in 1970 was more than 34 percent, while in 1901 the rate stood at only 16 percent.¹⁵ Most of the increase was due to the fact that more married women were working outside the home. At the same time, the Commissioners noted that women were heavily involved in voluntary associations, usually to perform social welfare services.¹⁶ They predicted an increase in the labour force participation of women and prepared a set of recommendations to alleviate gender segregation in the workplace. Their predictions for the future work patterns of women were optimistic. These included the expectation "that the situation of women will be generally improved in the future the experts foresee."¹⁷ Improvements would include a shorter work week, greater sharing of housework and child care by men and women, more emphasis on education and competence, with less emphasis on sex-typing, and better preparation of school-age girls for life in the work world. They concluded that the "next generation of men will probably find the competition of women quite natural in a way that their fathers did not."¹⁸

In terms of participation rates, there are indications that the commissioners' predictions have been realized. The labour force participation data for Canadian women show a jump from 38 percent in 1970 to 50 percent in 1981 (see Table 4-1). In addition, the distinction between the career woman and the wife/mother has broken down. A growing proportion of the female labour force consists of women between the ages of 25 and 34. The figures for 1971 and 1981 are 21 and 28 percent, respectively.¹⁹ Many of these women are either the sole or the main wage earner in the home. In a 1981 national study, respondents were asked about their role in the income structure of the home. At that time 41 percent of the women interviewed identified themselves as the main wage earner, compared with 86 percent of the men. The majority of these female main wage earners either had never been or were no longer married. Many of them were supporting children (see Table 4-2). The reality of family life for many Canadians is far removed from the traditional nuclear family led by a male wage earner.

The work force participation of married women has risen dramat-

TABLE 4-1 The Participation of Men and Women in the Paid Labour Force in Canada

	Population		Labour Force		Participation Rate (%)
	(1,000's)	%	(1,000's)	%	
1970					
Men	7,162	49	5,571	66	78
Women	7,366	51	2,824	34	38
1980					
Men	8,026	49	6,294	63	78
Women	8,297	51	3,680	37	44
1981					
Men	8,826	49	6,909	60	78
Women	9,178	51	4,613	40	50

Source: Department of Labour, Women's Bureau, *Women in the Labour Force* (Ottawa: The Department, 1983), p. 10.

TABLE 4-2 Percentage of Men and Women Who Classified Themselves as the Household Main Wage-earner

	Male	Female
Marital Status	(percent)	
Married	92	10
Once Married	95	91
Never Married	63	61
Number of Children		
0	72	52
1-2	95	35
3 +	96	36

Source: Data from the 1981 Quality of Life study, Institute for Behavioural Research, York University.

ically. In 1950, only 10 percent of married women 20 years or older worked either full-time or part-time.²⁰ In 1980, 51 percent of all married women were in the paid labour force. In other words, today the majority of married women in Canada combine the public role of worker with the private role of wife.

These changes have both affected and been affected by alterations in the family. Margrit Eichler writes that even our definition of the family has altered:

Until fairly recently, marriage was seen as a lifelong commitment. Now, it has become a volitional union, rather than an automatic one. Likewise, it is now often a conscious decision for couples to have children, rather than an automatic consequence of fertility.²¹

TABLE 4-3 Employment by Occupation and Sex in Canada

Occupation	Women as Percent of All Female Workers			Men as Percent of All Male Workers		
	1975	1980	1982	1975	1980	1982
Managerial	3.4	4.9	6.0	8.4	9.5	10.2
Natural science	0.8	1.3	1.3	4.8	5.2	5.2
Social science	1.4	1.8	1.9	1.1	1.3	1.4
Religion	—	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.4
Teaching	7.2	5.8	6.2	3.0	2.9	3.0
Medicine	9.5	8.6	9.2	1.8	1.7	1.9
Artistic	1.1	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.6
Clerical	36.1	34.6	34.0	6.9	6.3	6.4
Sales	10.4	10.4	10.2	11.5	10.4	10.8
Service	16.6	18.1	18.2	9.7	10.1	10.7
Farming	3.0	2.8	2.7	6.8	6.2	5.9
Fishing	—	—	—	0.3	0.5	0.5
Forestry	—	—	—	0.8	0.8	0.8
Mining	—	—	—	0.9	1.0	0.9
Processing	1.8	1.8	1.7	5.0	5.1	4.7
Machining	0.4	0.3	0.3	4.0	3.9	3.6
Fabrication	5.9	5.4	4.4	11.2	11.6	11.5
Construction	0.1	0.2	0.2	10.9	10.0	9.3
Transport	0.4	0.6	0.6	6.3	6.4	6.0
Materials handling	1.3	1.3	1.2	3.3	3.5	3.3
Other crafts	0.5	0.6	0.6	1.9	1.8	1.8
All occupations	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Pat and Hugh Armstrong, "Women and the Economic Crisis," a brief to the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, November 1983, p. 39.

Note: A dash in this table indicates that the number involved was too small to be statistically reliable.

However, while the participation rate of women in the paid labour force has increased, the labour force itself has remained highly segregated by gender. There are significant differences in the hours of work, financial rewards, promotion patterns, and types of work of men and women. Evidence of both the degree and persistence of this job segregation is provided in Table 4-3. Women are heavily concentrated in clerical and, to a lesser degree, service and sales jobs. Men are more evenly distributed across occupations. In addition, although on average women in the labour force have somewhat higher social status origins and education levels than their male counterparts, on average they have lower incomes and intra-job mobility. In a 1981 study, the annual earnings of women in the sample were only 60 percent of the men's earnings for that year.²² In its 1984 report on women in the labour force, Labour Canada reports that in 1981, "the average earnings for women who worked a full year (either full-time or part-time) amounted to 58.9 percent of the average earnings of their male counterparts."²³

There is no evidence that this differentiation in work or occupation is decreasing, except in the province of Quebec. In Quebec, at least in terms of their hourly wage, French-speaking women in 1980 earned 79 percent as much as men. More women are unionized within Quebec than outside the province (32 versus 23 percent), and this may explain the anomaly.²⁴ Even in the federal civil service, the situation has improved only in the administration and foreign service category. Since 1971, when the Office of Equal Opportunities was established, the concentration of women in administrative support jobs has increased from 68 to 81 percent: "Women remain highly ghettoized within the federal public service."²⁵

There are several explanations for this pattern. Monica Boyd suggests that women are more likely to cluster in the middle levels of the occupational hierarchy when they enter the job market. They remain there, largely because traditionally female jobs like nursing and typing have limited career potential.²⁶ Albert Breton proposes that the structure of marriage has hindered women's career potentials.²⁷ Michael Ornstein, using survey rather than statistical data, concludes that wage differentials are due to the following factors: (a) discrimination against women; (b) concentration of women in low-wage occupations; (c) greater gains from work experience for men than for women; (d) over-representation of women in part-time jobs; (e) the greater impact of non-unionization on women than on men; and (f) differences in the occupational distributions of men and women.²⁸ All these factors can be cited when explaining the present situation.

Changes in Women's Political Involvement

Prior to 1980, there was little written specifically on the theme of women and politics. Most early writings concentrated on explaining the small differences that could be found in the political behaviour of men and women. It has long been argued that men and women have different perceptions and expectations of their political system, and these differences do make conceptual sense. Women are relative newcomers to the world of politics and are still experiencing problems with access to both political and economic power, similar to those of the working class in the early 1900s. However, whereas the working class has obtained substantial power, either through a strong trade union movement as in the United States or by forming its own political party as in Great Britain, women have consistently remained outside the mainstream of political power. As late as 1979, Allan Kornberg et al. concurred with Robert Putnam that "women are the most underrepresented group in the political elites of the world. The world of high politics is almost exclusively a man's world."²⁹ If politics is interpreted as government, "the experience women have ranges from total exclusion to selective inclusion, from discrimination to paternalism, from rejection to condescension."³⁰

The common theme throughout the early period of research on women and politics was that women, either by circumstance or nature, think and behave differently than men in the political world. The perceived differences in the public roles and attitudes of men and women were based on the existence of widespread role differentiations. This was the case in Canada in the 1950s, when the majority of women were not working outside the home.

In the early days of behavioural research, the political arena was described as a competitive "rough-and-tumble" world characterized by contests among aggressive combatants. Lester Milbrath described the political arena as off-limits "for insecure, timid, and withdrawn people who do not have great faith in their ability to deal with their environment."³¹ This characterization posed special problems for women defined in the context of the private roles of wife and mother. The woman's private role orientation made her unfit for the public world of politics. This kind of thinking led to conclusions such as those made by Robert Lane. Women, he argued, have lifestyles characterized by "exclusion from more socially valued areas of activity, and narrower orbits."³² Such reasoning was used to justify the relative absence of women from decision-making posts in national politics and their concentration at the local level, a pattern created by the rational choice of mothers and wives who were appropriately more concerned with local than with national politics.³³ No mention was made of the gatekeepers guarding the doors to political power.

There are several different levels of political activity, and women in Canada have not been very significant at the higher echelons. The right of women to hold all forms of public office was not legalized until 1929, 11 years after the granting of federal female suffrage rights. In 1929, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ruled that women had the legal status of persons and were eligible to be summoned to and become members of the Senate of Canada. Between 1919, when women were given the right to sit in the House of Commons, and 1984, women have never held more than 5 percent of the seats. Janine Brodie and Jill Vickers conducted a study of women candidates in 1979 and concluded that women are frequently the sacrificial candidates in elections. Although the percentage of women candidates increased from 4 percent in 1968 to 14 percent in 1979, most of the increase was explained by women running either as fringe party and independent candidates or as candidates in lost-cause ridings. In a study of the five federal election campaigns between 1950 and 1975, only 18 percent of women sampled for the study were nominated in ridings in which their party had won three of the five previous campaigns.³⁴ When assessing the 1980 federal election, in which the Conservatives did not nominate any women in their strong western ridings, the authors concluded that "only the willingness of the Liberal Party to recruit a small number of women to run in safe seats in Quebec has guaranteed a small representation of women in the House of

Commons.”³⁵ The absence of women from high political office has had a significant effect on the policy-making process.

This pattern is similar to that found in other countries. A report on a 1975 EEC study notes that within the European Community, “the percentage of women elected to national parliament goes from three (in Belgium and Italy) to nine percent (in the Netherlands) and rises to seventeen percent in one country only — Denmark.” Even in one-party states where the percentage of women in elite political offices may reach 35 percent, these are frequently the less powerful of the positions at the top.³⁶

In spite of their absence from decision-making levels of political life, women are nevertheless active in the work that must be done at election time and in the process of electing the decision makers. There is little information on the early political involvement of women.³⁷ In spite of problems of interpretation, the evidence suggests that, in terms of participation rates at least, whatever differences did exist in the past had disappeared by the early 1970s. In 1979, Jerome Black and Nancy McGlen reviewed the evidence from the 1965 and 1974 Canadian federal election studies. These studies showed that gender differences in political participation decreased over the period. Black and McGlen found that women were somewhat less likely than men to discuss or be interested in politics, but these differences were small. Labour force participation by women had the most consistent impact on women’s rates of political participation. They also noted that the impact of gender on political participation was strongest in Quebec, where the catching-up process has taken place over a much shorter period than in the rest of Canada.³⁸

Gender differences in reported voting turnout have almost disappeared. In the 1980 federal election study, 87 percent of the women and 88 percent of the men interviewed reported they had gone to the polls on election day. The voting behaviour of men and women is also similar, as shown in Table 4-4, which is based on a nationwide Quality of Life (QOL) study conducted for three years by the Institute for Behavioural Research at York University.³⁹ There are differences according to region and from one election to the next, but they are small.

The frequencies for political activities as measured in the QOL study are listed in Table 4-5. There are persistent differences on four of the measures — community activity; contacting an elected representative; signing a petition; and attending a protest meeting. When they are subjected to analysis of variance, gender persists as an explanatory variable even when other variables are considered, as shown in Table 4-6. However, the power of gender as a predictor is relatively weak, except in the case of contacting an elected representative.

Differences on measures such as trying to convince others to vote your way, or giving money to a party or a candidate, have persisted over time. Differences in levels of campaign activity have almost disap-

TABLE 4-4 Reported Federal Party Affiliation of Men and Women

	1977		1979		1981	
	M	F	M	F	M	F
	(percent)					
Liberal	44	46	43	45	46	47
Progressive Conservative	19	21	23	25	23	26
New Democrat	12	11	15	13	14	13

Source: Data from the 1977, 1979 and 1981 Quality of Life studies, Institute for Behavioural Research, York University.

TABLE 4-5 Political Involvement of Men and Women

	1977		1979		1981	
	M	F	M	F	M	F
	(percent)					
Volunteer work during a political campaign	16	14	17	14	16	15
Worked with others in community on a problem	33	24 ^a	39	31 ^a	35	29 ^a
Spoke or wrote to an elected representative	34	25 ^a	37	26 ^a	35	26 ^a
Signed a petition	not asked		40	35 ^a	44	40 ^a
Attended a protest meeting	not asked		24	16 ^a	23	16 ^a

Source: Data from the 1977, 1979 and 1981 Quality of Life studies, Institute for Behavioural Research, York University.

a. The differences between men and women are statistically significant, $p \geq 0.05$.

peared. In a 1977 Ontario election study, for example, 14 percent of the men and 15 percent of the women interviewed reported working for their party on election day.⁴⁰

In examining political participation, it is important to look beyond the standard measures of voting and campaign activity. While these are significant, they must be considered together with several other questions. Conceptually, it makes sense to think of several dimensions of political participation. One of these is the instrumental dimension that has been examined in the past (although usually without regard to gender differences). But there is a second, expressive dimension of participation which involves the participant's sense of involvement in the action or actions being considered.

The sense of involvement will be affected by, among other things, strength of support for the political system. The decision to take part in the existing system implies some acceptance of the rules of the game.

TABLE 4-6 F Values for Political Participation Variables Used in the 1981 Quality of Life Study

	Volunteer Work		Work with Others in Community		Spoke or Wrote to Elected Representative		Signed a Petition		Attended a Protest Meeting	
	F	Sig. of F	F	Sig. of F	F	Sig. of F	F	Sig. of F	F	Sig. of F
Gender	7.01	.008	7.04	.008	25.5	.000	11.7	.001	16.8	.000
Age	19.89	.000	1.61	.204	14.9	.000	25.9	.000	12.7	.000
Education	37.10	.000	80.27	.000	67.4	.000	146.7	.000	61.8	.000
Occupation	1.35	.294	.50	.732	1.6	.179	1.8	.134	.13	.806
Marital status	3.93	.02	2.56	.077	1.5	.213	1.4	.231	3.3	.036
Number of children	6.60	.01	12.56	.000	7.3	.007	2.1	.151	1.0	.429
Region	1.49	.201	.709	.586	7.2	.000	15.4	.000	5.1	.000

Notes: F is calculated as $\frac{MS_A}{MS_{\text{error}}}$

This significance test does not provide information about the pattern of effects but simply measures the degree of significance of a factor, taking into account the other factors in the model.

**TABLE 4-7 Levels of Satisfaction of Men and Women
with the Federal Government**

Level of Satisfaction	1977		1979		1981	
	M	F	M	F	M	F
High	32	30	28	24	23	22
Medium	43	49	43	51	43	51
Low	25	21	29	25	34	27

Source: Data from the 1977, 1979 and 1981 Quality of Life studies, Institute of Behavioural Research, York University.

Note: The differences between men and women are statistically significant in each year, $p \geq .05$.

When this condition is not fulfilled, citizens may look for alternative activity either marginal to or outside the existing rules. The expressive dimension may also be measured by political efficacy questions, which try to gauge citizens' perceptions of the political impact of participating.

In each year of the QOL study, less than one-third of the respondents were highly satisfied with the performance of the federal government (see Table 4-7). Most gave the government a middle-range rating on a satisfaction scale. Variations by region are not shown in the table. Women in the Prairies expressed much less satisfaction than men in 1979 and 1981. Support for the federal government declined substantially in the Prairie provinces and British Columbia for both men and women between 1979 and 1981. By 1981, about one-half of both men and women in the West were very dissatisfied. In terms of women's support, these figures demonstrate a somewhat greater tendency for women to place themselves at the middle of the satisfaction scale.

Two other participation-related variables are political interest or psychological involvement in politics, and sense of efficacy. It is easy to see how these will affect the expressive dimension of participation. People who feel that their actions matter and who find politics interesting or relevant to their concerns are more likely to experience a sense of involvement when engaging in political activities. Traditionally, women as a group have been less interested in politics than men. In the 1979 and 1981 QOL studies, this difference was sustained. While interest levels varied by region, occupation, and education for both men and women, the size of the gender difference remained fairly constant. Overall, 21 percent of the men and 12 percent of the women interviewed in 1979 declared that they were very interested in politics. The figures are similar for 1981.

In the QOL study, levels of efficacy were low. Three-quarters of respondents in all three years agreed that elected representatives soon lose touch with the people. There was also general agreement with the

TABLE 4-8 Responses to the Statement: "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on."

	1977		1979		1981	
	M	F	M	F	M	F
	(percent)					
Agree	60	76	60	74	56	72
Disagree	40	24	40	26	45	28

Source: Data from the 1977, 1979 and 1981 Quality of Life studies, Institute for Behavioural Research, York University.

Note: In each year the difference between men and women is statistically significant, $p \geq .005$.

propositions that "government doesn't care much what people like me think," and "people like me don't have any say about what the government does." There were no differences between men and women on any of these questions. The majority of both men and women reported a sense of remoteness from the decision-making process. At the same time, more women than men agreed that politics and government are complicated and hard to understand (see Table 4-8). This pattern did not disappear when education and occupation controls were used. For women, the remoteness of politics goes beyond the sense that politicians don't pay much attention to them, to a more fundamental problem in understanding how the process works.

These data suggest that the political integration of women is not yet complete. The participation rates and political choices of men and women at the mass level in Canada are generally the same, with only a few exceptions (and even there the difference is still quite small). However, women are less involved psychologically and are more likely to find politics complicated. Women also are less likely than men either to run for political office or, if running, to get elected. The similarities in the political behaviour of men and women at the mass level should not be taken as evidence of similar views of the political world.

Attitudes About Changes

Survey evidence supports the proposition that women in the paid labour force have decided to work for either financial or career reasons. In a national survey conducted in 1979, 51 percent of the women interviewed who were then in the paid labour force reported that financial considerations were their main reason for working. According to 1983 data collected by Decima Research, Canadians have come to accept this reasoning.⁴¹ Women working in the occupations at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder are most likely to interpret women's paid labour

TABLE 4-9 Responses to the Statement: "Women work because they need money to support themselves or their family."

	Occupation							
	Manual		Clerical/ Sales/Service		Technical, Professional, Managerial		Housewife/ Unemployed	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Agree	59	80	55	(percent) 71	75	55	62	65
Depends	30	22	37	20	18	32	28	24
Disagree	11	—	9	10	7	13	10	11

	Ethnicity					
	British		French- speaking/ Quebec		Other	
	M	F	M	F	M	F
Agree	58	63	50	67	59	65
Depends	36	27	29	16	31	25
Disagree	7	9	19	16	10	10

Source: Data from a 1983 poll by Decima Research.

as a response to economic necessity (see Table 4-9). In addition, many of the women at home in traditional roles would like to break into this new world of work.

The 1979 QOL national study found that the majority of women at home would have liked to have a paying full-time or part-time job. The responses varied widely by age groups, with the youngest (18–29) and the middle-aged (30–45) much more likely than older women to opt for either part- or full-time work. Women with children expressed an interest in a job outside the home, although they were more likely to prefer part-time work (see Table 4-10).

These data do not demonstrate widespread dissatisfaction with the role of housewife, although not all housewives claim they really enjoy housework. For example, in the 1981 QOL study, only 29 percent of the housewives between the ages of 18 and 29 said they enjoyed housework. The percentage increased substantially with age, to 60 percent in the 60-plus category. However, the data do suggest that the participation of women (including women with children) in the paid labour force is regarded as either legitimate or necessary by the majority of both men and women. In this sense, women have more choices in Canada today than they had in the early 1900s. At the same time, women have at least as many, or more, responsibilities. The single-parent family is usually

TABLE 4-10 Interest of Women Not Employed in the Labour Force in Finding a Paying Job

Attitude to Job	Number of Children		
	0	1-2	3+
		(percent)	
Yes, would like full-time	34	16	12
Yes, would like part-time	18	38	31

Source: Data from the 1979 Quality of Life study, Institute for Behavioural Research, York University.

headed by a woman. Even in two-parent families, the major responsibility for the home and children still remains with the mother, who is more likely today to also be working for pay outside the home.⁴² For the majority of working mothers and wives, the private roles have been squeezed into a space also occupied by their public role in the paid labour force. At the same time, most men have not expanded their private roles to reach some equilibrium with their newly employed partner.

In all the survey data examined, there is clear indication that, when considered as a general principle, the majority of both men and women in Canada support equal opportunities for both sexes in the work world. For example, in a 1980 Decima poll, about one-half of both male and female respondents agreed that women are as capable as men of doing a job. Women's agreement decreased with age. In a 1983 Decima poll, the question of job capabilities was worded somewhat differently. Respondents were asked if, mentally and emotionally, women are as capable of doing a job as are men. Two-thirds of the respondents, both men and women, agreed with this statement (see Table 4-11).

These findings are supported by evidence from a 1976 study by Roger Gibbins et al. which investigated the question of women's opportunities for advancement in the work world.⁴³ In this study, 68 percent of men and 76 percent of the women agreed that more women should be promoted into senior management positions.

Almost everyone interviewed in the 1981 QOL study supported the principle of equal pay for equal work. Slightly fewer supported legislation to guarantee equality. Overall, 65 percent of the men and 74 percent of the women interviewed agreed that there should be more government programs to favour the hiring and promotion of women and minority groups (see Table 4-12). This trend appeared much earlier in the 1971 Gallup Poll results reported by Eunice Schreiber.⁴⁴ In 1981, support for legislation to eliminate discrimination against women was not constant across regions or socioeconomic groups. Younger women were more supportive than older women, and support was highest among French-speaking women in Quebec.

TABLE 4-11 Evaluations of Women's Ability to Do a Job as Well as Men

	18-29		30-49		50-59		60 +	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
(percent)								
Responses to the statement: "Women are as capable as men of doing a job"								
Spring 1980								
Agree	49	55	51	48	44	37	46	37
It depends	26	20	24	24	26	22	24	28
Disagree	25	24	24	28	31	41	29	34
Responses to the statement: "Mentally and emotionally women are capable of doing any job a man can do"								
Summer 1983								
Agree	72	77	71	71	65	73	59	65
It depends	21	17	20	15	21	16	20	14
Disagree	8	6	9	14	14	11	21	22

Source: Data from a 1983 poll by Decima Research.

TABLE 4-12 Support for Programs Favouring the Hiring of Women and Minority Groups

	Men	Women
(percent)		
Atlantic provinces	48	65 ^a
Non-French-speaking Quebec	56	59
French-speaking Quebec	68	77 ^a
Ontario	41	51 ^a
Prairie provinces	40	49 ^a
British Columbia	34	47 ^a

Source: Data from the 1981 Quality of Life study by the Institute for Behavioural Research, York University.

a. The difference between men and women is statistically significant, $p \geq .05$.

The hypothetical question of whether women *could* do a job is quite different from whether they *should* be doing it. There are some limits to the willingness of Canadians to open the labour market equally to men and women. Equal opportunity principles come into conflict with problems of unemployment and perceptions of the responsibility for the private work of the family. In a 1983 Goldfarb poll, one-half of the respondents felt that mothers working outside the home contribute as much to social development as women who stay at home to raise their family. However, a 1983 Decima poll found that 51 percent of the men and

TABLE 4-13 Views on the Job Priorities of Men and Women in Times of Economic Crisis

	"Men with families should have job priority over married women"						"Women will have to resume the traditional roles of wife and mother"					
	Agree			It Depends			Disagree			Agree		
	M		F	M		F	M		F	M		F
	M	F		M	F		M	F		M	F	
(percent)												
Education												
Some or all elementary	69	52		17	23		12	26		80	77	24
Some or all secondary	58	52		24	21		17	25		59	49	51
Some or all post-secondary	36	25		30	30		32	44		34	24	76
Age												
18-29	43	36		31	21		24	42		41	26	74
30-49	48	41		25	28		26	29		50	43	67
50-59	57	48		25	19		15	32		62	53	46
60 +	70	68		17	19		11	16		72	73	27

Source: Data from a spring 1983 poll by Decima Research for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada.

45 percent of the women felt that in times of economic crisis men with families should have job priority over married women (see Table 4-13). These attitudes may be changing. The younger men and women in the sample were less likely than older respondents to agree with this proposition. In addition, education played a significant role. Agreement was substantially lower among respondents with post-secondary school education.

The conflict between women's public roles in politics and in the labour force and their private roles as wife and mother is also apparent from survey responses. One major stumbling block to full-time paid employment for women is the reassignment of child-care duties. In 1976, 83 percent of the men and 81 percent of the women interviewed by Gibbins et al. agreed with the statement that women with young children should stay at home. In a 1983 Decima poll, agreement on this statement dropped to 54 and 51 percent, respectively. This conflict between public and private roles has been noted in other countries as well. In a 1975 study of the attitudes of men and women in the nine countries belonging to the European Economic Community, only one-third of the men interviewed preferred their wives to be in paid employment. At the same time, 60 percent of the women interviewed said they would like to have paid employment.⁴⁵

One alternative to mothers caring for children during the day is greater job flexibility and more sharing of the private role functions between men and women. A second possibility is improved access to privately run child care. A third option is more publicly subsidized daycare. A question about daycare was included in the 1977 wave of the QOL survey. Respondents were asked to evaluate how much effort government should put into 21 areas of activity, one of which was daycare. Overall, 50 percent of the men and 56 percent of the women supported more government action in this area. Support for more effort for daycare was strongest among French-speaking Quebecers (64 percent of the men and 68 percent of the women). In a 1983 Goldfarb survey, the pattern was similar. On the question of whether the federal government should make more money available for daycare, 48 percent of the men and 52 percent of the women agreed either moderately or strongly. An even greater proportion (71 percent of both men and women) supported the principle of tax deductions for daycare. In a 1983 Decima poll, 70 percent of women and 57 percent of men felt that daycare services should be made available to anyone who wants them. Support was strongest among French-speaking Quebec women, the young, and working-class women.

There is evidence of widespread support for the liberal notion of equality of opportunity. The majority of both men and women agree that women should be given the opportunity to compete equally with men in the labour force; public roles should be open to women. However, we cannot tell from these data how public roles should be defined. The

support for provisions that would improve women's chances to compete is also apparent, although with less strength. In other words, there is widespread support for role equality among both men and women. This trend is similar to that reported in the European Economic Communities' 1975 and 1978 studies. In 1978, about two-thirds of the European men and women interviewed favoured changes in the public status of women.⁴⁶

The support for role change is more difficult to assess. At the very least, opinions are divided on who should take responsibility for the private domain. The tendency to assign private roles exclusively to women decreases with education and increases with age. The impact of socialization is apparent. Generally, women in higher status occupations call for more changes in female roles. There are some indications that role changes are under review, particularly by women. The case of French-speaking Quebec is interesting. Support for remedial action was significantly higher among both men and women. Consistently, francophone respondents in Quebec were more likely to call for government action, and in addition, French-speaking women in Quebec were the most feminist in orientation, leading the way on questions of role change.

The Women's Movement in Canada

Focussing on Transition

The major transitions in the status of Canadian women which began in the late 1960s were accompanied by activity among women's groups, some of which sought an active role in political decision making. Others concentrated on helping women adjust to their new social and economic roles. The proliferation of women's groups in Canada in the 1970s was not a new phenomenon; a similar period of growth occurred between 1893 and 1919. National groups and the date when each was established are listed in Table 4-14.

The early 1900s was the time of growing industrialization in Canada. The breakdown of the predominantly agrarian economy was marked by massive changes in family and religious mores. As well, the traditional support structure of the church often faltered in the cities, particularly when cyclical depression and unemployment created widespread suffering.

This marked the beginning of what has been called maternal or social feminism, the era of reformist crusaders working to alleviate the impact of the industrial revolution. Their concerns with the evils of intemperance, prostitution, the breakdown of families, and the decline in spiritual values are well known. At the same time, these groups carried out essential political functions by helping the state cope with the impact of industrial change. Women's groups in this early period tried to solve

TABLE 4-14 National Groups in the Women's Movement

1883	Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU)
1883	Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA)
1893	National Council of Women (NCW)
1894	National Council of Jewish Women (NCJW)
1919	Federated Women's Institutes (FWI)
1930	Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs (FB & PW)
1960	Voice of Women (VOW)
1969	National Farmers' Union (Women's Division)
1972	National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC)
1973	Canadian Abortion Rights Action League (CARAL)
1974	Native Women's Association of Canada
1974	Canadian Teachers' Federation, Status of Women Program
1975-6	Canadian Association of Women Executives
1976	National Association of Women and the Law (NAWL)
1976	Canadian Research Institute for the Advancement of Women (CRIAOW)
1976	Women's Bureau, Canadian Labour Congress
1981	Canadian Congress for Learning Opportunities for Women (CCLOW)

the housing and educational needs of women in the labour force. They fought for better legal and political rights for women, and generally tried to provide emotional and financial support to citizens whose families could not fulfill these needs.

Among these early women's groups, a separatist view of men and women prevailed. Women's roles were defined as primarily private, focussed on the home and family. It was argued by spokeswomen of these early groups that women had a special part to play in the development of society by virtue of their role as mothers, and that as the nurturers of society they were morally superior to men. It was seen to be the responsibility of women to apply their private morality to the public world.⁴⁷ The efforts of these women's groups resulted in the development of missionary programs, proposals to combat slum housing in the cities, as well as boarding houses and employment registries for women in the paid labour force.

The early groups focussed on the struggle for women's suffrage rights, which would give women greater power and increased opportunities to impose their morality on society. The suffrage activity had several unexpected by-products. The argument for women's suffrage, while based on the special maternal qualities that women could bring to the political arena, was advanced in the liberal framework of equal opportunity and equal access for all citizens. This laid the groundwork for the later struggle to establish equal rights for both sexes. It led to the growing sense within the minds of some women that equal rights also implied the freedom to choose roles. In addition, the vote was a short-term rallying point for women and women's groups, and masked the underlying

differences among them. Women's involvement in the suffrage issue had a long-lasting impact on the analysis of women's political behaviour, if not on that behaviour itself. Later writers on women and politics were concerned almost exclusively with behaviour at the polls. Furthermore, in their analysis of voting behaviour, most researchers ignored the lesson of the suffrage years. They persisted in treating women as a cohesive group, in spite of evidence to the contrary in the post-suffrage period. As a result, in the accounts of women's political activity following the 1918 federal suffrage victory, there was little information about organizations such as the Federated Women's Institutes or the National Council of Women. Discussion was focussed on elections, political parties, and elected officials.

The post-suffrage women's groups were of two types. The best known were the traditional maternal feminist groups, which concentrated on women's special roles as mothers and wives. They worked to enhance the supportive role of women in the Canadian economy, and focused on voluntary social service activities. Less well known were the organizations of women in the labour force pressing for role equality on the job. These latter groups supported their members who were breaking new ground in employment. They gradually pressed for greater equality of opportunity in the work world. For example, a paper was presented to the first meeting of the Federated Women Teachers of Ontario in 1918 on the subject of "Why Are Women with the Same Training and Qualifications as Men Relegated to the Less Remunerative Positions?"⁴⁸ In these early years, groups concentrated on annual submissions to government and educating the public on significant issues. "They consistently presented resolutions and briefs to government on such issues as education and vocational training for women, the right of equal opportunity to work for equal pay, taxation and pension reform, laws pertaining to marriage, divorce, family planning and citizenship."⁴⁹

New groups emerged in the 1960s which made new claims about the rights of women. As Sylvia Bashevkin notes, "increased public expenditures and a broadened scope of social problems have brought the state closer to women, making politics more salient and resulting in increased levels of turnout, political interaction in the marriage relationship, and other forms of participation."⁵⁰ This had an impact on the style and content of women's groups in Canada. The 1960s was the period of gradual awakening to the problems of women in modern industrialized society. There were two distinct themes in this process of consciousness-raising. One stressed improved equality of opportunity. Some groups that had been in existence for many years began to campaign more actively for equal rights for women. They focussed on equal pay, improved educational opportunities, and greater equality of opportunity in the job market. At the same time, other groups also demanded improved economic policies for housewives, such as survivor's benefits in pension plans.

A second theme was role change. In the early days of the movement, groups focussed on raising the consciousness of women about the impact of separate spheres on their lives. The women's liberation movement was born, and women's centres, rape centres, and shelters were quickly organized. These centres were often led by university women who had been student activists and were dissatisfied with their second-class status within the student movement. These new groups added vitality to the women's movement and performed a consciousness-raising function on a grand scale. Linda Briskin has summarized these groups in the following way:

Although there was discussion of mass organizations, the movement functioned in a fragmented way — small groups around specific projects or consciousness groups — and was very essentially middle class. The only ideology of the early women's movement was one of sisterhood — intrinsically apolitical.⁵¹

The growth in the women's movement during the period was partly due to the unwillingness of political parties to deal with women's issues. As Janine Brodie and Jill Vickers point out, although women are significant in terms of party memberships, they "have not been fully integrated into party organizations."⁵² There are still separate women's auxiliaries within the Liberal and Conservative parties. More important, women rarely gain power within party hierarchies. Those who are active in the movement today recognize the significance of female members of Parliament for the attainment of either role equality or role change. Nevertheless, many of them reject a party label, and some perceive all parties as resistant to meaningful role change. Others condemn the parties for their treatment of their women members. Many activists are concerned that party labels will divide women even on issues on which there is consensus.⁵³

The national organizations that emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s emphasized economic equality. One of the early activists, Laura Sabia, describes the present role of women's groups as pressuring for a time when men and women, through economic independence, will be seen as individuals with equal rights.⁵⁴ Her equation of women's rights with economic rights represents a dominant theme in the literature and lobbying activities of Canadian women's groups in the 1970s. The liberal argument for equality of opportunity both affected the nature of the new groups on the scene and had an impact on the traditional groups that had emerged in the early 1900s. For example, while the National Council of Women remained committed to serving "the highest good of the family and the State and application of the Golden Rule to Society, Custom and Law,"⁵⁵ it also called for improved job opportunities for women in the labour force. A gradual transformation of the role limitations on women was underway. Increasingly, all national women's groups came to accept the principle that women should have the freedom to choose lifestyles.

There was also a growing awareness that people's ability to make role choices is limited by their economic background.

However, by the late 1970s the emphasis among women's groups had shifted from exclusively economic concerns to a broader range of issues. Demands for equal access to the public world were increasingly combined with demands for greater state regulation of the private world. Some groups, concerned with role change, pressured governments for policies to take into account the transformations that had already occurred in the social and economic status of men and women and in the nature of the family. Public funding for daycare and improved social services for single parents became significant issues. At the same time, there was greater recognition that the power relationship between men and women is a political issue. The claim that the personal is political provided the rationale for putting issues such as reproductive freedom, rape, and wife and child abuse on the public agenda.

The changing focus is evident in the annual presentations of national women's groups to the federal government between 1970 and 1984. The two largest national groups, the National Council of Women and the National Action Committee on the Status of Women, moved from family law, child care, and equal pay to a broad range of issues including peace, native women's rights, pornography and prostitution. This broader set of concerns is reflected in the submissions from women's groups to this Commission, listed in Table 4-15.

In addition, the early call for legal equality was transformed. Groups began to press harder for affirmative action programs that could help overcome long-standing inequalities. This development marks a transition from demands for equal rights to demands that government take positive steps to legislate for equality, and a recognition that removing the legal barriers to the public world would have to be accompanied by positive steps to bring women into that world.

The Classification of Women's Groups

Women's groups have some common characteristics. Like most public interest organizations, they stress the process of democratic discussion and decision making; they try to educate their membership and promote discussion about issues; and they generally call for more participatory democracy in Canada. They believe that governments should listen to women and provide more information to the public in general. The leadership of most groups is convinced that women have a different approach to problem solving than men. Implicit in their call for greater participation of women in public life is a call for transformations in public role styles as well as policy changes. This appeal for redefined public roles is reminiscent of attempts by the suffragists to impose private morality on political life. Today, the emphasis is on decision-making

TABLE 4-15 Recommendations of National Women's Groups to the Royal Commission on the Economic Future and Development Prospects for Canada

Recommendation	Support Group
Mandatory affirmative action in the public and private sectors	YWCA, CRIAW
Moral suasion campaign by federal government for executive advancement in private sector	CAWE
Removal of sexual discrimination on the job	NCW, CRIAW
Accessible, affordable daycare through higher family allowances	YWCA
Training programs to prepare women for non-traditional jobs	YWCA, CAWE
Pension reform:	
Coverage of part-time workers	YWCA
Mandatory coverage of homemakers in Canada Pension Plan	YWCA
Uniform actuarial tables for men and women	YWCA
Removal of gender role stereotyping	YWCA
Tax deductions for job-related expenses of volunteer workers	NCW
General recognition of role of voluntary sector	YWCA
Recognition of marriage partnership in family law	NCW
Sharing of full-time jobs	NCW
Better training programs to reduce the cost of job interruption of paid skills development leave	NCW, CRIAW
Structural reforms in the political system to increase the role of women as political actors (e.g., changes in electoral system)	CRIAW, NAC
Count women in all research	CRIAW
Broader government definition of social services:	
Remove criterion of poverty from funding	NAC
Better coordination of federal and provincial funding arrangements	NAC
More executive women on federal boards and commissions	CAWE
Employment standards legislation to protect workers in the home	
Free access to marriage and family counselling	NCW
Allowance for women at home	NCW

processes rather than intemperance or prostitution, on the transformation of public role definitions to include power-sharing and cooperation.

There is less agreement on the way in which views should be presented to government. More traditional groups like the Federated Women's Institutes see their role as reactive. They undertake political action primarily in response to government requests for information and are characterized by a fairly narrow definition of politics, explicitly rejecting lobbying as a tactic. On the other hand, the groups seeking role changes endorse political action as the means to bring about these

changes. They have a broad definition of what is political and often take their demands to government via demonstrations or letter campaigns. These techniques may supplement the written submissions that women's groups have traditionally made to the federal government.

Most women's groups rely heavily or exclusively on government funding. They are therefore subject to government guidelines and budget cuts, and this has sometimes restricted their flexibility and freedom to lobby. In structural terms it has meant that most women's groups do not employ a lobbyist and are staffed by volunteers.

There are some differences in the organizational goals of women's groups. For example, the Young Women's Christian Association seeks to provide opportunities for personal growth, to deepen concern for human needs, and to act responsibly in the world community.⁵⁶ Its representatives define the YWCA as a voluntary group, designed to serve the needs of women in the community. The National Action Committee on the Status of Women works for improvements in the economic, political and social status of women. It is a lobby group that presents government with guidelines for policy and develops a feminist analysis of current problems. In spite of these differences, both groups work for economic changes that will facilitate role equality. In one section of its pamphlet on goals, the YWCA defines its underlying philosophy as "helping women individually and collectively, to develop their skills so that they can participate fully in every facet of society."⁵⁷ Like the National Action Committee, the YWCA now works to promote women's economic independence.

Above and beyond the differences in general orientation among the various women's groups, different emphases are visible. An examination would demonstrate the broad range of feminist orientations within the Canadian women's movement. The directory published by the women's program of the Secretary of State lists over 700 organizations, although there are many more than that. Women active in the interest-group process estimate that in Quebec alone there are over 1,500 groups. Women's groups are different from most other interest groups in that they regularly combine their special interests in, for example, women and sport or women and business with general concerns about the status of women. The significance of this general orientation becomes clear when we examine two issues — the Constitution and pensions — later in the paper. Few of these groups have explicit links with a political party, and their membership usually cuts across party lines. All are working in some way for the feminist goal of improving the status of Canadian women.

If feminism is defined as a belief in equal treatment of men and women,⁵⁸ most women's groups in Canada either explicitly or implicitly accept that label. This is not a new development. As early as 1920, the

platform of the traditional National Council of Women included a list of reforms for the equal political rights of men and women.⁵⁹ Even the recently formed REAL Women, a group which publicly denounces feminism and the feminist label, supports the principle of equal opportunities for women. A recent position paper on affirmative action by this new group concludes that appointments should be made on the basis of ability, qualifications and endeavours, and not on the basis of gender.⁶⁰ There is consensus among women's groups on the need to end gender-based discrimination, and on the need for accessible daycare, equal employment opportunities, and better protection against sexual harassment, although the precise formula proposed varies by group. This becomes more obvious when we look at the different goals of the national groups.

Groups Working for Role Equality

Several of the national women's groups accept the traditional notion of separate public and private worlds and work to protect the rights of women within the family. However, this traditional view is frequently moderated by concerns about equal rights for women who do work outside the home. These groups make up the traditional wing of this role equality category. The National Council of Women (NCW) is the largest, with a self-reported membership of 750,000 women. The NCW has been in existence since 1893 and has some 1,500 local associations and a head office in Ottawa. Its purpose is described this way in a publicity pamphlet:

The aim of the Council is to improve the quality of life of all. By bringing together into federation associations of common purpose, the Council acts as a medium for information sharing, and as a forum for the development of policy on social issues.⁶¹

Looking at its yearly presentations to government, it may be argued that the NCW supports role equality for men and women without endorsing the breakdown of gender role differences. In the past few years, it has recognized either the need or the desire of some of its members to work in the paid labour force, and has been forced to consider the sometimes conflicting interests of its traditional membership — women working in the home, and its newer membership — women in the paid labour force.

The NCW took part in the formation of the Victorian Order of Nurses, the Children's Aid Society, and the Consumers Association of Canada, and includes national unity, pensions, land use, promotion of the arts, and public safety among its list of interests. The list of resolutions prepared for study and discussion at the 1983 Annual Meeting reflects a commitment to broad social goals beyond the status of women. They include: right-to-work legislation; standards concerning word process-

ing machines and video display terminals; education re fetal alcohol syndrome; flat rate salary increase; computer theft; improved and faster passenger rail service; upgrading rail facilities; pollution; technical change and female jobs; prostitution and soliciting; legal admission of refugees; children — a national resource; and child care assistance.⁶²

This orientation — not focussing exclusively on women's issues — is shared by most of the groups that came into existence before 1920. For example, the Federated Women's Institute has goals linked to the home and country. Concern for the family has led to group activity on spousal violence, pornography, child custody in divorce cases, and pensions for homemakers. The Institute seeks a fair economic return for the woman working at home, particularly in rural areas.

In addition to these traditional groups, there are economic-oriented organizations within this category, such as the Canadian Association of Women Executives and the Status of Women Program within the Canadian Teachers' Federation. They are working to improve women's opportunities for advancement in the work world, though they often disagree on the means by which equal opportunity can be achieved. For example, the Association of Women Executives is firmly committed to private sector action and rejects government legislation for change. It concentrates on issues like pensions, daycare and voluntary affirmative action, stressing that government should provide leadership and business will follow. The Teachers' Federation shares the equal opportunity ideal but calls for government legislation as well as leadership. Its Status of Women Program stresses the need for effective human rights commissions.

Significantly, even these groups combine their call for equal opportunity in the work world with concerns about related social issues. For example, the Teachers' Federation (Status of Women Program) has three main goals: (a) the promotion of non-sexist curricula in the schools; (b) increased opportunities for women teachers; and (c) the identification of social issues, particularly those regarding children, such as pornography.⁶³

The Women's Bureau of the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) shares this economic orientation. The Bureau supports the principle of equal opportunity and treatment for all workers, and sanctions what it calls positive special treatment during a transitional period. In the CLC's terms, role equality includes freedom from sexual harassment and no penalties on women in the labour force for their childbearing function.⁶⁴

Groups also exist for the advancement of women in non-economic spheres of activity. The Canadian Association for the Advancement of Women in Sports is committed to improving opportunities for girls and women to participate in both segregated and integrated sport activities. It presses for government action to remove current allowable gender restrictions on sports participants. This group is also concerned with the general problems of adolescents and the elderly in our society.

Groups Working for Role Change

Some groups combine their call for role equality with concern for role change. The National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) is a good example. NAC works for self-determination for women in political, economic, and social roles.⁶⁵ It is less concerned with providing for the welfare of the family and more concerned with affirmative action to make equal status for men and women a reality. It also represents other groups (at this time about 230) and has over 3 million women members. This structure has a moderating influence on the group's proposals, since on many issues it will try to find a middle ground acceptable to most members.

NAC has direct links with the women who lobbied successfully for the establishment of a Royal Commission on the Status of Women. In 1971, one year after the commission's report was tabled, the group that had lobbied for establishment of the commission presented some of the recommendations to cabinet ministers and obtained funds for holding a conference of women. In 1972, that group set up a "Strategy for Change" conference at which 700 women met to discuss ways of pressing for the changes proposed in the report. Following that conference, the National Action Committee was established to continue the work for the Royal Commission proposals and "evaluate and advocate changes to benefit women."⁶⁶ While the head office of the NAC is in Toronto, the group's annual meeting takes place in Ottawa so members can present the newly adopted resolutions to the House of Commons. The site of the head office has been the subject of debate within the committee, and a resolution to move to Ottawa was narrowly defeated in 1983.

Another group working for role change is the Canadian Congress of Learning Opportunities for Women, which presses for more citizen participation in government and more cooperative, consensus-based decision making in the public sphere. A similar position has been adopted by the Voice of Women, which stresses the need for democratic decision making and the relationship between women's rights and world peace. Role changes have also been advocated by socialist, lesbian, and radical feminist women, though these groups have not been very visible in national politics, as they tend to form small self-contained units throughout the country.

The distinctions among groups on the question of equal opportunity versus fundamental role change are becoming increasingly blurred, which is probably a reflection of the greater percentage of women of childbearing age in the paid labour force. In their daily lives, these women have experienced the difficulty of separating public and private roles. As group members, they have pressured for the recognition of overlapping public and private roles in the positions taken by their organizations. As a result, all groups working for the improved status of

TABLE 4-16 Women's Groups in the Province of Quebec

1893	Montreal Council of Women (MCW)
1907	Fédération Nationale Saint-Jean-Baptiste
1964	Association pour le Planning des Naissances de Montréal
1966	Association féminine d'éducation et d'action sociale (AFEAS)
1966	Fédération des femmes du Québec (FFQ)
1969	Montreal Women's Liberation Movement Front de libération des femmes du Québec
1973	Réseau d'action et d'information pour femmes (RAIF) Centrale de l'enseignement du Québec, comité de la condition féminine Fédération des travailleurs de Québec, comité de la condition féminine
1974	Confédération des syndicats nationaux, service de la condition féminine Centre d'information et de référence pour femmes YWCA, committee for social action
1979	Association des femmes collaboratrices (AFC)

women now support better daycare and retraining programs to allow more women to take up the employment opportunities created by government legislation. The overwhelming emphasis of these groups is on the need for governments to provide these new policy initiatives. In addition, the largest national group, the National Action Committee, has been joined by many smaller groups seeking the removal from women's roles of personal and economic dependence on men.

The Quebec Groups

Women's groups in the province of Quebec and the dates when they were established are listed in Table 4-16. The women's movement in Quebec deserves special consideration for several reasons. First, the history of women's groups in the province is very different from that of the national groups. While women gained the vote provincially elsewhere in Canada by 1920, in Quebec they had to wait until 1940. This phenomenon had an impact on the subsequent development of the movement. The reasons for this lag in formal political equality provide clues to attitudes and activities in the province today. In part, rapid change over the last 15 years has distinguished the Quebec experience from that of the rest of Canada, the United States, or France.⁶⁷ Also, the impact of the *survival* or survival ideology that developed in Quebec and remained dominant until the 1940s offers some explanation for current patterns. Secondly, some of these women's groups have strong Quebec loyalties that preclude their involvement in national groups. Thirdly, the positions adopted by Quebec groups on marriage and family related issues have led to a special set of tensions within the women's movement; in many

respects, the Quebec groups are more radical in their orientation to women's issues. Finally, there is sometimes a communications barrier between the Quebec groups and the national groups. Some of the latter lack the funds to translate their material into French, and some of the Quebec French-speaking groups are more comfortable working exclusively in a French-language setting.

The Impact of Survivance

In a minority report of the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the Constitution, it was noted that:

It is true that each of Canada's provinces has a population which is slightly different from that of other provinces, but in Quebec, we find a *nation* in the sociological sense of the word. (italics added)⁶⁸

It is precisely that sense of nation which distinguishes the provincialism of Ontario or British Columbia from the nationalism of Quebec.

The first Quebec nationalist ideology, which became known as *survivance*, has been called defensive in character.⁶⁹ *Survivance* nationalism glorified traditional values in the context of agrarianism, the French language, and the Roman Catholic religion. The Church had a special place in this ideology, for the triumph of *survivance* meant the triumph of the Roman Catholic Church. This had special significance for women and the women's movement. The Church was able to dominate social life in the province until the rapid urbanization of the mid-1900s. It also sought, and at times achieved, a dominant role in the political affairs in the province, significantly affecting women's groups.

In the early 1900s, Quebec was troubled by the same economic problems as English Canada. Quebec was industrializing at about the same rate as Ontario, and rapid urbanization brought new strains to social organization. Women's groups emerged in the province, just as they had in English Canada. The first French-speaking group was the Fédération nationale Saint-Jean-Baptiste, which began to press for social reforms. The history of this group provides early indications of current strains in the women's movement in Quebec. The group developed after the breakdown of short-lived union of English- and French-speaking women in the Montreal Local Council of Women.⁷⁰ Its program was typical of social organizations of the period. It stressed the teaching of religious principles and conformed to the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church. However, the conflict between Catholic teachings and the growing demand for women's equality was inevitable. There are parallels here with general political developments in the province. In 1935, the liberal reform movement, the Action Libérale nationale under Paul Gouin, was silenced when it allied with conservative forces led by Maurice Duplessis. The growing women's rights sentiment in the Association

Saint-Jean-Baptiste was also silenced by its alliance with the conservative forces led by the Church. Thus, the progression from social or maternal feminism to liberal feminism which characterized women's groups in English-speaking Canada was retarded in Quebec.

Ultimately, liberal forces exploded in the province with the death of Duplessis and the election of successive governments committed to liberal principles and the welfare state. The catching-up process that characterized political events in the province also produced a vigorous women's movement. While the goals of this movement are scarcely distinguishable in content from those of the English-speaking national women's movement, the nationalist history of the province has made a common French-English front an impossibility. The question of language is the most obvious dividing force, in spite of the existence of at least two significant English-speaking groups in Quebec (CIRF, or the Centre d'information et de références pour femmes, and the Montreal Council of Women).

More fundamentally, the strong Quebec nationalist spirit enhanced by over a century of *survivance* ideology gave rise to a way of thinking that focussed on Quebec's distinctiveness. Thus, when CIRF tried in 1973 to bring French- and English-speaking women together, the effort failed as much because of the different perceptions of rights and issues of the two groups as from problems of language.⁷¹ Representatives of the major groups in Quebec perceive their main focus to be the Quebec government, not the federal government. Group representatives note the significance of language, as well as the fact that most of their concerns (e.g., conditions of work, social services, education) come under provincial jurisdiction. The structural reality of the federal-provincial distribution of power has contributed to the segregation of Quebec groups from national groups. Thus, although a group such as the Fédération des femmes du Québec belongs to the National Action Committee, most of its activity is concentrated at the provincial level.

This does not mean that all Quebec women's groups are separatist in orientation. The recent "Yvette" incident illustrates the divisions within the women's movement over the question of Quebec independence. This took place in March 1980, during the debate preceding the Quebec referendum on sovereignty association. Lise Payette, who was the minister responsible for the status of women in the Parti Québécois government, announced a program for improved sex education in the schools and greater availability of contraceptives. At the time she labelled the wife of the Opposition leader Claude Ryan as an "Yvette," referring to a fictional character in Quebec school readers who plays a traditional supportive role. The comment was given a great deal of publicity in the Quebec press. In their analysis of the impact of this incident, Renée Dandurand and Evelyn Tardy focus on the nationalist dimension of the Yvette phenomenon and conclude that it represented the conflict

between pro- and anti-separatist forces. They feel that the media had turned a Liberal-Péquiste split into a traditional-feminist division.⁷² The incident demonstrates the divisive forces of both Quebec nationalist sentiments and party affiliations. On this particular occasion, the two influences did interact.

The Goals of Quebec Groups

The years between the decline of the Fédération nationale Saint-Jean-Baptiste and the proliferation of women's groups in the 1970s were not silent years for politically minded women. Suffrage groups did emerge in the province and left a legacy of equality-rights-oriented women. In 1966, two of these women, Thérèse Casgrain and Monique Bégin, founded the Fédération des femmes du Québec (FFQ), the group that most closely resembles the federal National Action Committee. The FFQ successfully pressured the provincial Liberal government to establish the Quebec Council on the Status of Women. Four years later, the women's liberation movement was underway in the province. The proliferation of national groups from 1970 to 1980 was mirrored in Quebec, with a similar pattern of development.

The earliest of the Quebec women's groups focussed on consciousness-raising and developing a feminist perspective. Their language was more radical than that of their English-speaking counterparts. From 1970 to 1972, the Front de libération des femmes du Québec (FLFQ) fought for the liberation of women, the national liberation of Quebec, and the liberation of the working class. While the FLFQ began with both English- and French-speaking members, ultimately the former were expelled. By the late 1970s, this and some smaller radical groups had either disappeared or moderated their programs. The remaining groups merged their traditional and feminist points of view, although the meeting ground still tended to be closer to the feminist pole.

Today, the specific goals of the Quebec groups resemble those of the national women's organizations. The more traditional among them focus on the economic rights of housewives, with the more feminist also targeting the needs of women in the paid labour force, such as universal access to daycare, the removal of sexual harassment, the merits and perils of part-time work, affirmative action, equal pay for work of equal value, and access to non-traditional jobs. There is little conflict among the women's groups in Quebec, and they frequently form alliances. They differ primarily on the scope of their demands, but ultimately all of these groups perceive economic independence for women as the key to true equality.

As is the case nationally, the two oldest groups are the most traditional. The English-dominated Montreal Women's Council, founded in 1893, continues to work for improved quality of life. Its concerns are

specifically social — such as education, pornography, and youth in trouble. While its leaders do not object to the label of feminist, they prefer the term “humanist,” which they take as meaning the improvement of relations between women and men. The group’s perspective reflects its predominantly English-speaking, middle-class, housewife membership. The fact that the French-speaking version of traditionalism is more militant may be indicative of the basic differences between language groups. For example, the Association féminine d’éducation et d’action sociale (AFEAS) grew out of the urban Cercles d’économie domestique and l’Union catholique des femmes rurales. It represents moderate feminists⁷³ who want to help women gain control over their lives. Since its formation, AFEAS has been concerned with educational and social action. This group demonstrates the contrast between Quebec and national groups, since even this traditional Quebec group has begun to consider role changes and has added some of them to its agenda. A working group for improved women’s status was added in 1980, and the AFEAS now supports financial independence for housewives (a role change), as well as economic rights for women in business with their husbands. This second concern gave rise to the creation of a new group in 1979, the Association des femmes collaboratrices. This group’s preoccupation with the financial problems as well as the social benefits of housewives may explain the heavy emphasis on economic problems, as it works to translate women’s rights from theory into practice.

The Fédération des femmes du Québec is not so much a separate group as a union of other groups in the province. The FFQ is about 80,000 strong, through either direct or affiliated membership. Like the AFEAS, the FFQ is a self-described feminist group working for the promotion of women’s rights.⁷⁴ Its objectives include the coordination of activities of women’s groups, providing information, and working for change in areas that extend explicitly beyond social relations. The FFQ works for pension reform, affirmative action, the control of pornography, and economic rights for women in the labour force and at home.

The FFQ’s political action is supported by a service-oriented group, the Centre d’information et de références pour femmes (CIRF), which is primarily an information source for immigrant and disadvantaged women, and is especially concerned with labour force problems.⁷⁵ Within this group, too, the theme of economic independence for women is important.⁷⁶ The director estimates that it helps some 30,000 women a year.

The contrast between national and Quebec women groups is most apparent in the functions carried out by the YWCA. Nationally, the YWCA is primarily concerned with providing social services and functioning as a voluntary association committed to the principle of a healthy family life. Within Quebec, the group is avowedly feminist. In the

mid-1970s, a committee for social action was created to deal specifically with the problems of women. The impact of marriage on women has received critical scrutiny. For example, the YMCA has tried to alleviate the difficulties of battered wives. The social action committee also has a director of feminist action who works to coordinate the pressure group activities of the YWCA with those of other groups, such as the FFQ.⁷⁷

The number of more radical feminist groups in Quebec has declined since 1970. They developed out of the radical separatist groups of the 1960s and early 1970s, and disappeared with them in the middle of the last decade. The most visible of those remaining is the Réseau d'action et d'information pour femmes (RAIF). This group has attracted most media attention, and tackles specific questions of concern to women. It is a self-proclaimed lobby group that also collects and distributes information on issues significant to the status of women. The goals of RAIF include financial independence for women and the removal of the effects of patriarchy in society.⁷⁸ This commitment "does not question the basis of *the family*, but rather that of marriage and patriarchy and *religious that are always patriarchal*, a source of brutal and arbitrary judgment, trampling upon human rights and inspiring despair, especially among women." (translation)⁷⁹ RAIF analysis focusses specifically on the domination of men over women in private spheres of activity.

The indictment of patriarchy is repeated in the literature of the trade unions. In the 1970s the three large central unions in Quebec established special committees on women's status, concerned with the condition of women both within the unions and society in general. The most interesting developments have occurred within the Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN), which represents province-wide unions. The committee on the status of women consists of 15 elected members who develop recommendations in light of this statement: "There can be no advancement of male workers without also thinking of the advancement of female workers."⁸⁰ The committee was first formed in the 1950s. It was dissolved in 1966, when the Confédération recognized the principle of gender equality, but was reactivated in 1974 by women in the union concerned about existing gender inequalities. In view of its union framework, this committee is naturally concerned with the status of women in the paid labour force. Its work involves scrutiny of the government and the union itself.

In 1981, the committee addressed what it considers to be the most serious problem of women in the 1980s — the impact of the economic crisis. In an analysis of the economic crisis, the committee urged the CSN to maintain equal status for women as a priority goal. This recommendation was accepted by the union. Although trade union committees generally agree on status-of-women questions, splits did develop among them in the late 1970s, primarily because their respective parent unions differed on general strategy. These committees try to forge alliances with

other women's groups of similar positions on specific issues. According to Ginette Legault, they must confront two problems. First, they cannot push demands for the equality of women in the workplace if they cannot demonstrate equality within union structure. Secondly, they face the conflict between the goals of women, which may cut across class lines, and the goals of their unions, which may stress class divisions.⁸¹

In addition to these major groups, certain organizations in the province are working to bring about changes on specific issues. The most important of these are the pro-choice and anti-pornography groups (the *Coordination nationale pour l'avortement libre et gratuit* and the *Front commun contre la pornographie*). The pornography group is very visible, with over 300,000 members, and has forged alliances with groups like the trade union committees.

Organization

Quebec groups are generally more willing than national groups to declare that their goals are political. Their broad definition of politics includes the struggle to improve the status of women. Of the groups interviewed, only the English-dominated Montreal Council of Women specifically rejected the lobbyist label, preferring to think of itself as a voluntary group. Even the traditional AFEAS believes in the effectiveness of lobbying but is hampered by the lack of economic resources. It might be deduced that the political consciousness of French-speaking groups in Quebec is further developed than that of the majority of national English-speaking groups.

French groups in Quebec seem to have a greater understanding of the political implications of funding arrangements than do national groups. For example, AFEAS receives a significant proportion of its funding from the federal Secretary of State, and recognizes that this poses special problems of paperwork, adjustments in its objectives, and financial insecurity. The more radical groups like RAIF reject government funding altogether, on the grounds that "these funds make groups dependent and are often accompanied by certain conditions." (translation)⁸²

The Quebec groups appear to be more institutionalized than the national groups. There is an alliance between the Quebec government's Council on the Status of Women and moderate groups like the *Fédération des femmes du Québec*. In the past, the council has had more influence on the Parti québécois government than its equivalent at the national level; however, this influence has been declining as the government moves away from a reformist platform. The gains have been moderate. Maternity leave provisions for public sector workers are better in Quebec than anywhere else in Canada, and the provincial government has accepted the principle that women should have the right to choose abortion. However, on issues involving federal-provincial

negotiation and government regulation of the private sector, the changes requested by women generally have not been enacted.

The Federal Government's Response to the Women's Movement

In some ways, the women's movement has been profoundly affected by federal government policies. The establishment of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in 1967 helped to legitimize the concept of equal rights for men and women. The years immediately following the publication of the commission's report were marked by government efforts to guarantee legal equality. In addition, the federal government began a funding program widely used by women setting up rape crisis or women's centres. The federal government's Advisory Council on the Status of Women has played a significant role in the past in providing information to women's groups, as well as passing group goals on to the appropriate policy makers. However, government response to the women's movement has not reflected a strong commitment to the movement's goals. An examination of that response is useful for determining the limits of government action.

The federal government's response has been consistently marked by at least four characteristics:

- a developing commitment to role equality;
- incremental policy making;
- the segregation and dispersion of women's issues; and
- support for voluntary groups.

The Developing Commitment to Role Equality

The government has several options when it comes to women's issues. First, it may decide to favour the traditional segregation of public and private roles and work to restrict women's involvement in the former. Secondly, it may decide to extend the principle of equal opportunity to women. Within this second option there are two possible courses to follow. The conservative route is to focus on legal equality and remove discriminatory laws from the statute books. The more radical route is to adopt the principle of positive role equality and enact affirmative action measures. Thirdly, the government may decide to endorse the principle of role change, and develop policies that would alter the relationship between men and women in private as well as public life. This would involve measures like universally accessible daycare and pensions for housewives. Of course, there are many possible ways in which these role changes could be implemented.

With a few minor exceptions, the federal government has opted for the second alternative, role equality. In its earliest form, equality was defined as freedom from discrimination. In 1981, following the successful lobbying effort of women's groups in their submissions to the Joint House-Senate Committee on Constitution, the principle was extended to equality under the law. The federal government has adopted the practice of removing or prohibiting discriminatory practices from federal legislation. This focus on legal equality, however, was a response to international pressure rather than to women's group pressure. As Chaviva Hosek points out, prior to the Constitution issue there was little concern within the Canadian women's movement for legal equality rights.⁸³

In 1964, the government ratified the International Labour Organization's 1958 Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation. Since that time, Canada has agreed to other international conventions prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender and government has also worked to legalize equality in its domestic laws. An anti-discrimination clause was included in the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1972. The Canadian Human Rights Act was passed in 1977. This Act makes it discriminatory not to pay equal wages to men and women who are performing work of equal value in the same establishment. The Canadian Human Rights Commission hears complaints about wage parity, and its equal pay advisors compare the value of the jobs in question. In addition, the government has reviewed existing legislation and made amendments where necessary to remove discrimination against women.⁸⁴ In terms of its own workers, the government passed a Public Service Employment Act in 1967 which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex.

The government's record in guaranteeing the implementation of these legal equalities is less impressive. In its report, the Royal Commission on the Status of Women proposed guidelines for government policy which included: (a) women should be free to take employment; (b) the care of children is a responsibility to be shared by the mother, the father and society; (c) society has a special responsibility for women because of their child-bearing role; and (d) some affirmative action is important.⁸⁵

The Royal Commission's emphasis on legislating for equality has been strongly supported by most groups active in the 1970s and 1980s within the Canadian women's movement. The federal government has formally sanctioned this principle. In 1972, the federal cabinet gave formal approval to the report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women. However, the government has achieved only partial success in implementing the commission's recommendations. In 1979, the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women issued a publication entitled *Ten Years Later*, which reviewed the achievements of the federal government in implementing the report of the Royal Commission on the Status

of Women and noted that only 43 of the 122 recommendations under federal jurisdiction had been implemented. Sue Findlay, the first director of the Women's Program in the Secretary of State, describes this document as a "a slim and innocent-looking publication in which can be found the material for an analysis of the limits of reform by the state."⁸⁶

What were these limits in the 1970s? The government, in acting on the commission's recommendations, focussed on legal equality, equal benefits for male and female workers, and equal opportunity programs to improve the access of women to the labour market. In other words, it concentrated on regulating the equal treatment of men and women in the public sphere of paid labour. A national industrial training program was established to increase the proportion of women in non-traditional jobs. In this program, an employer may be reimbursed for up to 75 percent of the wages paid to women being trained in jobs traditionally performed only by men.⁸⁷ In addition, there has been some attempt to control sexual harassment on the job. In 1976, the Cabinet adopted the principle of affirmative action for hiring practices in Crown corporations and in industries benefiting from government contracts.⁸⁸ The Treasury Board Secretariat manages the affirmative action program in the public service. Significantly, the first appointment of a woman to the senior executive category was made in 1972, and the second in 1973.⁸⁹

In 1979, an affirmative action directorate was established by Cabinet directive. This program promotes voluntary adoption of affirmative action in the private sector to improve the representation and distribution of members of three national target groups (women, native people and disabled persons) at all levels of the work force. It has not been very effective. For example, in a study of employees in Kitchener-Waterloo conducted during the summer of 1984, it was found most employers interviewed were not aware of affirmative action as a voluntary government program. One respondent in the survey even defined affirmative action as effective monetary policy.⁹⁰

In 1979, the government adopted a new strategy when a "Plan of Action" was developed as part of the United Nations Decade of Action (1975-1985). With this plan, the federal government declared a commitment to specific action in five areas: rape, wife-battering, sexual harassment, women in the media, and pensions.⁹¹ This represented a transition from general issues to specific target areas. It is significant that affirmative action and daycare, both of which were dominant issues in the proposals of women's groups, were not included in the plan. Nevertheless, it represented a renewed commitment to equality and economic independence, and included the directive that all Cabinet documents must include an analysis of all proposals in terms of their significance for women. Although this directive has proved to be primarily symbolic, overall the Plan of Action has been a positive development. It has focussed government attention on a small number of areas of con-

cern. However, at the same time, it has imposed serious limits on the scope of reform. Furthermore, its implementation has been characterized by emphasis on continued study of issue areas, with reluctance to take into consideration the recommendations or expertise of women's groups.⁹²

There is some indication that the commitment to positive equality measures will be strengthened in the 1980s. In 1981, Canada ratified the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. This Convention goes beyond the guarantee of legal equality, to require "a state to take all appropriate measures to ensure that half its population is guaranteed the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on the basis of equality with the other half of the population."⁹³ In addition, the federal government as an employer has responded favourably to demands for positive equality measures for its female workers in the Canadian Union of Public Employees.

How can we evaluate these developments? Within the past few years women working within status-of-women divisions of the government have made several attempts to assess the scope of reform. The 1983 report of the Secretary of State to the United Nations reviews the federal government's achievements. According to this report, the major thrust of government action has been role equality in the public sphere.⁹⁴ Another overview of reforms was prepared by Freda Paltiel in her report to the United Nations.⁹⁵ This report concentrates on social security, taxation and general welfare measures. The list of reforms includes pension review; improved maternity leave provisions for natural and adoptive parents; proposals for health risk assessment and reduction with special consideration of differential gender risks; a refundable child tax credit; changes in the definition of family income to recognize the common-law unit; increases in the child care expenses deduction; taxation deductions for salaries paid to a spouse; studies of part-time work; priorities for women in training programs; and an affirmative action program in the public service. Paltiel also notes the deficiencies in these programs. For example, alimony or separation payments have a special taxation status that benefits the paying spouse (usually the husband or father) disproportionately. Most of these programs do represent some recognition of the changes that have occurred in family life, and move a small way toward helping women reassign the private roles they leave behind when they enter the labour force. However, they do not meet these needs adequately and clearly do not take into account the special needs of children and housewives.

There are several possible explanations for the inadequacies of programs such as daycare and pensions. Factors like cost, the pressures of federal-provincial relations, and conflicting proposals for action must be taken into account. In addition, there is some evidence that policy

makers resist significant changes. With the exception of the affirmative action program, whose future is uncertain, these achievements have been relatively inexpensive. There has been a strong emphasis on study and review, but many of the programs that could facilitate equal opportunity have not been implemented. The federal government must be held at least partly responsible for this failure, for it has sometimes demonstrated an unwillingness to act. For example, the federal cabinet spent two and one-half years approving in principle the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women, but approval was not accompanied by the usual list of specific resources, directives, and priorities.⁹⁶

In 1981, Treasury Board Secretariat resisted the proposal of Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Employment and Immigration, for inclusion of affirmative action in his project for a revised labour policy. This led to the redefinition of affirmative action as positive employment — a voluntary rather than a mandatory program.⁹⁷

If we examine the selection of issues for the national plan of action, some of the limits to reform emerge. The government chose to focus on violence against women, gender-role stereotyping, and the financial problems of older women. However, the daycare issue, which fundamentally challenges our preconception of the family as the woman's responsibility, was not included. As Margret Eichler notes, there has been strong resistance by the federal government to alternative definitions of the family. She argues that the basis for social security is still the notion that people should look out for themselves and their family members. "Only when the nominal channels fail will government agencies step in to provide some maintenance of income."⁹⁸

The Incremental Approach

Part of the explanation for government's limited response lies in the attitudes of its officials. Often, department heads or cabinet ministers do not understand the nature of demands from women's groups.⁹⁹ However, part of the explanation is structural and arises from the distribution of federal and provincial responsibilities. Since the 1930s and 1940s, when the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council made several landmark decisions, major power over social services has been vested in provincial governments. At the same time, the bulk of fund-raising power is vested in the federal government. This has tended to retard change in the social service sector, and helps to explain why the federal government has concentrated on adding to existing programs.

A good example of this policy of incrementalism is daycare legislation. While it is the case that the assumption of responsibility for daycare by the federal government would involve endorsing a proposal for role change, the fact remains that daycare involves federal-provincial negoti-

ation. Daycare is a provincial responsibility, although some of the funds are provided through the Canada Assistance Plan. In an environment of competitive federalism, there are fears at both levels of government that reopening negotiations for the Canada Assistance Plan might result in major losses for them both. They prefer to add on to existing programs, or to maintain the status quo in order to prevent possible losses.

The Segregation and Dispersion of Women's Issues

The federal government has established several mechanisms for dealing with women's issues. The political responsibility rests with a minister responsible for the status of women. This cabinet position was created in 1972 as one of the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women. The minister is charged with both advancing equality rights and transmitting women's needs to government, though this portfolio has always been combined with another cabinet post. The minister is assisted by Status of Women Canada, a central agency charged with coordinating government activities relating to women. Status of Women acts as a policy secretariat and coordinates the federal-provincial consideration of women's issues. In 1976, Status of Women Canada was separated from the Privy Council Office, and the coordinator was granted deputy ministerial status. However, without direct financial links with women's groups, this office has had to rely on the voluntary submission of information.

The funding of women's groups is controlled by the women's program in the Secretary of State. There is a physical distance separating this program from the office of the coordinator. One office is located in Hull, Quebec, the other in Ottawa. In addition, the women's program director reports to the Secretary of State rather than to the coordinator of the Status of Women, and there is no formal mechanism to integrate the activities of the two bodies.

In the 1970s, advisors on women's issues were integrated into the Departments of Justice, Employment and Immigration, and Health and Welfare. A Women's Bureau had already been established in 1954 in the Department of Labour. Most of the women hired as advisors in these departments complained of the "difficulty in getting approval for their proposals — rarely seeing deputy ministers and not being included in senior management committees where decisions are made."¹⁰⁰ With the exception of the Health and Welfare Advisor, there has been no regular contact between these departments and the central coordinating agency, Status of Women Canada.

Finally, there is an Advisory Council on the Status of Women. This Council was set up in 1973, again on the recommendation of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women. It has had a troubled history. In 1981, there was a formal split between the president of the council and the

government on the development of the new Canadian Constitution. Since then, the council has had to work to reestablish links with women's groups. The federal government created the council to bring matters of interest and concern to women before the government and the public and to advise the minister responsible for the status of women. However, the president of the Advisory Council in 1983 described the council's function as one of informing women's groups about the decisions of government.¹⁰¹ There is little integration between the Advisory Council and government advisors on women's issues. The Advisory Council often works on projects not directly related to the work of the government agencies responsible for the status of women. For example, in 1983 the council was working on a major project on women as health guardians in the home — an issue not part of the national plan of action. This process, in which different themes are addressed by the different agencies or departments, represents a dispersion of effort.

Support for Voluntary Groups

In its funding policies, the federal government has demonstrated a commitment to problem-solving by voluntary groups. It seems likely that this pattern will continue or even accelerate in the current economic crisis. There was a proliferation of women's groups in Canada following the publication of the report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women. Some of these groups were responding to the enthusiasm for the cause of women's rights generated by that report. Others were taking advantage of government funds made available through summer works or special employment grants. The financial impact of International Women's Year in 1975 is also clear. The federal government institutionalized support for women's groups within a division of the Secretary of State in the context of the United Nations effort, by creating the women's program. In 1975, the program received \$2.5 million for a granting program.

In the context of government support for voluntary groups, the Department of National Health and Welfare has established two awards for voluntary work. The Lifestyle Award is presented to citizens who have performed valuable voluntary work in the areas of health and social welfare. The Thérèse Casgrain Award recognizes achievements in social reforms. The awards are described in a department publication as demonstrations of "its continuing commitment to the promotion of voluntary action."¹⁰² In addition, the national plan of action endorses the voluntary work of women, and includes a commitment to supporting women's groups working for status of women issues.

Ethel Klein, in her assessment of the women's movement in the United States, has noted that "on controversial issues authorities adopt broad structural policies that establish procedures rather than allocate

resources. This relieves governments from the costs of acting."¹⁰³ There is some evidence that the same pattern exists now and will persist in Canada. This observation becomes clearer in the context of the government's response to women's groups on different kinds of issues. Two issues are examined here. The first, the inclusion of equality rights for men and women in the Canadian Constitution, is a role equality issue. It is an expressive issue that would seem to require little if any financial commitment, and demonstrates the transition of the federal government, under pressure from women's groups, from a policy of equal treatment of men and women before the law to equality within the law. The second, the revision of the Canada Pension Plan, involves role changes in that it focusses on the economic status of women in both public and private spheres. It is a redistributive issue. Not only is it very expensive, but it also raises questions about state regulation of the traditionally private role of the housewife.

Two Case Studies of the Interaction Between Women's Groups and the Government

The Constitution

The first issue examined is the Constitution, with particular emphasis on the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, introduced by the federal government in June 1978 as the Constitutional Amendment Bill. In 1980, the National Action Committee established the structure for discussions on the theme, in what has been described as a conscious attempt to be proactive rather than reactive.¹⁰⁴ Regional meetings were planned but cancelled, since the groups applied too late for government funding. Instead, a Toronto meeting took place in October 1980. At the same time the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women commissioned a series of papers, many by women lawyers, on the implications of a new constitution in which it was now clear that a Charter of Rights and Freedoms would be included. This Charter was part of the Constitutional Amendment Bill introduced in the federal House in June 1978, as well as the resolution introduced on October 6, 1980.¹⁰⁵

Women's groups generally tried to stimulate discussion on the proposed Charter. The National Council of Women of Canada tried to poll the views of some of its members, and used that information as the basis for its position paper.¹⁰⁶ While the polling process was not necessarily thorough, it represents what one Constitution lobbyist has described as "the desire to make government represent women's views and work with us. It is our right and our responsibility to *demand* that."¹⁰⁷

The Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, led by Doris Anderson, played a leading role in the discussions. To stimulate

awareness, Anderson travelled across the country. A conference on the Constitution was planned by the Advisory Council for September 1980, but was cancelled because translators were on strike for daycare and maternity leave provisions. A second conference was scheduled for February 14, 1981.

In the meantime, women's groups carried on with their analysis and prepared submissions for the joint committee of the House of Commons and the Senate. As Chaviva Hosek points out, there are some common features in most of these presentations. With the exception of the Canadian Business and Professional Women, all the women's groups that prepared submissions affirmed their support for an entrenched charter. Their decision to work for legal role equality was a political one. There were groups, for example, that wanted the right to abortion included in the Charter, but realized they would not achieve this and made no demands. There was a prevailing sense, at least among the activists within women's groups, that "unless we did something with what was on the table we had no chance of getting anything at all."¹⁰⁸ Concern for equality in the law, as well as before the law, and for affirmative action programs to bring about equal status for men and women were part of most submissions.

The Advisory Council conference scheduled for February 14 was also cancelled. At this point, a new group emerged to lobby for equality rights in the Charter. This group, the Ad Hoc Committee, was established by about 15 women from Toronto and Ottawa who decided to organize the February 14 conference cancelled by the Advisory Council. Within a few weeks, the Ad Hoc Committee, with the cooperation of some women members of Parliament and civil servants, brought together over 1,300 women to discuss a new constitution. After the conference, Ad Hoc Committee members continued to pressure both federal and provincial governments for equality rights for women.

Finally, in April 1981, the House of Commons unanimously passed a resolution to include section 28 in the Charter. That section reads: "Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons." In the November 1981 Accord, that section was made subject to the override clause in the Charter. A small group of women from the Ad Hoc Committee lobbied the provincial premiers. Ultimately, section 28 was removed from the override clause.

The exclusion of section 28 from the override clause was due directly to the concentrated lobbying tactics of this small Ad Hoc Committee which organized the support of thousands of women across the country. They began by working according to the federal government's rules and soon learned to write their own rules. They learned to make decisions quickly, often without the prior research and deliberation which is the keynote of the women's movement. Some Ad Hoc Committee members

have described their experience variously as an adventure in cooperation, a sharing of ideas, and the sense that each one of them "had a *part* of the answer — not that one person had all the answer, and her job was to make sure you understood it."¹⁰⁹

In the context of what might have occurred, the Constitution lobby was successful. In spite of promises to the contrary, the November accord with the provinces would have allowed equality rights for women to be subject to provincial override. Without the concerted lobbying activity of the Ad Hoc Committee directed at both the federal government and the provincial premiers, the independence of section 28 would have remained a casualty of federal-provincial bargaining.

The Ad Hoc Committee's success can be explained in the following ways. In terms of gender role orientation, its demands and arguments were couched in role equality terms. The restriction to equality was partly a function of the circumstances surrounding the debate. By 1980, most women's groups felt that Canada would have a new constitution with an entrenched Charter. Thus, even opponents of the Charter were concerned that, however bad it might be, it would have to include equality guarantees for women. The Ad Hoc Committee, although small itself, had conference attendance, letters, telegrams, and group approval to support its claim to represent Canadian women. It was able to demonstrate its mandate, and was assisted also by the failure of opposing groups to mobilize until after the issue had been settled.¹¹⁰ The proposals of groups to the government did not differ significantly, and the concern for discussion, analysis, and consensus, which is characteristic of women's groups, could in this instance be accommodated without much delay. Groups like the NAC had been gathering information for several years, and the Ad Hoc Committee was able to use its expertise. Finally, and most significantly, the Ad Hoc Committee quickly learned how to lobby government, and was assisted by contacts within government, particularly by sympathetic members of Parliament. Furthermore, with its independent financial status, it did not have to rely on government funding. In the early stages of the issue, opposition members of Parliament instructed women's groups about procedure and possibilities for change, and donated office space to the Ad Hoc Committee. In the later stage the federal government, at odds with the provincial premiers, allied with the Ad Hoc Committee to pressure for agreement. Here the federal-provincial setting assisted the lobbying efforts of the Ad Hoc Committee.

The pattern of federal government response to women's groups on this issue is instructive. In this case, the government initiated the issue and successfully defined and limited the scope of the debate to role equality. In the process, women's groups were forced to respond to government initiatives.

It is clear from this issue that even legal equality rights for women may

take second place on the government agenda when competing claims are advanced. Here, federal-provincial relations took first place, at least in the short term. It is clear as well that the federal government's response to women's groups is affected by the position taken by the minister responsible for the status of women. During the Constitution debates, Lloyd Axworthy was replaced by Judy Erola in this position. The women involved in the lobby effort felt that she responded more sympathetically to their demands.

The Pension Issue

The pension issue brings forth a rather different set of concerns, and also illustrates to what extent the women's movement is still caught up in its traditional patterns of action. This issue has been an area of concern for women's groups for many years. In its report, the Royal Commission on the Status of Women urged that housewives be allowed to participate in the Canada/Quebec Pension Plans. They urged consideration of two means of achieving housewife coverage — credit-splitting of the husband's contributions, or contributions by the housewife as a self-employed worker.¹¹¹ In modified form, these two proposals are the basis for two sets of recommendations from women's groups in Canada.

The pension issue is substantially different from the Constitution issue. The groups that took part in the process of addressing government always treated the Constitution as a vehicle for obtaining role equality. The pension issue has been characterized by more debate among women's groups on role change.

All women's groups that have prepared position papers for the government are concerned that two-thirds of single women over the age of 65 live below the poverty line.¹¹² They have noted three causes of poverty for older women: (a) the movement of women into and out of the labour force because of household and childrearing responsibilities; (b) the fact that women are more likely to work part-time than are men; and (c) the fact that on average women employed full-time in the labour force earn only about 60 percent of male earnings.¹¹³

The problem has been well analyzed over many years. The National Council of Women of Canada began to make recommendations on pension policy as early as the 1940s. In 1978, the organization surveyed its membership and published *The Financial Situation of Older Women*. The Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women also has a long history of thought and analysis on the pension issue. It made its first policy recommendations in April 1974, and in April 1978 it published a devastating account entitled *Women and Aging: A Report on the Rest of Our Lives*, by Louise Dulude. In 1982, the Advisory Council established a national clearinghouse on pensions to provide women with information on the issue.

The findings and recommendations have been taken to government via the annual presentations and submissions to the Canada Pension Plan advisory committee and the special parliamentary committee on pensions. The content of these submissions helps to differentiate the pension issue from the constitution issue. The groups have disagreed primarily on a formula for integrating homemakers into the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan (here referred to as C/QPP), but there is complete agreement on the principle of a homemaker pension. In her recent report on pensions written for the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Dulude notes that the "solution of one adequate basic pension for everyone, to be taxed back from those with large personal incomes, keeps cropping up in the discussions of women's groups." This system would be simple to administer, "would guarantee that everyone receive an adequate pension, would be fairer to women and would make unnecessary the whole complicated process of trying to fit women in a system that wasn't built for them."¹¹⁴

The National Council of Women of Canada was the first group to stress the need for financial security for the spouse who remains at home.¹¹⁵ It is concerned about women born before 1920 who were socially pressured toward dependency on husbands, families, and low-paying jobs, and the woman "who will grow old at the beginning of the 21st century who has not only been nurtured on a heightened sense of identity and independence, but will face a radically different social climate."¹¹⁶ In its 1983 proposals, the National Council recommends that 50 percent of the income-earning spouse's contribution be applied to the non-earning spouse, with ensuing tax deductibility for the earning spouse. This proposal allows homemakers' pensions to vary according to their husbands' income. The outlines of the ideological strains inherent in this issue become apparent.

The National Action Committee on the Status of Women has adopted a position similar to that of the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women. This is not surprising, since Louise Dulude carried out pension studies for the Advisory Council and is a member of NAC's pension committee. The NAC proposal is based on a commitment to the principle of equality of the spouses in marriage. In this context, NAC recommends that pension plan credits of married partners be split equally when the younger of the two reaches age 65. This would help overcome the current differences in wages paid to men and women in the labour force, which results in lower pension credits for women. NAC's plan for housewives is rather different from the National Council of Women formula. NAC rejects the notion of homemakers as dependents, and therefore objects to the government's proposal to limit homemakers' benefits to widows' benefits.¹¹⁷ It recommends that homemakers with children below age seven or with severely disabled family members in the home become members of the C/QPP in their own right. NAC assigns

a common value to their labour for contributory purposes equal to one-half the average industrial wage, or about \$10,000 in 1983. This program would be subsidized by all C/QPP contributors. Homemakers who do not have responsibility for young children or severely disabled persons would be integrated in the C/QPP on the same basis, but the family member benefiting from their labour would carry the pension cost.

Only one group, the National Association of Women and the Law (NAWL), specifically addresses the problem of balancing measures that would "encourage the belief that housework or childcare is a female responsibility," with the reality that "women do 'drop-out' to care for a home and/or children," and that women do assume a double burden.¹¹⁸ NAWL proposes a scheme in which, as with the NAC proposal, women's work would be valued at half the average industrial wage. However, it proposes that provisions should be made to require a working spouse who can afford to keep his or her partner at home to make contributions for the homemaker to C/QPP, regardless of the presence of young children or disabled persons.¹¹⁹

The factors inhibiting success are evident from the submissions. The gender role orientations of the three groups discussed above illustrate the splits within the women's movement. The National Council of Women favours a scheme bordering on role equality, while the National Action Committee and the National Association of Women and the Law favour schemes designed to recognize and promote role change. Because the groups do not agree, and because all proposals would affect women and — indirectly — men generally, no one group can claim to have a mandate. In this context, the tactical concern for process is important. The National Action Committee proposal is called "Pension Reform: What Women Want." The National Council of Women emphasizes its awareness of members' concerns and has published a study analyzing the results of an opinion poll of its members dealing with pensions.

The pension issue, a question of redistribution and potential role change, demonstrates the current crisis among women's groups, for they cannot demonstrate a clear mandate. Failing this, strong lobbying is required, but that kind of action is in conflict with the approach of women's groups to problem solving and concerns with the process of representation.

This issue also demonstrates some limits to government action. As Paltiel points out, "feminizing the pension debate has a ten-year history in Canada."¹²⁰ In 1975, during International Women's Year, for the first time employed men and women were treated equally in the Canada Pension Plan. A childbearing drop-out provision was added to the federal plan in 1977. This allows contributors to remove 15 percent of the total period for the calculation of pension benefits. However, this change did not come into force until June 1983, when Ontario finally decided to

agree to the proposal. The government also introduced a credit-splitting provision in 1978. This permits the equal splitting of pension credits earned by husband and/or wife during their marriage (of at least three years' duration) if they become divorced. Significantly, only 2,775 applications for credit splitting were approved between 1978 and June 1981.¹²¹ Subsequently, in 1980, the government amended the plan to permit the incomes of spouses working in an unincorporated family business to be considered as pensionable earnings. In 1981, a National Pensions Conference was held, and later a meeting was held by the representatives of women's groups who had taken part in the conference. Federal money was made available to groups that set up regional seminars on the theme, and the federal government also established a 14-member Canada Pension Plan Advisory Committee.

The federal government's view of pensions was contained in the 1982 green paper, *Better Pensions for Canadians*. The paper addressed the question of the fairness of existing public and private plans, and three proposals were advanced: (a) the establishment of adequate guaranteed minimum incomes; (b) fair opportunities for individuals to provide for their retirement; and (c) avoidance of serious disruptions of pre-retirement living standards. Several recommendations have special relevance for women. Proposals for improved vesting and portability, inflation protection, and a requirement for joint and last survivor annuities were noted as gains for women.¹²²

These proposals would require no more than amendments to the existing pension plans. The government has favoured this approach in the past. The fate of pensions for housewives is a good example. In April 1983, the Canada Pension Plan Advisory Committee recommended a plan that would provide homemakers age 65 and over with pensions equal to about one-half of the Canada Pension Plan retirement benefit. The proposal included evaluating homemakers' services at one-half of the average industrial wage, with heads of households being required to contribute 3.6 percent of these "pensionable earnings." This is similar to the NAC proposal and involves role changes. The traditional economic relationship between the homemaker and her spouse would be substantially altered.

The proposal was rejected by both the Minister of Health and Welfare and her advisory body, the National Council of Welfare. Instead, the minister proposed working within the existing system and eventually splitting the Canada Pension Plan benefits of the homemaker's spouse, creating benefits 50 percent higher than current rates. This benefit-splitting plan would not alter the basis of the existing financial relationship between homemaker and spouse. In addition, the minister rejected the possibility of an immediate solution, noting the high cost of changes and the lack of consensus on the issue among women's groups.

Conclusion: Opportunities for the Future

Traditionally, women assumed primarily household roles in what is sometimes called the private world, and men assumed primarily political and labour force roles in what is sometimes called the public world. In the twentieth century, the separateness of these two worlds has broken down. Canadian women have entered the public world of paid labour in significant numbers, and the reality of family life today often differs significantly from the traditional nuclear family. In addition, the participation of women in political life has increased dramatically since suffrage rights were granted federally in 1918. Although these changes do not represent the complete integration of women into public life, they are signs of significant role changes and of the gradual disintegration of the barriers separating public and private worlds. However, the passage from one world to the other has been rather one-sided. While women have entered the public world in significant numbers, men have successfully resisted the assumption of private roles. This has had unfortunate consequences for both men and women, and has become a significant issue for Canadian women's groups.

Women's groups in Canada have taken a leading role in working out a program of adjustment to the new realities. In the early 1970s they focussed on equal rights for women in the public world. As women assumed new responsibilities in the labour force and politics, the emphasis shifted from equal rights legislation to role changes for both men and women. Women's groups began to recognize that equal opportunity in the public sphere required significant role changes in the private sphere, and that the public and private are linked. Ultimately, some groups began also to consider basic changes in the definitions of public and private roles, and a possible mixing of the two. The focus shifted from equal opportunity programs to better daycare facilities, educational opportunities for women, and counselling services. At the same time, the economic and personal dependence of women on men in their private roles increasingly came under attack, and the slogan "the personal is political" was born. In this context, women's groups demanded economic independence for all women, not just those in the paid labour force. They also sought ways to end the physical abuse of women by men. This transition from role equality to role change as the dominant theme among women's groups was most pronounced in the province of Quebec, in which there was a rapid process of catching up following the 1940 provincial suffrage victory.

The transition has resulted in the diversification of the movement. There is no consensus among women today on the precise nature of the changes needed. The lack of consensus reflects the fact that ideological questions must be answered. Should there be full employment? Should

there be public support for private roles? Should there be private support for public roles? If there is to be more choice of roles for everyone in the population, what is the range of alternatives? These are the questions which women's groups are now examining.

The federal government has ignored some of these questions and focussed primarily on role equality in the public world. The government finds it difficult to deny publicly the access of any individual to the individual rights and freedoms contained in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is moving from formal removal of discriminatory provisions from its laws to the positive enforcement of equal access to the public world. However, the government has not regularly taken into account in its policy making the impact of role equality in the public world on life in the private world. Neither has it addressed many of the proposals for role changes that women's groups have advanced. This has serious consequences for family relations, the quality of child care, and the future direction of women's political activities.

There are several explanations for the gap between the demands of women's groups and the response of the federal government. On the group side, there has been relatively little concern with effective lobbying tactics, so that often their message has not been transmitted to policy makers. On the government side, there is evidence that women's issues often receive low priority. In addition, the intricacies of federal-provincial relations often work against change.

However, there are some compelling reasons why government should listen more closely to the message of the women's movement. Some significant role changes have already taken place in Canadian society. Women's groups have taken a thoughtful look at these changes and have prepared proposals for policy reforms which would accommodate them. In addition, some of these groups have redefined the responsibilities of men and women in both the public and private worlds. Contained within their demands is a plea for a society with a healthier balance of obligations and rights. This kind of role change might mean that:

The two domains may be related in such a way as to enrich and protect each other. . . . The democratic theorists were not fuzzy-headed idealists when they argued that politics is an educational experience that extends deep into our private lives. Likewise, it is difficult to believe that politics and government are as democratic as they can be when people learn their values in a private life that is, in so many respects, inegalitarian. . . .¹²³

The Constitution negotiations demonstrated the positive synthesis which can occur when public and private values are combined. Women's groups can effectively adopt some of the traditional tactics of the public world in their lobbying efforts without sacrificing the virtues of consultation, cooperation and accommodation. At the same time governments can revise their policy agendas and deliberative processes to incorporate

some of the values of the private world without sacrificing efficiency and good government.

Notes

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1. See, for example, Naomi Black's description of Helen Gregory MacGill in the Introduction to Elsie Gregory MacGill, *My Mother the Judge* (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1981), p. xv. Black writes, "Women of Helen's generation did not anticipate paid employment on any continuing basis. . ." and "The Minnesota phase of Helen's life ended, as had the previous ones, in response to what happened to the men in her life."
2. Robert Paul Wolff, "There's Nobody Here But Us Persons," in *Women and Philosophy*, edited by Carol H. Gould and Max W. Wartofsky (New York: Putnam's, 1964), p. 134.
3. Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Moral Woman and Immoral Man: A Consideration of the Public-Private Split and Its Political Ramifications," *Politics and Society* 4 (1974), p. 455.
4. Virginia Sapiro, *The Political Integration of Women: Roles, Socialization, and Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), pp. 30-31.
5. Elshtain, "Moral Woman and Immoral Man," p. 463.
6. Alison M. Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allenhead, 1983), pp. 35-39.
7. Elshtain, "Moral Woman and Immoral Man," p. 462.
8. Carole Pateman, "Women, Nature and the Suffrage," *Ethics* 90 (1980), p. 566.
9. Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*, p. 97.
10. Ibid.
11. Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 149.
12. Joyce Gelb and Marian Lief Palley, *Women and Public Policies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 7-8.
13. "Women and Men: Is a Realignment Under Way?" *Public Opinion* (April/May 1982) p. 27.
14. Between November 1983 and April 1984, all of the women's groups listed in the 1982 listing published by the Women's Program, Secretary of State, were sent a questionnaire asking to describe their goals, tactics, funding, and relationships with the municipal, provincial, and federal levels of government. This group census provided information about the character of both national and regional groups.
15. Canada, Royal Commission on the Status of Women, *Report* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970), p. 54.
16. Ibid., pp. 45-47.
17. Ibid., p. 158.
18. Ibid.
19. Canada, Department of Labour, Women's Bureau, *Women in the Labour Force: Earnings of Men and Women* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1979).
20. This figure is taken from 1951 census data.
21. Margrit Eichler, *Families in Canada Today* (Toronto: Gage Publishing, 1983), p. 1.
22. Michael Ornstein, "Equality in the Workplace: Accounting for Gender Differentials

- in Job Survey," Women's Bureau, Dept. of Labour series A, no. 2 (Ottawa: The Department, 1983), p. 1.
23. Canada, Department of Labour, *Women in the Labour Force: Earnings of Men and Women* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1984), p. iii.
 24. "Earnings Gap Between French and English Has Closed." *Au Courant* 4 (4) (1984): 8-9.
 25. Julie White, "Current Issues for Women in the Federal Public Service" (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1983), p. 3. See also Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, *Ten Years Later* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1979). The Council notes that ten years after the publication of the report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women, "women, who made up 15.3% of the total workforce of the surveyed Crown corporations, had only succeeded to 1.9% of the senior management positions" (p. 25).
 26. Monica Boyd, "Sex Differences in the Canadian Occupational Attainment Process." *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 19 (1982): 21-23.
 27. Albert Breton, "Marriage, Population, and the Labour Force Participation of Women," study prepared for the Economic Council of Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1984).
 28. Ornstein, "Equality in the Workplace."
 29. Robert Putnam, as quoted by Allan Kornberg, Joel Smith, and Harold D. Clarke, *Citizen Politicians - Canada* (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1979), p. 186.
 30. Thelma McCormack, "Toward a Nonsexist Perspective on Social and Political Change," in *Another Voice*, edited by Marcia Millman and Rosabeth Moss Kanter (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1975), p. 25.
 31. Lester Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 216.
 32. Robert Lane, *Political Life* (New York: Free Press, 1959), p. 216.
 33. *Ibid.*, pp. 209-10.
 34. Jill McCalla Vickers and Janine Brodie, "Canada," in *The Politics of the Second Electorate*, edited by Joni Lovenduski and Jill Hills (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 67.
 35. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
 36. Commission of the European Communities, *European Men and Women: A Comparison of Their Attitudes to Some of the Problems Facing Society* (Brussels, 1975), p. 97.
 37. When survey methods were adopted in Canada in the 1960s, women were not of much interest to researchers. Some of the findings are inconsistent. For example, it was suggested in several constituency studies that women were less likely than men to vote New Democrat. However, in two national surveys (1962 and 1968) there was no significant difference between men and women on party support. Several articles noted in passing the existence of gender differences in the party images and party support. However, these differences did not recur systematically in different studies over time. In addition, the authors noted that the gap was rarely controlled for socioeconomic and situational factors to see if the difference was generalized or specific. Often this was because there were problems in applying some of these controls. In the early election studies, researchers requested only the occupation of the head of the household. Married women were assigned the special class of the husband, based on his occupation or income.
 38. Jerome Black and Nancy McGlen, "Male-Female Political Involvement Differentials in Canada, 1965-1974," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 13 (1980): 475-97.
 39. The Quality of Life study was carried out by the Institute for Behavioural Research at York University. It consisted of a national three-wave panel study conducted in 1977, 1979, and 1981. The sample consisted of 3,288 cases in 1977, 3,475 in 1979, and 3,953 in 1981.
 40. This study was conducted by Robert Drummond and Fred Fletcher of the Department of Political Science, York University. The interviews were conducted with 1,196 respondents between June and August 1977.

41. Decima Research data referred to in this paper should be interpreted with care because the samples, while representative, were small.
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43. Roger Gibbins, J. Rick Ponting, and Gladys Symons, "Attitudes and Ideology: Correlates of Liberal Attitudes Toward the Role of Women," *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 9 (1978): 19-40.
44. Eunice Schreiber, "The Social Bases of Opinions on Women's Role in Canada," *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 1 (1975): 61-74.
45. Commission of the European Communities, *European Men and Women*, p. 74.
46. For a good summary of these two surveys, see Naomi Black, "Feminism and Integration: The European Communities' Surveys — European Men and Women," *Journal of European Integration* 4 (1980): 83-103.
47. See Carol Bacchi, *Liberation Deferred? The Ideas of the English-Canadian Suffragist, 1877-1918* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983).
48. Doris French, *High Button Boot Straps* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1968), p. 33.
49. Canada, Department of the Secretary of State, Women's Program, "Pressure for Change: Notes Prepared for Discussion at United Nations International Seminar," September 7, 1974, p. 6.
50. Sylvia Bashevkin, "Women and Politics: Perspectives on the Past, Present, and Future," unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Saskatoon, May 1979, p. 13.
51. Linda Briskin, "Toward a Socialist Feminist Movement," *Our Generation* 10 (1974): p. 26.
52. Janine Brodie and Jill McCalla Vickers, "Canadian Women in Politics: An Overview" (Ottawa: Canadian Research Institute for the Advancement of Women, Paper No. 2, September 1982), p. 25.
53. These views emerged in interviews with representatives with national women's groups conducted in 1983 and 1984.
54. Interview with Laura Sabia, May 1984.
55. National Council of Women, "Councils of Women in Canada: Aims and Objectives," Council pamphlet.
56. Young Women's Christian Association, *The YWCA in Canada* (May 1983).
57. Ibid.
58. There are several definitions of feminism in the literature. It has been variously defined as total equality for men and women, as a rejection of a male-defined society, or as belief in the capabilities of women. Naomi Black provides a useful discussion of the concept in "Feminism and Integration." Black writes on p. 92, "Although there is a good deal of disagreement, we may say that, in a policy context, feminism at least means insistence on equality of treatment, particularly equal access to all elements of public life, along with equal rewards for activities. In a theoretical context, feminism means refusal to judge women as inferior in comparison with men, or with some masculine standard."
59. Ibid., p. 93.
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77. Interviews with Francine Mayer, Director of Feminist Action, YWCA, Montreal, June 1984.
78. Interview with Marcelle Dolment, president of the Réseau d'action et d'information pour les femmes, June 1984.
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An Assessment of the Probable Impact of Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada

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Introduction

The aboriginal peoples of southern Canada are an extremely diverse population. The Indian population can be divided into status and non-status Indians, and the former into treaty and non-treaty Indians. The status Indian population encompasses nearly 600 bands, which differ dramatically in their population size, territorial base, access to natural resources, level of community and individual wealth, linguistic and tribal character, and proximity to urban centres (see Appendix A). The non-status Indian population consists of persons of Indian ancestry who, unlike status Indians, are not registered under the Indian Act and therefore do not fall under the jurisdiction of the federal Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. Some non-status Indians are unregistered because they chose not to take up their entitlement, while others lost their entitlement either voluntarily or involuntarily — as in the case of a status Indian woman marrying a non-Indian man. Non-status Indians may share the physical and cultural features of status Indians and may even live on an Indian reserve at the pleasure of the band, but they lack most of the rights and privileges of band members. Many of the Métis, or mixed bloods, trace their roots to the offspring of marriages between Indian women and French or Scottish fur-trading men. Many other persons who trace their mixed blood to much more recent intermarriage have more in common culturally with non-status Indians or non-aboriginals than with the descendants of the original Métis. Outside of Alberta and Manitoba, most Métis do not live in predominantly Métis settlements. Box 5-1 provides information on the size of the Métis and non-status Indian population, and Appendix B describes the social and economic conditions of this population.

BOX 5-1 The Size of the Métis and Non-Status Indian Population

A precise description of the Métis and non-status Indian (MNSI) population is difficult to formulate. Not only is there a lack of systematic record-keeping on this population, but also, unlike the registered Indians who are defined in law, the MNSI population is essentially defined on the basis of self-identification. Since one's identity depends upon the social situation in which the individual is involved, the MNSI population is variable. As one analyst (Taylor, 1979) has suggested, the MNSI population is perhaps best conceptualized using a model of concentric circles. It would consist of: (a) a *core* population characterized by Native culture, high fertility and mortality rates, low educational attainment, high unemployment, and a low level of labour force participation; (b) a non-core population that identifies itself as Métis or non-status Indian, but shares few of the aforementioned socio-demographic characteristics; and (c) a second non-core population whose members are unaware of, only marginally aware of, or uninterested in their Native genetic heritage. Some people drift in and out of the core population from time to time, depending upon employment opportunities, migration patterns, and kinship ties. Furthermore, if self-identification is to be the basis of eligibility for participation in government programs for the MNSI population, the incentives will be such as to draw a portion of the non-core non-self-identifying MNSI population into the non-core self-identifying category.

Estimates of the size of the MNSI population vary widely. The 1981 census counted only about 75,000 non-status Indians and about 98,000 Métis. This is by far the lowest of the numerous estimates we have encountered and is not recognized as valid by MNSI organizations: Indeed, the Ontario MNSI political organization (OMNSI) alone claims to represent 185,000 MNSI. Taylor (1979) notes that federal government estimates of the nationwide MNSI population range from 300,000 to 435,000. Estimates of the additional non-core, self-identifying population range from 400,000 to 600,000 people, while the non-core non-self-identifying population having some Native genetic heritage is put at between one million and two and one-half million people. Although the core population is of highest priority for government program and policy initiatives, the imprecision or range of variation of the estimates for even that core population is still too great to allow for proper planning and costing of government interventions.

The federal government estimates the following provincial breakdown (in thousands) of the 1976 MNSI core population.

Nfld.	1.0-1.4	Quebec	20-28	Alberta	45-63
N.S.	2.5-3.5	Ontario	50-70	B.C.	45-63
P.E.I.	0.6-0.8	Manitoba	62-87	N.W.T.	10-13
N.B.	2.5-3.5	Sask.	64-90	Yukon	2.5-3.5
				Total	305-426

Urban = 100-122; Developed Rural = 93-142; Mid-North = 112-163

From the above table, the geographic distribution of the MNSI population appears to be approximately as follows: Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, each about 1 percent; Prince Edward Island, less than 0.5

percent; Quebec, 7 percent; Ontario, 17 percent; Manitoba, 20 percent; Saskatchewan, 21 percent; Alberta, 15 percent; British Columbia, 15 percent; the Northwest Territories, 3 percent; and the Yukon, 1 percent.

It should be noted that, demographically speaking, the MNSI population is particularly significant in Saskatchewan, where it has a very visible urban presence. For instance, the MNSI population of Regina is probably more than 15,000 persons. Projections by Saskatchewan government consultant Ken Svenson call for the total aboriginal population of Regina to reach 20 percent of that city's population by 1986 and almost 37 percent by the turn of the century.

This report examines the relationship between these aboriginal peoples of southern Canada and the governments of Canada. It addresses three principal concerns about aboriginal self-government — the impact on the internal vitality of aboriginal communities; the impact on the “marginalized” aboriginal population; and the impact on the political relationship between aboriginal peoples and the governments of Canada. The third question encompasses both the manner in which self-government will affect Canadian citizenship for aboriginal peoples and the manner in which aboriginals will be incorporated into the larger Canadian society and policy.

The existing relationship between these aboriginal peoples and the governments of Canada has been very contentious and, in any final analysis, unsuccessful. One has only to turn to the very limited integration of aboriginal Canadians into the nation's political, economic and cultural mainstreams and to the socioeconomic distress encountered by many, if not the great majority, of aboriginal communities, for more than ample evidence. In short, the potential of Canadian citizenship has not been realized.

As a consequence, there has been a growing demand from both aboriginals and non-aboriginals for a fundamental restructuring of the relationship between the governments of Canada and aboriginal peoples. The relationship was studied extensively in the Hawthorn report (Hawthorn et al., 1967), and radical reform was proposed in the 1969 white paper,¹ although little trace of either can be found in contemporary proposals. The demand for change intensified during the last decade, when the Canadian federal system was in a state of constitutional flux. Against the backdrop of broader political turmoil over the constitutional fabric of the Canadian state, aboriginal Canadians were provided a stage upon which to pursue their own constitutional objectives. The broader constitutional process was temporarily brought to a halt by a proclamation of the Constitution Act in April, 1982; however, the constitutional position of aboriginal peoples was left open by Section 37 of the Act, which initiated a series of First Ministers' Conferences dealing with aboriginal affairs.

In the interval between the proclamation of the Constitution Act and the writing of this report, the focus of aboriginal constitutional deliberations has sharpened considerably. One issue — aboriginal self-government — has come to dominate the agenda for both Indians and Métis. Here a critically important role has been played by the House of Commons Special Committee on Indian Self Government (the Penner Committee), whose report in November 1983 called for the establishment of "Indian First Nation Governments" as a distinct third order of government within the Canadian federal state. The Penner Report (1983) and its generally enthusiastic reception by Indian political organizations have reinforced self-government as *the* issue upon which the resolution of other issues depends. It has thus become the focal point of this report, the window through which we examine the broader relationship between aboriginal peoples and the Canadian state.

Regrettably, the literature on aboriginal self-government in the Canadian context is sparse. It is rich in eloquent rhetoric and philosophy² but largely lacking in rigorous analysis and specific, concrete proposals. The Penner Report only partially rectifies this deficiency, for it is most concerned with identifying directions in which reform efforts should move. After examining the internal impact of self-government on aboriginal communities, we shall subject the Penner model of self-government to critical scrutiny which reveals some important weaknesses in, and unforeseen consequences that would flow from, its favoured approach. By so doing we do not mean to suggest that aboriginal self-government should be abandoned as a goal, but rather to identify the points at which the need arises for creative policy thinking, so that aboriginal self-government can be attainable in some form permitting the maximum possible degree of self-determination. We will rarely have policy solutions to offer, though, for that is not our mandate. Instead, we hope that our identification of trouble spots can contribute to the setting of the agenda for the next round of policy research and negotiation. It is also our hope that the policy levers and conceptual tools which we identify will prove to be a constructive contribution to practitioners trying to craft new relationships between Canadian governments and aboriginal peoples.

The focus on aboriginal self-government allows us to overcome, at least partially, the fragmentation within the aboriginal population that bedevils analysis in this field. Somewhat paradoxically, we overcome the problem of fragmentation by cutting the aboriginal population in yet another way. Our analysis focusses on two groups: those individuals — be they status Indians, Métis or others — who live in communities in which the majority of the population is of aboriginal descent and there is some realistic potential of territorially-based, self-governing aboriginal institutions; and those living outside such communities, for whom the scope and potential for self-governing aboriginal institutions is extremely limited. Individuals in the latter group may be twice mar-

ginalized — separated from Canadian society by their aboriginal status and distanced even from communities in which aboriginal Canadians form the majority of the population. This marginalized group not only encompasses most of the non-status Indian population, but also extends to Métis living in urban areas and to the approximately one in four status Indians who live outside Indian reserves and Crown land settlements. Thus, in focussing on self-government, politicians have in large part excluded from the political agenda the majority of the aboriginal population, for the marginalized sector of the aboriginal population is not only unlikely to be greatly assisted by the implementation of self-government, but may even be adversely affected by self-government. Special problems of political integration are posed by the marginalized sector and the reader should bear in mind that when our analysis focusses on aboriginal communities it has little applicability to the aboriginal “diaspora.”

Our analysis of self-government first examines its internal impact on aboriginal communities. The question here is the extent to which self-government may help aboriginals to attain their aspirations and overcome community-level social problems. We then assess the impact of self-government on the political relationship between aboriginal communities and the governments of Canada. The question here is the extent to which self-government might enrich, alter or erode Canadian citizenship, if Canadian citizenship is to be maintained at all by persons living under the jurisdiction of aboriginal governments.

If even an approximation of the type of aboriginal self-government envisaged by the Penner Committee is ever to become a reality in Canada, the flexibility of both the larger Canadian society and the aboriginal peoples will be put to the test. New policy levers would have to be found and old levers would have to be put to imaginative use. In the past, when the political will has been present, our political leaders have found such solutions. Examples include the use of the French civil code in Quebec while British common law forms the basis of common law elsewhere in Canada, and the 1981 Canada-Alberta energy agreement, with its provision to reduce to zero percent but not officially eliminate the contentious natural gas export tax.

Generating the political will to pursue dramatic departures from conventional practice is not easy, but it can be facilitated somewhat by making political leaders aware of the adaptability demonstrated by the comparable systems of government. In the section on institutional reform, our report notes that various cherished traditions, like the principle of equal protection under the constitution, have been sacrificed on the altar of pragmatism as parliamentary democracies such as Australia and other constitutional democracies such as the United States have come to grips with the exigencies of decolonization. In the process, policy makers have found workable solutions to thorny problems.

Before proceeding, a number of caveats should be offered. First, it is

not our intention to act as advocates for aboriginal self-government. We leave that task to the more-than-capable hands of aboriginal organizations. Our intention is to examine the impact of self-government, *should it be achieved*. Second, our analysis will be restricted to the Indian, Métis and non-status population living in the ten provinces; the aboriginal situation in the northern territories (including the Inuit of northern Quebec) will not be incorporated in our analysis. Third, in keeping with the Royal Commission's mandate, our analysis is forward-looking; it dwells less on the problems of the past than on the potential of the future, should aboriginal self-government be implemented. At the same time, the status quo cannot be ignored; it is against that status quo that we must weigh the costs and benefits of alternative strategies. Finally, it is essential to keep in mind the great diversity that exists within the aboriginal population and among aboriginal communities. Therefore great caution must be used in applying to specific aboriginal groups and communities the general findings to which this report is necessarily restricted.

It is useful to note former Prime Minister Trudeau's opening remarks to the March 1984 First Ministers' Conference on Aboriginal Constitutional Matters:

Aboriginal communities have rightful aspirations to have more say in the management of their affairs, to exercise more responsibility for decisions affecting them. These functions are normal, and essential to the sense of self-worth that distinguishes individuals in a free society. . . . And so we are not here to consider whether there should be institutions of self-government, but how these institutions should be brought into being; what should be their jurisdictions, their powers; how they should fit into the interlocking system of jurisdictions by which Canada is governed.

We concur with this sentiment, although as the analysis unfolds, it will be seen that the questions posed by the Prime Minister defy easy answers. Nevertheless, both Canadian federalism and aboriginal affairs have been transformed enormously over the last quarter century and, if not obstructed, will continue to be transformed over the next quarter century. From these changes will emerge new problems and new opportunities, the responses to which, as aboriginal leaders are quick to point out, will speak volumes about the nature of social justice in Canadian society.

The Concept of Aboriginal Self-Government

The concept of aboriginal self-government has been revived relatively recently. While many of its principles are clear, the manner in which they will be made operational is not. This lack of operational detail stems in part from strategic choices made by aboriginal national political organi-

zations and in part from the fact that the diversity of the aboriginal population requires that the form of aboriginal self-government be adaptable to local conditions.

The closest we have to blueprints for aboriginal self-government are two documents. The first, entitled *Native People and the Constitution of Canada*, is the report of the Métis and Non-Status Indian Constitutional Review Commission (1983). The second is the 1983 Report of the Special Committee on Indian Self-Government (the Penner Report), which has been widely but by no means universally adopted as a working model by Canadian Indians. To the frustration of provincial premiers and others, neither document provided much detail in a number of critical areas. The conceptual discussion that follows, therefore, should be taken as little more than that — a conceptual discussion. Significantly, though, the principles discussed may well form the foundations of aboriginal self-governments.

Self-government is seen by aboriginal leaders as an aboriginal right based on the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the treaties, and Section 25 of the Constitution Act.³ It is also viewed as a collective right embedded in the right to self-determination as recognized by international law. The tone of the argument for self-government is captured in the following quotation (Thalassa Research Associates, 1983, pp. 2–3):

Indian self-government is based on the inherent right of peoples or nations to self-determination. It can be recognized, confirmed, accommodated — even nurtured — by non-Indian governments. It is not, however, derived from or granted by non-Indian governments. The authority of Indian governments is derived from the consent of the Indian people they represent.

The right of self-government, it is argued, has never been surrendered. Therefore Section 35.1 of the new Constitution — “the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed” — is taken to include the right to self-government.

Self-government incorporates a number of components, including of course *political institutions* that would be accountable to the aboriginal electorate. While the precise nature of these institutions is still unclear, it is generally asserted that they would be democratic and representative in character, albeit with a blend of aboriginal tradition that would set them at least somewhat apart from other Canadian political institutions performing similar tasks.

Second, they would have a *territorial base*. For status Indians that base would be provided by the existing reserves, supplemented by new reserves where needed and by additional land in those cases where the present reserves are too small or too poor in resources. For the Métis, a new territorial base will have to be created, possibly through the surrender of provincial Crown land.⁴ The Métis National Council argues that the governments of Canada must provide this land base in keeping

their commitments under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Council dismisses past land grants to individuals as not making it possible "to identify the lands as aboriginal lands over which the Métis collective has jurisdiction and over which it can develop and exercise self-governing institutions."⁵ It should also be noted that within aboriginal cultures land is assigned not only an economic value but also a profoundly spiritual value, for it mediates the aboriginal's relationship with his or her creator. Aboriginals' attachment to the land is part of a spiritual relationship with the universe, its elements, and its creatures.

Control over group membership, or boundary maintenance, is a logical extension of self-determination and is therefore a fundamental precept of aboriginal self-government. Indeed, the 1984 secession from the Assembly of First Nations by Prairie Indian political organizations to form the Prairie Regional Council suggests that control over group membership is as important to them as control over natural resources under the Natural Resources Transfer Act of 1931 is to Alberta. However, the question of who is or is not entitled to membership may be very contentious. The Métis face a particularly difficult task in establishing such group boundaries (see Box 5-1).

All proposals for self-government assume some continuing *fiscal support* from the Government of Canada and, in the case of Métis proposals, from the provincial governments. It is recognized that self-government without adequate fiscal resources would be a trap rather than an opportunity. The Assembly of First Nations (1984, p. 14) argues that such fiscal transfers would be in exchange for the First Nations' initial contribution of land and resources to Canada. By an extension of this argument, First Nation governments would *not* be accountable to Parliament for the expenditure of federal funds. They would be accountable only to their own electorate, although a report on funds spent would be submitted to Parliament and the Auditor General.

A definitive proposal for the pivotal issue of *the division of powers* between the federal, provincial, and aboriginal governments has yet to be advanced. The Penner Report (1983, p. 63) somewhat ambiguously states that "self-government would mean that virtually the entire range of law-making, policy, program delivery, law enforcement and adjudication powers would be available to an Indian First Nation government within its territory." The Assembly of First Nations (1984, p. 6) states that under Indian government "the laws governing land, social services, cultural development, education, taxes, economic development — *all aspects of life* — would be directed by the needs of the people enacting them."⁶ In its presentation to the 1983 First Ministers' Conference, the Métis National Council called for seemingly equally broad powers for Métis self-governments.⁷ All of these proposals could place the residents of aboriginal communities virtually beyond the reach of the federal and provincial governments.

Indeed, it is not clear if any federal or provincial role is contemplated for those living within aboriginal communities. While there may be powers that are not covered by the statements above, their character is not readily apparent. For instance, the National Indian Brotherhood has listed 24 jurisdictional areas that would fall under the domain of Indian governments: (1) band constitutions; (2) citizenship; (3) land; (4) water; (5) air; (6) forestry; (7) minerals; (8) oil and gas; (9) migratory birds; (10) wildlife; (11) fisheries; (12) conservation; (13) environment; (14) economic development; (15) education; (16) social development; (17) health and welfare; (18) marriage; (19) cultural development; (20) communications; (21) revenues; (22) justice; (23) Indian law enforcement; and (24) local and private matters. These areas include those at present under the control of both the federal and provincial governments and also, in the case of migratory birds, under international convention.

The Criminal Code itself might not apply within aboriginal communities. Here it is useful to quote Sol Sanderson, president of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations:

We cannot have Indian self-government without being able to enforce it and that requires a judicial system. It requires laws that are controlled by Indians, not borrowed from a non-Indian system . . .⁸

It is not entirely clear whether this statement is meant to remove Indian communities from the Criminal Code; it may be directed to the administration of justice rather than to the Code itself. Yet if Indian laws are “not borrowed from a non-Indian system,” non-Indian judicial agencies — including the Supreme Court of Canada — presumably would be unable to act as courts of appeal. Thus the residents of aboriginal communities could occupy a very different judicial world than other Canadian citizens.

One additional feature of aboriginal governments that should be mentioned is what we might call their *external reach*. The proponents of self-government envisage an important international dimension. Chief Sol Sanderson, for example, writes about the need to “re-establish our international personality in the courts and political assemblies of the world,” and “to influence the development of international conventions and international law so that they more adequately protect the rights of Indian Nations. . . .”⁹ The willingness of aboriginal organizations to use the international arena in the past, and the expectation that in the future aboriginal governments will have some international presence, demonstrate the gulf that separates the existing municipal governments in Canada from the aboriginal governments that have been proposed.¹⁰

At this point it is useful to stress again that there is not a single model of aboriginal self-government. It is more appropriate to think of a continuum of models, ranging from that sketched in above to ones in which aboriginal communities would exercise little direct control over their governance. In the middle would be found experiments such as the

Indian tribal council concept in Manitoba, where Indian bands and tribal councils administer over 70 percent of the regional budget of the Department of Indian and Northern Development (DIAND) without exercising any claim to political sovereignty per se.¹¹ Indeed, flexibility will be essential if quite different community aspirations are to be met and varying community circumstances accommodated. As Chief Sol Sanderson (1981, p. 22) explains:

The choice is not pre-determined and is wide-open, from a modest regime of local autonomy, through forms of federal association, to a full-fledged, separate international personality, ie. statehood and independence.

It must be recognized, however, that there is a sharp break in this continuum. To one side lie proposals originating with the federal government — proposals in which aboriginal governments would exercise *delegated authority* in that they would have a legislative rather than a constitutional base. On the other side lie proposals in which aboriginal governments would be constitutionally rather than legislatively based, with a guaranteed jurisdiction similar in principle, although not necessarily in scope, to that of provincial governments. Such aboriginal governments would be subordinate to neither provincial governments nor the government of Canada. These proposals assert aboriginal sovereignty as the basis for self-government. They would entail a fundamental restructuring of the political relationship between aboriginal communities and the governments of Canada.

Because of this break, incremental movement along the length of the continuum may be possible only to a certain point. Beyond that point there is a choice to be made, as a recent DIAND document (Policy Development Group, 1983) explains:

There are, basically, two futures or alternatives for the development of Indian Government in Canada: (i) the modification of a colonial framework for the governance of Indian people, i.e. continued integration of band governments and tribal councils in a statutory system of local government, with a considerable overburden of past policies (the devolution scenario); or (ii) the development of Indian government as a distinct and unique order of government in the Canadian polity, with some form of "home rule", i.e. limited sovereignty constitutionally entrenched, and with the democratic institutions and resources to conduct responsible self-government in Indian jurisdiction (the self-government scenario).

While it might be possible to recast the choice in different ways, the choice itself cannot be avoided.

To some readers, the models falling to the self-determination side of the break will seem extreme. Note, for example, the presentation of Billy Two Rivers, Chief of the Kahnawake Band Council, to the March 1984 First Ministers' Conference (pp. 256–57):

The Maudenosuwanne Six Nations Confederacy have no desire to separate from Canada since the Confederacy have never been part of Canada . . . the new Constitution that has been granted to the Parliament of Canada by Great Britain will have no jurisdictional authority within our territories or over our people. Our people are citizens of our nation and do not seek citizenship within the nation of Canada.

As one might expect, aboriginal politicians' contributions to the political debate will often be couched in such eloquent rhetoric which, although it may serve well to dramatize the issue and mobilize support, should not necessarily be construed as a bottom-line position. We shall suggest, in the section on aboriginal self-government and Canadian citizenship, that the extremist models of self-determination will only rarely be closely approximated in practice.

In concluding this section, we note that the rejection of Canadian citizenship is *not* a consensual position. It remains to be seen, however, if and how self-determination can be reconciled with notions of Canadian citizenship, for some forms of aboriginal self-government may well be incompatible with Canadian citizenship.

The Sociological Impact of Self-Government on Aboriginal Communities

We take as our point of departure the assumption that although aboriginal self-government in the post-colonial period in Canada will be unique in important respects, there will nevertheless be certain continuities between the Canadian experience and the experience of colonized peoples in such places as Asia, Africa, the South Pacific and the Caribbean.¹² We further assume that some of the discontinuities that do exist will prove instructive in assessing the development prospects for Canadian aboriginals.

Our fundamental concern is with the question: What effect will aboriginal self-government have on the attainment of aboriginal aspirations, especially at the community level? Our analysis of aboriginal documents and our observation of aboriginal affairs over the past ten years have led us to conclude that the gist of aboriginal aspirations is captured by the four points in Box 5-2.

A corollary to our main research question is: What dangers, problems, pitfalls, and limitations are likely to accompany aboriginal self-government? Conversely, we also need to know what comparative advantages Canadian aboriginal self-governments would possess, for non-aboriginal politicians and others may hold unfounded concerns and fears about aboriginal self-government due to their failure to recognize pronounced dissimilarities between the situations of indigenous peoples in Canada and indigenous peoples elsewhere.

Box 5-2 Summary of Aboriginal Aspirations for Aboriginal Self-Government

1. Greater self-determination and social justice. Protection of and control over own destiny, rather than subordination to political and bureaucratic authorities based outside the ethnic group.
 2. Economic development to end dependency, poverty, and unemployment. Economic justice in the sense of a fair distribution of wealth between the aboriginal and nonaboriginal populations.
 3. Protection and retention of aboriginal culture.
 4. Social vitality and development that will overcome such existing social problems as ill health, the housing crisis, irrelevant and demeaning education, and alienation (including its manifest symptoms such as interpersonal violence, suicide, and the abuse of drugs and other substances).
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The Concept of Social Vitality

Our use of the term "social vitality" is adapted from Matthews' work (1983) on the resettlement of outport communities in Newfoundland. Matthews demonstrated a point which is potentially of major importance to the concerns of this report — that a community's lack of economic viability need not entail its demise as a sociologically viable collectivity. The work of Blishen and his colleagues (1979) among eight British Columbia Indian communities examines in more detail the concepts of social vitality, economic viability and political efficacy. Their data suggest that a threshold level of social vitality may be a prerequisite for, or a cause of, both political efficacy and economic viability. Of the three variables, they tentatively attach causal primacy to social vitality. However, some of the causal relations between these three concepts may be reciprocal. For instance, contrary to Matthews, Blishen et al. found that within the communities they studied, social vitality could not be retained over the long term in the absence of political efficacy and economic viability. Leaving aside this debate, important as it may be, for our present purposes the significance of the concept of social vitality is that, broadly speaking, it sensitizes us to many of the ways in which aboriginal self-government might have an impact upon aboriginal communities.

Matthews identified three dimensions of the social vitality of a community. Each dimension refers to the presence of organizations that carry out certain types of activity for the community. The activities are: (a) passing on the values, norms, and skills necessary to live in the community, e.g., schools, churches, and the family; (b) communicating within the community, e.g., mass media and consultative bodies; and (c) providing opportunities for pleasurable social interactions that build social solidarity, e.g., sports teams and service or entertainment organizations.

We extend the concept of social vitality to include several other

dimensions, and in so doing explicitly equate the concept with sociological "healthiness." First, we include the presence of meaning-conferring activities, such as those that encourage a sense of identity and collective pride, or those that develop integrative symbols which span cleavages within the community.¹³ Second, we add the dimension of boundary-maintaining mechanisms and activities. This refers to the preservation of culture, the reproduction of the membership of the community, and the formal or informal regulation of in-migration and out-migration, such that the community is neither swamped/absorbed by outsiders nor depleted by demographic haemorrhaging from within. Third, we use the term social vitality to encompass the presence of legitimacy conferred upon the political regime, its incumbents, and their policies. Such feelings of legitimacy will usually be accompanied by feelings of loyalty.

The presence of effective mechanisms for the resolution or regulation of conflict is another feature of community social vitality. Conflict is normal in the life of any collectivity, but if it is so intense or unbounded as to immobilize the community, then the community can hardly be said to be sociologically healthy. Finally, our concept of social vitality includes the presence of leadership and organizational expertise, which enable collective goals to be pursued effectively by the community as a whole or by its component groups.¹⁴

International Comparisons

Viewed in its entirety, and in its domestic context, the situation that Canadian political leaders face in the realm of aboriginal affairs is unique. No prefabricated policy solutions can be lifted holus-bolus from other countries. However, general comparison of Canada's situation with that of other countries can yield insights into the sociological feasibility of aboriginal self-government in Canada.

A major factor distinguishing the Canadian case from many African cases of decolonization, for example, is that in Canada white settlers have become demographically dominant whereas the reverse is true in most African countries. Various other differences flow, directly or indirectly, from this fact and from the difference in the absolute size of the indigenous population in Canada compared with most African countries. Many of these differences constitute definite advantages for the Canadian case. One example is the lack of an aboriginal military force, which suggests that intertribal strife within Canadian aboriginal governments will not escalate into bloody political instability. Another example is the greater manageability of Canadian aboriginal governments, due to their smaller size.

Aboriginal aspirations for self-government are summarized in Box 5-3. Compared to many other cases where the attainment of indigenous

BOX 5-3 Size as a Factor in Aboriginal Self-Government

We can predict with assurance that aboriginal governments will experience an expansion of scale compared to the pre-self-government era, and that "supra"-level aboriginal governments, which encompass two or more local aboriginal governments, will emerge. However, not only are there limits to the growth of aboriginal governments, but it is also likely that such supra-level governments will have a rather delimited role (e.g., mainly intergovernmental relations rather than delivery of services). Thus, in comparison to the government of even a municipality like the city of Winnipeg, aboriginal governments and the population they serve will be small. That relative smallness is a two-edged sword.

Smallness is clearly a disadvantage, for in many respects it represents a delimited capacity. Included under this rubric would be the shallowness and narrowness of the pool of human talent, the meagre opportunity structure to offer to career-oriented members of the community (and the concomitant probability of losing some of that scarce talent to other organizations offering greater scope of power, challenge and fulfillment), and weak political bargaining power vis-à-vis external actors. In addition to delimited capacity there are the disadvantages of the unavailability of economies of scale, the paucity of conflict-neutralizing cross-cutting cleavages, and the presence of what might be called "the tyranny of small groups" (see Box 5-4). Finally, in the case of extreme smallness we might well find a preoccupation with what in Quebec was called "la survivance" (the struggle to survive as a distinct group). As an ethos this can produce a rigid conservatism that, at the level of personal lifestyle and choices, is far from liberating in its effects.

Yet smallness also offers many advantages, some of which can be subsumed under the title of enhanced manageability. This derives from such features as the homogeneity of language and culture, the ability to use streamlined organizational structures, ease of coordination and integration, and a relatively compact territorial jurisdiction. In addition to enhanced manageability, small governments offer the additional advantage of low levels of the centralization that might otherwise stifle local initiative. Yet another advantage is the obverse of the "tyranny of small groups" argument. That is to say, small groups are characterized by an ease and prevalence of informal social control, which reduces the financial cost of the administration of justice. A related advantage is the high level of visibility of human behaviour in small communities; this will probably reduce the incidence or severity of bureaucratic conflict and enhance accountability to the local population. Another advantage is the obverse of the "survivance conservatism" argument. That is to say, the perception of a continuous external threat not only encourages the definition and solidification of a positive collective identity, but in so doing also facilitates the mobilization of the local community for collective endeavours.

In conclusion, we must bear in mind that in some respects aboriginal governments will have "the best of both worlds." They will be able to enjoy the benefits of smallness for some purposes and will be able to join together in supra-level organizations or governments for other delimited purposes. Our assessment of the net effect of smallness is thus a positive one. Smallness does not preclude robustness and in some ways enhances it sociologically.

self-determination is relatively recent, Canadian aboriginal governments will possess numerous other advantages unrelated to the factors noted above. Particularly important is the comparatively high level of literacy among Canadian aboriginals and the already increasing average level of educational attainment.¹⁵ Another demographic factor, the dependency ratio (persons aged 0–14 and 65 + as a proportion of the population in the 15–64 age bracket) will also favour Canadian aboriginals¹⁶, in that to the extent that Canadian aboriginals of labour-force age find employment in the 1980s and beyond their income gains will not be nullified by being largely absorbed by the dependent sector of the aboriginal population.

Another quite different advantage of aboriginal governments in Canada is that rather than having primary loyalties to a particular clan or community, many of those who will staff Canadian aboriginal governments have already acquired universalistic norms of service through working for the federal government or some pan-aboriginal organization such as a tribal council or a provincial aboriginal political association.¹⁷ Among many other helpful factors are the lack of deep ideological fissures within the indigenous population (such as Geertz (1971) found in Indonesia), and the lack of major institutional interest groups (e.g., church, army, or dominant corporation), which have monopolized most political positions and impeded the growth of independent modern political forces (in Central America, for example) as noted by Eisenstadt (1963, p. 166). There is also, of course, the advantage as relative latecomers to the self-governing and nation-building phenomenon, of being able to learn from the mistakes of those who have gone before.


Immediate Contextual Changes After the Advent of Aboriginal Self-Government

To assess the impact of aboriginal self-governments on the aspirations of grassroots-level aboriginal citizens in their communities, we shall use a simple model. That model treats the advent of aboriginal self-government as producing certain fairly immediate and fundamental contextual changes in institutional structures and social relations. Those changes in turn present problems and opportunities for action that require aboriginal political and bureaucratic leaders to make certain choices. The nature of those choices will determine the longer-range impacts that aboriginal self-government will have on the aspirations of aboriginal citizens. Schematically this can be portrayed as in Figure 5-1.

In this section we shall take as given the attainment of a form of aboriginal self-government along the lines described in the previous section. Our task here is to identify the changed social environment that this produces or calls for. These changes will be in institutional structures (particularly the form, goals, and norms of the civil service of the new governing order) and social relations.

The degree of change experienced with the formal severing of the

FIGURE 5-1 A Model of the Impact of Aboriginal Self-Government



colonial ties depends in significant part upon the amount of prior preparation that the colonial regime gave (intentionally or not) to the aboriginal community in question. In Canada to date the preparation for Indian self-government, while lacking in some important respects, has been much more extensive than that received by Métis and non-status Indians, most of whom are not formally organized into communities with a territorial base.

Perhaps the most fundamental change is in the level of expectations held by community members. Aboriginal politicians could not have convinced aboriginal people that self-government merited the displacement of other important items from the political agenda had they not been able to instill in the voters' minds the hope and expectation of significant tangible improvements in their life situation under aboriginal self-government. In some communities these expectations may be near millennial, especially on the part of those in the lower socioeconomic strata. Members of particular local communities will also have their appetites whetted by the "demonstration effect" of successes in other Canadian aboriginal self-governments. In an effort to fulfill the aspirations of the electorate, and perhaps even as part of a rivalry with neighbouring aboriginal self-governments, aboriginal politicians and bureaucrats will bring about a significant expansion in the size and role of the aboriginal state.¹⁸ This will both contribute to, and itself be part of, a major thrust towards nation-building. The aboriginal state will thus become a major instrument of social change, and aboriginal bureaucrats in that state apparatus will quickly become a powerful pressure group. Indeed, for years the aboriginal civil service might well be the only organized pressure group. Thus, the distinction between their bureaucratic and political roles will probably become blurred.

Structurally, the aboriginal civil service will also change. In particular, it will to a certain extent become more structurally differentiated. New specialized branches and units will be created to perform the wider array of tasks and to deal with the wider range of problems that become its responsibility. For instance, whereas in the earlier era extracting resources (e.g., preparing program proposals that would draw fiscal transfers from the federal or provincial government; harvesting natural resources) and distributing them was perhaps the primary responsibility of aboriginal politicians and any aboriginal bureaucracy. With the advent of aboriginal self-government, much more attention must be devoted to

the regulation of economic and social behaviour, to responding to demands from the grassroots, and to the creation and effective manipulation of symbols (Almond, 1966, pp. 96–118). New staff positions or organizational units will emerge to fulfill these functions. In the same vein, whereas previously locally-initiated policy proposals to other governments, if funded at all, came back with rules and conditions attached; with the advent of aboriginal self-government the conversion of policy proposals into authoritative rules will now be the responsibility of the aboriginal government's bureaucrats and elected politicians.

The African experience suggests that the ideology of aboriginal self-governments will probably stress two main themes. In Africa the first was "Negritude," which in the southern Canadian aboriginal context translates into an emphasis upon preserving the essence of "Indian-ness," "Cree-ness," "Mohawk-ness," etc.) or of "Métis-ness." The second ideological theme will be that of planning for social and economic progress. The emphasis on planning requires the bureaucrats to concentrate more on rationality as a value in their daily work lives, whereas in earlier times traditional practices and institutions were sometimes legitimated on grounds quite apart from rationality.

A related change in societal context involves the emergence of pronounced and pervasive strains between modernism and traditionalism. A primary thrust of the new aboriginal self-government will be one of "catching up" to contemporary (aboriginal or nonaboriginal) standards of health, education, material goods consumption, political development, and freedom of choice, and otherwise partaking of what Geertz (1971, p. 363) calls "The Spirit of the Age." Yet the primary rationale for aboriginal self-governments is rooted in the differentness of "the indigenous way of life." Admittedly, aboriginal leaders assert that aboriginals can be aboriginal and modern too, for aboriginal culture has adapted in the past and will continue to adapt in the future. Furthermore, nationalist movements and ideologists sometimes become the "carriers" of modernity, while justifying their activities in the name of "traditional" cultural symbols. Nevertheless, we cannot dismiss lightly Geertz' (1971, p. 363) finding that "There is no new state in which these two themes [traditionalism and modernism] are not present." The tension between them, he found, "pervades every aspect of national life, including the transformations of the social structures of the new state."¹⁹ Paradoxically, though, Geertz also found (p. 362) that in some cases:

the very success of independence movements in rousing the enthusiasm of the masses and directing it against foreign domination tended to obscure the frailty and narrowness of the cultural foundations upon which those movements rested. . . .

The aboriginal state will find itself enmeshed in a network of relations with other governments and this network will probably be much broader

than that which existed before the advent of aboriginal self-government. (This is discussed further in the section on aboriginal self-government and Canadian citizenship.) Such broadening of networks of intergovernmental relations is but one example of the expansion of scale that characterizes post-colonial social structures.²⁰ Such expansion of scale in other spheres can also be expected for Canadian aboriginal self-governments, notwithstanding the fact that they will be drastically smaller than governments of most post-colonial regimes abroad. For instance, we can expect an expansion in the complexity of problems such that some of them will be wholly or largely beyond the control or influence of the aboriginal government. We can also anticipate an increase in the degree and complexity of social organization (e.g., an increased number of levels of hierarchy of skill, income, and prestige). Related to this will be an increase in inclusiveness, if the aboriginal government encompasses more than one band or community. Of particular note is the fact that the total amount of mobilizable power within the community will be augmented substantially. Not to be overlooked either is the expansion that will occur along the spatial dimension if the land base is expanded as part of the terms of creation of the government or if the aboriginal government encompasses more than one band or community.

Social class relations will begin to change with the advent of aboriginal self-government. As opportunity structures are opened, those who are already advantaged will be disproportionately able to partake. Thus, there will probably be an expansion of the middle class (for instance, to include the extended family and friends of the old middle class) and perhaps even a change in the social composition of the elite.

One change of particular relevance to registered Indians should be noted. Under the administration of DIAND, several factors played a role in integrating Indian communities. Among these were dependency, a subtle form of coercion, hostility toward government, and shared problems. DIAND served as a convenient, and often deserving, target of hostility. However, with the advent of aboriginal self-government the bases of community integration will change. New targets of hostility and new tension-release mechanisms will be found, with the result that changes in the flavour of local politics will also emerge.

Anticipated Problems of Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada

The problems that will likely accompany aboriginal self-government in Canada are many; so are those surrounding the existence of Canada itself. A policy analyst who could have brought twentieth century social science insights to the Confederation debates of the 1860s might well have counselled the abortion of the embryonic concept. Thus it should not be inferred from our discussion of the multiplicity of problems

surrounding aboriginal self-government that we are advocating that aboriginal self-government be aborted. On the contrary, in aboriginal government we have the makings of another Canadian experiment, the results of which will be watched with interest by the leaders of the peoples of the "fourth world."²¹

We will not expound here on all the possible problems generated by the various changes. Instead we selectively draw what to us are the most important problems (mainly sociopolitical in nature) already noted in this paper, in our earlier publication (1984) in this area, and elsewhere in the academic literature. We organize them under four headings: (a) problems related to the social psychology of development; (b) problems pertaining to relations between the social classes; (c) political-bureaucratic problems; and (d) economic problems. Consideration of constitutional problems will be dealt with later in the paper.

Problems Rooted in the Social Psychology of Development

We have already identified escalation of expectations among grassroot aboriginals as one of the fundamental changes accompanying the advent of aboriginal self-government. Grassroots citizens will often not appreciate the fact that decolonizing social systems need to spend time digesting each new constitutional advance before proceeding to the next, so as to avoid massive socioeconomic and sociopolitical dislocations within the system.

Social change will follow the advent of aboriginal self-government. It will probably be a complex, uneven, and many-directioned movement of the disparate parts of the community social system, rather than a synchronic movement of the whole (Geertz, 1971, pp. 359–60). This, coupled with impatience and unrealistically high expectations, can lead to the illusion that the community is falling behind or that nothing much is happening, when in relative terms progress is actually being made.²² In yet other communities aboriginal self-governments will prove to be a failure, for any number of reasons — inadequate resources, mismanagement, or merely the fact that the nature of some problems inherently precludes aboriginal governments from having much effect on them. Historically, when aspirations that are felt to be justified by their holders go unfulfilled, the resultant frustrations have often proven to be a highly destabilizing political force. Such frustration can generate anger or, conversely, cynicism and apathy. All of these reactions can undermine the social vitality of the community, particularly insofar as the legitimacy of aboriginal self-government and the loyalty and commitment of its citizens are concerned. In our estimation, this and other problems of delegitimation are the most serious of all the sociopolitical problems surrounding aboriginal self-government.

Problems Related to Class Relations

Self-government is by no means synonymous with egalitarianism. Self-

government brings not only benefits, but also costs. Some of the costs of aboriginal self-government in Canada may be increased rigidity in the system of social stratification in aboriginal communities, the development of new forms of stratification, or an increase in tension in relations between the classes.

In his studies of developing areas and new states, comparative sociologist S.N. Eisenstadt (1963, p. 168) has found "an intensification of the inherent tendency of the political elite and bureaucracy to enhance their monopolization of power and prestige." This, he reports, is manifested in various ways, including efforts to subject most processes of upward mobility to the control of the political elites; efforts to subject a large number of economic, professional, and cultural activities to political control; and the imposition of non-economic criteria and daily regulation and direction on economic activities.

The result is a restriction in elite recruitment and circulation, and a concentration of power in the hands of the few. When this is combined with an ostentatious style of living by the elite, the legitimacy of the regime and its incumbents is again undermined.

Weiner (1966) has observed that in politically developing societies the scale and volume of conflict increases. In part, this is because the modernization phenomenon never benefits all sectors of a community evenly, and rarely even proportionately. In case after case in the social science literature, the existing middle class benefits the most (as can be seen close to home in the case of Quebec after the Quiet Revolution).²³ This is but one source of increased tensions, and even polarization, between social classes in the post-colonial era. Other related sources include the creation of new occupational roles that may be in conflict with old roles; a decline in the status of certain sectors of the community (particularly those whose status was based on ascriptive criteria rather than on achievement-oriented criteria); and differential rights and privileges of citizens living on the aboriginal land base vis-à-vis those living off that land base. This latter factor might induce aboriginal citizens to remain on, or return to, the aboriginal land base, which in turn could increase the population pressure on aboriginal lands and remove the safety valve of out-migration. That, of course, might well heighten community tensions even further.

Variation in wealth will exist not only within a given aboriginal community, but also across communities. If aboriginal governments exist at the supra-community level, there will be a need for these governments to act as vehicles for the redistribution of wealth. Attaining consensus on the mechanisms of redistribution will by no means be an easy task. The more broadly encompassing a particular aboriginal government is, the more complex that redistribution problem becomes.

Although social stratification often increases with the advent of self-government, some societies — such as Jamaica as described by Bell

(1965) — do exhibit greater circulation of elites and less exclusive access to elite positions. Among some of those that do not, the increased social stratification may actually have some constructive consequences, in that it can mean a net increase in power within the community and therefore a greater ability to organize effectively and command higher levels of mobilization in pursuit of community development projects (Bell, 1965, p. 162).

Political-Bureaucratic Problems

Much has been written about the problems and transgressions of bureaucrats and politicians in developing states. In that literature, a recurring problem for the bureaucracy and an absolutely critical issue is the shortage of skilled technical and professional personnel and the lack of sufficient knowledge about the changing indigenous community and the ways to effectively address its needs.²⁴ To some extent these problems can be surmounted by hiring outside expertise on limited-term contracts. Although the fact that aboriginals are in control renders this preferable to the colonial system, it is nevertheless an expensive and not always satisfactory solution.

Levy (1967) also notes that in times of rapid technological change another problem faced by financially constrained public bureaucracies in such new states is rapid obsolescence. This pertains not only to their physical plant (e.g., tools and machines) but also to their software and some of their skills.

The literature also points to problems concerning the procedures for promotion within the public service. In some communities traditional or nepotistic criteria (e.g., birth or loyalty) will vie with bureaucratic criteria such as formal education. Perhaps even more problematic in the Canadian context will be the resort to consensual (rather than authoritative) decision-making criteria, which permit many people (e.g., the traditionalists and the suspicious) to block collective action.

Problems are also likely to arise in relations between aboriginal senior bureaucrats and aboriginal politicians. Admittedly, in national and provincial aboriginal organizations indications are that bureaucrats hold their political "masters" in deference. Those politicians, however, are in some respects the cream of the crop. In many aboriginal self-governments the less educated and otherwise less capable political leaders might not receive such deference from their bureaucrats, who will often have a greater breadth of experience and education than their politicians. There is thus a high potential for conflicts between the senior bureaucrats and the politicians, which may lead bureaucrats actively or passively to oppose the implementation of the politicians' directives. Another possibility, of course, is the emergence over time of a new type of political leader, as bureaucrats themselves enter electoral politics as candidates.

Another potential source of divisiveness is to be found in the very efforts of politicians to win votes in those aboriginal self-governments that encompass more than one ethnic group. Political leaders' manipulation of ethnic loyalties, their efforts at cultural revival, and their attempts to instill pride in the ethnic history may reaffirm diverse traditions and past conflicts and thereby rekindle those past antagonisms (as, for example, in post-independence Ceylon).²⁵

An even more fundamental problem for politicians is identified by Eisenstadt (1963, p. 173) in the following terms:

The elite could thus arrive at an impasse in which the implementation of the various societal goals, and its own ultimate claims to legitimation, would become seriously impeded by the necessity to spend many of its resources as emoluments for its supporters.

In some respects Eisenstadt presaged the notion of "the fiscal crisis of the state" of which O'Connor (1973, p. 6) and others have written more recently. The main point, though, is that the use of expenditure instruments to buttress the legitimacy of the governing regime is a perilous and self-defeating course of action when revenues are finite.

Economic Problems

Consideration of the fiscal crisis of the state raises the broader subject of the economic problems of aboriginal self-governments. A detailed consideration of these or of the economic development potential of aboriginal self-governments goes beyond our mandate and our expertise. However, several observations of a general nature seem to be in order.

First, present indications are that most aboriginal territory is not rich in natural resources (see Appendix A). In most aboriginal communities the economic opportunity structure is severely truncated, and not just in the natural resources sector. Thus, most aboriginal governments, including perhaps some of the Alberta Indian bands that are currently experiencing an economic boom based on non-renewable natural resources, will be heavily dependent upon transfer payments from other governments, at least over the intermediate term.

Second, as noted in Box 5-3, the small size of the aboriginal population creates problems of diseconomies of small scale (e.g., high per capita costs) in the delivery of services. This is especially problematic in territory with a widely dispersed population. Furthermore, the inventory of skills in small aboriginal communities is generally small, which can be problematic in several respects. One important concern is whether, if there are enough skilled aboriginal people to staff or manage the public sector, there will be too few left to staff or manage a vigorous and productive aboriginal private sector.

Third, aboriginal communities face many other problems of economic development that in some cases call into question their very economic

viability. Among the more common of these are: a paucity of basic public facilities (e.g., sewers, high voltage electric power); a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis outside investors; and geographical remoteness from suppliers, markets, and cognate industries.

To identify these problems is not to pronounce a blanket condemnation of the economic prospects of aboriginal governments. Numerous aboriginal economic development projects, such as those of the James Bay Cree of Quebec, the Mohawks of the Six Nations, and the Bloods of Alberta, have been unqualified successes. It must be acknowledged however, that the economic challenges facing most aboriginal governments will be formidable and multifaceted, as was recognized by aboriginal leaders who presented briefs to this Royal Commission.

There is a striking degree of overlap between the fundamental problems of aboriginal self-governments and those of other governments — namely, curtailing unrealistic expectations, maintaining citizen commitment, providing for the redistribution of wealth and recruitment of new blood into the elites, controlling bureaucratic power, recruiting skilled labour to the public service, managing labour relations in the public service, containing ethnic antagonisms, maintaining the legitimacy of the regime and its incumbents, and fostering economic development. While the sources and nuances, and sometimes the severity, of these problems differ from those of non-aboriginal governments, the issues are highly similar. In that respect, our analysis suggests that although the problems of aboriginal governments will be considerable, they are not beyond the pale. However, we must also note that the capacities of aboriginal governments will usually be much less than those of other Canadian governments (e.g., the capacity for borrowing on international money markets). Thus, the mere fact that aboriginal governments and other governments share many problems will not necessarily make those problems any easier for aboriginal governments to handle.

The Impact on Community Social Vitality

The impact of self-government elsewhere around the world has been very mixed. Self-government alone does not necessarily lead to democracy as we in Canada define the term. Although the most serious afflictions of other post-colonial regimes — such as militarized factionalism — are highly improbable in the Canadian aboriginal self-government situation, in some countries the paternalism, dependency, and underdevelopment of colonialism have been replaced by even worse regimes under self-government. Yet the status quo in Canada can no longer be tolerated. The question remains, however, as to whether aboriginal self-government will be able to produce a significant improvement in the daily lives of its aboriginal citizens. Turning now to that question, we conclude that there are sound sociological and social

psychological reasons to expect that even when aboriginal self-governments are only mildly successful the net sociological impact of aboriginal self-government on individuals will be profoundly positive — that their communities will experience fundamental gains in social vitality that will be reflected in positive changes in the lives of individuals. For such success to be attained, however, certain fundamental challenges and choices must be addressed. These we identify in the following pages.

Two caveats should be noted before we proceed. First, our discussion of the impact of aboriginal self-government is organized in terms of the dimensions of community social vitality. It should be noted that aboriginal self-government will also have other impacts on aboriginal people, although our discussion treats these only in passing. Second, the social vitality benefits identified below will not be experienced uniformly by all self-governing aboriginal communities, for the realization of those benefits is enhanced by certain contextual conditions. Among these are the presence of exploitable natural resources, a minimum-sized population base that not only permits certain economies of scale but also encompasses a depth and breadth of human talents, and the presence of an economic opportunity structure. These are not necessarily prerequisites for social vitality, for Matthews (1983) found thriving social vitality in Newfoundland outport communities that were not economically viable. They are, however, enhancing or facilitating conditions, and it must be borne in mind that in their absence even some territorially-based aboriginal governments will not be able to reap a full harvest of social vitality benefits for their community. Over the intermediate term, at least, such communities will be little better off than the marginalized sector of the aboriginal population.

Impact on Institutions of Socialization

The main institutions for inculcating the values, norms, and skills of the community into its members are the family and elders, the school, the peer group, religion, and the mass media.

Although the family as a value has remained strong in aboriginal cultures, the colonial experience has subjected the family as an institution to considerable strain. For instance, a school curriculum denigrating aboriginal values has often caused parents who espouse those values to slip in their children's esteem. That in turn has undermined parental authority. Similarly, the welfare dependency syndrome of the colonial regime has eroded the self-esteem of many adults. How much can a child respect a parent who has little self-respect or who engages in escapist behaviour (e.g., alcohol abuse) that jeopardizes the security, livelihood, or reputation of the family? With such a role model, how can a child develop a healthy self-concept? Assuming that one of the highest priorities of aboriginal self-government will be to break the welfare dependency syndrome, and assuming at least a modest degree of success at

that task,²⁶ we can predict a strengthening of the family unit under aboriginal self-government.

Respect for community elders had already exhibited some resurgence by the 1970s. Aboriginal governments in control of their own resource allocation can be expected to invest some token financial resources in institutionalizing the esteemed position of the elders (e.g., a travel budget for the council of elders, a small scholarship in honour of an elder) and to invest other symbolic and honorific resources more freely toward the same end (see Raymond Breton's paper in this volume on the use of symbols by the state).

One of the largest and most tangible positive impacts of aboriginal self-government will be seen in the schools. Indeed, in the case of registered Indians, education was one of the first institutions to begin to come under aboriginal control and proof of the benefits of aboriginal control is already visible in Alberta, the James Bay area, and elsewhere. Band-controlled schools with Indian teachers and Indian elders as resource persons have generated increased interest in school, decreased truancy and drop-out rates, and improved self-esteem.²⁷ There is no reason to expect that the effects will be any different with other aboriginals. However, an important decision will be necessary in the educational realm. That is, to what extent will aboriginals be prepared to give up some aspects of sovereignty in order to retain access to non-aboriginal institutions of post-secondary education (plus hospitals and other services for which the infrastructural costs are enormous)?

Aboriginal self-government will probably exert on peer groups no effects independent of those already cited. Native religions, however, will probably experience something of a resurgence as part of a more generalized cultural revival comparable to that experienced in Quebec during and after the Quiet Revolution. It must be remembered that most aboriginal cultures are profoundly spiritual. The religious revival may well be syncretic with the Christian religions which have enjoyed at least superficial acceptance in many aboriginal communities for generations. It will contribute to the general spiritual health²⁸ of the aboriginal communities and will revivify those institutions that inculcate spiritual values in community members.

Impact on Communications Institutions

The impact of aboriginal self-government on the mass media is likely to be minor. Much of the growth potential of the aboriginal market was probably exhausted during the 1970s, when there was a flowering of various aboriginal newspapers and magazines and some broadcast media programs and organizations. Although aboriginal government might directly or indirectly result in a slight increase in the number of hours of local aboriginal radio broadcasting, the main impact upon communications in aboriginal communities will probably be from a

source quite independent of aboriginal self-government — the satellite dish receivers, which will mainly bring more non-aboriginal programming into the aboriginal community.

The other major aboriginal institution of communication is the so-called “moccasin telegraph,” a broad network of informal interpersonal contacts extending from local communities to other aboriginal communities and organizations across the entire country.²⁹ The expansion in the size and scope of aboriginal governments and in the range of inter-governmental ties will augment the importance and vibrancy of this institution of communication.

Impact on “Sociation”

Our initial discussion of social vitality referred to a third dimension — providing opportunities for pleasurable social interaction, or “sociation.” Sociation has always tended to thrive among aboriginals, although less so in cities than in rural settlements. Under aboriginal self-government, sociation in the rural areas would probably change very little, apart from the change emerging from an increased need to come together in the public opinion formation and decision-making processes. However, one of the challenges faced by aboriginal self-governments is how to integrate into the aboriginal community those “marginal” aboriginal citizens who live away from the aboriginal land base.

Impact on Meaning-Conferring Activities

This is probably the area in which the impact of aboriginal self-government will be the greatest. It is also the pivotal sphere around which so much of community social life indirectly revolves, for as Breton writes elsewhere in this volume:

Individuals expect to recognize themselves in the public institutions. They expect a certain degree of consistency between their private identities and the symbolic contents upheld by public authorities, embedded in the societal institutions, and celebrated in public events. Otherwise, individuals feel like strangers in the society; they feel that the society is not *their* society.

For an unknown number of aboriginals, non-aboriginal society is presently viewed as alien and oppressive, even if that view is not articulated.³⁰ Accompanying that view is profound pent-up hostility that is often vented in a self-destructive manner³¹ or at other members of one's own community. Such a situation is diametrically opposed to the notion of community social vitality as we have defined it.

One of the most profound impacts of an aboriginal self-government that is merely modestly successful in other dimensions is that through its accomplishments and its symbolic products it will instill in aboriginal citizens a sense of pride and positive identity, and will help to restore the sense of dignity that derives from and contributes to people taking on greater

responsibility for their collective and individual destiny.³² (The ideology of “*maîtres chez nous*” — masters in our own house — was an integral part of this same phenomenon in Quebec’s Quiet Revolution.) As one Indian leader has asserted, “We must do away with the Indian Affairs band offices. They don’t lend any dignity to Indian government.”³³

To be sure, these crucial symbolic gains of increased pride and dignity and positive self-concepts can be attained to a certain extent through reforms other than aboriginal self-government, as is demonstrated on a large scale by the case of Quebec, and on a small scale by such other cases in the literature as the black residents of Green County, Alabama who captured control of local politics in that deep South county (Perry, 1980). However, the plight of certain sectors of the aboriginal population is arguably (and in some cases demonstrably) worse than that of people in these two situations. Accordingly, more drastic and dramatic measures are needed. Indeed, the importance of the element of dramaturgy in aboriginal self-government should not be underestimated, especially in light of the extreme importance of symbolism in many aboriginal cultures. Thus, just as other Canadian governments devote considerable resources to building symbols, so too will aboriginal self-governments, for colonialism has left disfiguring scars on the symbolic systems of aboriginal peoples, especially the registered Indians. The need is great and on the psychocultural plane the gains to be attained from symbolic politics are important.

These gains from aboriginal self-government derive from diverse sources. The reformed school curriculum and use of aboriginal teachers has already been mentioned as one such source. Political scientist Gabriel Almond’s discussion (1966, pp. 105–10) of the “political capabilities” (or “functional requisites”) of political systems sheds light on other sources of these gains. He explicitly identifies the manipulation of symbols as one such essential activity found in all political systems. In the context of aboriginal self-government he would include the following under this rubric: displays of the majesty and power of the aboriginal state; displays of the physical symbols of the aboriginal state, such as flags and monuments; and other ceremonies showing respect for and pride in aboriginal elites, comparable on their own scale to the June 1984 gala testimonial held by the Liberal Party of Canada in honour of Pierre Trudeau. We can add to his list such phenomena as important instances of international recognition (e.g., by the United Nations or its agencies), participation in First Ministers’ Conferences, audiences with world leaders like the Pope and the Queen, and status before world tribunals.

As Almond notes, such symbolic displays may create or mobilize reserves of support and may facilitate other kinds of system capabilities. For instance, they may facilitate the pursuit of what in Quebec was called *la politique de grandeur*. This was a form of politics which stressed

grandiose economic development projects (e.g., the creation and operation in French of Hydro Quebec) that produced a sense of efficacy in the population, created career opportunities in a hospitable work environment, and stood as visible symbols of the accomplishments and modernity of the ethnic group. *La politique de grandeur* is, however, not without extreme financial risks. The decisions aboriginal leaders make about such projects will thus be among the most consequential they face.

We shall mention just two more of the various other sources of such symbolic-psychological benefits of aboriginal self-government. One is the ideology expressed by political leaders. It is able to take on a distinctive content under conditions of self-government, and in doing so may be able to promote aboriginal identity, social cohesion, and mobilization to action in ways not previously available. However, aboriginal leaders will be faced with the challenge of attaining that mobilization while minimizing the element of coercion which is inherent in such appeals to "primordial" attachments. The other source of symbolic psychological gains is in the collective control that aboriginals are able to exercise over the development of their own community. The numerical domination that the James Bay Cree hold on the boards of directors of the various "Cree entities" created under the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement is one example of this. Such majority representation permits aboriginal control over the *rate* at which various political functions are carried out (e.g., the rate of regulation of behaviour, the rate of extraction of resources, the rate of distribution of valued goods and services and opportunities, and the rate of symbol flow). Elsewhere, the fundamental importance of this form of control was demonstrated by the fact that it was a major stumbling block to an agreement on off-shore oil jurisdiction between the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador and the federal Liberal government. The Newfoundland case also suggests that one of the major dilemmas faced by emerging aboriginal governments will be whether to hold out over the long term for such control (so as to avoid the severe community dislocations that flow from unregulated development) when the needs of their citizens are so pressing in the short term.

Impact on Boundary Maintenance

The phenomenon of boundary maintenance has a cultural dimension as well as social and demographic dimensions. Strong cultures are better able than are weak cultures to remain intact when in contact with another culture. For registered Indians the impact of aboriginal self-government on boundary maintenance will probably be minimal, except for the cultural strengthening or revival mentioned earlier and a decline in the incidence of Indian children being placed for adoption in non-Indian homes. Both are significant gains and both have obvious implications for Indian aspirations to protect and retain Indian culture. Métis

will also realize these same gains perhaps to a greater degree. Métis culture will probably also be strengthened by a migration of some of the urban Métis population to the Métis land base. This population increase in Métis settlements can contribute to the "critical mass" of population that arguably is needed for cultural institutions to flourish rather than merely survive.

Finally, given the central role of the land and its living creatures in most aboriginal cultures, any expansion of the land base of an aboriginal community should enhance the integrity of that community's aboriginal culture.

Impact on Legitimacy

Conferring legitimacy on the regime, on the incumbents of that regime, and on its policies is another aspect of community social vitality. Such legitimacy is derived from various sources, of which one is the traditional political order that was in place before the colonial era. Presumably many aboriginal governments will restore some features of community decision making from their political heritage. Students of public policy recognize that the process of policy formulation is often as important as the policy product that emerges; policy decisions and programs issuing from traditional decision-making structures and processes are likely to carry far more legitimacy than decisions and programs formulated by non-aboriginals in the distant provincial or national capital. Furthermore, familiarity with the local mores and informal power structure will probably enable local decision-makers to make better decisions for implementable policies and programs.³⁴ Greater policy effectiveness will in turn enhance their legitimacy. Similar legitimacy gains under aboriginal self-government are likely to be realized because bureaucrats will have more time to spend on "ends-oriented" activity — producing policies and programs — and will need less time for "means-oriented" activity (e.g., preparing Treasury Board submissions justifying program proposals, preparing monthly or quarterly statements of financial accountability). Such a reordering of priorities should mean less delay in addressing pressing local needs.

An important caveat must be registered before leaving this discussion of legitimacy. If an aboriginal government fails to meet the legitimate aspirations of its constituency, aboriginal self-government might well forfeit its legitimacy in the minds of that electorate. That in turn could conceivably produce a socially devastating form of marginality, in which that particular aboriginal population is alienated from both the aboriginal government and non-aboriginal governments.

Impact on Conflict Regulation and Resolution

While the modernization that aboriginal self-government brings may well entail an increased volume and scale of conflict (Weiner, 1966,

p. 557), some conflict-mediating structures (such as DIAND and the RCMP) will no longer be present in the community. Weiner's research suggests that traditional mechanisms of tension-release and conflict regulation will often not be viable in contemporary times. Thus, one of the more important challenges facing aboriginal self-governments will be to adapt old conflict-resolution institutions and devise new ones to meet contemporary needs. Some models will be available in non-aboriginal society — such as ombudsmen, human rights commissions, regulatory agencies, crisis intervention teams of social workers, small claims courts, counselling agencies, arbitration boards, and conciliation boards. A large measure of success in these endeavours will be pivotal in bringing to fruition most of the other potential benefits of aboriginal self-government.

Impact on Leadership and Organization

Aboriginal self-government will make stiff demands for leadership and organizational skills, and this will be a thorny problem area for many communities, particularly those with a small population base. Shortages of leaders and other skilled personnel will be exacerbated if those persons seek the broader challenges provided by the public service of the federal, provincial, or larger aboriginal governments. One challenge of aboriginal self-governments will be to retain their skilled personnel and develop exchange mechanisms with other governments that will provide challenges for them while retaining those skills in the community. More difficult will be the challenge of finding the right mix of public and private enterprise on the aboriginal territorial base and the best combination of regulation and autonomy for private sector aboriginal (or non-aboriginal) entrepreneurs, assuming that there is an appropriate role for private enterprise in aboriginal economic development.

A significant amount of leadership and organizational potential in aboriginal communities has been rendered at least temporarily unavailable due to alienation, incarceration, or escapist behaviour such as alcohol abuse. Aboriginal self-government will permit the spontaneous reclaiming of some of that potential (as a result of phenomena discussed above) and the calculated reclaiming of others by means of aboriginal-staffed rehabilitation programs rooted in aboriginal culture. It is difficult to predict the extent to which aboriginal self-governments will be able to liberate and utilize the underused leadership and organizational skills of women who have been confined to traditional roles. However, the question itself raises the interesting issue of tensions between traditionalism and modernism, and between individual rights and collective rights, which underlie so many of the decisions that will have to be made by and about aboriginal self-governments. We shall return to this in our later discussion of citizenship issues.

Overall Assessment of the Impact of Aboriginal Self-Government

In concluding this section, we return to our identification of what we view as main thrusts of aboriginal aspirations. The immediately preceding discussion dealt in depth with one of those thrusts — community social vitality — and also touched on the other three thrusts. We shall briefly recapitulate them below.

— The first aspiration was for greater self-determination and social justice. Our discussion of the transfer of control from colonial authorities to aboriginal authorities, the increased ability to mobilize the populace, and the reclamation of lost leadership potential all lead us to conclude that aboriginal self-government will undoubtedly give aboriginals (especially registered Indians) greater control over their own destiny. From this will flow significant material and psychological benefits. However, the justness of aboriginal governments may vary considerably. Justice is not an automatic by-product of self-government. An assessment of that justness varies according to whether the observer's standards are traditional or contemporary, collectivistic or individualistic.

— The second main component of aboriginal aspirations was identified as economic development, which will inevitably be a high priority on the agenda of most aboriginal governments. Many aspects of our discussion of community social vitality have touched indirectly on this. Examples include breaking the welfare dependency syndrome; the greater validity of policies based on legitimated and localized decision-making procedures; pursuit of *la politique de grandeur*; attenuation of alienation; the increased sense of individual and collective pride; the forging of a role for the private sector; and the reclamation of temporarily unavailable leadership potential (including entrepreneurial leadership). These factors all provide grounds for hope for the success of economic development ventures. However, there are bound to be failures — some on a large scale — due to the scarcity of skilled personnel, the taking of inadvisable risks in the pursuit of *la politique de grandeur*, under-capitalization, failure of conflict resolution, and other reasons. In the final analysis, though, the attainability of aspirations for economic development must depend in large part on the value of the aboriginal land base and the nature of the fiscal equalization arrangements reached among aboriginal self-governments and between them and other governments.

The protection and retention of aboriginal culture was the third general aspiration identified. The prospects for this are quite positive, as was discussed above under the rubric of institutions for socializing individuals into the values, norms, and skills of their culture. The revitalization of the schools is of course particularly relevant here. Our discussion of the impact of aboriginal self-government on meaning-conferring activi-

ties also dealt with the predicted resurgence of cultural pride and individual dignity, and the flow of symbolic expression in government ceremonies, honours, etc. These too should contribute significantly to the attainment of cultural protection and retention. Indeed, the attainment of this aspiration seems likeliest of all, barring unrealistically high expectations, immobilizing community conflict, and colossal failure at economic development.

To summarize, we have found that in many respects Canadian aboriginal self-governments are in a highly advantageous situation compared to other decolonizing peoples. They are free of many of the millstones hampering other peoples, such as militarization, lack of experience in public bureaucracies, unmanageable population diversity, and vastness of population or territory. Canadian aboriginal self-governments will face many changes — including an expansion in the scale of most aspects of their sociopolitical environment, pervasive strains between modernism and traditionalism, changing relations between the classes — and many problems, particularly in curtailing unrealistic expectations, maintaining legitimacy, distributing wealth and power, recruiting highly skilled personnel, and achieving economic development. The prospects for at least modest success in attaining their citizens' aspirations are reasonable, although some failures are inevitable. Sociologically, aboriginal self-government is quite feasible and in fact desirable. However, our analysis has been much more applicable to aboriginal citizens on an aboriginal land base than to those off that land base, and we have given virtually no consideration to the constitutional and external-political feasibility of aboriginal self-government, including trade-offs in citizenship rights that aboriginal citizens may be called upon to make voluntarily or by compulsion. We turn to these issues in the remaining sections.

A Note on the Marginalized Aboriginal Population

The marginalized aboriginal population — those of aboriginal descent who live or will live outside aboriginal communities with some prospects of self-government — has three important characteristics. First, it is very heterogeneous, encompassing off-reserve status Indians, Métis living outside communities in which the Métis form a majority, and non-status Indians. Second, and as a consequence of the first characteristic, the boundaries of this group are very indistinct and potentially contentious. Third, it is a large group relative to those of aboriginal descent who live within aboriginal communities. While precise figures are impossible to obtain, the marginalized population probably exceeds the community-based population by a margin of three or four to one, a ratio that is too often overlooked.

Coming to grips with the size and composition of the marginalized

population is not an easy task. While Section 35.2 of the Constitution Act defines the “aboriginal peoples of Canada” to include “the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada,” only the Inuit can be readily enumerated. The Métis have been defined as the descendents of those persons in western Canada who received land grants and/or scrip under the Manitoba Act of 1870 or the Dominion Lands Act of 1879, in addition to “those other persons of aboriginal ancestry who have become a part of the Métis community.”³⁵ However, as we noted in our Introduction, the size of that population has yet to be determined. Non-status Indian organizations claim that the term “Indian” in Section 35.2 should not and must not be restricted to those individuals recognized as Indians under the terms of the Indian Act. Instead they argue that self-identification must be the criterion of Indian and hence aboriginal status. The problem with this approach is that it is impossible to estimate the size of the Indian population. It is difficult to know how that size could be determined — how could one measure self-identification? More generally, if aboriginal status carries with it some differential rights or access to government programs and services, self-identification may be a contentious way of setting group boundaries. To take an extreme example, if aboriginal Canadians were to enjoy some reduced exposure to federal or provincial taxation, many Canadians might suddenly identify with the aboriginal community or be urged to do so by their accountants.

For aboriginal groups concerned with boundary maintenance, self-identification is also problematic in that it would reduce communities’ control over who would or would not be a member. As a consequence, aboriginal organizations have set forth a number of membership principles. First, aboriginal communities should be able to decide who is and who is not a member, although possibly under constraints imposed by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Second, individuals who are not members of a territorially concentrated aboriginal community but who assert some identification with the aboriginal sector of the population should be recognized under the Constitution as aboriginals. Third, the federal government must assume some residual trust responsibility for such individuals. Whether these principles can be put into practice, and whether they would be acceptable to the governments of Canada, is very much in doubt.

Here we encounter an interesting dilemma. The argument for aboriginal self-government rests on the assumption that aboriginal rights are collective in character. This assumption, however, could leave the marginalized aboriginal population in a very exposed position. They could, in effect, be stripped of their aboriginal status. Aboriginal rights could come to be associated with self-governing aboriginal communities, and no longer be seen to adhere to the individual. Aboriginal rights, in other words, may not be portable across the boundaries of aboriginal communities. This in turn raises a very real fear of “ghetto-ization,” of forcing

individuals to live within the confines of aboriginal communities if they wish to retain their formal aboriginal status.

There is nothing automatic or predetermined about this outcome, but its political probability is not that remote. Canadian governments may well find a "white paper" approach to the marginalized aboriginal population very attractive: individuals within this population would be entitled to the same programs and services, delivered through the same governments, as all other Canadians living outside self-governing communities. In effect, individuals would have to decide, by their choice of residence, between being Canadians like other Canadians or retaining an aboriginal status. This is not to suggest that the marginalized population would be thrown to the wolves. The Charter protections against discrimination based on race or ethnicity, the possibility of affirmative action programs, human rights commissions at both the national and provincial levels, and provincial human rights codes all provide some degree of protection for individuals who might be prejudicially affected by aboriginal ancestry. Thus a loss of aboriginal status would not necessarily leave individuals exposed to the caprices of a hostile majority society.

However, if aboriginal status comes to be confined to those individuals resident within self-governing aboriginal communities, the size of Canada's formal aboriginal population will be greatly reduced even if aboriginal communities experience net in-migration. Aboriginal organizations, not surprisingly, are very cognizant of this threat — if that is the correct term — and have sought to counter it in a number of ways. First, the argument is made, particularly by non-status representatives, that the rights of all aboriginal peoples are now protected by the Constitution, irrespective of where individuals may choose to live. Second, proposals have been made for institutional reforms (discussed in the section on institutional reform) to provide all aboriginal citizens with some leverage on the national and provincial political systems. Third and most problematic, it is argued that aboriginal governments should have some tie to aboriginal residents living outside self-governing aboriginal communities.

This last argument for extra-territoriality has yet to be fully developed. The Métis National Council has proposed (1983) that self-government rights apply "both on and off the Métis land base," but what this would mean in practice has not been spelled out. Would it mean that non-residents could vote in community elections and be entitled to a share of community assets, or that the community government could tax individuals living outside the community? Status Indians have also argued that the legislative domain of Indian governments should not be restricted to the Indian land base, although again what this would mean in practice is not clear. It seems unlikely that the federal and provincial governments would allow the jurisdiction of aboriginal governments to extend beyond the territorial limits of the aboriginal community. Thus it is difficult to see what linkages could be forged between aboriginal governments and

individuals of aboriginal descent who choose to live within the broader Canadian society.

It must be emphasized that self-governing aboriginal communities are unlikely to encompass even a majority of those individuals who have a claim, or are asserted to have a claim, to aboriginal status under Section 35 of the Constitution Act. To the extent that aboriginal rights come to be embodied in the collective right of self-government, aboriginal individuals living outside self-governing aboriginal communities may face a substantive erosion of their aboriginal status. The governments of Canada may treat them just like other Canadians. While this is not necessarily a bad thing, the implication is that the implementation of self-government could greatly reduce the size of Canada's aboriginal population. While any such reduction will be vigorously contested, particularly by the Métis and non-status communities, it may well be the eventual price of aboriginal self-government. If the resultant assimilation of the bulk of the aboriginal population is to be avoided, some form of institutional reform beyond the implementation of self-government will be required.

Aboriginal Self-Government and Canadian Citizenship

In discussions of aboriginal self-government, it is generally although not universally assumed that the residents of self-governing communities will be *both* Canadians and aboriginals, and that aboriginal governments can be accommodated as a distinct third order of government in the Canadian federal system. In short, it is assumed that aboriginal self-government is compatible with Canadian citizenship, that the latter can be stretched to encompass the former. Yet before this assumption is too quickly accepted we must examine in some detail the impact of self-government on the political relationship between aboriginal Canadians and the existing governments of Canada. At issue is the nature of Canadian citizenship.

The concept of citizenship encompasses what has become a very complex relationship between individuals and their governments. Within the Canadian context, the rights of citizenship have now been enshrined in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Citizenship also includes the obligation to support, through taxes, the programs of democratically-elected governments. Just as there should be "no taxation without representation," there is no representation without implicit consent to taxation. In addition, citizenship in the Canadian context has come to encompass protection from the extremes of poverty. While individuals do not have a "right" to a certain level of income, we have established a variety of safety nets to try to ensure that people are not subjected to abject poverty as a consequence of their age, lack of employment, physical and mental disabilities, and so forth. These redistributive mechanisms are intended to provide an income floor.

Falling below that floor, as some aboriginals have, would be seen as being denied the economic protection that citizenship has come to imply.

Finally, it can be argued that democratic citizenship has come to imply freedom from an excessive burden of government. By this we mean that governments should not intrude excessively into the lives of individuals, and that the task of operating and financing governments should not become so burdensome as to pre-empt a healthy and vital private sector. For many if not most Canadians, whose "burden" of participation extends little beyond episodic electoral participation and whose tax loads are manageable if not light, this aspect of citizenship may hardly seem worthy of mention. It is, however, by no means irrelevant to an assessment of aboriginal self-government.

There is little question that the existing relationship between aboriginal peoples and the governments of Canada is unsatisfactory, and that there exists a pressing need for fundamental change. At this time, however, we cannot be certain that the implementation of aboriginal self-government will strengthen citizenship for aboriginals, or that new problems will not be created in the wake of aboriginal self-government. There are a number of points where Canadian citizenship may come under considerable strain, if it is to be retained at all by aboriginals falling under the jurisdiction of aboriginal self-governments, although the intensity of that strain will depend upon the extent to which actual self-government approaches the model of self-government sketched in above.

Aboriginal Individuals and the Government of Canada

For individuals resident within self-governing aboriginal communities, political representation vis-à-vis the government of Canada can take two forms — a direct linkage through the electoral process, and an indirect linkage through aboriginal governments. The first of these connections is of concern here.

The electoral linkage between aboriginal individuals and the government of Canada may well be contingent upon the form of self-government adopted. In the proposals that have originated with the federal government, aboriginal governments would exercise only delegated authority:

The intent [of the Indian government proposal] is to delegate parliamentary authority to the band level, not to substitute Indian band authority for parliamentary authority. Clearly, therefore, the proposed Indian government scheme envisions no alterations in the basic relationship between Indians and the federal government. (Long et al., 1984, p. 73)

In this case, individuals resident within aboriginal communities would have unimpaired entitlement to the federal franchise. As any powers

exercised by aboriginal governments would ultimately fall under the jurisdiction of Parliament, residents would be entitled to participate in the election of the House of Commons. However, in proposals in which aboriginal governments are seen as a distinct order of government exercising sovereign rather than delegated authority, entitlement to the franchise becomes a more complex issue.

If aboriginal governments exercise sovereign power, and if their field of jurisdiction overlaps that of the Canadian Parliament, we encounter the logical problems that torpedoed proposals made in the late 1960s and early 1970s for a special constitutional status for Quebec. In the Quebec case, MPs from the province would have been placed in an untenable position. On matters falling within the jurisdiction of Parliament for all provinces except Quebec, they would not have been entitled to vote. Thus the composition of parliamentary majorities and the ability of the government to command the confidence of the House would vary dramatically from issue to issue, depending upon whether the issue fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament or was one of those matters handled by both the Quebec and federal governments. Quebec MPs would be partial MPs, voting at some times and not at others.

The magnitude of this problem in the case of aboriginal governments should not be exaggerated, however, since apart from minority government situations, the impact of aboriginal MPs on the composition of parliamentary majorities would be relatively minor. In short, we could probably fudge the issue; residents of aboriginal communities could vote as would other Canadians even though it would be recognized that on some issues aboriginal governments rather than Parliament would have jurisdiction. The seriousness of the problem would depend upon the extent of the overlap between the legislative jurisdictions of aboriginal governments and the government of Canada. If the great bulk of the aboriginal population continued to be represented by non-aboriginal MPs, and aboriginals constituted a small minority within most ridings and a majority within only a few, the problem would fade to insignificance.

Here it should be stressed that no matter what the self-governing status of aboriginal communities, the residents of such communities will continue to have an interest, and a stake, in the affairs of the federal government. There is no reason to assume, for example, that aboriginal Canadians will be any less interested than other Canadians in acid rain, the health of the national economy, and arms control. The argument can therefore be made that aboriginal Canadians would want the opportunity to participate in national affairs as individuals and as Canadian citizens, and would not want to have their right to participate circumscribed or delimited by their aboriginal status. Interestingly, however, this continued participation in the national political process is not satisfactorily addressed in Indian government proposals. The Penner Report (1983, p. 56), for example, recommends that "legislative authority would

... be with Indian governments, and the primary relationship of the Indian people involved with the federal government would be through those governments." Taken at face value, this ambiguous recommendation seems to imply that Indians would not enjoy or would not need the federal franchise. To say that this would fundamentally alter the nature of Canadian citizenship is to understate the issue.

For marginalized aboriginal Canadians, the federal franchise poses a different kind of problem. There is no question of entitlement, as their relationship with the government will differ little, if at all, from that of other Canadians. The problem is to provide some effective electoral leverage for a population that is relatively small, heterogeneous and dispersed across 282 federal constituencies.

Aboriginal Individuals and the Provincial Governments

It is generally assumed that aboriginal governments will assume many of the responsibilities normally associated with provincial governments, and that they will encroach more into the provincial than into the federal domain. The larger the overlap with provincial powers, the greater are the theoretical problems that arise with the provincial franchise. If aboriginal governments would provide most of the programs and services now delivered to aboriginal communities by provincial governments, the rationale for aboriginal participation in provincial elections would be compromised. If, on the other hand, aboriginal governments were to operate within a much more restricted domain, the problem would be of manageable proportions.

The role of provincial governments in aboriginal affairs has long been contentious. Canadian Indians have argued that Indians and their activities on Indian lands should be beyond the reach of provincial laws because Section 91.24 of the 1867 Constitution Act gives exclusive jurisdiction over Indians and lands reserved for Indians to the Parliament of Canada (Stanley, 1983). Indian treaties, it is pointed out, have been signed with the Government of Canada and not with provincial governments. In practice, though, provincial governments have become involved in Indians' affairs. (To cite but one example, the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement signed in 1975 established a direct relationship between the Cree and the Quebec government.) However, the extent to which such provincial involvement in Indian affairs should be constitutionally acknowledged is a matter of intense debate among Indians.

The Métis are in a very different position with respect to provincial governments. While there was some discussion at the March 1984 First Ministers' Conference on the possibility of the Métis coming under federal jurisdiction, at present the federal government argues that the Métis are not included under Section 91.24 of the Constitution Act and acknowledges no special responsibility to the Métis beyond its responsi-

bility to all Canadians. Provincial governments in the prairie provinces have been legislatively active with respect to the Métis population and have provided special programs and services. There is, then, no parallel to the Indians' constitutional and historical objection to a provincial role, although the potential jurisdictional division between provincial and Métis aboriginal governments is no less problematic.

While it is technically inappropriate to talk about provincial citizenship (one is a Canadian *citizen* and a provincial *resident*), there is no question that citizenship encompasses the political relationship between individuals and their provincial governments. As with the federal government, the residents of self-governing aboriginal communities will also have an interest and a stake in provincial affairs. For example, post-secondary education and hospital care both fall within the provincial domain. Although aboriginal access to provincial hospitals and post-secondary institutions could be secured through intergovernmental contracts, such contracts would provide no leverage on larger policy issues such as the level of financial support provided to post-secondary education, the quality of hospital care, and the "right" of health professionals to extra-bill. More generally, there would remain a need for a mechanism — the provincial franchise — through which individuals could express their preferences on the direction of provincial policies and on the composition of provincial governments.

Yet the franchise implies a reciprocal relationship. If the residents of self-governing aboriginal communities are to enjoy full Canadian citizenship with the right and opportunity to participate in the government, at both the national and provincial level, then logically such residents cannot be placed beyond the reach of provincial assemblies or of provincial taxation.³⁶ This, then, emerges as one of the fundamental issues surrounding aboriginal self-government. If there is one outstanding ambiguity in existing proposals for aboriginal self-government in southern Canada, however, it lies in the relationship envisaged between aboriginals and provincial governments. Because this relationship is so intrinsic to Canadian citizenship it must be addressed.

Here it must be noted that the existing provincial electoral systems provide little effective leverage for aboriginal citizens. As at the national level, the aboriginal population tends to be thinly dispersed across a large number of constituencies and thus fails to emerge as an effective electoral clientele, a group actively courted and listened to by those seeking provincial office. There is, then, an argument to be made for reform to both the provincial and federal electoral systems. (See the discussion of institutional reform in the final section.)

Intergovernmental Relations

Intergovernmental relations are of fundamental importance to Canadian political life in general, and to the operation of the Canadian federal

system in particular. They range from ongoing meetings among ministers, deputy ministers and departmental officials to the First Ministers' Conference. They touch virtually all areas of public policy and are of particular significance in the fields of social policy and economic development — fields of special interest to aboriginal communities.

How can self-governing aboriginal communities fit into the existing network of intergovernmental relations? The simple answer is, only with great difficulty. Although self-government proposals such as those in the Penner Report place a great deal of emphasis on intergovernmental relations, on aboriginal citizens speaking to the federal and provincial governments through aboriginal governments, practical intergovernmental arrangements have yet to be devised.

Aboriginal communities would confront a broad and complex array of intergovernmental relations. Linkages would have to be maintained with a variety of federal departments and agencies. To date, Indian contact with the federal government has been largely centralized through DIAND. If the Department were to be a casualty of self-government, as is generally assumed, the complexity of the relationship could quickly become unmanageable unless the Department were to be resurrected in some form. Here the Penner Report (p. 61) recommends the creation of a new central agency, a Ministry of State for First Nation Relations, "which would manage and coordinate the federal government's relations with the Indian First Nations." The Métis have also recommended a new secretariat, attached to the Federal-Provincial Relations Office, to coordinate all policies directed toward the Métis.³⁷ In both cases it is assumed that the new agency would act as a vigorous aboriginal advocate within the national government. Yet while the new agency would have a different mandate and a radically transformed clientele from DIAND, it would nonetheless be first and foremost an agency of the national government. To assume that the minister responsible for the agency would push aboriginal interests to the point of damaging his or her own career, or to assume that the professional civil servants staffing the agency would do so, is to assume too much. Such an agency could well be preoccupied with the transmission of government policy to aboriginal governments, rather than with the transmission of aboriginal interests into the governmental process. In short, it is not clear that the behaviour of the new agency would depart radically from the past behaviour of DIAND.

Aboriginal governments would have to deal with a large number of provincial departments and agencies. If, for example, residents were to have access to provincial hospitals, secondary schools and post-secondary institutions, various intergovernmental agreements would have to be negotiated and renegotiated. Intergovernmental contact would have to be maintained with neighbouring municipalities and, in some cases, with school and hospital boards. There could also be extensive relationships

with other aboriginal governments, including some located in other provinces and outside the country. Thus the intergovernmental load facing any particular community could be considerable. To enable aboriginal governments to cope, model agreements would probably have to be formulated to serve as patterns that aboriginal governments could adopt in whole or in part.

The intergovernmental load imposed on any one community is only part of the picture, for we must also keep in mind the number of self-governing communities that are likely to arise. While any precise prediction is impossible, it is safe to assume that the number will be large. Given that there are now close to six hundred Indian bands spread over ten provinces, and given the potential Métis and non-status communities, there could well be one hundred or more aboriginal self-governments, even if many bands combined with one another and many others decided not to opt for self-governing status. We must then ask how these aboriginal governments, *each of which could have a different form or degree of self-government*, would fit into the existing intergovernmental system, imperfect as it may be.³⁸

Two problems arise from the matter of numbers alone. First, over one hundred independent governmental actors could not be absorbed into the existing system. They would overwhelm the existing governments even though the latter would represent twenty to thirty times as many people. To take an extreme but not irrelevant example, one cannot imagine a First Ministers' Conference consisting of the Prime Minister of Canada, the ten provincial premiers, and over one hundred Aboriginal First Ministers. The problem would arise repeatedly in an intergovernmental system that stressed the formal equality of participating governments. The governments of Ontario and Quebec, for example, would not tolerate a system in which their provincial delegation would be formally equated with the representatives of an aboriginal community of a few hundred or at most a few thousand individuals. The second problem arises from considerations of political influence. Intergovernmental relations entail a great deal of negotiation in which the political and bureaucratic resources of different administrations are pitted against one another, at least to a degree. Despite the possibility and past history of coalitional politics at such meetings, aboriginal governments would be playing with a very weak hand. One would have to be unreasonably optimistic to think, for example, that a government representing an aboriginal community of several hundred individuals living in northern Alberta could go one-on-one against the government of Canada or Alberta.

The implication is clear. Effective participation in *intergovernmental relations* will be impossible without the creation of aboriginal "supra-governments" — that is, aboriginal governments that transcend the level of the local community. Without provincial and national aboriginal governments,

there is little realistic prospect of self-governing aboriginal communities being integrated into the existing intergovernmental system.

Here we would go beyond Sally Weaver (1984, pp. 67–8), who stresses the need for political organizations that would transcend the local community:

[Band government] will be facilitated by the development and maintenance of stronger national and provincial lobbying organizations, representing band interests, which can keep pounding, pressing and monitoring the federal government. So I see band-level government supported by provincial and national Indian organizations as being the most sensible and viable model of Indian government.

The nature of intergovernmental relations also necessitates *governmental* organizations that can impose decisions upon individual community governments, and from which communities would not be free to withdraw on matters of policy dispute. In effect, government at the community level would become analogous to municipal government, because the legislative power of provincial and national aboriginal governments would supersede that of the community-level aboriginal government. In other words, *the price of self-government may be the surrender of some aspects of self-government to new and larger aboriginal organizations*. Yet, to the extent that what is at issue is aboriginal control rather than local control, aboriginal communities may prefer to pay the price in order to change the status quo of the 1980s. Without such a surrender of power, aboriginal participation in Canadian executive federalism (the general term applied to the conduct of intergovernmental relations) would be next to impossible. Here it should be stressed that to the extent that the present system works, it is because the participants speak for governments; if deals are made, the participants know that all can deliver on the bargain. A situation in which aboriginal representatives in intergovernmental relations could not deliver, in which they could only recommend to one hundred or more self-governing communities, would not work. Intergovernmental agreements would have to be binding, and this is unlikely in light of the fact that different aboriginal governments will have different powers.

The need for large-scale aboriginal governments, imposed by the reality of Canadian intergovernmental relations and executive federalism, raises a host of issues that have only begun to be addressed. What, for example, would be the division of powers between community-based aboriginal governments and the larger provincial and national aboriginal governments? Would the larger governments be based on the traditional cleavages within the aboriginal community — status Indian, Métis, etc. — or would they encompass the entire aboriginal community? Would they be federal or unitary? Where would they be located? How would they be elected and by whom? Such questions are

not only of great importance, they are also very difficult to resolve. Here it is useful to quote from a recent study of Indian self-government (Little Bear et al., 1984):

At present . . . band councils are loath to delegate significant powers to provincial and national Indian organizations. [Such delegation] is more attractive to the weaker and poorer tribes than it is to the stronger and more prosperous ones: the "have" bands believe they may have to give up more than they would gain as participants in a united political front.

However, as we have shown, the restriction of self-government to local communities does not appear to be a viable alternative, if by self-government we envisage some approximation of the Penner recommendations. Effective integration into the intergovernmental relations system would be impossible to achieve. The political power of individual aboriginal governments would be miniscule relative to that of the governments they would confront on a daily basis across a wide range of policy concerns. As Little Bear et al. point out (p. 179), the power of existing political organizations such as the Assembly of First Nations could even be reduced: "Ironically, the development of more political autonomy by Indians at the band level may undercut the capacity of provincial and national political organizations such as the AFN to act as spokesorganizations for the collective interests of status Indians." It would be very difficult to integrate aboriginal governments into the framework of the Canadian federal state — into the amending formula, the Established Programs Financing Arrangement, the equalization formula, First Ministers' Conferences, and the scores of lower level intergovernmental conferences. In short, it is not clear that community-based self-governing institutions can stand alone, nor is it clear that a supporting aboriginal governmental structure can be put into place.

The Power to Tax

Aboriginal governments would have both the power and the necessity to tax the people, lands and resources lying within their jurisdiction. The contentious issue is the right of the federal and provincial governments to tax. Of particular concern here, if only because of their symbolic value, are income and corporate taxes. Less visible levies, such as excise taxes and tariffs, have been and are likely to be of less concern.

The Métis National Council (1983, p. 3) has assumed that residents of aboriginal communities would be exposed to both federal and provincial taxation, as is the case for Métis at present, and that "since they are being taxed, they should be able to benefit from the payment of these taxes on the basis of equality with other Canadians." The Indian position, however, is less straightforward.

Indian associations argue that the treaties provide for total exemption

from all taxes on Indians by either the government of Canada or provincial governments, and that this exemption has been confirmed and reinforced by Section 87 and 90 of the Indian Act.³⁹ At present, total exemption is not the reality, although income earned by Indians from employment on reserves is tax-exempt. The Indian constitutional position, however, is clear-cut; Indian governments and their residents should be exempt from all federal, provincial and municipal taxation.

The argument for tax-exempt status, based on the claim that taxes have already been paid in perpetuity by the loss of aboriginal lands, is problematic in at least five respects. First, the residents of self-governing aboriginal communities will continue to be the recipients of federal and provincial programs. National defence, the Canada Pension Plan, unemployment insurance, and highways are just a few examples. Thus there are potential problems with Canadians' reactions to what they might perceive as Indians' free-rider status. Such reactions could undermine political support for fiscal transfers from the governments of Canada to aboriginal communities. Second, a tax-exempt status, or more specifically a significant tax differential for individuals living within and outside aboriginal communities, could severely restrict individual mobility. Third, it is not clear how the non-aboriginal residents of aboriginal communities would be treated. The Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations has insisted⁴⁰ that only Indian governments should be able to tax non-Indians living and working on a reserve, and non-Indian corporations located on a reserve. Certainly there could be a very hostile reaction by Canadian governments to aboriginal communities serving as tax havens within Canada, allowing individuals and corporate entities to avoid federal and provincial taxation. Fourth, it can be argued that the existing exemptions from taxation meet with little public resistance because Canadians tend to see aboriginal peoples as relatively impoverished. However, should aboriginal individuals or communities experience economic success or engage in conspicuous consumption, political support for tax exemption may be difficult to maintain. At the very least, public support for fiscal transfers could be badly eroded.

A fifth and perhaps more fundamental problem arises from the fact that taxes are the price of the democratic franchise. Citizens are entitled to a say in the composition and operation of government because they foot the bill. Under this argument, a tax-exempt status could undermine the right of aboriginal Canadians to vote. Even if the right to vote remains intact, the nature of Canadian citizenship is fundamentally transformed if the federal and provincial governments are denied the power to tax. Residents of aboriginal communities could be set apart by a tax status that was seen as inherently unfair, particularly if self-government is successful in promoting economic development. If the franchise and Canadian citizenship are to remain intact, the principle of a tax-exempt status might have to be sacrificed in the pursuit of the larger goal of self-government. At the same time,

though, any taxation agreement would have to ensure that adequate fiscal transfers are made, that residents of aboriginal communities are not subjected to double taxation,⁴¹ and that aboriginal communities are not subjected to such a crushing tax load as to cripple their prospects for economic development.

The Redistribution of Wealth

The redistribution of wealth is perhaps the central issue in political life. If aboriginal governments on the scale of the Penner committee recommendations are realized, such governments may have to take on the politically sensitive problems associated with the redistribution of wealth within aboriginal communities. Here, however, we wish to consider the redistribution of wealth among aboriginal communities.

There are at present a variety of mechanisms for the redistribution of wealth among provinces. The centrepiece of these is the equalization formula and the transfers that it generates from the national treasury to the "have-not" provinces. Through equalization payments, provincial differences in tax resources are diminished so that Canadians can enjoy roughly the same level of government services for roughly the same level of taxation, no matter where they choose to live. When we turn to aboriginal communities, we find real or potential differences in wealth that dwarf those among the ten provinces. As a consequence, the redistributive problems will be of a greater magnitude.

It may be possible to leave redistributive problems in the hands of the federal government or, in the case of Métis communities, in the hands of provincial governments. Given the inevitable need for fiscal transfers, a floor could be established below which no community would be allowed to fall. The primary redistribution would be from the national (or provincial) treasury to communities falling below that floor. Transfers among aboriginal governments would not be involved and variations in wealth above that floor would be ignored.

It is questionable, however, whether such a strategy would be viable in the long run. If some communities do very well, and this is undoubtedly the case for relatively small but resource-rich communities, Canadian taxpayers and their governments might resist transfer payments to have-not aboriginal communities unless such transfers were tied to some form of redistribution among aboriginal communities.⁴²

Redistribution among aboriginal communities could be approached in two ways. The first would be to rely upon mechanisms that are already in place. Thus, just as the federal and provincial income tax could be used within aboriginal communities, the equalization formula could be adapted to aboriginal communities on condition that equalization payments be made directly to aboriginal governments rather than being channelled through the provincial governments, and that special atten-

tion be paid to the disadvantaged northern communities within the provinces.⁴³ It must be recognized, however, that since equalization payments are made from the national treasury, access to equalization payments implies exposure to federal taxation.

The second approach would be to leave the matter of redistribution to the larger aboriginal population. A large block of funds could be designated by the federal government as being "for aboriginal governments" and the distribution of those funds among those aboriginal governments could be handled by aboriginal mechanisms rather than through existing mechanisms such as the equalization formula. This approach is envisioned in a proposal by the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (Sanderson, 1981, p. 34) for a Canada-Saskatchewan Indian Resources Fund: "a pool of revenues to be created by statutory formula governing the Indian sharing with Canada of revenues and resources which would be controlled, managed, administered and distributed on the basis of policies established by the Chiefs of Saskatchewan." The control of this fund would clearly have to be governmental in character. Notwithstanding some traditions like the potlatch, it seems unrealistic to assume that in today's world voluntary or non-coercive mechanisms would work for matters involving the distribution or redistribution of wealth. Furthermore, the Federation's proposal does not address the need to redistribute wealth among the aboriginal communities themselves. Unless this issue is resolved, Canadian support for redistribution cannot be assumed.

The Protection of Individual Rights

The dominant North American political culture places great emphasis on the protection of individual rights and freedoms. In the Canadian case, that emphasis has been embodied in the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights, in provincial human rights legislation, and, since April 1982, in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The aboriginal culture, however, has a quite different emphasis, as expressed in the report of the Métis and Non-Status Indian Constitutional Review Commission (1983, p. 2):

The value system of the dominant socio-cultural system in Canada is liberalism which places emphasis on the individual, individual rights and private property. This is in contrast to the value system of Native peoples which places a far higher value on the collectivity or upon the community. It is ironic that non-Native Canadians, with all their liberal ideological baggage, cannot understand the significance to the Native peoples, or for that matter to any self-conscious minority group, of being recognized as a collectivity. They do not realize that a cultural minority faces certain death by assimilation if the political system forces it to deal with the majority culture as individuals.

Chief Sol Sanderson (1984, p. 152) reinforces this point within a broader

argument for the entrenchment of collective rights — the rights of Indian nations *as nations* — in the Canadian Constitution:

What is the definition of Indian? For some purposes “Indian” is defined as an ethnic group, just like the Italians, French or German. For other purposes “Indian” is defined as a racial group like Blacks or Japanese. But in the Royal Proclamation, “Indian” is defined as a nation. That definition is the basis of our claim to nationhood in Canada.

It is from these different, and to a degree conflicting, cultural premises that problems arise in the protection of individual rights within the context of self-governing aboriginal communities.

While we would not suggest that aboriginal peoples are particularly hostile to individual rights and freedoms, the cultural emphasis on collective rights does inject a note of caution. Situations will arise when individual and collective rights come into conflict. When that happens, which value system will prevail — that of Canadian society, with its emphasis on individual rights, or that of the aboriginal community, with its emphasis on collective rights? What would happen if a member of a self-governing aboriginal community challenged the collective decision of that community on the basis of the individual rights enshrined in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms? Box 5-4 summarizes some of the issues.

Aboriginal self-government itself is meant to provide protection for collective rights; the issue that remains is the protection of individual rights within the jurisdictional domain of aboriginal governments. Aboriginal organizations are particularly sensitive to this issue, and generally recognize that a balance must be established between individual and collective rights. One of the most serious potential disputes arises over the mechanisms through which individual rights will be protected. Aboriginal organizations prefer internal codes, tribunals and commissions rather than the external protection provided by the Canadian judicial system and the new Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Métis National Council, for example, has proposed that a Métis Rights Commission or a Métis Peoples Court ensure that “every individual member of each Collective is equally entitled to the Rights and Benefits which are guaranteed to that Collective, without discrimination on the basis of religion, sex, age, marital status, or mental or physical disability.” This wording parallels Section 15 of the Charter.

The Charter itself is seen as an infringement upon the political sovereignty of aboriginal communities, while the Canadian judicial system is considered insufficiently sensitive to both collective rights and aboriginal traditions. The Charter could pose a particular problem to aboriginal governments in the case of non-aboriginals living on the aboriginal land base. As the Penner committee points out, such individuals would not share in the ownership of community assets administered by the aborig-

Box 5-4 Small Communities and Individual Rights

In the debate surrounding the establishment of the U.S. Constitution in the late 1700s, U.S. nationalists associated with James Madison developed a generally compelling argument that the rights and freedoms of individuals are most likely to be threatened in small, relatively homogeneous communities. Where social and economic diversity is lacking, Madison argued, the tyranny of the majority is most likely to prevail. Therefore, individual rights and freedoms are best protected within larger, more diverse communities, where it is more difficult to articulate a majority will and a multitude of conflicting and competing interests fragment and immobilize the majority.

This argument seems of special relevance to aboriginal communities, which are not only small but very homogeneous relative to the larger Canadian population. Within such aboriginal communities, individual rights and freedoms may come under intensified pressure. Moreover, the small size of communities may prevent any effective separation of powers, and thus may compromise the neutrality of government. In a trial, for example, it could well happen that the defendant, the police, the lawyers, the judge, the jury and the aggrieved would all be known to one another; many could be linked by ties of kinship and clan. Whether justice would prevail in such a situation is, of course, dependent upon the way in which one would define justice. There is a strong possibility, however, that the procedural foundations of the Canadian judicial system would not prevail.

inal government. Thus, the committee recommends that aboriginal rights prevail over the political rights in the Charter, and that only those people whom the aboriginal community recognizes as members have the right to participate in the election of aboriginal governments.

Notwithstanding Section 33.1 (the "override" provision) of the Constitution, it can be argued that all individuals within aboriginal communities should be entitled to the full protection of the Charter and of the Canadian courts, that the Charter should apply within the jurisdiction of aboriginal governments as it applies within the jurisdiction of the federal and provincial governments, and that individuals should have access to appeal mechanisms extending beyond the boundaries of the aboriginal community. To a degree, this argument may smack of paternalism by suggesting a lack of faith that aboriginal communities if left to their own devices, will adequately protect the rights of their residents. However, if residents of aboriginal communities remain Canadian citizens and the Charter rights apply to *all* Canadian citizens, the argument transcends paternalism. More fundamentally, it concerns the nature of citizenship. If the Charter is considered purely an operational definition of Canadian citizenship, and it can be seen in no other light, then to place aboriginal

communities outside the Charter is to diminish fundamentally the citizenship of aboriginal Canadians.

The contemporary debate over Section 12.1.b of the Indian Act, which penalizes Indian women who marry non-Indian men by requiring those women to forfeit their Indian status, demonstrates that these are not abstract issues unlikely to arise in practice. Conflicts between collective rights, aboriginal rights and individual rights will occur; individuals living within aboriginal communities will appeal to external protections. The manner in which such conflicts are resolved will tell us a great deal about the nature of aboriginal self-government, and about the extent to which self-government alters the character of Canadian citizenship.

The Burden of Government

It seems reasonable to be wary of systems of government that impose very heavy demands upon citizens, or in which the public sector absorbs so many of the available human resources that a healthy private sector is unable to coexist. Such problems are of concern because self-government is likely to impose a heavy governmental load on the aboriginal community. There will be a need to provide local services, and thus a need for teachers, social workers, sanitation workers, medical staff, community organizers and administrators of various hues. There will be a need for police and court officials. As discussed earlier, there will be a heavy intergovernmental load as the aboriginal government interacts with agencies in the federal and provincial governments, with other aboriginal organizations and governments, with bordering municipal governments, school boards and hospital boards, and perhaps with governments and organizations beyond the Canadian border. Apart from the bureaucratic dimensions of this load, there will also be a need for an elaborate political structure to handle local government, community representation in larger aboriginal governments, and representation within the federal and provincial legislative assemblies.

The load would be reduced if aboriginal governments chose to occupy only part of their potential legislative domain and to concentrate their human resources, for example, within the community's educational system. Many services could be contracted out to neighbouring municipal governments, to provincial or federal agencies, or to the private sector. Indian bands opting for a limited form of self-government might leave the provision of some services to DIAND, thus perpetuating a role for the Department. Agreements could be struck with other aboriginal governments to share the administrative overhead. However, in relatively small aboriginal communities that do not amalgamate with other communities, the available human resources may still be stretched to the point where economic development in the private sector is impaired if not preempted. Although the required expansion in the public sector will stimulate employment, an excessive

concentration of employment opportunities in the public sector may prove troublesome over the long run.

A further concern arises from the point made in the section on sociological effects of self-government, that aboriginal communities will face high per capita overhead costs in the delivery of services due to the lack of economies of scale. In many communities, the replacement of existing structures such as DIAND with aboriginal governments may mean that with self-government the same level of financial support will result in a lower level of services, or that more money will be needed to provide the same level of services. Yet there is no guarantee that increased support will be available, if Canadian governments continue to operate under relatively severe fiscal constraints. Here it is useful to note the caution expressed by a senior official of the Alberta government (Thiessen, 1984, p. 88):

The adequacy of fiscal resources needed to meet local government requirements must be given very careful study to avoid passing on to the bands, under the guise of local autonomy, inadequate financial capability. Bands, when confronted with the pressure of restraints and budgetary shortfalls, will be forced either to reduce programming or to turn to other federal or provincial government departments, which are also faced by restraint.

Aboriginal awareness of such problems is reflected in the repeated demand that the implementation of self-government be accompanied by adequate levels of fiscal support.

Mobility

The geographical mobility of individuals is both a fact of Canadian life and a freedom now entrenched in Section 6 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is also an important feature of aboriginal life. Reserves, for example, can provide a place of renewal and spiritual sustenance for individuals pursuing careers in the broader society. It is important therefore that aboriginal self-governments do not impose excessive restrictions on the mobility of individuals both into and out of aboriginal communities. It is when mobility is impaired that concerns about "ghetto-ization" are most likely to arise.

Mobility could be restricted by sharp differentials at the boundaries of aboriginal communities in such things as tax load, the provision of important social services, and inclusion in the franchise. Differentials in favour of the aboriginal community could curtail outward mobility, while differentials in favour of the broader society could encourage emigration from aboriginal communities. Furthermore, if aboriginal governments were to have control over such things as marriage, divorce, adoption and child welfare, then aboriginal, provincial and federal practice would have to be coordinated to some extent so as not to impair mobility.

The governments of Canada could maximize mobility by ensuring that individuals leaving aboriginal communities have full access to such programs as the Canada Pension Plan,⁴⁴ unemployment insurance, family allowance, medicare and welfare. Whether such access would necessitate tax contributions from the residents of aboriginal communities is a matter yet to be examined.

The issue of mobility is linked to that of control over community membership. Indian bands oppose unrestricted mobility onto Indian land, especially mobility that would bring with it full participation in community affairs and access to collective assets. At present, the Indian Act contains an implicit "right of return" for every band member, with the proviso that the right to vote in band elections requires residency on the reserve. A recent study of the Indian trust relationship (Nahwegahbow et al., 1983, p. 368) has suggested that aboriginal governments may wish to set conditions on the rights to return:

[An aboriginal government] might make permanent residence a voting requirement. It might choose to give official status to its own language [thereby making entry into the community more difficult for those lacking a command of the aboriginal language]. Semi-official documents, such as driver training manuals or various application forms, might be readily available in the official language of the First Nation; and available by special request in English or French. A First Nation might codify its traditional laws in the language in which they have been handed down from generation to generation.

The general point to be stressed is that aboriginal governments have a stake in boundary maintenance that at times may run counter to the free mobility of individuals. While the governments of Canada have an obligation not to restrict the mobility of individuals, aboriginal communities are more interested in maintaining walls between themselves and the larger, assimilationist society. Yet if these walls become too high, those members of the community who have widely marketable skills may choose to "go down the road" in order to avoid being bottled up within a small community. Both walls that are too high and those that are too low pose a threat to aboriginal communities.

Conclusions

In bringing this section to a close, it is useful to place aboriginal governments within a federal context. For the most part, proposals for aboriginal self-government assume that it is compatible with the Canadian federal system. Note, for example, a 1978 speech by Noel Starblanket, at that time President of the National Indian Brotherhood (pp. 3–5):

I must emphasize that we believe Indian self-determination can be achieved within the Canadian framework. As this country's first citizens, we are

extremely suspicious of anyone wishing to break up Canada. We know we have a larger stake in this country than any other people living here at present. . . . We believe the Canadian federal system can accommodate a people's collective interests.

Six years later the Penner committee called for First Nation governments as a distinct order of government within the Canadian federal system. Political reaction from outside the aboriginal community has gone even further, to propose compatibility with the existing federal system as a condition for the recognition of self-government. As former Ontario Premier Bill Davis explained at the March 1984 First Ministers' Conference (pp. 74-76):

The aboriginal peoples are entitled to various institutions of self-government within the Canadian federation and the aboriginal people require the opportunity of participating fairly in resource development. . . . There can be reforms within the structure of the Canadian federal system which give aboriginal people more control over their lives but without fragmenting our country and provinces or our individual communities.

Although it is appealing to think of aboriginal governments as analogous to provincial governments, fitting into the federal system in much the same way, there are problems with the analogy. If aboriginal governments were simply to replace provincial governments for the residents of self-governing communities, the analogy might hold. As we have illustrated, however, provincial governments will not drop out of the picture. Moreover, many of the legislative responsibilities commonly assigned to aboriginal governments are at present within the jurisdictional domain of Parliament, not the provincial legislative assemblies. We thus need a much more complex federal model that ties together at least three levels of government, divides legislative powers at least three rather than two ways, and defines the relationship of aboriginal individuals to at least three quite different governments. If aboriginal governments exist at the level of local communities, at the level of district or tribal councils, and at the provincial and/or national levels, the form of federalism becomes all the more complex.

Federal systems of government have a number of important characteristics which must be borne in mind in the analysis of aboriginal government. Citizens directly elect each level of government, and each level of government can act directly upon citizens. Thus, for example, residents of Manitoba are exposed to both federal and provincial taxation and are bound by the laws of both Parliament and the Manitoba legislative assembly. In return, they vote in both provincial and federal elections; they enjoy direct representation within Parliament that is quite independent of the indirect representation achieved through their provincial government. If aboriginal governments were to fit within this model, certain conditions would have to apply. The residents of self-

governing aboriginal communities would be part of the provincial and federal electorates. Both the federal and provincial governments would be able to act directly upon the residents of such communities. In addition, aboriginal governments and their residents would come within the constitutional framework of the Canadian federal state, including probably the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. If these conditions were not met, the federal model would be seriously compromised.

The compatibility of aboriginal self-government with federalism specifically, and with the Canadian political system as more broadly conceived, depends upon the form that self-government assumes. Here it is useful to think back to the self-government continuum discussed earlier. At the left end of that continuum we placed models in which aboriginal governments would be analogous to municipal governments. Next came those in which aboriginal governments exercise a broader range of powers, but in which their legislative authority is delegated rather than constitutionally recognized or entrenched. The current powers of DIAND, for example, could be delegated to band governments, with the ultimate responsibility for such powers — and the right to revoke such delegation — resting with Parliament. Further along the continuum came aboriginal governments that would be analogous to provincial governments and would exercise constitutionally defined and entrenched legislative authority. Finally, we could extend that continuum to incorporate models in which self-governing aboriginal communities are analogous to sovereign states. This continuum has been placed along the horizontal axis of Figure 5-2.

As we move to the right on that axis, the compatibility of aboriginal self-government with the institutional and constitutional status quo in Canada decreases: the “costs” of aboriginal self-government increase. On the aboriginal side, these costs, which have been enumerated in the preceding pages, could include reduced aboriginal access to federal and provincial programs, restricted mobility, and reduced protection for individual rights and freedoms. On the non-aboriginal side, such costs could include a significant restructuring of the constitutional and institutional status quo, such as what might be entailed in trying to incorporate aboriginal governments within the amending formula and the existing patterns of intergovernmental relations. As the figure illustrates, the costs of self-government are relatively modest for those models in which aboriginal governments exercise delegated authority. Indeed, most of the problems raised in this part of our essay would be of little consequence. Only with the models in which the authority of aboriginal governments is constitutionally entrenched — in which it rests upon a claim to sovereignty — do the costs increase dramatically.

Figure 5-2 can be expanded by incorporating the sociological benefits of self-government discussed earlier. If we assume that many of those benefits can be attained under models of self-government that fall well

FIGURE 5-2 Political Costs of Aboriginal Self-Government





FIGURE 5-3 Political Costs and Sociological Benefits of Aboriginal Self-Government



short of sovereignty, there comes a point on the graph where very little further sociological advantage attaches to the models of self-government further right on the horizontal axis. In Figure 5-3 the sociological benefits are plotted on the same graph as the costs. There we observe that the net difference between costs and benefits varies markedly across the

various models of aboriginal self-government. Models based on the exercise of delegated authority combine relatively low political or constitutional costs with relatively high sociological benefits. Conversely, models based on constitutionally entrenched or sovereign authority, such as the basic model presented in this paper and that recommended by the Penner Report, entail much higher political or constitutional costs coupled with only marginal sociological gains.

Institutional Reform

At present, Canadian political institutions do not adequately represent aboriginal peoples. The electoral system does not provide anything close to proportionate representation for relatively small and geographically dispersed minorities, such as aboriginal peoples. In the vast majority of federal and provincial constituencies, aboriginal Canadians make up an insignificant proportion of the electorate. Their impact on the electoral outcome is slight and therefore their vote is not courted by candidates or parties. Furthermore, they are seldom nominated as candidates for the major parties. Only in the North is the aboriginal population large enough to determine the outcome and to provide some assurance that aboriginal candidates will be elected.

While the problem of numbers and geographical dispersion can be seen as a general problem of institutional design, it is exacerbated in this case because aboriginal Canadians lack compensating political resources such as wealth, a key role in the economy, or powerful foreign allies. Hence the conclusion of the Hawthorn Report in 1966 (Chapter 17): "regardless of their wishes, Indians are destined to having only marginal influence in the political decisions of a society from whose embrace they cannot escape." Although the quest for aboriginal self-government can be seen in part as an attempt to escape from or soften that embrace, there remains the issue of political influence in the broader society, influence that may be of critical importance both to aboriginals living within and those outside self-governing aboriginal societies.

The question to be addressed, then, is whether we should contemplate institutional reform so as to enhance aboriginal representation. Reform might well increase the feeling of political efficacy and trust on the part of aboriginal peoples, and result in public policies more carefully attuned to aboriginal interests and aspirations. As aboriginal Canadians will continue to have a stake in the activities of federal and provincial governments even with the implementation of self-government, reformed institutions could provide a more effective aboriginal voice in national and provincial affairs. Furthermore, for those aboriginals who would live beyond the umbrella of aboriginal governments, institutional reform is of special importance.

While enhanced political representation for aboriginals may at first

seem a motherhood issue, it is anything but that. Reform would be difficult to achieve and could cause significant disruption to the institutional foundations of Canadian political life. It may complicate the representative role of aboriginal governments. Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, it might be argued that in Parliament and in provincial legislative assemblies, aboriginal Canadians should be represented not as aboriginals but as Canadians and as Nova Scotians, Manitobans or whatever; that aboriginal status per se is irrelevant to legislative representation, particularly if aboriginal self-government becomes a reality.

Although Canadian Indians displayed considerable interest in institutional reform in the 1970s,⁴⁵ this interest has waned noticeably in recent years. In its 1984 guide to the Penner Report, for example, the Assembly of First Nations dismissed the need for parliamentary reform (pp. 15–16).

It was not thought useful to have a special seat in Parliament for Indians, since a single vote would have little power. At this time, self-government was seen as a greater force for Indian people. . . . First Nations would govern themselves as a distinct order of government. A special seat in Parliament would not be needed.

To our knowledge there has been no Indian interest whatsoever in more effective representation in provincial legislative assemblies.

This lack of interest in institutional reform stems directly from the current emphasis on self-government. As Indians try to disengage themselves from existing Canadian political institutions, it could seem somewhat contradictory to push at the same time for a greater say in those institutions. More importantly, the creation of effective Indian representatives within Canadian legislative institutions could complicate the representative role of aboriginal governments. As Chief Sanderson explains (1984, p. 158), "It is likely that if there were a number of Indian MPs elected to Parliament or appointed to the Senate, the basic problems affecting Indians would be aggravated because government leaders would then consult them instead of coming to the true leaders of our people in Canada." In short, the potential leaders of aboriginal governments oppose parliamentary reform for the same reason that provincial governments tend to oppose Senate reform: it would create competing spokesmen.

In our view, however, more effective aboriginal representation in legislative assemblies, both national and provincial, would not necessarily pose a threat to aboriginal governments. Indeed, it could be argued that more effective representation could provide important political support for aboriginal governments, that aboriginal self-government and institutional reform would be mutually reinforcing. It can also be argued that effective aboriginal representation within legislative institutions is no less important to the political integration of the aboriginal

community into Canada than is effective representation for Quebec and the West to the national integration of those communities. It is important, we submit, that aboriginal Canadians have a direct say in their federal and provincial governments, that they not be restricted to speaking through aboriginal governments. Thus we are in agreement with the Native Council of Canada (1983):

Full citizens cannot simply be the passive objects of policy; their full participation in the policy-making process is required. It is this need which the demand for a constitutionally entrenched block of seats for Native peoples in Canada's Parliament and provincial legislatures is designed to meet. Only thus can their participation be assumed in the resolution of their social and political dilemmas arising from their ambiguous social status and spatial characteristics.

The major push for institutional reform has come from the Métis, who have consistently sought representation in Parliament and in provincial legislative assemblies based on who the individual is rather than on where he or she might live. The Métis rationale for institutional reform, in the Report of the Métis and Non-Status Indian Constitutional Review Commission (1983, p. 36) merits citation at length:

The aboriginal people we represent . . . see our participation in existing political institutions of Canada as a recognition of, and a parallel process to, our aboriginal right to self-government. We see these mechanisms as a vehicle by which aboriginal people in general — and those aboriginal people, who may not be able to participate in traditional or constitutionally established forms of self-government, in particular — can effectively contribute to and foster the development of a distinct aboriginal community in Canada. As complex as the challenge may prove to be, we must not lose sight of the basic long-term goal we are pursuing — and that is the development of practical and effective mechanisms to insure the full and equal participation of aboriginal people in the political processes of Canadian life.

The tone of this argument, with its stress on political integration, differs considerably from that found in contemporary Indian argumentation.

The Métis interest in institutional reform reflects the relatively dispersed nature of the Métis community and the likelihood that even with the creation of new, self-governing Métis communities, much of the Métis population will still live within the larger Canadian society. It is for these people in particular that institutional reform is required, although reform is also seen as a means of providing guaranteed participation by the Métis collectively in the political life of the country (*ibid.*, p. 30). In both cases, the goal is a form of "ethnic franchise" that would provide guaranteed representation in national institutions for aboriginal peoples.

The Native Council of Canada (1983, pp. 35–40) has developed a detailed set of reform recommendations for the House of Commons. The Council recommends that aboriginal constituencies be created, with an

aboriginal electoral roll. The number of such constituencies would be proportionate, and only proportionate, to the aboriginal share of the national population, estimated to be approximately 5 percent. Aboriginal seats, which are also recommended for provincial legislatures and territorial assemblies, would be constitutionally guaranteed. Such reforms, the Council suggests, would impose only marginal change on Canadian legislative assemblies:

Any proposal for a Native bloc of seats should conform whenever possible with the established principles of the Canadian electoral system. This is particularly true with respect to the qualification and enumeration of electors, the number and distribution of seats, the nomination process and the form of representation.

Aboriginal voters would vote in a different constituency, one defined by the characteristics of the voters rather than by territory alone, while the rest of the system would remain intact.

An unresolved problem is that of defining the aboriginal electorate. Here we might suggest the use of self-identification, much like the process used in open primary elections in the United States where citizens choose to vote in either the Republican or Democratic primary. While an individual can vote in only one primary, the choice of primary is up to the voter. By analogy, the Canadian voter could be offered a choice between the regular constituency ballot or the aboriginal ballot. Aboriginal Canadians could then choose whether to vote in an aboriginal context or in the regular constituency election. Aboriginal ballots would be aggregated across a number of the regular constituencies, and a winner declared.

The advantages of such a system could be considerable. It would enable aboriginal candidates to be elected, but it would not force aboriginal individuals to use the aboriginal ballot. It would not require proof of aboriginal status, and could thus provide an expressive vehicle for the marginalized population. It could apply across the country, both within and outside self-governing aboriginal communities.

There are, of course, a number of problematic details to work out. Would there be one aboriginal ballot, or would there be separate Indian, Métis and non-status Indian ballots? Would the number of aboriginal constituencies be proportionate or disproportionate to the aboriginal share of the national population? Would additional public funds be available for aboriginal candidates forced to campaign across very large constituencies? Would the new aboriginal constituencies be added to or deducted from the number of seats that provinces presently have in the House? For example, if 10 percent of the Saskatchewan population voted on the aboriginal ballot, would Saskatchewan lose 10 percent of its current seats? If not, aboriginal voters would in effect be double-counted in the determination of provincial seats. If the seats were deducted,

would aboriginal MPs be expected to perform as regional representatives as well as aboriginal representatives? How would aboriginal MPs fit into the conventions of parliamentary life? Would they run under party labels, be bound by party discipline, join party caucuses, and sit in Cabinet where they would be bound by the conventions of cabinet solidarity and confidentiality?

While such questions by no means negate the potential utility of electoral reform, they do suggest that reform will not be easily accomplished. Here it might be noted that the electoral system has proven to be very resistant to reform even when subjected to the intense regional pressures which arose when successive Liberal governments during the 1970s and early 1980s were all but devoid of elected representation from western Canada. It should also be noted that any attempt to restructure the electoral system in order to better reflect aboriginal interests could generate similar demands from other groups within the society, demands which would further complicate any quest for electoral reform.

Aboriginal Canadians, like most other Canadians, have not seen the Senate as an institution central to their interests or aspirations. However, when the issue of Senate reform has arisen within the broader political system, the Native Council of Canada has been quick to recommend that a reformed Senate incorporate aboriginal representation.⁴⁶ Aboriginal interest in Senate reform will not, by itself, provide sufficient impetus for reform to take place; but if Senate reform does take place, the question of aboriginal representation will have to be discussed.

An altered role for the Supreme Court of Canada has been suggested, albeit in a somewhat indirect fashion. There has been no suggestion that the composition of the Court should be changed or that the manner in which Supreme Court justices are selected should be modified. It has been proposed, however, that the Supreme Court play a more marginal role in the lives of aboriginal Canadians, a suggestion that comes at a time when the Charter is pushing the Supreme Court toward the very centre of Canadian life. L.C. Green (1983) recommends that the role of the Charter (and, by extension, of the Supreme Court) in aboriginal life be reduced:

It might be preferable to enact an Aboriginal Charter of Rights and Freedoms to be protected by the "notwithstanding" clause of the existing Charter, and with protective arrangements embodied so that amendments may only be made with the consent of the aboriginal peoples. . . . Even should this be done, however, it must be recognized that the control of any such rights would still remain for interpretation by the courts, and such a special Charter might lead to contentions that a court made up of aboriginal peoples was the only tribunal qualified to interpret such rights.

A basic question to be addressed, then, is the role of the Supreme Court in the interpretation of aboriginal rights and in the affairs of aboriginal governments.

In general terms, the advocates of aboriginal self-government argue against any significant role for the Supreme Court. This argument is partly based on the assertion of sovereignty — how can the Supreme Court of *Canada* act as a tribunal for aboriginal governments? The argument is also based in part on the assumption that the Supreme Court would be ill-equipped to interpret laws reflecting aboriginal traditions and legal concepts. The rule of precedent, the British common law tradition, and the training of Supreme Court justices would all be inappropriate. Thus both the Penner committee and the Assembly of First Nations have advocated the creation of a special court to hear aboriginal disputes with the federal or provincial governments, a court that would include at least equal aboriginal representation. Chief Sanderson (1984, p. 157) puts the argument in the following terms:

We are not prepared to continue going to the federal courts or the provincial courts to resolve "Indian rights", questions, and jurisdictional disputes. We contend that these disputes should be resolved either by all-Indian tribunals or by tribunals consisting of a membership half of whom would be appointed by the Indians and the other half by the federal government.

The Supreme Court, then, would not be involved.

Ultimately, the role of the Supreme Court will depend upon the outcome of the ongoing constitutional discussions, and upon some determination as to the applicability of the Charter to aboriginal communities. Both the Court's role in intergovernmental conflict and its role in individual cases arising from within self-governing aboriginal communities remain to be clarified. It is not the nature of the Supreme Court that is under discussion, but rather its relevance to aboriginal life.

The types of institutional reform discussed to this point have been common topics in Canadian political discourse. Electoral reform, for example, has been frequently debated as at least a partial cure for regional alienation. At issue, then, is the possibility of adapting general arguments for institutional reform to the specific needs and circumstances of aboriginal peoples. It is important, however, that we do not restrict our gaze to what have become conventional options for institutional reform. If aboriginal self-government of the type envisaged by the Penner committee is ever to become a reality in Canada, institutional innovation and flexibility will be essential. In this respect, useful insights can be gleaned from the decolonization experience of other Western countries.

The Penner committee has already examined arrangements that have been worked out for and with the Inuit of Greenland; the Indians of the United States; the Sami in Norway, Sweden and Finland; the aboriginals in Australia; and the Ainu in Japan. Canadian status Indians have found all of these arrangements unacceptable insofar as application to Canada. To broaden the range of institutional innovations, we have looked at the

recently decolonized island mini-states of the Caribbean and South Pacific. Many of those mini-states present numerous similarities with the situation of Canadian aboriginals (especially status Indians) in terms of such factors as the small size and linguistic and cultural diversity of the population, economic underdevelopment, non-contiguous territory, and rugged topography of the land.⁴⁷ All have been under the recent rule of the United States, Britain or British Commonwealth countries, although in contrast to Canada none have experienced demographic dominance by non-indigenous settlers. The examples discussed in Box 5-5 are taken from Puerto Rico, the West Indies associated states, Papua New Guinea, the Cook Islands, and the United States' former strategic Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, Micronesia and the Mariana Islands.⁴⁸

By way of context, it should be noted that decolonization in these island territories could have followed any of several broad paths. Full-fledged independence is one such path, while associate-state status (e.g., the Windward Islands Associate States in the West Indies or Micronesia in the South Pacific) is another. At a still lower level of autonomy, countries with a federal form of government could have negotiated provincial or quasi-provincial status with their former colony, as the United States has done in some respects with Puerto Rico and the Marianas. Alternatively, municipal status could have been bestowed upon the various settlements in the colony. Finally, some model based on the authority of professional associations (e.g., a provincial law society or college of physicians and surgeons) could have been pursued if an even more limited form of autonomy were sought.⁴⁹

Box 5-5 provides a cursory survey of arrangements between other recently decolonized small states and their metropole, illustrating the ample precedents that exist for the adaptation of contemporary Western governmental systems, including those very much like our own, to the aspirations of colonized or otherwise subordinated peoples residing on their own land base. Although Canadian circumstances may differ in some important respects,⁵⁰ it is important that the research agenda for aboriginal self-government in Canada be expanded to incorporate a broader range of aboriginal experience. A more extensive comparative analysis could yield three important benefits. First, it would sensitize Canadians to a larger inventory of institutional innovations, including both changes within the institutions of the metropole and modifications in the application of metropole institutions, norms and values to aboriginal communities. Second, it could loosen the bonds of ethnocentrism which have restricted Canadian debate on aboriginal self-government. We may well find that traditional institutions can be highly malleable, and in the process of being changed can acquire increased value because of their ability to better serve the needs and aspirations of minorities without inflicting significant damage on the majority in the metropole. Third, it could demonstrate that significant institutional change can occur without the aboriginal tail wagging the non-aboriginal dog.

Box 5-5 A Comparative Perspective on Institutional Reform

One way in which the colonial metropolises exhibited institutional flexibility in the Caribbean and South Pacific was in their willingness to countenance anomalies or inconsistencies. Decolonization sometimes took on a hybrid form from the list of options mentioned in the text. For some purposes (e.g., entering into treaties with foreign countries) the new aboriginal government would be deemed that of an independent nation, and for other purposes (e.g., postal service, civil aviation) it would be deemed that of a province.

Many innovations in political representation and parliamentary procedure were introduced. For instance, Puerto Rican delegates to the U.S. House of Representatives have voting rights on committees but not in the full House. They also have other rights and privileges (e.g., expense accounts) that are not identical to those of the other congressmen. In Papua New Guinea even as fundamental a principle of parliamentary government as the vote of non-confidence was opened to modification. A non-confidence vote cannot be called within the first six months that the Prime Minister is in office. Furthermore, the motion must specify which individual is to take over as Prime Minister. The Cook Islands constitution even permits the Cook Islands to opt totally or partially out of its agreement with New Zealand by a two-thirds vote of the Legislative Assembly.

Citizenship provisions and the rights of individuals have also taken many different forms. The Cook Islanders, for instance, have New Zealand citizenship without voting rights there. In contrast, Micronesians have status as U.S. *nationals* but not as U.S. *citizens*, and are not subject to involuntary induction into the armed forces of the United States. In the literature on Micronesia and numerous other countries with a small land area, we find differentiated mobility rights for outsiders, to distinguish the right of entry from the right to establish residence.

Widely varying principles have been applied to the important issues of the judiciary and of the applicability of the law of the metropole. One approach, used in the Mariana Islands, has been to categorize the laws of the metropole (the United States) into specific laws that do or do not apply to the former colony. In the Cook Islands, New Zealand law applies only with the consent of the Cook Islands legislature. Another possibility, also found in the Cook Islands, is to categorize the laws (or specific clauses of particular laws) of the new state into "entrenched" and "non-entrenched" types, with stricter adoption and amending criteria for the former. This is particularly well suited to constitutions themselves (e.g., as found in that of Papua New Guinea).

Interesting possibilities also emerge vis-à-vis the judiciary. Examples are the functionally specific courts (e.g., land courts) of the Cook Islands; the waiver, for the Mariana Islands, of the U.S. constitutional requirement of indictment by grand jury; and the placement of limitations on the jurisdiction of the supreme court of the metropole. In the latter case, it could be stipulated that appeal to the supreme court of the metropole is available for only certain types of cases, such as criminal cases wherein the sentence is in excess of a specified period of time or cases where financial damages or fines are in excess of a specified amount (c.f. the Cook Islands). Conversely, at the level of intergovernmental disputes, the

hallmark of the Micronesian accord with the United States is its explicit stipulation that it does not subject either party to the courts of the other. Instead of judicial review by a supreme court, disputes arising over the interpretation of the compact are subject to "good faith negotiations."

The adequacy of, and accountability for, fiscal transfers is another crucial issue surrounding aboriginal self-government. In Micronesia a schedule of guaranteed grants and loans was negotiated to be extended over a two-phase transition period, and for a fixed period the United States continued to provide certain services without compensation. Britain continues to provide financial assistance to the associated states of the West Indies, but this is considered foreign aid now that these states have declared independence. In the Cook Islands, accountability takes the form of an audit conducted by New Zealand officials who report to the Cook Islands legislature rather than to the New Zealand legislature.

Finally, we come to foreign affairs. With regard to membership in the United Nations, it is useful to bear in mind that the statehood requirement for membership has been met by states with a very small population (e.g., the Maldives Islands with a population of 93,000 people and Iceland with its 185,000 people) and by others with very small land area (e.g., Malta at 316 square kilometres). The United Nations also offers other forms of participation, such as consultative status and associate status. Micronesia provides a useful example of treaty-making arrangements. There, the United States retains the unilateral power to make foreign treaties and extend their provisions to Micronesia, except when the treaty relates exclusively or predominantly to Micronesia, in which case the treaty is subject to Micronesian approval.

Conclusions

Canadian aboriginals have argued that the right to self-government is already entrenched in Section 25 of the Constitution. The existence of such a right, however, does not ensure that it can be put into practice. Nor do we know how that right will be interpreted or what forms self-government might assume. In the latter instance, for example, aboriginal communities may choose to occupy only a portion of the legislative domain implied by the right of self-government. More importantly, the fact that the Canadian government will still need to make fiscal transfers to aboriginal governments gives the national government the power to impose conditions on self-government.

What might such conditions be? In essence, they would probably be designed to protect the values of Canadian citizenship and to ensure some minimal degree of political integration of aboriginal individuals into the Canadian political process. Such conditions might include firm guarantees for the protection of individual rights (including recourse to external appeal), the preservation of the federal and provincial franchise for residents of self-governing aboriginal communities, the application of

a uniform criminal code, and taxation powers for both the federal and provincial governments.

Such conditions, we submit, would not seriously erode the positive benefits to be derived from aboriginal self-government. The question remains, however, whether the power to impose conditions implies a corresponding obligation. We could argue that it does — that the rights aboriginal peoples presently enjoy as Canadian citizens must be protected. From this perspective, government is indeed further obliged to ensure that the potential of Canadian citizenship for aboriginal peoples is more fully realized in the future than it has been in the past. The governments of Canada, it is said, have an obligation not only to the existing aboriginal population, but to the generations to come. Their rights of citizenship must be protected and cannot be placed aside in negotiations to redefine the political relationship between the governments and aboriginal peoples of Canada.

A contrasting view, which examines rights from a social evolutionary perspective, holds that rights are merely socially established guaranteed expectations, and thus are more malleable over time. Historically, new social rights (e.g., the right to worker's compensation payments for injury sustained on the job) are often acquired at the cost of extinguishing a civil right (e.g., the worker's right to sue the employer over the injury). Similarly, with the passage of Bill 101 in Quebec, French Québécois gained a measure of collective protection but lost the individual right to send their children to English-language schools. In short, as Charles Taylor (1985) notes in his study for this Royal Commission, this school of thought holds that the dignity of individuals can be safeguarded through other means than the defence of individual rights. As Taylor argues,

Severe doubts still hang over the long-term viability of the rights model. . . . Can it really substitute for the sense of having a say in the common decision? Is the increasing stress on [individual] rights as trumps over collective decisions going, in the end, to undermine the very legitimacy of the democratic order?

Taylor thus favours a model of decentralized participatory democracy, which would be compatible with a high degree of aboriginal self-determination. Such a model would require that the larger Canadian state act less as a juridical protector of individual rights and more as a mediator among the interests of constituent subcultures (Maybury-Lewis, 1984).

At issue is the way in which individuals are to be incorporated into the larger society and polity. The social anthropological literature (Smith, 1969, 1984) has identified three main modes of incorporating racial or ethnic groups into a larger society. The first, called "differential incorporation," involves the differential distribution of civil and political rights among different racial or ethnic groups — that is, some groups

have lesser rights than others. The second mode of incorporation is called "universalistic" or "uniform" incorporation. Here, as in the so-called individual rights model mentioned earlier, individuals are incorporated directly into the public domain as equal individuals, without any intermediary role being played by membership in a racial or ethnic sector or organization. Significantly, Smith himself (1969, p. 435) has described this as radical political individualism, inherently assimilative in both its orientation and its effect. Finally, there is "equivalent" incorporation, which Smith has described (p. 434) as a consociation of complementary or equivalent but mutually exclusive racial or ethnic groups, in which membership in one is a prerequisite for citizenship in the wider political unit. In this third mode of incorporation there exist group rights, while in the second mode there exist only individual rights.

A fundamental conflict pertaining to territorially-based aboriginal groups is between the desire to incorporate the individual members of those groups into Canadian society on a universalistic basis, and the desire to incorporate them on the basis of the equivalency (consociational) mode. In its emphasis upon individual rights, the liberal ideology of Canadian society has difficulty accommodating the group rights that are the essence of the equivalency mode of incorporation. However, with the inclusion of aboriginal rights in the Constitution and the entry of the federal and some provincial governments into negotiations over aboriginal land claims, we have witnessed an adaptability by that ideology which was virtually inconceivable only fifteen years ago. The limits to the adaptability are yet to be tested.

Under either model the tendency may be for governments to neglect what we have identified as the marginalized aboriginal population, those individuals of aboriginal descent who do not live within self-governing aboriginal communities. We now have in place a number of mechanisms designed to ensure the full rights and opportunities of Canadian citizenship to such individuals as individuals. However, it remains an open question whether these mechanisms — the Charter guarantees, provincial human rights codes, human rights commissions, and special federal and provincial programs — will be sufficient. They may be, but vigilance must be maintained lest individuals continue to suffer in the future, as they have in the past, by virtue of aboriginal descent.

It must be recognized that aboriginal self-government in any form will be an experiment, and that across the number of aboriginal communities involved there is an actuarial certainty of some failures. In other cases, communities may abandon self-government not because it failed, but because other political arrangements hold greater promise. In either case, for as long as Canadian citizenship is retained *there remains a residual trust responsibility for the federal and provincial governments* to provide adequate safety nets for aboriginal individuals and communities. The retention of Canadian citizenship can mean nothing less. Just

as it can be argued that aboriginal self-government must not permit aboriginals to turn their backs on Canada, so too Canadians must not be permitted to turn their backs on long-standing aboriginal problems that will not simply fade away in the new dawn of aboriginal self-government.

Notes

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We wish to thank Cynthia Williams and Alan Cairns for this opportunity to reflect on the development of aboriginal self-government in Canada and for their helpful comments in the various stages of the project. We also wish to thank our research assistants, Carole Pesta and particularly Paul Russell, who proficiently distilled for us a mountain of books, articles, and documents. Finally, we are grateful to our colleague Bill Reeves and to the four anonymous referees, all of whose comments were influential in reshaping or reinforcing our thinking at several pivotal points in the analysis.

1. See Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (1969). For a discussion of the formulation of this policy paper see Weaver (1981).
2. See, for instance, the papers by Lyons (1984) and Marule (1984).
3. For a detailed interpretation of Section 25, see Sanders (1983).
4. In Alberta, about 3500 Métis, far less than the majority, live on eight settlements established through the Alberta Métis Betterment Act.
5. First Ministers' Conference on Aboriginal Constitutional Matters, Ottawa, March 15–16, 1983.
6. Assembly of First Nations (1984), p. 6. Emphasis added.
7. First Ministers' Conference, 1983, doc. 800-17/007.
8. First Ministers' Conference on Aboriginal Constitutional Matters, Ottawa, March 8–9, 1984. Unverified and unofficial verbatim transcript, p. 402.
9. Foreword to Opekokew (1982), pp. ix–xii. In this publication, Opekokew develops the proposal for a World Assembly of First Nations, which would provide an international vehicle for the First Nations of Canada.
10. For a detailed discussion of the international dimension of self-government, see Nahwegahbow et al. (1983, pp. 333–35).
11. See Indian and Inuit Affairs Program (Manitoba Region), *Evolution of the Indian Tribal Council Concept in Manitoba: Purpose and Progress, 1966 to 1983* (Winnipeg, 1983).
12. Our use of the term “colonialism” is derived from Blauner (1969). His model of internal colonialism has four elements, of which the first may be reformulated to refer to the dominant ethnic group dictating the terms under which the subordinated indigenous population will be able to participate in the dominant society. Second, the colonizing power carries out a policy that constrains, transforms, or destroys the culture of the indigenous people. Third, racism is present as a system of domination. Fourth, members of the colonized group are administered by members of the dominant group, especially in such a way as to be managed and manipulated in terms of their ethnic status. The concept, then, is a “pure type,” which fits the registered Indian situation much better than, say, the urban Métis situation, although it is not irrelevant to that latter situation. We use the term “post-colonial” rather arbitrarily to refer to the period after the attainment of self-government by the indigenous people.
13. Conversely, the lack of meaning-conferring activities, or the presence of activities that produce only negatively-evaluated meanings, might be called alienation.
14. Our usage of the concept “social vitality” thus encompasses and goes beyond that of Blishen et al. (1979), who define it (p. 35) as: “the process by which individuals become mutually bonded in reciprocal relationships of trust and obligation in order to share knowledge, obtain resources, and resolve mutual problems.” They conceive of social vitality as the continuum ranging from nearly total social isolation (“privatization”) to nearly total social integration (“communalism” or “communitarianism”). The con-

cept of social vitality clearly merits further research, particularly with respect to its relationship to economic viability.

15. In light of the complex, highly educated environing society within which aboriginal governments will have to manoeuvre, the *need* for high levels of educational attainment by aboriginals is pressing, perhaps even more so than in some other decolonizing societies.
16. If the fertility of status Indians is at all typical of the larger aboriginal population, then aboriginal birth rates are plummeting (from levels of about 40 births per 1,000 population in the early 1960s to less than 30 births per 1,000 population in the mid-1970s). This rate, however, is still higher than the rate for Canadians as a whole, and leaves aboriginals with a dependency ratio considerably higher than that of the larger Canadian population.
17. See Eisenstadt (1963), pp. 159–74.
18. Our use of the term “the state” follows that of Miliband (1973) in his seminal book *The State in Capitalist Society*, pp. 50–51. While the term “the state” might sound pretentious when applied to a small aboriginal government, Miliband’s usage of the term encompasses even municipal-level government. More to the point, the civil service of aboriginal governments will be fulfilling many of the same functions as the provincial-level state, will be engaged in sociopolitical relationships broadly comparable to other states, and will be caught up in many of the same dynamics as other larger-scale states.
19. See Geertz (1971). The demand for change, yet the suspicion of the new — the refusal to abandon the traditional ways of doing things — has been apparent in many aspects of relations between registered Indians and the Government of Canada and is but one concrete example of this societal tension that aboriginal self-governments will face.
20. See Box 3.2 and Bell (1965).
21. See Manuel and Posluns (1974).
22. Over time, aboriginal self-governments experiencing considerable success may find that there occurs the psychological phenomenon of “habituation,” which is the tendency of stimuli to lose their effectiveness with repetition or duration. That is, the electorate’s standards of what is acceptable may rise with the continued enjoyment of earlier successes. This, however, is a problem that many aboriginal self-governments would be happy to face.
23. See Guindon (1964), pp. 150–62.
24. See Levy (1967). The quotation is from pp. 203–04.
25. Two quite different points need to be made here. First, there are other sources of tribalism besides those mentioned here. In the African context, for example, other main sources of tribalism have been fear that the other colonized ethnic group(s) will dominate one’s own ethnic group in the power structures of society, and competition for employment. Secondly, aboriginal governments that span more than one aboriginal ethnic group (e.g., Mohawk and Ojibwa) may avoid tribalism, but at a cost in ethnic distinctiveness. The writing of Anthony Smith, when applied to the Canadian situation, would suggest that such pan-aboriginal or even pan-Indian governments would probably be assimilationist in the sense that, instead of pursuing divisive electoral and political strategies, they might adopt a culturally homogenizing “integrative nationalism.” He also suggests that there is a fundamental opposition between the state (which is rationalized, bureaucratic, technocratic, and impersonal) and the ethnic community (which is spiritual, particularistic, and has unique solidarities). See Smith (1981, pp. 140–195).
26. Even if there is little improvement in economic conditions we can expect the administration of a welfare system to be drastically different (e.g., work-for-welfare schemes) under aboriginal self-government compared to under DIAND or provincial or municipal welfare agencies. Aboriginal self-government will be less likely to share with those non-aboriginal agencies a vested interest in keeping aboriginals dependent and non-productive on the welfare rolls.
27. For but one testimonial see Ann Angebrandt, “Band-Controlled School a Success for Cree Reserve,” *Calgary Herald*, June 19, 1984, p. B9.

28. The close relationship between aboriginal physical, mental, and spiritual health was formally recognized by the Government of Ontario when, in the 1970s, it granted an Indian medicine man status as a special practitioner under the government health insurance program. Practising physicians with an aboriginal clientele also attest to this close linkage.
29. For a brief description of the "moccasin telegraph" see Ponting and Gibbins (1980, p. 146).
30. The psychological damage inflicted by the experiencing of that perceived oppression is vividly described by psychiatrists whose patients are subordinate group members. For two such poignant accounts see Grier and Cobbs (1968), and Fanon (1963).
31. For instance, recently available data for the mid- to late-1970s reveal registered Indian suicide rates (per 100,000 population) to fluctuate at levels two to three times as high as those of the overall Canadian population. See Ponting and Gibbins (1980).
32. For a discussion of the gain in dignity experienced by his people as a result of their successful collective operation of a pencil manufacturing factory, see Chief Earl Old Person (1984, p. 151).
33. Sol Sanderson at the Indian Government Development Conference, June 1979.
34. Conversely, though, it should also be noted that familiarity with the informal power structure creates the opportunity for the content of public policies to be distorted to serve the narrow interests of that informal power elite.
35. *First Ministers' Conference, 1984*, transcript p. 63. The speaker was Mr. Fred House, member of the executive committee of the Métis National Council.
36. However, we note in the final section of this paper that the hallmark of some recent cases of decolonization is the willingness of the former colonial regime to countenance certain logical incongruities in the interests of pragmatism.
37. See Métis and Non-Status Indian Constitutional Review Commission (1983), p. 33.
38. While the system and format of intergovernmental relations have undergone extensive change in the post-World War II era, and while continued incremental change can be expected in the future, there are limits to the elasticity that the system can exhibit as part of any adaptive effort.
39. For an example of this argument, see Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations, *Chiefs' Policy Document*, Item 6(a), April 1983.
40. In an undated draft by the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations entitled *Revenue and Resource Sharings and Indian Economic Development*, p. 26.
41. Double taxation could arise if aboriginal governments were to assume fiscal responsibility for programs normally delivered to Canadians by the federal and provincial governments.
42. The breadth and intensity of any such resistance, and its political significance, are difficult to predict.
43. See Métis and Non-Status Indian Constitutional Review Commission (1983, pp. 76-77).
44. Pensions raise an interesting problem that has not been addressed. The Canada Pension Plan relies in large part upon a tax on employment income. If aboriginal communities were exempted from this tax, pension benefits could still be provided through comparable and potable aboriginal pension plans that could be integrated into the broader Canadian framework, much as the Quebec Pension Plan is today. It is not clear, however, that many aboriginal communities would provide a firm actuarial base for a comparable pension plan, or that the level of contributions would be equivalent.
45. For example, see National Indian Brotherhood (1971), and Starblanket (1978).
46. See the presentation of the Native Council of Canada to the Joint House-Senate Committee on Senate Reform.
47. See the opening pages of each case study in Liebowitz (1976). For instance, the Cook Islands have an area of 93,000 square miles and a population of approximately 25,000 people. The Mariana Islands have about half the population but twice the land area.

48. The data below are from Liebowitz (1976).
49. We acknowledge the contribution of our colleague W. J. Reeves, who suggested the professional model as a vehicle for dealing with the issue of extra-territoriality. We shall explore this model elsewhere.
50. Canadian aboriginal communities, for example, are embedded within a larger, non-aboriginal society and do not share the geographical isolation from the metropole that characterizes island mini-states.

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Appendix A

Miscellaneous Data on Status Indians, by Province^a

	Total ^b	Atl.	Que.	Ont.	Man.	Sask.	Alta.	B.C.
Number of bands	573	29	39	115	57	68	41	194
Number of reserves or settlements	2,281	64	39	171	103	124	96	162
Average area of reserves or settlements (× 1000 hectares)	1.1 ^c	0.4	1.9	3.6	2.1	4.1	6.7	0.2
Pop. (× 1000 persons)		11	30	66	43	45	35	54
% of Cdn. Indian pop.	100	4	10	22	15	15	12	18
% of Provincial pop.	1.3	0.5	0.5	0.8	4.4	4.4	2.7	2.4
% off reserve or settlement	28	26	18	32	25	30	22	36
% of bands with:								
population < 100	17	17	13	17	5	3	10	28
population 101-300	31	35	15	35	11	16	22	42
population > 1000	13	7	29	13	28	21	25	3
Average population per band	516	382	774	574	761	662	858	280
Geographic distribution of bands								
% in remote locns.	29	0	36	30	44	15	17	27
% in other rural locns.	42	45	13	45	46	63	46	40
% in urban or semi-urban locns.	30	55	51	25	11	22	36	33
% of reserve land with good potential:								
for agriculture	na	25	8	25	38	50	45	na
for deer, caribou, etc.	na	na	66	19	47	85	36	56
for recreation	na	2	8	13	4	3	1	12

Appendix B

Social and Economic Conditions of the Métis and Non-Status Indian Population

Various studies of the MNSI population have been conducted, but some of these pertain to only a few provinces and none claims to be representative in the strictest sense. However, their findings tend, for the most part, to point in the same direction. One such study, conducted by the Native Council of Canada and the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission during February–May 1976, obtained interviews throughout the country in the households of over 24,000 MNSI in 364 communities ranging from large metropolitan areas to small arctic hamlets.

Highlights of the 1976 MNSI National Demographic and Labour Force Report

Dependency Ratio As with status Indians, about 54 percent of the MNSI population were of labour force age (ages 15–64). For Canada as a whole the figure is 66 percent. The 1980s are witnessing a major influx of aboriginals seeking to enter the full-time labour force.

Educational Attainment Approximately one-half of the MNSI population surveyed and three-quarters of the total Canadian population report having completed nine or more grades of formal schooling. About 1 in 33 MNSI and 1 in 4 other Canadians report having completed 13 or more grades of formal schooling.

Language Facility Two-thirds of the respondents cited English as the language spoken most fluently. The number of people citing French or Native languages was almost equal at about 12 percent. The other 7 percent reported themselves as English-French bilinguals.

Labour Force Activity Of the population aged 14–64, only 57 percent were in the labour force, with 38 percent employed and 19 percent unemployed. Twenty-two percent were housekeepers and an almost equal number was either retired, disabled, or full-time students. The data suggest a strong attachment to the labour market on the part of MNSI males, but a low attachment by MNSI females (77 percent vs. 36 percent respectively, compared to 78 percent and 45 percent for males and females respectively in the overall Canadian population). Male and female MNSI unemployment rates were both about 33 percent of those in the labour force. This was over four times as high as the overall Canadian rate at that time. Average employment for those working was only 28

weeks per year. Occupations held at the time of the survey were concentrated at low skills levels: restaurant worker, domestic, secretary, clerk, construction trades worker, timber cutter, motor vehicle mechanic, truck driver, and taxi driver. Average weekly earnings were 16 percent lower than for Canadians as a whole.

Highlights of the Survey of Ontario MNSI

A 1978–79 survey of 1,533 MNSI households incorporating 5,444 persons was conducted in 66 Ontario communities. These were predominantly in northwestern Ontario and excluded large metropolitan areas such as Toronto and Thunder Bay. Results were generally similar to those from the national survey, although additional questions were included. The Ontario survey found that almost as many MNSI (60 percent) as other Ontarians (66 percent) owned or were paying off mortgages on their dwelling; two-thirds of all MNSI households surveyed received no form of social assistance payment; and family size was only slightly higher than for Ontario as a whole (3.6 persons vs. 3.4 persons).

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Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in Canada

The Politics of Gender, Ethnicity and Language in Canada

ALAN CAIRNS and CYNTHIA WILLIAMS, Research Coordinators

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